

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-309

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 61 License No. DPR-36

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The applications for amendment by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, (the licensee) dated April 12, 1982 and May 21, 1981 as supplemented December 11, 1981, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Certified By Atrice Mocher

8208030063 820714 PDR ADOCK 05000309 PDR

- Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.8(6)(b) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-36 is hereby amended to read as follows:
 - . (b) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 61, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 14, 1982

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 61

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-36

DOCKET NO. 50-309

Revise Appendix A as follows:

| Remove Page | Insert Fage |
|-------------|-------------|
| 3.9-2 | 3.9-2 |
| 3.9-4 | 3.9-4 |
| 5.2-2 | 5.2-2 |
| 5.2-3 | 5.2-3 |
| 5.3-1 | 5.3-1 |
| 5.5-1 | 5.5-1 |
| 5.12-1 | 5.12-1 |

In the reactor protective system, four independent and redundant channels monitor each safety parameter. If any one of the four channels deviates from a pre-selected range, a trip signal is initiated. For any safety parameter, a trip signal from any two of the four protective channels will cause a reactor trip. If one of the four channels is taken out of service for maintenance, the protective system for that parameter is changed to a two out of three coincidence for a reactor trip by bypassing the removed channel. When a second channel is taken out of service, the trip module for that channel is placed in the trip mode, and the resultant logic for that parameter is one out of two. Thus, with one or two channels removed from service for that parameter, protective action is initiated when required and the effectiveness of the reactor protection system is retained.

The operating requirements for the reactor protective system are shown in Table 3.9-1.

Redundant sensors and logic are provided for the initiation of all engineered safeguards systems. In both the containment isolation and containment spray systems, two identical subsystems are used in each system. In the safety injection actuation systems diverse sensors are used for the initiation of two identical subsystems. Each of these three engineered safeguards systems may be operated as shown in Table 3.9-2 without jeopardizing safeguards initiation. One subsystem may be removed from service for a limited time for purposes of maintenance or testing because it is highly unlikely that a failure of the operable subsystem would occur concurrent with an accident requiring engineered safety features actuation.

The safety injection actuation system is initiated by two out of four pressure sensor channels. When three sensors are operable the degree of redundancy, as defined in the definitions section, is one. This degree of redundancy is also provided when two sensors are operable with a third sensor placed in a configuration which simulated the tripped condition.

Although no credit is taken for the high rate-of-change-of-power channel in the Maine Yankee accident analysis, operability of this channel at low power levels provides back up assurance against excessive power rate increases. Temperature feedback effects protect against excessive power rate increases at higher power levels.

The minimum number of operable channels for the accident monitoring instrumentation is given in Table 3.9-3. The accident monitoring instrumentation is used to evaluate and aid in mitigating the consequences of an accident.

...

TABLE 3.9-2

Instrumentation Operating Requirements

for Engineered Safeguards Systems

| No. | Functional Unit | Minimum Operable Sensors Per Subsystem | Bypass Conditions | Initiation Set Points |
|-----|-----------------------------|---|----------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 | Safety Injection: | | | |
| | A. Manual | 1 | * | |
| | B. High Containment Pressur | re 3(a) | * | less than 5 psig |
| | C. Low Pressurizer Pressure | a 3(a) | * | greater than 1585 psig |
| 2 | Containment Spray: | | | |
| | A. Manual | 1- | * | |
| | B. High Containment Pressur | re 2/set(b) | * | less than 20 psig |
| 3 | Containment Isolation: | | | |
| | A. Manual | 1 | * | |
| | B. Containment High Pressur | re 2/set(b) | * | less than 5 psig _ |

(a) Two operable sensors are acceptable, provided one of the inoperable sensors is placed in a configuration which simulates the tripped condition.

÷ .

(b) Each subsystem is initiated by two out of three pressure sensors. The minimum degree of redundancy in each subsystem is one.

* Reactor coolant pressure less than 1685 psig.

Amendment No.61



5.2-2

Amendment No. 24 * 30 .

5.3 FACILITY STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

5.3.1 Each member of the facility staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions, except for (1) the Radiological Control Section Head who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975, and (2) the Shift Technical Advisor who shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plant design, and response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.

5.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

PLANT OPERATION REVIEW COMMITTEE A.

FUNCTION 1.

> The Plant Operation Review Committee (POPC) shall function to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

COMPOSITION 2.

The Plant Operation Review Committee shall be composed of the:

Chairman: Plant Manager

Vice Chairman: Assistant Flant Manager - Designated

Member: Operations Department Head

Member: Maintenance Department Head

Member: Technical Support Department Head

Member: Reactor Engineering Section Head

Member: Chemistry Section Head

Member: Instrument and Control Section Head

Member: Radiological Controls Section Head

3. ALTERNATES

All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the PORC Chairman to serve on a temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in PORC activities or count toward a PORC quorum at any one time.

MEETING FREQUENCY 4.

The PORC shall meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the PORC Chairman or Vice Chairman.

QUORUM 5.

A quorum of the PORC shall consist of a minimum of five people as follows:

The Chairman or Vice Chairman plus four members, or a. The Chairman and Vice Chairman plus three members.

b.

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Plant Operation Review Committee shall be responsible for:

Amendment No. 34, 50, 61 5.5-1

5.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA

11 A 1

- 5.12.1 In lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal" required by paragraph 20.203(c)(1) of 10 CFR 20, each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is 1000 mrem/hr or less shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit.* Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:
 - a. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area.
 - b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate level in the area has been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them.
 - c. A health physics qualified individual (i.e., qualified in radiation protection procedures) with a radiation dose rate monitoring device who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and who will perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified in the RWP. The surveillance frequency will be established by the Radiological Control Section Head.
- 5.12.2 The requirements of 5.12.1 above, shall also apply to each high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1000 mrem/hr. In addition, locked doors shall be provided to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Plant Shift Superintendent on duty and/or Radiological Control Section Head.

*Health Physics personnel shall be exempt from the RWP issurance requirement during the performance of their assigned radiation protection duties, provided they comply with approved radiation protection procedures for entry into high radiation areas.

Amendment No. 30, 34, 30, 61

5.12-1