

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-373/82-26(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-373

License No. NPF-11

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL

Inspection Conducted: April 19 through May 7, 1982

Inspectors: L. A. Reyes

R. D. Walker for

5-21-82

R. D. Walker for
W. G. Guldemon

5-21-82

R. D. Banksbury
R. D. Banksbury

5/21/82

Approved By: R. D. Walker, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 1C

R. D. Walker for

5-21-82

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 19 through May 7, 1982 (Report No. 50-373/82-26(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection. The inspection consisted of followup on previous inspection findings and independent inspection effort (secondary containment trackway door seals). The inspection involved a total of 64 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including six inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the two areas examined, no items of noncompliance were identified in one area; one item of noncompliance was identified in the other area (Paragraph 3: failure to follow the procedure for installing the secondary containment seals).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

R. H. Holyoak, Station Superintendent
G. J. Diederich, Station Operating Assistant Superintendent
*R. D. Bishop, Administrative and Support Services Assistant Superintendent
J. M. Marshall, Operating Engineer
T. Borzym, Security Administrator
J. Renwick, Technical Staff Supervisor

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the construction, quality assurance, technical and operating staff.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview of May 6, 1982.

2. Followup On Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/82-06-01A): Failure to follow the out-of-service procedure. The licensee has issued Revision 13 to Station Procedure LAP 900-4, "Equipment Out-Of-Service Procedure" which requires, "A second person to make an inspection and verify that the physical isolation points have been properly positioned and tagged O.O.S." and "Upon completion of the verification inspection, the verifier will initial and date the equipment outage checklist..."

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/82-06-01B): Description of valve 1D6032 in the mechanical checklist was unclear. The licensee has issued Revision 3 to Procedure LOP-DG-08M, "Diesel Generator Mechanical Checklist" which clarifies the valve name. A broken keyway in the valve handle was repaired and the valve tested.

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/82-06-01C): Loss of temperature indication for the LPCS pump motor bearings during system testing. The licensee has issued Revision 17 to Procedure LAP-1600-2, "Control of Standing Operating Orders" which provides guidance to the operator to use the process computer CRT and/or printout to monitor equipment parameters.

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/82-12-01): Failure to control housekeeping and cleanliness in Unit 1 safety related equipment rooms. The licensee completed a cleanup of the affected areas. The Project Manager issued a memo to all LaSalle County Project Personnel reminding them of the need for procedure adherence. Routine tours conducted by the inspector have indicated adequate housekeeping and cleanliness practices are being used.

(Closed) Noncompliance (373/82-12-02): Failure to follow the out-of-service procedure. The licensee has instructed the shift supervisors to accept only written outage requests as per Attachment B to Procedure LAP 900-4. The out-of-service procedure was reviewed with construction crafts and they were specifically instructed to: (1) Not

to begin work on a job until specifically instructed to do so by the CECO supervisor in charge of the work; (2) Construction crafts are not to work on any valves which are tagged as isolation points with an out-of-service card. The incident was reviewed with the operating supervisors, nuclear station operators, equipment operators, and equipment attendants on all six shift crews.

(Closed) Open Item (373/81-00-25): Chapter 6, Paragraph 6.4.1, "Radiological Protection" of the LaSalle Safety Evaluation Report states for the control room emergency filtration system, "To assure the availability of this filter train during radiological emergencies, the applicant has agreed to do the following: (1) Make provisions to manually initiate the control room heating, ventilating and air conditioning supply air filters ("Odor Eater") on receipt of a high radiation alarm from an outside air intake; (2) Test the air filter train in conjunction with the once-through charcoal filter (approximately once every 18 months). The inspector reviewed abnormal operating procedures and Technical Specifications to verify that these commitments had been satisfied.

Abnormal Operating Procedure LOA-VC-01, Revision 1, dated June 22, 1981 prescribes control room HVAC operation during high radiation conditions. Section C.1.6 requires that the control room HVAC charcoal filter be manually placed on line consistent with commitment (1) above. Technical Specification 4.7.2.b establishes a requirement to test the entire air filter train including the "Odor Eater" charcoal filter every 18 months consistent with commitment (2) above.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/81-24-04): Witness secondary containment leak test. The inspector witnessed a leak rate test on the secondary containment conducted April 24, 1982. The witnessed test proved that:

1. One standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 300 seconds, and
2. while operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour, greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in the secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 4000 CFM \pm 10% can be maintained.

The test was run with the sealing tubing inserted under the trackway doors and one trackway door open. When the test was duplicated with the sealing tubing removed one standby gas treatment subsystem was unable to perform 1. and 2., above with one trackway door open. The inspector concluded that the test was acceptable and secondary containment integrity is maintained as long as the sealing tubing is inserted under the trackway doors as required by procedure or both trackway doors are maintained closed. This item is closed.

3. Independent Inspection Effort

Secondary Containment Trackway Door Seals

On April 22, 1982, at approximately 3:00 p.m., while conducting a plant tour, the resident inspector observed that the seals on both of

the reactor building trackway doors were not installed. At least one door with the seal in place is required to satisfy Technical Specification 3.4.6.5.1 requirements for secondary containment. Although both seals were not in place, both doors were closed. Data collected during the secondary containment vacuum test indicates that the seals are not required if both doors are closed.

This is an item of noncompliance for failure to follow LaSalle County Station Procedure LLP 82-5 which requires the installation of the seals every time the door is open.

Upon notification by the inspector, the licensee immediately terminated the core alterations that were in process and installed the door seals. In addition to the above mentioned corrective action, the licensee has installed a lock on the doors. The key for this lock is controlled by the shift engineer.

The licensee is presently conducting training of operating personnel on the requirements of Procedure LLP 82-5. LER 82-004 has been submitted to report the event. The inspector has no further questions on this matter.

No additional items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Management Interview

A management interview was conducted discussing the scope and finding of the inspection with the licensee at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.