GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 29, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-18/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-18/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-18/03L

Report Date

June 29, 1982

Occurrence Date

May 27, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Main Steam Drain Valve V-1-106 was operated and failed to fully close. V-1-106 was declared inoperable and action was taken to comply with Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.a.1.b.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in a routine start-up mode. The reactor was critical in IRM range 8 (approximately 40 MWt).

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, May 27, 1982, at approximately 11:15 AM, during a routine startup, Main Steam Drain Valve V-1-106 was operated and failed to fully close.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The valve (V-1-106) was operated, closed halfway, then failed to fully close due to a high torque trip of the Limitorque operator. The cause of the high torque trip is still under investigation. However, due to the fact that the valve is located in the Drywell (inerted during plant operation), further investigation of this occurrence will be postponed until access to the Drywell can be obtained.

Analysis of Occurrence

The primary containment isolation valves are provided to maintain primary containment integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accident. Failure of V-1-106 to close, caused a loss of primary containment isolation redundancy. However, if isolation of primary containment had been required in an emergency situation, redundant valves could have operated to provide isolation of the primary containment.

Corrective Action

V-1-106 was closed electrically and tagged out of service. This valve is normally closed during power operation. Also, main steam drain valves V-1-110 and V-1-111 (outer primary containment isolation valves) were tagged out of service in the closed position as required by Technical Specifications. Repair or replacement of the valve will be accomplished during the next shutdown.