MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Helping Build Mississippi
P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

May 7, 1982

Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-416/417
File 0260/15525/15526
PRD-82/17, Interim Report No. 1,
HMA Relays
AECM-82/206

On April 6, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns GE Type HMA Relays which have an excessive length of uninsulated leads to the moveable contacts.

We have determined that this matter constitutes a reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e). We are currently investigating reportability under 10CFR21.

All details known at this time are included in our attached Interim Report. This report was originally due on May 6, 1982, but a one day extension was granted by Mr. F. Cantrell. We expect to submit a Final Report by June 28, 1982.

Yours truly,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr
ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley
Mr. R. B. McGehee
Mr. T. B. Conner

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor
South Miss. Electric Power Association
P. O. Box 1589
Hattiesburg, MS 39401

INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 FOR PRD-82/17

I. Description of the Deficiency

A possible deficiency exists in GE Type HMA auxiliary relays manufactured during 1976 through June, 1981. The length of the uninsulated flexible leads connected to the moveable contacts of some HMA relays exceeds the allowable dimensions and can result in reduced spacing between the leads and the coil circuit terminals. The reduced spacing introduces the possibility of circuit connection between the flexible leads of the HMA contact circuits and the adjacent coil circuit terminals.

One (1) relay with the applicable date code has been identified in Unit 1 at GGNS and ten (10) in Unit 2.

In Unit 1 the system affected is Residual Heat Removal. In Unit 2 the systems affected are Residual Heat Removal, High Pressure Core Spray, and Low Pressure Core Spray. These are all in the NSSS scope of supply.

In Unit 1, the type HMA Relay is used in the RHR Pump stop control circuit. We have determined that failure of this relay could affect the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

The cause of the deficiency was a manufacturing error of using longer flexible leads in the relay than was specified.

As stated above, the extent is limited to only one (1) relay in Unit 1 and ten (10) relays in Unit 2.

General Electric has issued Field Disposition Instruction (FDI) WAVC for Unit 1 and FDI-WBSJ for Unit 2 to inspect the relays and to install insulating tubing over the contact terminals and part of the flexible leads as necessary. To prevent recurrence, General Electric is instituting better controls of manufacturing quality. All work for GGNS Unit 1 has been completed.

III. Status of Proposed Resolution

Known safety implications, cause and extent of the deficiency, corrective actions, and actions to preclude recurrence have all been determined.

Mississippi Power & Light has evaluated this deficiency as reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

IV. Reason Why a Final Report Will be Delayed

Reportability of the deficiency under 10CFR21 has not been determined.

V. Date When Final Report Will be Submitted

We expect to submit a Final Report by June 28, 1982.