

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
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 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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 G A E I H 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58CON'T

0	1
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 REPORT SOURCE L 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 2 0 8 8 2 8 0 3 1 0 8 2 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With reactor mode switch in run & performing HNP-2-3410, RCIC Steam Line
0 3 dP Instrument FT&C, switch 2E51-N018 was found to actuate at +142.1"
0 4 H₂O. Tech Spec Table 3.3.2-2 requires actuation at $\leq 300\%$ of rated flow
0 5 which corresponds to $\leq +111"$ H₂O plus 15" H₂O head correction. The re-
0 6 dundant switch 2E51-N017 was operable. The health & safety of the pub-
0 7 lic was not affected. This is a non-repetitive event.

0	9
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 SYSTEM CODE I B 11 CAUSE CODE D 12 CAUSE SUBCODE C 13 COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U 14 COMP. SUBCODE S 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17

 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 EVENT YEAR 8 2 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 1 6 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 REPORT TYPE L REVISION NO. 0
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN X 18 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 0 8 0 0 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the event has been attributed to admin. controls. On 1-11-82,
1 1 HNP-2-3410, Rev. 11 was SRO'ed to change the setpoint from 142" H₂O to
1 2 120" H₂O. A permanent revision to Rev. 11 was submitted on 1-12-82. Be-
1 3 fore Rev. 12 was approved, the instrument was recalibrated under Rev. 11
1 4 & therefore was outside Tech Specs. A recalibration was performed.

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 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 0 2 9 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance Test 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1	6
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 ACTIVITY RELEASED Z 33 CONTENT Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1	7
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 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1	8
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 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41
7 8 9 11 12 80

1	9
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 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43
7 8 9 10 80

2	0
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 PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45
7 8 9 10 808205210035 820310
PDR ADDCK 05000366
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARED C. L. Coggin - Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv.

PHONE: 912-367-7851

LER #: 50-366/1982-016
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report
for LER 50-366/1982-016

On 2-8-82, with Unit 2 at steady state 29% thermal power, the monthly surveillance procedure (HNP-2-3410, Rev. 12) "RCIC Steamline Hi dP Instrument FT&C" was being performed when it was found that the inboard Hi dP switch (2E51-N018) setpoint exceeded the Tech Spec limit (Table 3.3.2-2) of 111" + 15" head (corresponding to 300% of rated steam flow). The switch actuated at 142.1" H₂O. The redundant RCIC outboard Hi dP switch (2E51-N017) was operable as was the HPCI system. There were no effects upon public health and safety due to this non-repetitive event.

The cause of this event was due to a failure of administrative controls. Procedure HNP-2-3410, Rev. 11 (RCIC Steam Line dP Instrument FT&C) had been SRO'ed to reflect changes to the setpoint for 2E51-N018. The method of handling temporary changes to procedures had been changed previously which inadvertently allowed for use of a revision of the procedure which was not current if the procedure had been SRO'ed and a permanent revision reflecting these changes had not been distributed to the various procedure manual sets.

On 1-11-82, HNP-2-3410, Rev. 11 was SRO'ed to reflect a change in setpoint on 2E51-N018 from 142" to 120" WC (Head correction included). On 1-12-82, a permanent revision to HNP-2-3410, Rev. 11, incorporating the SRO changes, was submitted for approval. Prior to the issuance of Rev. 12 of HNP-2-3410 on 2-4-82, calibration again was performed for 2E51-N018 on 1-28-82, under Rev. 11. Persons calibrating the instrument were not aware of the existence of an SRO'ed change to HNP-2-3410, Rev. 11 prior to calibrating the instrument on 1-28-82, and therefore the instrument was calibrated to the wrong setpoint (142") which exceeded the Tech Spec limit established on 1-11-82. The instrument calibration became due again on 2-8-82, and 2E51-N018 was found to be outside Tech Specs under Rev. 12 of HNP-2-3410. The instrument was immediately recalibrated to the 111" setpoint. Plant personnel have been reminded of the differences between a temporary (SRO) change and a permanent procedure revision and the need to be aware of any SRO change which might need to be repeated prior to issuance of a revised procedure.