



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 9, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-032/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-032/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. J. Midura".

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *RF*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
S PDR

The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-032/03L
Report Date: 06-09-82
Occurrence Date: 05-15-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Nos. 11 and 12 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-124.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 87% - Unit Load 960 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1845 hours, on May 15, 1982, during routine surveillance, Nos. 11 and 12 Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP) flows were both less than required by the Technical Specifications. The pumps were declared inoperable, and with no operable pump in the boron flow path, Technical Specification Action Statements 3.1.2.2.a and 3.1.2.6 were entered.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The BATP flows had decreased due to an increase in impeller to volute clearance which resulted from normal wear.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

This occurrence led to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Boration capability existed through the flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank via a charging pump. Consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the general public was involved.

Action Statement 3.1.2.2.a requires:

With the flow path from the boric acid tanks to the Reactor Coolant System inoperable, restore the inoperable flow path to operable status within 72 hours, or be in at least hot standby and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to at least 1% delta k/k at 200^oF within the next 6 hours.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (continued):

Action Statement 3.1.2.6 requires:

With no boric acid transfer pump operable, restore at least one boric acid transfer pump to operable status within 72 hours, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% delta k/k at 200°F.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

No. 11 B ATP impeller clearance was adjusted and the pump was satisfactorily tested. The pump was declared operable at 0610 hours, May 16, 1982, and with one operable pump in the boron flow path, Action Statements 3.1.2.2.a and 3.1.2.6 were terminated. No. 12 B ATP subsequently tested satisfactorily, and was declared operable on May 19, 1982.

FAILURE DATA:

Gould Pumps Inc.
Horizontal Centrifugal Pump
Model 3196

Prepared By R. Frahm

H. J. Spichner
General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-58