

ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY



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L30-82(05-28)-L

500 SOUTH 27TH STREET, DECATUR, ILLINOIS 62525

May 28, 1982

Mr. James R. Miller, Chief
Standardization & Special Projects Branch
Division of Licensing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Miller:

Reference: Clinton SER Outstanding Issue No. 1 -
Transportation Accidents (NUREG-0853)

Clinton Power Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-461

Enclosed is a copy of the Illinois Power Company response regarding Outstanding Issue #1 of the Clinton Safety Evaluation Report (SER-Section 2.2) on Transportation Accidents. The response presents analysis demonstrating that toxic chemicals which may be shipped via the ICG Gilman line do not present a significant risk to the safe operation of the Clinton Power Station. This report (Attachment #1) reviews the concerns associated with the shipment of all toxic chemical materials on the ICGRGL and concludes the following:

1. Some chemicals were eliminated from concern on the basis that the maximum control room concentration would be less than the two-minute exposure limit. This was determined from "HAZCHEM", a computer analysis program that evaluates the habitability of a power plant control room in the event of a toxic chemical release at or near a power plant.

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2. The remaining potential chemical hazards were eliminated from concern by utilizing risk assessment methodology. Since none of the toxic chemicals transported via the ICGRGL resulted in accident probabilities of 10^{-7} or greater per year, none of these accidents need to be considered as design basis events for CPS.

Also enclosed, as Attachment #2, is a copy of the IP proposed revised response to NRC question 311.6, regarding transportation of explosive materials via ICGRGL. This response was prepared to address NRC concerns regarding the potential hazards resulting from delayed ignition of a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) cloud formed as the result of a tank rupture near the CPS.

This response concludes that, from a risk assesement standpoint, the delayed ignition of LPG gas clouds caused by the accidental rupture of a rail tank car need not be considered a design basis event for the CPS.

The general contents of these reports were discussed with Joe Sinisgalli, NRC Siting Analysis Branch reviewer, on May 28, 1982. In summary we request early review of these reports so that this issue can be closed out in the supplement to the SER.

Sincerely,

G. E. Wuller
Supervisor - Licensing
Nuclear Station Engineering

GEW/TLR/lt

cc: Mr. J. H. Williams, NRC Clinton Project Manager
Mr. H. H. Livermore, NRC Resident Inspector
Mr. A. A. Sinisgalli, NRC Siting Analysis Branch
Illinois Dept. of Nuclear Safety