6.11.	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Unit 2.
1.5	CONTROL BLOCK:
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	AEPORT L 6 0 5 10 0 0 3 2 8 0 0 3 1 8 8 2 8 0 4 1 5 8 2 0 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 With unit 2 in mode 1 (75% power, 570 degrees F, 2235 psig) at 0820 CST on 03/18/82
0]3	the upper head injection (UHI) system was declared inoperable due to the inadvertent
0 4	[closing of two isolation valves. This event placed the unit in action statement (b)
0 5	of LCO 3.5.1.2. There was no effect upon public health and safety. Previous
06	Occurrences: none.
0 7	· ·
0 8 7 . P	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE 8
09	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \text{SVSTEM} \\ \text{CODE} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{CODE} \\ \text{S} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{F} \\ 10 \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} 11 \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{CAUSE} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{COMPONENT CODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{COMPONENT CODE} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} $ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\
	Image: Number
	ACTION FUTUDAR EFFECT SHUTDOWN TAKEH ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT X 18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9
10	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) During the performance of start-up test SU-9.1, UHI isolation valves 2-FCV-81-21 a.d
111	23 closed on a low-level signal from the accumulator tank level switches caused by a
112	pressure drop to the switch AP cell. The pressure drop was produced when a sample
113	was attempted to be taken from the level switch sense line. The valves were
110	immediately reopened.
15	9 Status Status 30 ME SHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) 80 E (28) 0 7 5 (29) NA 0
	CTIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 80 LEEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 80
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 44 45 80 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (32) 32 1 0 0 (1) Z (38) NA 1
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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20	PURLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 8206010532 NRC USE ONLY Na NA 8206010532 10 11 <td< td=""></td<>
	Name of Preparer: H. R. Rogers /M. R. Harding Phone: (615) 751-0349

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQR0-50-328/82037Technical Specification Involved: 3.5.1.2Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.c

Date of Occurrence: 03/18/82 Time of Occurrence: 0820 CST

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

With unit 2 in mode 1 at 75% power on 03/18/82, startup test SU-9.1 (10% load swing test) was being performed. During the performance of this test at approximately 0820 CST, two upper head injection isolation valves, 2-FCV-87-21 and 2-FCV-87-23, inadvertently closed. An alarm was received in the control room and immediate operator action brought the valves to their normal open position in accordance with technical specification LCO 3.5.1.2 action statement (b).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 2 in mode 1 at 75% power.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The most probable cause for the inadvertent closing of the UHI isolation valves was a drop in pressure to the level switches due to the opening of the sense line calibration valve which gave a low-level signal to the UHI isolation valves.

Analysis of Occurrence:

A maintenance request was initiated to investigate the closing of the two UHI valves.

A check was made of the level switches for the water accumulator for the UHI system. Level switches 2-LS-87-21 and 2-LS-87-23 are interconnected by their sense lines which originate from common root valves off the tank. These level switches close the UHI isolation valves 21 and 23 on a low-level signal. Investigation revealed that the low side common root valve to the level switches was closed.

An investigation was made into the most probable cause for the closed root valve. It was concluded that a sample was taken at approximately 0820 CST on March 18, 1982, (the day of the event). A calibration connection is located downstream to the sense line low side root valve and a piece of 1/8-inch diameter tygon tubing was found connected to the calibration isolation valve.

Upon questioning several Chem Lab technicians who took samples from the UHI accumulator, it was stated by one technician that on the day of the event (March 18, 1982) he had attempted to take a sample from the sense line calibration connection because of its convenience with the tygon tubing already on the connection. He stated that upon opening the calibration isolation valve, a stream of water came from the tygon tubing and that the UHI isolation valves closed. He immediately closed the calibration isolation valves and most probably the sense line root valve. He then drew his sample from the designated sample point and continued on his routine. Unit 1 root values were checked on 03/23/82 to see if the same error was present. Value 1-87-301 was found closed. The unit 1 SOI status file value lineup indicates that the value was verified to be open on 03/07/82. Because the same two analysts drew unit 1 samples on the same date, it is concluded that the most probable cause was common to the two incidents. All other Chem Lab analysts who have drawn UHI samples were questioned, and all stated they had never used the sense line as a sample point.

This is a personnel error in that the Chem Lab technician failed to follow procedures in sampling the UHI system.

Corrective Action:

As stated above, immediate operator action returned the UHI isolation values to the open position and the unit was in compliance with LCO 3.5.1.2. The following actions were taken in reference to the closed root values on the level switch sense lines:

- A. The sense line root valves (87-314 and 87-301) were opened.
- B. The level switch setpoint was verified to be within tolerance.
- C. The high and low sense lines were bled and vented to ensure a solid water filled leg.
- D. A hold order was placed on the sense line calibration values and verified to be closed.
- E. The Chem Lab technicians have been disciplined and instructed to follow procedures and take samples from designated sample points only.
- F. For the next 30 days, Operations will verify that the sense line root valves are open on each shift to prevent any recurrence.

Failure Data:

None.