

# ATTACHMENT 6 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

LAP 1500-5

Rev 2

Date March 12, 1982

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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REPORT SOURCE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

## EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

The Unit 1 Division II battery was in an inoperable status per Tech Spec 3.8.2.4.

Corrective action was not taken as specified in the Tech Specs. The Unit 1 Division

II charger was fully operable and the battery was at approximately 80% capacity

during the occurrence. The Unit 2 Division II D.C. system was available for alter-

nate power at all times. Safe operation was maintained.

SYSTEM CODE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Correct action was not taken because the Shift Supervisor misinterpreted the Tech

Specs. The battery was put on charge on 5/5/82. On 5/8/82 the battery was found to

be operable. Operating personnel have been notified of the Technical Specification

action requirements when specific gravities are found out of required limits.

ACTIVITY STATUS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

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NRC USE ONLY

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- I. LER Number: 82-016/03L-0
- II. LaSalle County Station: Unit 1
- III. Docket Number: 050-373
- IV. Event Description

The Technical Specification 3.8.2.4 states that Division 1 and/or Division 2 D.C. distribution system shall be operable and energized. Action c. of the referenced Technical Specification states the following:

"With one division battery and/or battery charger inoperable, operation may continue provided the Unit tie breakers for the effected division are OPERABLE and aligned to supply power to the affected distribution panel from the associated OPERABLE Unit 2 125 volt DC distribution panel; restore the inoperable battery and/or charger to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or declare the division distribution panel inoperable."

On 5/5/82 at 5:55 AM, the Unit 1 Division II, 125 VDC Battery pilot cells' specific gravities were found to be lower than the Technical Specification operability limit. A full set of specific gravities was not taken to determine if the pilot cell readings correctly reflected the operability of the battery. The battery was placed on charge per the operating procedure, but the Unit tie breakers were not aligned to provide power to the Unit 1 distribution panel from the Unit 2 distribution panel, as the referenced Technical Specification states.

V. Probable Consequences of the Occurrence

Fuel load was recently completed on Unit 1, and no irradiated fuel is on site. The Unit 1 Division II charger was fully operational, and the battery was approximately 80% capacity during the period of the occurrence. The Unit 2, Division II D.C. system was fully operable, and the Unit tie breakers were available for use during the period of the occurrence. Safe operation of the plant was maintained.

VI. Cause

On 5/2/82, the Unit 1 Division II battery was slightly discharged due to an increase in D.C. loads during a switchgear cleaning outage. An increase of approximately 61 amps on the Division II D.C. System was experienced, requiring the full charger ampere output current and additional output current from the battery.

The unit tie breakers were not closed, because the shift supervisor misinterpreted the Technical Specifications.

VII. Corrective Action

On 5/5/82, when the pilot cells were found to be 23 specific gravity points below the Technical Specification limits, the battery was put on charge. On 5/8/82, when it was determined that an error had been made, the status of the battery was checked, and was found to be operable.

To prevent future recurrence, Operating personnel have been notified of the Technical Specification action requirements, when pilot cell specific gravities are found out of required limits.