

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

1750 Chestnut Street Tower II

REGION II
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

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April 29, 1982

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - DOCKET
NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
REPORT BFRO-50-296/82008

The enclosed report provides details concerning the inadvertent disconnection
of the inlet sample line to a building ventilation continuous air monitor.
This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 3 Technical
Specification 6.7.2.b(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. A. Green
H. J. Green
Director of Nuclear Power

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Inspector, Browns Ferry

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 8208 Technical Specification Involved 3.8.B.8

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.2 * Date Due NRC 4/30/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 98 percent; unit 2 was operating at 97 percent; and unit 3 was in a refueling outage. Only unit 3 was affected by the event. During the daily source and background check of continuous air monitor (CAM) 3-90-250 personnel discovered that the inlet sample line had been disconnected. The line had been verified connected on the previous day.

Technical Specification 3.8.B.8 requires the reactor and turbine building vents be continuously monitored. These requirements were not met for a period of up to 24 hours. Because of the low activity levels present when the sample line was disconnected, the exact time that the sample line was disconnected could not be determined from a review of recorder traces.

During the time the sample line was disconnected, the CAM continued to monitor the ambient atmosphere around the CAM. The strip chart revealed no increase in activity levels during this time. During this time period there were no alarms received on local radiation monitors within unit 3. There were no airborne contamination zones in use during the event. Activities within the unit 3 reactor and turbine buildings involved maintenance activities associated with the last phases of the refueling outage. Due to these facts, it can be stated that this event had no adverse effect on the health or safety of the public. There are no redundant systems.

The cause of this event was apparently personnel error of some form. It is very unlikely that the sample line vibrated loose. The CAM is located next to a personnel walkway; therefore, it is possible that some unknowing individual had a need to move the CAM unit for access to other equipment and disconnected the sample line. Upon finding the sample line disconnected, personnel reconnected it. Warning signs will be placed on all effluent CAMs by May 19, 1982.

* Previous Similar Events:

NONE

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP