

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE: GA E I H 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1

REPORT SOURCE: L 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 - 3 2 2 8 2 0 4 2 1 8 2

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES: While performing HNP-1-3653, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Operability, on 3/22/82 and 4/5/82, and when investigating suspected air leakage on 4/10/82, SBGT failed to maintain secondary containment integrity as required by T.S.3.7.C.1.a and T.S.4.7.C.1.b. Neither plant operation nor the health and safety of the public was affected by this non-repetitive event.

SYSTEM CODE: S I C CAUSE CODE: E CAUSE SUBCODE: X X X X X X X COMPONENT CODE: X X X X X X X COMP. SUBCODE: Z VALVE SUBCODE: Z

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The failure to maintain secondary containment integrity was due to several leaking door seals, 8 open drain valves, and inaccurate control room instruments. Maintenance requests (MR's) were written to have the seals repaired. Drain valves were closed. MR's were written to recalibrate the control room indicators.

FACILITY STATUS: E % POWER: 0 9 9 OTHER STATUS: NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY: Testing SBGT Filter Train

ISSUED: N PUBLICITY: N NAME OF PREPARER: SBT PHONE: 912-367-7781

LER #: 50-321/1982-25
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1982-25

On 3/22/82 and on 4/5/82 with the unit in run mode and while performing HNP-1-3653, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Operability, and on 4/10/82 while investigating suspected air leakage to Unit I secondary containment, SBGT failed to maintain secondary containment integrity as required by T.S.3.7.C.1.a and T.S.4.7.C.1.b (reference deviation reports 1-82-49, 1-82-46, and 1-82-50). Both T.S. sections require that secondary containment must be capable of maintaining a minimum of 1/4" of water vacuum with each filter train flow rate not more than 4000 CFM. This condition was violated since 1/4" water vacuum could not be maintained according to control room instrumentation. Neither plant operation nor the health and safety of the public was affected. This is a non-repetitive event.

The violations of secondary containment integrity on 3/22/82 and 4/5/82 (deviation reports 1-82-49 and 1-82-46) were due to several leaking door seals. Maintenance requests (MR's) 1-82-1810 through 1-82-1813 were written to have the seals repaired. The seals were repaired on 4/5/82. On 4/10/82, a violation of secondary containment integrity occurred when 8 drain valves (Master Parts List numbers T45-F013, -F014, -F015, -F016, -F017, -F018, -F019, and a new fuel storage vault drain valve) connecting the Unit I and Unit II refueling floor to the Unit II reactor building were left open (reference deviation report number 1-82-50). The valves were closed. HNP-2-1442, Reactor Building Leak Detection System, will be revised by 4/26/82 to include a valve lineup for the 8 drain valves referenced in deviation report 1-82-50. This valve lineup requires that these valves remain closed.

Plant personnel feel that the violations of secondary containment integrity for the aforementioned deviation reports were due to the inaccuracy of control room instrumentation. MR's 1-82-1818 through 1-82-1822 were written to recalibrate the differential pressure instrumentation. Following recalibration of the instrumentation, HNP-1-3653 was successfully performed. A revision to HNP-1-3653 was submitted and approved by the Plant Review Board on 4/15/82 to include the use of an incline manometer to verify the pressure difference in the reactor building. The manometer will be zeroed (with interior ventilation off) to outside air conditions at the time of the test, since control room instrumentation cannot compensate for outside conditions.