U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/5/2/0/8/2/ (8) /0/6/1/5/8/2/ (9)

DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On May 20, 1982, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, the suction to the Residual Heat Removal /

/0/3/ / System (RHR) pumps from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was lost on three occas-/

/0/4/ / ions; once for 8 minutes, once for 26 minutes, and once for 1 hour. Since in /

/0/5/ / each case the RHR pumps were not de-energized for > 1 hour and no dilution of the/

/0/6/ / RCS occurred, the public health and safety were not affected. This event is /

/0/7/ / contrary to T.S. 3.7.9.2 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

/0/8/ / /

SYSTEM CODE — CAUSE CODE — CAUSE SUBCODE — COMPONENT CODE — COMP. SUBCODE — VALVE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /C/F/ (11) /X/ (12) /Z/ (13) /P/U/M/P/X/X (14) /B/ (15) /Z/ (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER — EVENT YEAR — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. — OCCURRENCE CODE — REPORT TYPE — REVISION NO.

/8/2/ /-/ /0/2/6/ /\/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN — FUTURE ACTION — EFFECT ON PLANT — SHUTDOWN METHOD — HOURS — ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED — NPRD-4 FORM SUB. — PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER — COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

/X/ (18) /G/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /I/0/7/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Suction to the RHR pumps was lost due to erroneous RCS level indications while /

/1/1/ / draining the RCS. The actual RCS level was lower than observed. In each case, /

/1/2/ / a charging pump was started to refill the RCS and to allow further RHR pump /

/1/3/ / operation. /

/1/4/ / /

FACILITY STATUS — %POWER — OTHER STATUS (30) — METHOD OF DISCOVERY — DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /G/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / /A/ (31) /Operational Observation/

ACTIVITY RELEASED — CONTENT OF RELEASE — AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) — LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER — TYPE — DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER — DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE — DESCRIPTION

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY

ISSUED — DESCRIPTION (45) — NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

8206240126 820615
PDR ADOCK 05000339
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Description of Event

On May 20, 1982, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, the suction to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps was lost on three occasions; once for 8 minutes; once for 26 minutes and on the third occasion for one hour. The last event occurred as followed:

The "B" RHR pump was running when its power source, the "2J" Emergency Bus was de-energized during a degraded voltage periodic test. The "A" RHR pump, powered from the "H" bus, was immediately started but was secured 17 minutes later due to caviation. A charging pump was then started and the RCS refilled using water from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). Each event is contrary to T.S. 3.7.9.2 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

Since Unit 2 was in Mode 5 following refueling , no significant decay heat was present in the core. In addition, for each event, the RHR subsystem was out of service for one hour or less and no operations were permitted that would cause dilution of the RCS boron concentration. Therefore, the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The primary cause for each of the above mentioned events was unreliable primary level indications while draining the RCS. The third event was initiated as a result of de-energizing the running ("1B") RHR pump's power source (the "2J" Emergency Bus) during a periodic test. However the opposite train RHR pump ("1A") remained available and was immediately started. Seventeen minutes later the "1A" RHR pump was removed from service due to cavitation.

The higher than normal indications in the primary level hose are occurring because the level hose is connected to the aerated primary vent system. This system operates at a slight vacuum as it is evacuated through the gaseous waste system to the release point. Such a situation results in a higher than actual level being indicated in the primary level hose.

Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate action was to start a charging pump and to refill the RCS from the refueling water storage tank. Subsequent to refilling the RCS, a RHR pump was placed in service and RHR flow was restored.

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further action is scheduled at this time.

Action Taken To Prevent Recurrence

A procedure change to OP-11.3, Aerated Primary Vent System (VA), to connect the primary level hose to the pressurizer vapor space, rather then to the VA header, has been initiated. This procedure should eliminate the ΔP problems that are occuring between the RCS and the primary level hose and causing unreliable primary level indications.

Generic Implications

There are no generic implications to this event.