

TELECOPY MESSAGE

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Certified By M.A. Biking 5/6/82

TO: 215-337-5324 FROM: 315-343-2110 DATE/TIME 3/19/82 - 2:30
Telephone Number Telephone Number

8474-1511-1882

TO: R.C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

From: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Unit #1
P.O. Box #32
Lycoming, New York 13093

SUBJECT: PROMPT REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
DOCKET NO. 50-220 LICENSE NO. DPR-63
ASSIGNED LER NO. 82-08

EVENT DATE: 3/17/82 REPORT DATE: 3/18/82

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SEE ATTACHMENT

COMPONENTS INVOLVED: Emergency Condenser Systems #11 and #12

CLOSE AND REMEDIAL ACTION:

Cause: SEE EVENT DESCRIPTION ATTACHED

Remedial Action: Standing Order #30 issued to close vent blocking valves #BV-05-01 & #BV-05-04 if emergency condenser system isolation is required.

FACILITY STATUS: % THERMAL MW 1843

- c) Routine Startup _____
- d) Routine Shutdown _____
- e) Steady State Oper X _____
- f) Load Change _____
- g) Shutdown _____
- h) Refueling _____
- i) Other _____
- j) Not Applicable _____

A written follow-up report will be sent within two weeks.

TELECOPY TO R.C. Haynes FROM T.J. Perkins DATE _____
J.E. Lemages _____

APN-21 -19 April 1979

IE 29 3/11

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

While making a review of Operation Surveillance Test N1-ST-R7, "High Radiation Emergency Cooling System Vent Monitors Instrument Channel Test", it was discovered that a potential path for reactor steam from emergency condenser steam line vents to atmosphere could result if emergency condenser tube leaks occur.

During the refuel outage of 1981, a modification to the Emergency Condenser Venting System was made. This modification was made to comply with NUREG-0737 Item II-B-1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents". The modification included the installation of piping and remote manual valves to allow venting of the Emergency Condensers to the suppression pool in the event that venting is required and the reactor main steam isolation valves are closed.

Normal operation of the emergency condensers is in the "standby" mode. In this mode the emergency condenser steam supply lines from reactor to emergency condensers are continuously vented to the main steam lines. This allows for immediate actuation on system initiation.

Emergency condenser isolation is required in the event of tube failure or emergency condenser steam line break. Radiation sensors and flow sensors are utilized to accomplish the isolation, which is to close the steam isolation valves, the vent valves, the drain valves and the condensate return valves for the effected system #11 or #12.

As a result of the modification made in 1981, complete auto-isolation of the effected emergency condenser system #11 or #12 can not be accomplished. This is due to the fact that vent blocking valve #BV-05-01 for #11 system and vent blocking valve BV-05-04 for #12 system are no longer in the "auto-isolation" scheme.

This could result in reactor steam from the uneffected emergency condenser system passing through its steam line vents through a common vent line into the effected emergency condenser and possibly through a failed tube or tubes to the shell side and to atmosphere.

To preclude this possibility, Standing Order #30, "Emergency Condenser Isolation" has been issued which details that whenever emergency condenser system isolation is required, all auto-isolation valves be checked as closed and that remote manual vent blocking valves BV-05-01 and BV-05-04 be closed for the effected system. Remote manual operation of these valves is accomplished from the main control room.

Since the startup of the unit after the 1981 refuel outage, no emergency condenser system isolations have been required and therefore, no risks to the general public have resulted from this postulated leakage path.