

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.G. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

April 7, 1982

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Walnut Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Docket No. 50-361 Licensee Event Report No. San Onofre, Unit 2

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

H. B. RAY

STATION MANAGER

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving the Chemical and Volume Control System. This submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements stipulated in Section 6.9.1.12.d of Appendix A to the Facility Operating License NPF-10.

On March 24, 1982, at 0830, Operations personnel began adding water to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from Refueling Water Storage Tank TOO6. A total of 6732 gallons of water was added to the RCS which resulted in a dilution in RCS boron concentration from 1972 to 1897 ppm. A dilution of 30 ppm had been expected for this quantity of additional water. Therefore, an unplanned dilution of 45 ppm (0.70% delta k/k) occurred.

Investigation revealed that a leakage path existed from the Primary Makeup Water Tank to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) TOO6 which caused an unidentified dilution of TOO6 and TOO5. This, in turn, caused the unexpected dilution of the RCS which resulted in a Shutdown Margin of 19% delta k/k (Technical Specifications require at least 2% delta k/k for Mode 5). The requirement for a boron injection path was satisfied by the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, and not the RWST, during this event.

The leakage path existed via two closed valves (2FV-0210X and S21901MU586) in the demineralized water makeup line to the Volume Control Tank. Leak rate was about 11 gpm. This relatively low leak rate was not noticed since the demineralized water (2FE-0210X) will not indicate flows less than about 17 gpm and the leak path existed only on an intermittent basis when a third valve (S21208MU054) connecting to the RWST was open.

The two leaking valves will be reworked and repaired to prevent recurrence of this problem. An evaluation of the flow element will be conducted to determine if replacement with a more sensitive element is appropriate.

Should you require any further information, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Ablay

Attachment (LER No. 82-008)

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement

> U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaffee - USNRC Resident Inspector - Unit 2