GPU Nuclear

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

May 17, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-24/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-24/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATINC STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-24/03L

Report Date

May 17, 1982

Occurrence Date

April 14, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Three reactor high pressure Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) initiation switches (IA83's) actuated at a value greater than that specified in the station's Technical Specifications, Section 2.3.4.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the station's Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the cold shutdown condition.

Description of Occurrence

The results of a surveillance test on the five EMRV initiation pressure switches indicated that three switch initiation setpoints had drifted to a value less conservative than that allowed in the station's Technical Specifications. The following table presents the pertinent data relating to the surveillance of the IA83 pressure switches

Switch Desig.	Tech Spec Limit (A)	Desired Inst. Setpoint (B)	As Found (PSIG)	As Left (PSIG)
IA83A	1079	1059 +0/-5	1058	1058
IA83B	1084	1084 +0/-5	1099	1083
IA83C	1076	1076 +0/-5	1084	1076
IA83D	1082	1062 +0/-5	1067	1060
IA83E	1082	1082 +0/-5	1089	1080

(A) Includes head correction factors. Values in PSIG.

(B) Setpoint in PSIG on increasing pressure. Values indicated include head correction factors.

The following conclusions are based on the above table:

1. IA83B, C, and E drifted high since the last time they were surveilled. The previous surveillance was performed early in January 1982. (The normal surveillance schedule is prior to start-up when the reactor is shutdown and the reactor coolant is below 212°F. The reactor was placed in a cold shutdown condition in early December 1981.) The test results presented in the table above were from the restart surveillance performed on 4/14/82, following a reactor scram from an attempted start on 4/12/82.

2. IA83E, setpoint was found within the manufacturer's stated accuracy (±1/2% of 1500 PSIG Proof or ±7.5 PSIG).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of this event is attributed to instrument repeatability and drift, of which one of the three switches that exceeded the Technical Specification limit was within the manufacturer's published accuracy.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Electromatic Relief Valves (EMRV) are used in the Auto Depressurization System (ADS) to depressurize the reactor as a prerequisite for Core Spray System initiation and for relieving reactor pressure during high pressure transients.

The IA83 switches sequentially control the EMRVs for relieving reactor pressure to the Torus, and all five EMRVs would have actuated before reactor pressure could reach the setting of any of the Safety Valves with substantial margin.

The three pressure switches which drifted above the Technical Specification limit would still have operated, if called upon to do so.

The safety significance of the three IA83 pressure switches which drifted above the Technical Specification limit is considered minimal since the setpoint variations were minor and generally consistent with the design of the pressure switch.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to readjust the pressure switches to actuate within the Technical Specification limit. The results of the next surveillance will be compared to the results presented in the Description of Occurrence to determine if the switch setpoint should be lowered to allow for upward drift.

IA83C pressure switch will be replaced if found outside the manufacturer's stated accuracy range during the next scheduled surveillance.

Parts are on order to replace pressure switch IA83B.

These switches are scheduled to be replaced by a model with an improved design during the Cycle 11 refueling outage.

Failure Data

Manufacturer:	Barksdale
Catalog No.:	B2S-M12SS
Proof Pressure:	1500
Adjustable Range:	77-1200