NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | ①   (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| 0 | 1 | A | L | B | R | F | 1 | ② | 0 | 0 | — | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | — | 0 | 0 | ③ | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ④ | | | ⑤ |
LICENSEE CODE — LICENSE NUMBER — LICENSE TYPE — CAT 58

CON'T

| 0 | 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | ⑥ | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 9 | ⑦ | 0 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 2 | ⑧ | 0 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 2 | ⑨ |
DOCKET NUMBER — EVENT DATE — REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

| 0 | 2 | During normal operation, while performing SI 4.7.B-3, C SBGT train was

| 0 | 3 | declared inoperable due to failure to meet flow distribution requirements.

| 0 | 4 | T. S. 4.7.B.1.c requires air flow distribution to be uniform within 20 percent

| 0 | 5 | across each train's HEPA filters. There was no effect on the health or safety

| 0 | 6 | of the public in that T.S. 3.7.B.3 permits operation for 7 days with one SBGT

| 0 | 7 | train inoperable. Redundant systems were available and operable.

| 0 | 8 |

| 0 | 9 | SYSTEM CODE S C ⑪ | CAUSE CODE X ⑫ | CAUSE SUBCODE Z ⑬ | COMPONENT CODE F I L T E R ⑭ | COMP. SUBCODE Z ⑮ | VALVE SUBCODE Z ⑯ |

⑰ LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 2 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 9 | OCCURRENCE CODE / | 0 3 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0 |

| ACTION TAKEN A ⑱ | FUTURE ACTION X ⑲ | EFFECT ON PLANT Z ⑳ | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z ㉑ | HOURS 0 0 0 0 ㉒ | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y ㉓ | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N ㉔ | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L ㉕ | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 7 2 5 ㉖ |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ㉗

| 1 | 0 | Roughing filters, prefilters, upstream bank of HEPA filters were loaded with

| 1 | 1 | debris from sandblasting during torus work. Affected filters were replaced.

| 1 | 2 | "C" train was tested and returned to service. Filters were replaced in "A"

| 1 | 3 | and "B" trains. Filters will be inspected on unit 2 following torus sandblasting

| 1 | 4 | during refuel outage.

| 1 | 5 | FACILITY STATUS E ㉘ | % POWER 0 9 8 ㉙ | OTHER STATUS NA ㉚ | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B ㉛ | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance testing ㉜ |

| 1 | 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z ㉝ | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z ㉞ | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA ㉟ | LOCATION OF RELEASE NA ㊱ |

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

| 1 | 7 | NUMBER 0 0 0 0 ㊲ | TYPE Z ㊳ | DESCRIPTION NA ㊴ |

PERSONNEL INJURIES

| 1 | 8 | NUMBER 0 0 0 0 ㊵ | DESCRIPTION NA ㊶ |

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

| 1 | 9 | TYPE Z ㊷ | DESCRIPTION NA ㊸ |

PUBLICITY

| 2 | 0 | ISSUED N ㊹ | DESCRIPTION ㊺ | NRC USE ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82029   Technical Specification Involved   3.7.B.3

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(2) * Date Due NRC 5/27/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 98-percent power; unit 2 was operating at 91-percent
power; unit 3 was in a turbine maintenance outage. During normal operation,
at 1445 hours on April 28, 1982, "C" train of standby gas treatment (SBGT)
was declared inoperable following performance of SI 4.7.B-3, Standby Gas
Treatment Flow Distribution Test. The Technical Specification 4.7.B.1.c
requirement that air flow distribution be uniform with 20 percent across
each train's HEPA filters was not met. "A" and "B" SBGT trains were verified
operable per SI 4.7.B-1, Standby Gas Treatment Operability, and a 7-day limiting
condition (LCO) for operation was initiated.

Investigation revealed that the roughing filters, prefilters, and upstream bank
of HEPA filters were loaded with sand and debris associated with sandblasting
operations from torus modification activities. "C" SBGT train-roughing filters
were replaced. Flow, flow distribution, and DOP tests, SIs 4.7.B-7, 4.7.B-3,
and 4.7.B-4 respectively, were performed satisfactorily and "C" SBGT train was
returned to service within the 7-day LCO.

"A" and "B" SBGT trains were subsequently removed from service and the necessary
filters replaced. These trains were tested and returned to service. Neither
the "A" or "B" SBGT trains failed surveillance requirements before filter replace-
ments. The filter replacements in these trains were based on visual inspections
only. All three SBGT trains will be visually inspected subsequent to the upcoming
unit 2 torus modification sandblasting to verify that excessive sand and debris
from torus modification-related activities are not deposited on the SBGT filters.
Additionally a caution order will be placed on unit 2 SBGT to reactor building
ventilation exhaust dampers to prevent these dampers from being used for
surveillance-related purposes during sandblasting operations.

* Previous Similar Events:

NONE

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor
*Revision: J R P