NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 — LICENSEE CODE: GAEIH1 (2) LICENSE NUMBER: 00-00000-00 (3) LICENSE TYPE: 41111 (4) CAT (5)

CON'T 01 — REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 05000321 (7) EVENT DATE: 033082 (8) REPORT DATE: 042782 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 3-30-82 with Unit 1 at 1220 MWt, mode switch in run, and Unit 2 in
03 refuel, QC dept. personnel were performing surveillance of fire barrier
04 penetration seals. Penetration seals were found breached in Unit 1 and
05 Unit 2 areas of the Control Building. Conditions of Unit 1 Tech Specs
06 3.13.1 and Unit 2 Tech Specs 3.3.6.8 were not met. This is a non-repe-
07 titive occurrence. There were no effects on public health and safety.
08

09 — SYSTEM CODE: AB (11) CAUSE CODE: X (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: Z (13) COMPONENT CODE: ZZZZZZ (14) COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER — EVENT YEAR: 82 — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 019 / OCCURRENCE CODE: 03 REPORT TYPE: L — REVISION NO.: 0

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS (22): 0000 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: Z (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z999 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Cable had been removed from penetration seals on Unit 1 without repairs
11 as required by plant procedures. Apparently seals were not initially in-
12 stalled in the Unit 2 area of the Control Bldg. during construction.
13 Fire watches were established per Tech Spec sections 3.13.1 & 3.3.6.8.a.
14 Seals were repaired on 4-14-82 for Unit 1 & on 4-10-82 for Unit 2.

15 — FACILITY STATUS: X (28) % POWER: 050 (29) OTHER STATUS (30): Condenser Maint. METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Surveillance

16 — ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

17 — PERSONNEL EXPOSURES — NUMBER: 000 (37) TYPE: Z (38) DESCRIPTION (39): NA

18 — PERSONNEL INJURIES — NUMBER: 000 (40) DESCRIPTION (41): NA

19 — LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY — TYPE: Z (42) DESCRIPTION (43): NA

20 — PUBLICITY — ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION (45): NA

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LER #: 50-321/1982-19
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
for LER 50-321/1982-19

On 3-30-82, with Unit 1 at 1220 MWt, mode switch in Run, condenser maintenance being performed and with Unit 2 in Refuel, the 18 month surveillance of fire barrier penetration seals and fire dampers was being performed by QC department personnel. In Station Battery Room 1A and 1B, two (2) penetration seals were found breached. On 3-31-82, the surveillance inspection continued and one (1) other penetration was found breached in the 1B Switchgear Room. Also on 3-31-82, nine (9) 4" conduit sleeves in the Unit 2 Air Compressor Room were found unsealed. Due to these events conditions of Unit 1 Tech Spec section 3.13.1 and Unit 2 Tech Spec section 3.3.6.8 were not met. This is a non-repetitive occurrence. There were no effects on public safety or health due to these events.

The event cause on Unit 1 has been attributed to the failure of personnel to comply with the Unit 1 procedure (HNP-1-6908M) for repair of fire barrier penetration seals after cable had been removed from the seals. On Unit 2, it appears that fire rated silicone foam seals were never installed in the 4" conduit sleeves during initial construction. Upon discovery of these incidents, immediate corrective action was taken to: (1) notify the Shift Foreman of each unit of the event; (2) establish fire watches as required by Tech Spec sections 3.13.1.1 and 3.3.6.8.a, and (3) prepare and issue Maintenance Request (MR's # 1-82-1824, 1826, 1827, and 2-82-1705) for repair of the seals.

Approximately 2600 fire barrier penetration seals were inspected during this surveillance with 12 identified as breached. This is a failure rate of less than 1/2 of 1%.