U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/AN/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/3/1/0/8/2/ (8) /0/4/0/8/8/2/ (9)

DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On March 10, 1982, during Safety Injection Funtional Testing, Feedwater Isolation /

/0/3/ / Valves MOV-FW-254A, B, C and Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Valves TV-2884A, /

/0/4/ / B and C could be reopened from the Control Room by constantly holding the control/

/0/5/ / switch "Open" when the Phase A Isolation signal was present. Since these valves /

/0/6/ / closed upon initiation of Phase A Isolation as required by T.S. 4.7.1.2.b.1 and /

/0/7/ / 3.5.2.c, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. This /

/0/8/ / event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/S/F/ (11)	/B/ (12)	/A/ (13)	/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/Z/ (14)	/Z/ (15)	/Z/ (16)

	LER/RO	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
(17)	REPORT NUMBER	/8/2/	/-/ /0/1/0/	/ \ / /0/3/	/L/	/-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
/X/ (18)	/X/ (19)	/Z/ (20)	/Z/ (21)	/0/0/0/0/ (22)	/Y/(23)	/N/(24)	/N/(25)	/Z/9/9/9/(26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The design of the affected valve control circuits permits operator action to open/

/1/1/ / the valves without resetting the Phase A Isolation signal. The valves were /

/1/2/ / immediately closed after demonstrating that they could be opened with Phase A /

/1/3/ / Isolation in effect. Reset circuitry will be investigated to determine if mod- /

/1/4/ / ification is required. /

	FACILITY STATUS	%POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/	/G/ (28)	/0/0/0/ (29)	/ NA / (30)	/B/ (31)	/ Engineer Observation /

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/	/Z/ (33)	/Z/ (34)	/ NA /	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/	/0/0/0/ (37)	/Z/ (38)	/ NA /

	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/	/0/0/0/ (40)	/ NA /

	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE	DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/	/Z/ (42)	/ NA /

	PUBLICITY ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
/2/0/	/N/ (44)	/ NA /	/ / / / / / / / / / / / / /

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 2 Attachment: Page 1 of 1
Docket No. 50-339
Report No. LER 82-010/03L-0

Description of Event

On March 10, 1982, during Safety Injection Functional Testing, Feedwater Isolation Valves MOV-FW-254A, B and C and Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Valves TV-2884A, B and C could be reopened from the Control Room when the Phase A Isolation Signal was present. This is contrary to Section 7.3.1.3.5.i of the North Anna FSAR which states that if an Engineered Safety Feature actuated device has been actuated by a safety features actuation signal, it can not be returned to the non-safety features actuation mode by operator action until the actuation signal has been reset. In effect, this requires at least two operator actions to take a device out of the safety features actuation mode. This event is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

These valves closed upon initiation of Phase A Isolation as required by T. S. 4.7.1.2.b.1 and 3.5.2.c. The open push buttons for all of the affected valves required constant holding to open the valves with the Phase A Isolation signal present. When the switch was released the valves returned to the Safety Feature Actuation Mode position. Trip valves TV-2884A, B and C returned to the closed position after the open limit switch actuated even when the control switch was held open. For these reasons, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The design of the affected valve control circuits permits operator action to open the valves without resetting the Phase A Isolation Signal.

Immediate Corrective Action

The valves were immediately closed after demonstrating that they could be opened with Phase A Isolation in effect.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The design of the control circuitry for the affected valves will be investigated to determine if modification is required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required to prevent recurrence.

Generic Implications

The control circuitry for valves of similar service on North Anna Unit 1 duplicate the design of Unit 2.