
NJK-82-158

April 1, 1982



Dear Mr. Case:

Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments completed during the month of March 1982, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

N. J. Kalivianakis Station Superintendent

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Enclosure

cc: T. J. Rausch

IF24

APR 16 1982>

DOCUMENT HANAGEMENT BR

TIDC

Group I & II Primary Containment Isolation

Description

This modification involved the installation of 3-position control switches and associated seal-in relays for Group I and II Primary Containment Isolation valves to ensure that the valves will remain closed when the isolation signal is reset. This has been done to satisfy the requirements of NUREG 0578. The new switches replaced existing 2-position switches, which would allow the valves to automatically re-open when the isolation was reset unless the operator would manually put the switches in the closed position.

Evaluation

This modification allows the Primary Containment Isolation valves to remain in their safe position when an isolation signal is reset. This will allow the operator to open only the valves that he deems necessary to have opened, instead of having the valves open automatically to their original position. The probability of a radioactive release to the environment is reduced as a result of this modification.

125V DC Main/Reserve Bus Separation Disconnect Switch - Temporary Fix

Description

As a precautionary measure against fire in the 125V DC Distribution System, this modification is a temporary means of separating the 125V DC Main and Reserve Bus until the long term solution to bus separation has been implemented.

This modification was initiated as an immediate temporary solution, as a result of the NRC's Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP). The staff expressed concern that a fire could render the cable providing back-up feed to the 125V DC Reserve Bus useless, thus, disabling both the Main and Reserve Bus.

To accomplish this temporary solution, installation of manual disconnect switchgear at the Reserve Bus end of the back-up feed cable was performed.

Evaluation

By providing a manual disconnect switchgear at the Reserve Bus end of the back-up feed cable to the 125V DC Reserve Bus, the possibility of a fire faulting the cable, (thusly, disabling the 125V DC Main and Reserve Bus) is reduced.

The disconnect switchgear does not alter the designed function of the back-up feed cable in anyway. Therefore, it improved the reliability of the 125V DC Distribution System.

Rewire Radiation Monitor Power Supply

Description

This modification changes the power source for the high range Drywell radiation monitors. These monitors are part of the Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System. Modification M-4-1-81-4 required the alarm contacts of the high range monitors be wired so as to initiate a Group II isolation. Group II logic required the alarm relays be normally energized and contacts closed. As installed, the monitors and alarm relays were de-energized and the alarm contacts open, thereby causing a constant Group II isolation. By changing to a continuously energized power source it will eliminate the constant Group II isolation. The modification was accomplished by connecting the power lead for high range radiation monitors to the powered side of the Atmospheric Containment Air Dilution / Containment Atmospheric Monitor (ACAD/CAM) control panel (90X-55, 90X-56) power switch.

Evaluation

This modification does not affect plant safety in any way. The modification will not affect the designed control logic of the high Drywell radiation Group II isolation, or the designed function of the monitors themselves. The modification will permit Group II high Drywell radiation to function without interferring with ACAD/CAM's operating procedures.