

December 13, 1993

Docket No. 50-302

LICENSEE: Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING ON AUGUST 11, 1993 - REGARDING LTOP PROTECTION

Representatives of the licensee met with members of the staff on August 11, 1993, in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss FPC's justification for the use of non-Appendix G methodology for LTOP protection at CR-3.

Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees. Enclosure 2 is a copy of the licensee's agenda and handouts used at the meeting.

Areas of concern expressed by the staff included: history of LTOP events and precursors at CR-3 and other B&W plants; justification that one PORV and operator action with a steam bubble in the pressurizer constitute a single-failure-proof LTOP system; and explanation as to why Appendix G or Code case methodology is not adequate for the licensee. The licensee addressed these concerns in its presentation, but the staff needed to consider further whether an LTOP event could be considered as not being expected to occur during the life of the plant, and whether the CR-3 LTOP system could be considered single-failure proof. This review is continuing.

(Original Signed By)

Harley Silver, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Enclosures:
As stated

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

** Distribution - See next page

OFFICE	LA:PDII-2	PM:PDII-2	D:PDII-2		
NAME	ETana <i>ETT</i>	HSilver	HBerkow		
DATE	12/13/93	12/14/93	12/13/93		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY - DOCUMENT NAME: C:\AUTOS\WPDOCS\CRYSTAL\LTOP.SUM

931212 91 931213
PDR ADDOCK 05000302
P PDR

NRC FILE CENTER COPY



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 13, 1993

Docket No. 50-302

LICENSEE: Florida Power Corporation (FPC)

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF MEETING ON AUGUST 11, 1993 - REGARDING LTOP PROTECTION

Representatives of the licensee met with members of the staff on August 11, 1993, in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss FPC's justification for the use of non-Appendix G methodology for LTOP protection at CR-3.

Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees. Enclosure 2 is a copy of the licensee's agenda and handouts used at the meeting.

Areas of concern expressed by the staff included: history of LTOP events and precursors at CR-3 and other B&W plants; justification that one PORV and operator action with a steam bubble in the pressurizer constitute a single-failure-proof LTOP system; and explanation as to why Appendix G or Code case methodology is not adequate for the licensee. The licensee addressed these concerns in its presentation, but the staff needed to consider further whether an LTOP event could be considered as not being expected to occur during the life of the plant, and whether the CR-3 LTOP system could be considered single-failure proof. This review is continuing.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Harley Silver", is written over the typed name and title.

Harley Silver, Sr. Project Manager
Project Directorate II-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II

Enclosures:
As stated

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

Florida Power Corporation

cc:

Mr. Gerald A. Williams
Corporate Counsel
Florida Power Corporation
MAC-A5A
P. O. Box 14042
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Mr. Bruce J. Hickie, Director
Nuclear Plant Operations (NA2C)
Florida Power Corporation
Crystal River Energy Complex
15760 W. Power Line Street
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

Mr. Robert B. Borsum
B&W Nuclear Technologies
1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. Bill Passetti
Office of Radiation Control
Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services
1317 Winewood Blvd.
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Attorney General
Department of Legal Affairs
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Mr. Percy M. Beard, Jr.
Sr. Vice President
Nuclear Operations
Florida Power Corporation
ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing (NA2I)
Crystal River Energy Complex
15760 W Power Line Street
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

Crystal River Unit No.3
Generating Plant

Mr. Joe Myers, Director
Div. of Emergency Preparedness
Department of Community Affairs
2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
Citrus County
110 North Apopka Avenue
Inverness, Florida 32650

Mr. Rolf C. Widell, Director
Nuclear Operations Site Support (NA2I)
Florida Power Corporation
Crystal River Energy Complex
15760 W Power Line Street
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

Senior Resident Inspector
Crystal River Unit 3
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
6745 N. Tallahassee Road
Crystal River, Florida 34428

Mr. Gary Boldt
Vice President - Nuclear
Production (SA2C)
Florida Power Corporation
Crystal River Energy Complex
15760 W Power Line Street
Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

Crystal River Unit 3

**LTOP Meeting
August 11, 1993**

Attendees

<u>Name</u>	<u>Office</u>
Harley Silver	NRR/PDII-2
Barry Elliot	NRR/EMCB
Jack Strosnider	NRR/EMCB
Keith Wichman	NRR/EMCB
Chris Grimes	NRR/OTSB
Rolf Widell	FPC
Ken Wilson	FPC
Ronnie Lo	NRR/OTSB
Herb Berkow	NRR/PDII-2
Tim Collins	NRR/SRXB
Bob Borsum	BWNT
L. Zerr	STS/EPRI
Ed Hackett	NRR/EMCB
John Tsao	NRR/EMCB
LRaghavan	NRR/PDII-2
Richard Croteau	NRR/PDII-2
Robert DePriest	NRR/PDII-2
Lambros Lois	NRR/DSSA/SRXB
Ken Yoon	BWNT
Robert Enzinna	BWNT
David Miskiewicz	FPC
Blair Wunderly	FPC
Jim Andrachek	Westinghouse
Darrell Gardner	TVA/Watts Bar
Tom Porter	TVA/WBN Licensing
Bob Jones (Part Time)	NRR/SRXB

AGENDA FOR CR-3 LTOP Meeting

1. Review prior licensee commitments for CR-3 LTOP analysis.
2. Review justification for considering LTOP events as non-anticipated operational occurrences at CR-3.
3. Compare fracture mechanics criteria and pressure-temperature limits for:
 - a. ASME Code, Appendix G methodology
 - b. Code Case N514 methodology
 - c. Licensee's proposed methodology
4. Compare LTOP setpoints, enabling temperatures and operating windows using:
 - a. ASME Code, Appendix G and SRP 5.2.2 methodology
 - b. Code Case N514 methodology
 - c. Licensee's proposed methodology
5. Summary:
 - a. Bases of proposed fract. mech. criteria for LTOP limit curves

B&W LTOP EVENT FREQUENCY

OBJECTIVE

LTOP EVENTS THAT EXCEED APPENDIX G P/T LIMITS ARE NOT ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES FOR B&W PLANTS

BACKGROUND

NUREG-1326 (REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF GI-94, 1989):

"THE B&W PLANTS HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THIS EVALUATION BECAUSE THESE UNITS HAVE NOT EXPERIENCED ANY LTOP TRANSIENTS AND, BASED ON THEORETICAL RISK, DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE OVERALL RISK OF LTOP EVENTS."

NUREG/CR-5186 (VALUE IMPACT ANALYSIS OF GI-94, 1988):

- AT B&W PLANTS DURING 1980 TO 1986, THERE WERE NO EVENTS THAT CHALLENGED THE OVERPRESSURE MITIGATION SYSTEM HARDWARE (RELIEF VALVE)
- BASED ON OPERATING EXPERIENCE DURING 1980 TO 1986, NUREG/CR-5186 PREDICTS LESS THAN 0.0016 OVERPRESSURIZATIONS PER REACTOR YEAR FOR PORV-AND-BUBBLE CATEGORY (B&W) PLANTS

REVIEW OF B&W OPERATING HISTORY

- INVESTIGATED B&W EXPERIENCE OF POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO LTOP SETPOINTS
- CONFIRMED THAT OPERATING EXPERIENCE SUPPORTS THE RESULTS OF NUREG/CR-5186 (I.E LTOP IS NOT AN ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCE FOR B&W PLANTS)

**FRACTURE MECHANICS BASES
FOR
LTOP SET POINT**

**K. K. YOON
B&W NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES
Lynchburg, Virginia**

**FOR
FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
August 11, 1993**

**CODE CASE N-514
AND
REVISED APP. G, SECTION XI
(LEVEL A & B LTOP)**

- o **LTOP SET POINT - 110% OF TECH SPEC APPENDIX G LIMIT**
- o **ENABLE TEMPERATURE - $RT_{NDT} + 50\text{ F}$ OR 200 F
WHICHEVER IS GREATER**

FRACTURE MECHANICS BASIS FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPENDIX G LIMIT

- o **FLAW SIZE - REFERENCE FLAW ($t/4$)**
- o **FRACTURE TOUGHNESS - KIR CURVE**
- o **SAFETY FACTOR - 2 ON PRIMARY LOAD**
- o **LTOP IS AN ISOTHERMAL TRANSIENT**

FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS FOR LEVELS A & B VERSUS C SERVICE LOADS

SERVICE LEVEL	A AND B	C	FACTOR
FLAW DEPTH	t/4	t/10	$\sqrt{10/4}=1.58$
TOUGHNESS	KIR	KIc	> 1.2
S.F ON PRIMARY STRESS	2	1.4	$2/1.4= 1.4$
ACCUMULATED SAFETY FACTOR OVER TECH. SPEC. APP. G LIMIT			2.65




Figure 3-3. ASME Code K_{IC} and K_{IR} Curves




Figure 3-4. Ratio of Fracture Toughness

FRACTURE MECHANICS BASIS

SERVICE LEVEL	A AND B	OTHER B&W LTOP	FACTOR
FLAW DEPTH	t/4	t/4	1
TOUGHNESS	KIR	KIR	1
S.F ON PRIMARY STRESS	2	1	2
ACCUMULATED SAFETY FACTOR OVER TECH. SPEC. APP. G LIMIT			2.0

LTOP SET POINT FOR CR-3

- o LTOP SET POINT - 250% OF TECH SPEC APPENDIX G LIMIT
- o ENABLE TEMPERATURE - $RT_{NDT} + 50\text{ F}$ OR 200 F
WHICHEVER IS GREATER

MEMORANDUM DATED: December 13, 1993

Distribution

Docket File

NRC & Local PDRs

PDII-2 Reading

T. Murley/F. Miraglia 12-G-18

J. Callan, 12-G-18

SVarga

GLainas

HBerkow

HSilver

RCroteau

ETana

OGC

EJordan

BELLIOTT, 7-D-4

JStrosnider, 7-D-4

KWichman, 7-D-4

CGrimes, 11-E-22

RLo, 11-E-22

TCollins, 8-E-23

EHackett, 7-D-4

JTsao, 7-D-4

LLois, 8-E-23

BJones, 8-E-23

L. Plisco, EDO RII

MSinkule, RII

160021

DF01
111