



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

May 5, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator  
USNRC  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-023/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station  
Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b,  
we are submitting the Licensee Event Report for Reportable  
Occurrence 82-023/03L. This report is required within  
thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

RF:ks

CC: Distribution

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The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-023/03L  
Report Date: 05-05-82  
Occurrence Date: 04-17-82  
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2  
Public Service Electric & Gas Company  
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

100' Elevation Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 82-087 and 82-089.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 2 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 17, 1982, during surveillance testing, the operator discovered that the inner door seal pressure on the 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock was less than the 47 PSIG required. The air lock was declared inoperable, and at 1410 hours Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered.

The air lock was returned to an operable status; however, on April 18, 1982, the inner door seal again failed to meet surveillance requirements. At 1530 hours the air lock was declared inoperable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered for a second time.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

In the first instance, the inner door low seal pressure resulted from a plugged seal air pressurization line.

The low seal pressure, on the second occasion, resulted from leaky inner door seals.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.6.1.3.a requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable door closed and restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

In both instances the outer air lock door was immediately closed. On the first occasion, the inner door seal line was blown out, and the seal was satisfactorily tested. At 1545 hours. April 17, 1982, the air lock was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

In the second case, the air lock inner door seals were replaced, and the surveillance test was satisfactorily performed. At 2205 hours, April 18, 1982, the air lock was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated for the second time.

FAILURE DATA:

Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.  
Door Seal

Prepared By R. Frahm

General Manager  
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-47