

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I | L | D | R | S | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 | LICENSEE CODE | 14 15 | LICENSE NUMBER | 25 26 | LICENSE TYPE | 30 | CAT | 58

CONT
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 9 | 60 61 | DOCKET NUMBER | 68 69 | EVENT DATE | 74 75 | REPORT DATE | 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | During normal operations, the isolation valve for HPCI pressure switch 3-2389D develop-
0 3 | ed a leak which depressurized the sensing line, causing a high differential pressure
0 4 | on the switches which isolated the HPCI system. HPCI was declared inop. (T.S. 3.5.C.2)
0 5 | and the required surveillances were immediately performed. There was no effect on pub-
0 6 | lic health and safety. The event was of minimal safety significance since all other
0 7 | safety systems were operable. This is the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.
0 8 | _____
7 8 9

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | S | F | 11 | CAUSE CODE | E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | B | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | V | A | L | V | E | X | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | H | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | D | 16
7 8 9 | 9 10 | 11 12 | 13 14 | 15 16 | 17 18 | 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | 8 | 2 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 2 | 7 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 1 | REPORT TYPE | T | REVISION NO. | 0
21 22 | 23 24 | 25 26 | 27 28 | 29 30 | 31 32
ACTION TAKEN | D | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | Y | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | W | 1 | 6 | 5 | 26
33 34 | 35 36 | 37 38 | 39 40 | 41 42 | 43 44 | 45 46 | 47 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | This event was caused by loose packing on the isolation valve to pressure switch
1 1 | 3-2389D. The packing nut was tightened and pressure switch was verified to be operable,
1 2 | HPCI system was then returned to service. Instrument Mechanics were instructed to check
1 3 | for packing leaks when future surveillances are performed.
1 4 | _____
7 8 9

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 9 | 9 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator observation | 32
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31 | 32 33

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 43 | 8207190239 820709 | PDR ADOCK 05000249 | S | PDR
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31

2 0 | PUBLICITY | ISSUED | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 45 | _____ | 58 59 | NRC USE ONLY | _____ | 80 81
7 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 13 | 14 15 | 16 17 | 18 19 | 20 21 | 22 23 | 24 25 | 26 27 | 28 29 | 30 31

NAME OF PREPARER Anthony Anandappa

PHONE: (815) 942-2920 ext. 421

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 82-27/01T-0

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)

DRESDEN UNIT (ILDRS-3)

DOCKET # 050-249

During normal operations HPCI pressure switch 3-2389D isolation valve developed a leak which depressurized the sensing valve and therefore, caused a high pressure differential on the switches. This high differential pressure immediately auto isolated the HPCI system by closing motor operated valves 3-2301-4 and 3-2301-5. HPCI was declared inoperable (T.S.3.5.C.2) and the required surveillances were immediately performed. There was no effect on public health and safety. This event is of minimal safety significance since the Automatic Depressurization and all other core cooling systems were operable.

The event was caused by loose packing on the isolation valve. Water used as the pressurizing medium leaked from the packing gland which caused a high pressure differential on the pressure switches. The valve packing was tightened and the differential pressure switches were tested satisfactorily to verify proper operation. The HPCI system was then returned to service. The instrument isolation valves will be checked for packing leaks when future surveillances are performed by the Instrument Maintenance staff. This is the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.



Commonwealth Edison

DEVIATION REPORT

DVR NO. 12 - 3 - 82 - 42
STA UNIT YEAR NO.

PART 1 TITLE OF DEVIATION HPCI Inoperative due to System Isolation
OCCURRED DATE 6/29/82 TIME 1551

SYSTEM AFFECTED 2300 HPCI
PLANT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT MODE RUN, PWR(MWT) 818, LOAD(MWE) 2518
TESTING YES NO

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
Packing on Isolation valve to pressure switch 3-2389-D failed which depressurized the sensing line to press switch causing high differential pressure on dPIS switches. This caused HPCI to isolate (2301-4 and 5 valves closed). Required surveillances began immediately and HPCI declared inop. Packing tightened and HPCI unisolated at 1625 and returned to service.

10 CFR50.72 NRC RED PHONE NOTIFICATION MADE YES NO

EQUIPMENT FAILURE YES NO WORK REQUEST NO. RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR J. Kotowski DATE 6/29/82

PART 2 OPERATING ENGINEER'S COMMENTS
HPCI was immediately declared Inop, and the Tech Spec required surveillances were initiated. At 1625, following repairs, HPCI was declared operable.

EVENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST
TECH. SPEC. VIOLATION
NON REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
14 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S. 6.6.B.1.e
30 DAY REPORTABLE/T.S.
ANNUAL/SPECL REPORT REQ'D
24-HOUR NRC NOTIFICATION REQ'D ENS phone
TELEPH Frank Lomax 6/30/82 1225
TELEGM/TELECOPY Keppler 6/30/82 1358
CECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE
5-DAY WRITTEN REPORT REQ'D PER 10CFR21
TELEPH CECO CORPORATE OFFICER DATE TIME

PRELIMINARY REPORT COMPLETED AND REVIEWED Michael Wright 6/30/82
OPERATING ENGINEER

INVESTIGATED REPORT & RESOLUTION ACCEPTED BY STATION REVIEW J Brunner 7/9/82 Michael Wright 7-12-82

RESOLUTION APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION Douglas Put 7/12/82
STATION SUPERINTENDENT