

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 24, 1982

BLRD-50-438/82-33

BLRD-50-439/82-30

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL  
QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL  
FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - BLRD-50-438/82-33,  
BLRD-50-439/82-30 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
R. V. Crlenjak on April 22, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR BLN NEB 8203. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to  
submit our next report by December 31, 1982.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with  
R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING  
BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE OF STARTUP AND RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

NCR BLN NEB 8203

BLRD-50-438/82-33, BLRD-50-439/82-30

10 CFR 50.55(e)

FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A pipe failure of the nonsafety grade Steam Generator Startup and Recirculation System in the Auxiliary Building could result in a harsh environment that exceeds the qualification limits for safety-related electrical equipment. Failure of nearby safety-related equipment in one system train because of the harsh environment caused by the pipe break coupled with an assumed failure in the same safety system in the other train may result in a situation that could adversely affect safe shutdown of the plant.

The cause of this deficiency was determined to be lack of sufficient pipe break analysis criteria at the time of system design. No other TVA facilities are affected by this deficiency.

Interim Progress

Meetings are being scheduled to better define the problem and to determine the best course of corrective action. Once corrective action is determined, it will be scheduled and implemented.