


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Southern California Edison Company

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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
P.O. BOX 128
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

REGIONAL

720528

TELEPHONE
(714) 492-7700

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596 - 5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Docket No. 50-361
LER No. 82-013
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

In accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A to Operating License NPF-10 for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, this letter is submitted as a 30 day report concerning a circumstance which was declared as an Unusual Event and reported by telephone to the NRC on April 28, 1982. A completed copy of the LER 82-013 is enclosed.

On April 28, 1982 the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was in Mode 4 at a temperature of approximately 225°F and a pressure of 2250 psia. RCS isolation valve leak rate testing was in progress pursuant to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.4.5.2.2.d using Engineering Procedure S023-V-3.5.2.

A Charging/Loaddown flow mismatch was observed by control room operators and an RCS Water Inventory Balance, in accordance with Surveillance Procedure S023-3-3.37, was commenced. The results of this test indicated total leak rate in excess of Technical Specification 3.4.5.2., with indications of unidentified leakage in excess of 1 gpm. Unidentified leakage could not be reduced below 1 gpm, in 4 hours permitted by Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 Action b. This caused the declaration of an Unusual Event in accordance with our Emergency Plan.

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
Unidentified leakage was reduced below 1 gpm in about 20 hours through a combination of actions including:

- a. More accurate measurement by Station Engineering of identified leakage using a revised Surveillance Procedure S023-3-3.37 with improved correlation of RC Drain Tank Level versus quantity.
- b. Tightening numerous RCS and CVCS boundary valves.
- c. Suspending all parallel activities such as chemistry sampling, surveillance testing of RCS Isolation Valves in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.5.2.2.d and carefully maintaining RCS temperature constant.

Corrective action to prevent recurrence is to improve Surveillance Procedure S023-3-3.37 to facilitate more accurate determination of identified and unidentified leakage and to provide additional manpower when raising RCS pressure following an extended shutdown in order to promptly take any action required to reduce unidentified leakage below 1 gpm.

If there are any questions regarding the above or the attached, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 82-013

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information & Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector San Onofre Unit 2)