

June 1, 1982

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch #2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LaSalle County Station Unit 1 Proposed Amendment to NPF-11

Appendix "A" Technical

Specifications

NRC Docket Nos. 50-373

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The purpose of this letter is to request the following immediate change in Technical Specification's for LaSalle County Station Unit 1:

Change Request NPF-11/82-3

Revise the special test exception for the Confirmatory Flow Induced Vibration Test to allow performance of the test with the "B" LPCI loop isolated. This is one (1) Class III amendment.

This proposed change was discussed with Dr. Bournia, et al, and is addressed in the attachment. This change has received on-site review and approval.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 170, a fee remittance in the amount of \$4,000.00 is enclosed.

Please contact this office if there are any questions in this matter.

Three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies of this transmittal and attachments are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

8206070456 820601 PDR ADDCK 05000373 CWS chorder 6/1/82 C. W. Schroeder

Nuclear Licensing Administrator

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Attachments

cc: NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / day

Notary Public

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LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1

TECH SPEC CHANGE REQUEST NPF-11/82-3

Subject: Allow performance of the Confirmatory Flow Induced Vibration Test with the LPCI "B" loop isolated.

Background:

The Confirmatory Flow Induced Vibration Test is performed prior to initial reactor critical. Fuel is loaded into the vessel, the reactor internals and head are installed, and the reactor is heated up with pump heat. A nitrogen bubble is induced in the top of the reactor vessel and heatup continues into Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown). There is no decay heat (since the core has never been critical). Since the reactor is changing from Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) to Condition 3 (Hot Shutdown) due to the reactor water temperature being in excess of 200°F, all systems required operable in Condition 3 must be operable prior to entering Condition 3.

Discussion:

During testing at LaSalle, the station has been unable to obtain a leak rate test on valve 1E12-F04lB that falls within the 1GPM limit imposed by Specification 3.4.3.2.d. The station is pursing repair of this valve with the vendor.

The station proposes that the manual isolation valve inside the drywell be closed. This, in combination with the normally closed injection valve provides the two closed valve protection required by action statement C of Specification 3.4.3.2. The closure of the manual isolation valve in the drywell will cause a control room alarm and indication that LPCI "B" loop is inoperable. The station's startup checklists require that all ECCS systems are verified operable prior to startup.

Closing this manual isolation valve causes LPCI "B" to be considered inoperable. Thus, in order to perform the Confirmatory Flow Induced Vibration Test, an exemption is required to allow:

- a) "B" LPCI loop to be inoperable, and
- b) 1E12-F041B valve leakage to exceed 1 gpm.

The requested changes (as shown on the attached marked up page 3/4 10-7) result in allowing the "B" LPCI system to be inoperable during this test. The HPCS, LPCS, LPCI "A" and LPCI"C" systems remain operable. During plant operation, operation would be allowed to continue for 7 days per Specification 3.5.1 Action a.1.