U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58
CON'T BEPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 0 0 6 0 1 8 2 8 0 6 2 9 8 2 9 7 8 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (1)
0 ? During normal operation while calibrating pressure switches that initiate or control
0]3 [the core standby cooling systems (S.I. 4.2.B-7) on unit 1, pressure switches
0 4 PS-3-74B sw. 1 & 2 operated at 246.43 & 336.43 psig respectively. T.S. Table 3.2.B
0 5 requires these switches to operate at 230 ± 15 psig and 450 ± 15 psig respectively.
0 6 There was no effect on public health or safety because redundant switches were
0 7 available and operable.
08
7 8 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE COMP. VALVE 80 CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
Image: Decision number Ler/RO Event year Sequential report no. Occurrence code Report no. Image: Decision number 8 2 0 3 8 0 3 L 0
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (22) ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) I O The Barton model 288 (PS-3-74B tw. 1 & 2) pressure switches' calibration had
1 1 drifted. They were immediately recalibrated, functionally tested, and returned
1 2 to service. PS-3-74B sw. 1 & 2 were replaced with an identical switch on
1 3 June 22, 1982.
1 4 7 8 9 FACILITY 80 METHOD OF 80
PACIENTY Spower OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 1 5 E (28) 0 9 7 (29) NA B (31) Surveillance tests
ACTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 80 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 6 \\ 7 & 8 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & (33) \\ 10 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 2 & (34) \\ 11 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} NA \end{bmatrix}$
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
+ 8 9 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
B207080471 820629
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (4) PDR ADOCK 05000259 80 TYPE DESCRIPTION S PDR 1
Image: Structure Viscore Visc
68 69 80 NAME OF PREPARER Bobby J. Irby PHONE (205) 729-0841 2
0

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Form BF 17 BF 15.2 2/12/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-<u>259</u> / 8238 Technical Specification Involved <u>Table 3.2.B</u> Reported Under Technical Specification <u>6.7.2.b.(1)</u>* Date Due NRC <u>6/30/82</u>

Event Narrative:

Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating normally. Unit 1 was the only unit affected by this event. While performing Surveillance Instruction 4.2.B-7 (Instrumentation that Initiate or Control the CSCS Reactor Low Pressure) on unit 1, pressure switches PS-3-74B switches 1 and 2 operated at 246.43 psig and 336.43 psig respectively. Technical Specification Table 3.2.B requires PS-3-74B switch 1 to operate at 230 ± 15 psig and PS-3-74B switch 2 to operate at 450 ± 15 psig. The trip level setting on PS-3-74B switch 1 actuates the recirculation discharge valves. The trip level setting on PS-3-74B switch 2 actuates a permissive for opening core spray and LPCI admission valves. The setpoints on the switches had drifted. The Barton model 288, pressure switches were immediately recalibrated per S.I. 4.2.B-7 and returned to service. There was no effect on the public health and safety because redundant switches were available and operable. PS-3-74B switches 1 and 2 were replaced with an identical switch on June 22, 1982.

* Previous Similar Events:

50-259/77007, 77002, 78010, 78024, 80087, 80089, 81001 50-260/81033, 80004, 82003, 82013, 80029, 81004, 81027 50-296/77003, 80028, 80018, 79010, 79028

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor *Revision: