

APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Report: 50-285/82-05

License: DPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: March 1-31, 1982

Inspector: LAYandell 4/8/82
L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector Date

Inspector: LAYandell 4/8/82
for L. J. Callan, Resident Reactor Inspector Date

Approved By: R. E. Hall 4/14/82
R. E. Hall, Chief, Reactor Project Section C Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted during period of March 1-31, 1982 (Report 50-285/82-05)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including (1) Licensee Event Reports Follow Up; (2) Operational Safety Verification; (3) Surveillance Testing; (4) Maintenance; and (5) Plant Operations. The inspection involved 104 inspector-hours by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*S. C. Stevens, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
W. G. Gates, Supervisor, Operations
J. R. Nielsen, Field Supervisor, Communications Department
K. C. Hyde, Test Engineer

*Denotes those attending exit interview.

The NRC inspectors also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection. These employees included licensed and unlicensed operators, craftsmen, engineers, and office personnel.

2. Follow Up on Licensee Event Reports

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that:

- . Correct reporting requirements were met.
- . Proper corrective action was identified and taken.
- . Licensee administrative procedures were followed in the evaluation and review of the event.

LER's reviewed included:

LER 81-008, Failure of 86B/CRHS (Containment Radiation High Signal) lock-out relay.

LER 81-009, Component Cooling Water leak in containment cooling fan/coil VA-7C/VA-8A.

LER 81-010, Recirculation Actuation Signal level switch channels found out of setpoint tolerances during surveillance test.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspectors performed certain activities as described below to ascertain that the facility is being maintained safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee's management control system is effective.

- a. The NRC inspectors made several control room observations to verify:
(1) licensee adherence to selected Technical Specifications, (2) operator

adherence to approved procedures, and (3) proper control room and shift manning. The NRC inspectors reviewed selected logs and records to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. The licensee's equipment control was reviewed for proper implementation by: (1) reviewing the maintenance order and tag-out logs, and (2) verification of "return to operable status of selected safety-related components and systems." The NRC inspectors observed shift turnovers and reviewed shift turnover sheets.

- b. The NRC inspectors toured the plant at various times during the inspection period to determine and/or verify equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, safety, and general housekeeping. These observations included the following:
 - (1) General plant and equipment condition
 - (2) Fire hazards
 - (3) Control of combustible material
 - (4) Presence of fire watches when required
 - (5) Physical security
- c. The NRC inspectors verified the operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System by performing a walk-down of the accessible portions of the system in accordance with the valve checklist in Surveillance Test (ST) Procedure ST-FW-1, Section F.1.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Surveillance Observations

The NRC inspector witnessed the monthly test of No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (Surveillance Test Procedure ST-ESF-6). The NRC inspector determined, through direct observation and through review of licensee documentation, that the Surveillance Test procedure conformed to Technical Specification requirements and received proper licensee review/approval, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met during the test, and that the test data were recorded accurately and completely. During the conduct of the Surveillance Test, the licensee had to secure No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator prior to the completion of its one hour test run due to a cooling water leak from a fitting on a 1/2" line. The NRC inspector observed portions of the repair of this leak, verified that the licensee demonstrated the operability of No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator during the period that No. 2 was inoperable with the leak, and reviewed the licensee's test documentation to verify that the Surveillance Test on No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator was successfully completed after the cooling water leak was repaired.

The NRC inspector witnessed the initial 18-month Halon System Surveillance Test (ST-FP-10, Section F.2), which included detector testing and ventilation damper operation in the control, switchgear, and cable spreading rooms. A QC representative was present as required by the test, and a fire watch was posted while the Halon System was deactivated. The test was terminated on the first day when manual actuation failed to provide an audible alarm. This matter was corrected by Safety Related Design Change Order 82-5 and the test was completed the following day. Maintenance Order (MO) 14265 was written to correct dual indication on Dampers VA-97A&B.

The NRC inspector witnessed Surveillance Test ST-WD-1, "Waste Disposal System Leak Rate," Sections F.1, F.2, and F.3, which is the walk down of portions of the waste disposal system for ISI determination of leakage. Procedure Change 8102 was issued on Section F.1 to include the new piping and valve added during the last outage.

The NRC inspector witnessed the testing of Containment Isolation Valves under ST-ISI-WD-1, Section F.1. During the test, Valve HCV-506A failed to close in AUTO. Maintenance Order 14342 was written to investigate and repair, and the NRC inspector observed the valve being "failed closed" locally to establish containment integrity. Once repairs were completed, the valve was re-tested and the system returned to normal.

Additionally, the NRC inspector witnessed portions of the following Surveillance Test activities:

- . Weekly "Reactivity Anomalies" Determination (ST-RA-1)
- . Monthly Channel "A" Safety Injection Actuation Signal Test (ST-ESF-2)
- . Quarterly testing of the Steam Block Valves to FW-10 (ST-ISI-MS-1)

In all the Surveillance Tests described above, the NRC inspector verified that:

- . testing was scheduled in accordance with Technical Specification requirements
- . procedures were being followed
- . qualified personnel were performing the tests
- . Limiting Conditions for Operation were being met
- . test data were being accurately recorded

The NRC inspector reviewed the Reactor Protective System (RPS) Surveillance Test Procedures for the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Channels (Procedure ST-RPS-4), and the High Pressurizer Pressure Trip Channels (Procedure ST-RPS-5).

The purpose of this review was to verify that the licensee's method for establishing, and then subsequently checking, the RPS Trip Setpoints would adequately ensure that the Limiting Safety System Settings established by Technical Specification 1.3 would not be exceeded or, if exceeded, would be identified. To accomplish this, the NRC inspector met with licensee Instrumentation and Controls personnel and reviewed the technical basis for selected RPS trip voltage setpoints that were checked during the monthly surveillance tests. The NRC inspector confirmed that the licensee's methodology appeared adequate and had no further questions.

The NRC inspector met with personnel from the OPPD Communications Section and observed the quarterly tests on the Emergency Warning Sirens Nos. 20, 57, and 93. At each siren location, the counter value was logged for use later in verifying the total number of valid signals received at the device during the testing period. A "growl" test was performed at each location using a portable transmitter to simulate the main transmitter signal from the downtown OPPD facility. This was the first quarterly test cycle after original installation tests, and the log book seemed up to date and in order.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance

The NRC inspector observed portions of the work being done under MO 14275, "Repair of Vent Header Valve," and witnessed the final QC inspection.

During Auxiliary Building tours, the NRC inspector observed final preparations for pouring concrete walls in the Control Room Corridor, and at Control Panel AI-100. Installation is continuing on the Post Accident Sampling System (NUREG 0737, Item II.B.3) in accordance with Field Change 79-191 and Drawing 54-EP-1A-9.

Maintenance Order 14342 was written when Valve HCV-506A failed to close in AUTO during a Surveillance Test. The MO was written to cover both HCV-506A and HCV-506B, and the NRC inspector verified that Technical Specification requirements were met during this time of maintenance. Valve HCV-506B was found satisfactory, but the solenoid for HCV-506A had a stuck plunger that required cleaning. At the completion of repairs, the NRC inspector witnessed the retesting of the valve in accordance with ST-ISI-WD-1, Section F.1.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives on April 2, 1982, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.