

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/2/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT
REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/2/7/8/2/ (8) /0/5/2/6/8/2/ (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On April 27, 1982, with Unit No. 2 in Mode 6 it was discovered that the 2J Emer- /
/0/3/ / gency Diesel Generator was returned to service without residual voltage protec- /
/0/4/ / tion in the control circuit of the diesel output breaker. The 2H Emergency /
/0/5/ / Diesel Generator was tagged out for the same Design Change. Offsite power sources/
/0/6/ / remained operable; therefore the health and safety of the general public were /
/0/7/ / not affected. This is contrary to T.S. 3.8.1.2 and reportable pursuant to /
/0/8/ / T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /E/B/ (11) /A/ (12) /C/ (13) /E/N/G/I/N/E (14) /Z/ (15) /Z/ (16)
LER/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION
REPORT NO. REPORT NO.

(17) NUMBER /8/2/ /-/ /0/1/8/ / / /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

/F/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /F/0/1/0/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / Design Change 80-S71 was started to remove the existing residual voltage timer /
/1/1/ / and install protective relaying. Due to a material delay, DC-80-S71 was stopped /
/1/2/ / after removing the timer but prior to adding the protective relaying. The 2J /
/1/3/ / diesel was then returned to service and the 2H diesel was removed from service. /
/1/4/ / The timer was re-installed on the 2J Diesel and operability was verified. /

FACILITY STATUS %POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
/1/5/ /H/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / (30) /C/ (31) / Review of Design Change/

ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)
/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA /

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

#### Description of Event

On April 27, 1982, with Unit No. 2 in Mode 6, it was discovered that the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator was returned to service on April 24, 1982 without residual voltage protection in the control circuit of the diesel output breaker. The 2H Emergency Diesel Generator was removed from service for the same Design Change (DC-80-S71) on April 26, 1982. The residual voltage protection timer was re-installed and tested satisfactorily on April 28, 1982.

#### Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The 2J Diesel would still have served its intended safety function in the event of a loss of power. The residual voltage protection is only required in the event that the diesels start on a safety injection signal with a subsequent loss of offsite power. This scenario could cause an out-of-phase transfer onto the emergency bus. The offsite power source remained operable during the entire event; therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

#### Cause of Event

Design Change 80-S71 was initiated to remove the existing residual voltage protection timer and install a voltage sensing protective relay. Design Change 80-S71 was not completed due to a material delay. The residual voltage protection timer was removed and the voltage sensing relay circuit was not operable prior to returning the 2J Emergency Diesel Generator to service. The 2H Diesel was then removed from service to implement the same design change. Both diesels were technically inoperable for approximately 50 hours.

Investigation revealed that the basic cause of the incident resulted from an administrative error in the tagout-clearance process.

#### Immediate Corrective Action

The residual voltage protection timer was reinstalled and the diesel output breaker was functionally tested by 1-ST-23. The 2J emergency diesel generator was declared operable and returned to service.

Design Change 80-S71 was later completed.

#### Scheduled Corrective Action

Administrative procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary to strengthen the tagout-clearance process.

#### Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

#### Generic Implications

There are no generic implications associated with this event.