NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAPD

In the Matter of:

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION

UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-443-OL

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

> Thursday, May 6, 1982 2nd Floor Courtroom Portsmouth District Court Portsmouth, New Hampshire

A prehearing conference in the above-entitled matter convened, pursuant to Notice, at 9:50 a.m.

BEFORE:

HELEN F. HOYT, Chairperson Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

DR. EMMETH A. LUEBKE, Member Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

DR. OSCAR PARIS, Member Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Applicant:

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Boston, Massachusetts 02110

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On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff:

ROY P. LESSY, Esq.

ROBERT G. PEPLIS, Esq.

Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel
Office of the Executive Legal Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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On behalf of the State of New Hampshire:

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On behalf of the State of Maine:

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On behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

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On behalf of the Town of South Hampton:

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On behalf of Sun Valley Association:

LAWRENCE EDELMAN, Esq.
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On behalf of the Society for the Protection of the Environment in Southeastern New Hampshire:

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On behalf of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution:

WILLIAM JOPDAN, Esq.
DIANE CURRAN, Esq.
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1725 I Street, N. W.
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On behalf of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League:

ROBERT BACKUS, Esq. 116 Lowell Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105

On behalf of the Coastal Chamber of Commerce:

BEVERLY HOLLINGSWORTH, Esq. 209 Winnacannet Road Hampton, New Hampshire

PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE HOYT: The hearing will come to order.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has assigned for hearings before this Board the case of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire in Docket Nos. 50-443-OL and 50-444-OL in the Application for an operating license for the Public Service Company of New Hampshire.

The members of this Board are--My name is Helen F. Hoyt, the Chairperson of the Board. To my immediate left is Dr. Emmeth Luebke, and to my immediate right is Dr. Oscar Paris.

We have distributed copies of the Statement of Policy on the Conduct of License Proceedings to all the parties present; and let me correct that to say all the Intervenors, the Applicant, and the Staff here this morning. That has been done prior to going on the record here.

At this time I will take appearances of counsel.

First, may I have the appearance of counsel for the Applicant, again, sir?

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson, members of the Board, my name is Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. I am a member of the firm of Ropes & Gray, 225 Franklin Street, Boston, Massachusetts. With me to my right is Robert K. Gad, III, and we will appear for the Applicants in this proceeding.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you, sir.

MR. LESSY: May it please the Board, my name is Roy P.

Lessy, Jr., Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel, appearing on behalf of the NRC Staff. To my left, the Board's right, is Mr. Robert G. Perlis, also Counsel for the NRC Staff.

JUDGE HOYT: Now, sir.

MR. KINDER: Good morning, Judge Hoyt. My name is Tupper Kinder and I'm Assistant Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire.

To my left is Dana Bisbee also with the Office of Attorney General. We appear for the State of New Hampshire and its Attorney General.

MS. SMOTWELL: Madam Chairperson, members of the Board, my name is JoAnn Shotwell. I'm an Assistant Attorney General and I represent the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

MR. MCDERMOTT: May it please the Board, my name is Edward J. McDermott of the Firm of Sanders and McDermott and I represent the Town of South Hampton.

MR. EDELMAN: Good morning. My name is Lawrence

Edelman. I'm with the Law Firm of Sanders & McDermott of Hampton.

I represent the Sun Valley Association.

MR. CHIESA: May it please the Court, Madam Chairperson, my name is Robert Chiesa and I'm representing the Society for the Protection of the Environment of Southeaster New Hampshire.

JUDGE HOYT: Sir, would you like to come over here in the Jury Box with the other Counsel?

MR. CHIESA: I would be delighted.

MR. JORDAN: Judge Hoyt, members of the Board, I'm William Jordan of the Law Firm Harmon & Weiss, Washington, D.C.

With me is Diane Curran my Associate. We are here on behalf of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution.

MR. BACKUS: Madam Chairman, my name is Robert Backus of Manchester, New Hampshire. I appear on behalf of the Intervenor, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. AHRENS: May it please the Board, my name is Phil Ahrens, Assistant Attorney General appearing on the behalf of the State of Maine.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you, sir.

MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: Good morning. My name is Beverly Hollingsworth and I'm appearing on behalf of the Coastal Chamber of Commerce.

JUDGE HOYT: Are you an Attorney, ma'am?

MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: No, I'm not.

JUDGE HOYT: Who filed a Petition of Intervention in this case?

MS. HOLLINGSWORTH: I believe Mr. Kendrik filed a petition for the Coastal Chamber of Commerce. He is no longer the Director, and as far as receiving the papers through the present Board of Directors, and I'm told we are still in the intervening section, I'm not familiar with anything other than that. It was the Hampton Beach Chamber of Commerce. It has a

new name.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. We've had some problems in beginning this proceeding through the Order that was issued in March. I have become conscious of a number of difficulties that the parties have mentioned concerning various inability to either receive the service on the Order or some combination of other factors of which they have not met the deadlines of this Order that we issued on the 6th of March.

One of the biggest problems I've seen is that no one seems to have a service list. I think everybody has a different combination of parties on the service list. Since I would rather get started off on the right foot in this case and avoid problems with matters that should not become of great magnitude, I took a moment to go into the official documents of the Commission; that is, the documents of the Secretary of the Commission. I have obtained copies of the service lists as they are constituted by that Office; that is, the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, and I have copies of these service lists for you if you wish to take one.

One of the parties, and I believe it was you, Mr. Backus, noted that you had not been served with various things. I think perhaps your case, if I may use it to illustrate some of the difficulties that I found, was that the Petition to Intervene that you had filed was sent in its original form to the Office of the Executive Legal Director where we ultimately found it.

I believe Mr. Lessy had that forwarded to the Secretary where it is now properly filed.

Service on the various parties is done by the Secretary and all the Orders of this Board will be sent through the Secretary and we will use this service list that the Secretary has. Despite this, your name did not appear on the service list because you did not file your pleas with the Secretary of the Commission. We have, as you will note, placed your name on the service list and the Secretary has made that correction.

I realize that sometimes in dealing with governmental bodies, it is very easy to assume if you serve one, you serve all.

Let me assure you, that's not necessarily true.

Please do file your future pleadings with the Secretary. I noticed in one of the pleas that you filed in regard to this hearing, you say you have not received service of the Order. Your name did appear on the service list of the Secretary and, as you will notice, it has a date beside it. That's the date that you were placed on the service list for this case. So there has been service made. Whether you received it or not is another matter. We can only assume that if the pleading is filed in the regular course of the Postal Service, it will be delivered to you.

So before we have any future pleadings, any allegation made that you were not served, let me urge you to first of all check your own files to be sure that it isn't behind the cabinet.

MS. SHOTWELL: I did so, ma'am, but I will be sure to

do that.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

For the Applicant, we have not received on this Board copies of your Application. I find that our Office has nothing from you. I'm sorry, but that's the case. So if you would send us copies of the books that you usually serve on the Board, I would appreciate it.

Please send it to the Office in Bethesda. We don't want to carry those back with us.

Mr. Lessy, let me bring to you one matter; that is, any matter of this Board, and let me be very clear with you, that is any Order of this Board will be served by the Secretary. We will urge you to make any appropriate arrangements that you feel necessary to insure that you receive service.

However, I think in order that we may have the assurance that all parties are served simultaneously, that will have to be the best plan that we can come up with.

We have no other preliminary types of problems to bring up. Do any of the parties wish to make any preliminary--

MR. BACKUS: I have just a question, Madam Chairman.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sure.

MR. BACKUS: Some of the names of this service list are names of people that are not here. I know one, for example, Mr. Wight. I believe I have a piece of correspondence from him to Attorney Kinder saying that he no longer cared to appear.

So I'm wondering if we are going to be, as a result of this pre-hearing conference, if we will be getting an amended service list. I always have concern about keeping the service list as sparse as possible.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Backus, I think perhaps you are confusing the service list with parties or Intervenors. At this point we have a number of Intervenors who have not yet become parties. They are on that service list as well, as you well know.

However, you may be on the service list if you wish and in the case of the person you mentioned, I think will probably remain on it. He has withdrawn as Judge Luebke has reminded me but he will remain on the service list unless he wishes to be removed.

MR. BACKUS: Does that imply then that for all parties that are filing something with this Board, that he should also be served? I mean that's what I took a service list to mean?

JUDGE HOYT: Well, for whatever reason Mr. Wight is still on that list, we will continue to serve him. I would assume that if he has withdrawn, the Secretary will very probably withdraw his name from the list if he wishes to have it withdrawn. I don't recall exactly what Mr. Wight said in his withdrawal.

However, many people may remain on the service list that are not necessarily the parties.

MR. BACKUS: I would just suggest that maybe when we are through with this prehearing conference, and I assume this Board will be issuing an Order setting forth its Decision on the various petitions, at that time we might be given an amended service list of those people who are parties who are required to receive copies of all Pleadings.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. What we'll do is make a concerted effort with the Secretary to see that the service list is amended. We will have an amended service list available at the next prehearing conference.

MR. LESSY: I have one minor point, if it pleases the Board?

JUDGE HOYT: Sure.

MR. LESSY: The service list here of the Docketing and Service Section just says, counsel for NRC Staff. It would probably save a few days if the parties could insert my name and the name of Mr. Perlis also. It would save someone the time it takes to look up the name of the counsel in the book, and that's liable to take more time than you think.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, could I suggest that perhaps we could ask the Secretary to amend the search list, and place your name on it as such.

MR. LESSY: Well, the Secretary's office, your Honor, traditionally uses this form of delegation. It doesn't use a particular individual for a lot of reasons that aren't really

New Hampshire or Boston, it would be helpful to me, particularly on documents that have a time sensitivity, if Mr. Perlis' name and my name were on there. It would save a whole additional process of mailroom people trying to figure out to whom it should go to.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. I think Mr. Lessy's point is well taken. You may not be aware that, as the NRC, we are in several different buildings, distributed throughout the Washington area. We have a mail system that probably makes the Pony Express look like Express Mail. It's just very difficult for us to always get the mail promptly. And, Mr. Lessy has a point well taken, when you happen to have sensitive documents, if you will.

Mr. Dignan, do you have anything, sir?
MR. DIGNAN: No.

JUDGE HOYT: Any other preliminary matters?

VOICE IN BACK OF ROOM: I'm from the--

JUDGE HOYT: Sir, sir. I do not believe that you have made an appearance on this record as counsel for any of the organizations, and therefore, as our Order indicated to you, we will not take any public testimony or statements here. I must ask you to refrain from speaking, sir.

VOICE IN BACK OF ROOM: I'm speaking on behalf of-JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting) Sir, I think I just
indicated to you that you would not speak on behalf of any

to you.

party that is not present at this Hearing this morning. I would appreciate you not interrupting the proceedings again. Thank you, sir.

VOICE IN BACK OF ROOM: Do I understand that
JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting) Sir, please be seated.

VOICE IN BACK OF ROOM: It's typical of the conduct of

the NRC. When it comes to a Hearing, the citizens who live here
JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting) Sir, I'm trying to be

courteous to you, please be seated.

VOICE IN BACK OF ROOM: And, I'm trying to be courteous

JUDGE HOYT: We have received two responses to our Order of March 12. There are two that have met the filing deadline that we have said in that Order, one is the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, and the other one was the State of New Hampshire.

Any particular discussion do we need to have on these two?

MR. BACKUS: Are you asking to have arguments addressed in support of these contentions?

First of all, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, if you wish.

MR. BACKUS: And, this is just on the first?

JUDGE HOYT: I believe there are three contentions,

25 or four. Yes, four.

MR. BACKUS: Four contentions. Well, Madam airman, and Members of the Board, as you pointed out in the initial submission, on behalf of the Seacoast Anti Pollution League, we did file four contentions. The first one, which is one that's been filed in various forms by several other parties, was that emergency planning cannot reasonably assure that the public health and safety will be protected at the Seabrook site.

Now, various parties, and I believe the Applicants have pointed out that some portions of this contention were somewhat inartfully worded in that we described the concern as being the site there when we intended to say, and we urge that the Board treat this as being amended to say that the concern is that no determination has ever been made that the Seabrook Emergency Protection Zone to be established, can be evacuated in time to avoid a major adverse effect from radiation in the event of a major accident.

There has been, additionally, an objection by the staff, I believe on the grounds of vagueness, and I would simply say that as I understand the prior Decisions of this Commission and its various licensing Boards, that our pleading practice here is, as was said in the Commonwealth Edison case, in 12 NRC 687 -- analagous to the pleading traditionally employed in Judicial proceedings in the Federal Courts; that is, we are under a Notice Pleading System here, as I understand it. And, I submit that this contention and the other contentions, which we

have set forth, are fully sufficient at this stage of the proceedings, when we are merely at the first prehearing conference— We do not have final safety evaluation from the staff, final environmental report, fully sufficient to advise the parties and the Board of the areas of concern that we feel must be addressed, and in which the Applicant has the burden of proving a proper resolution of the issue.

We have no objection to the idea that these contentions can be further refined as Discovery proceeds and additional material is developed. But, I do think that for SAPL, as to Contention No. 1, and now I'm speaking in support of the other contentions as well, has set forth under a Notice Pleading requirement, a fully sufficient basis for its participation in this Proceeding, and we look forward to participating in a responsible way, as we always have.

With regard to Contention No. 2 that had to do with the operation of the proposed condenser cooling system: Now, as I think the Board will be aware from the submissions on this matter, and maybe its general background on this issue, the condenser cooling system at Seabrook was, has been, and still is, a controversial issue with regard to this plan. It is proposed to use once-through cooling, as you know, and with very large amounts of water taken from an offshore port, just outside of Hampton Harbor, for condenser cooling. Until very recently, everybody associated with this project believes that the

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Applicant is committed to running the system in conjunction with a back-flushing operation, but which the bio-fouling in those tunnels; that is, the marine growth that one would inevitably expect in a salt water environment and one that is going to use heated salt water, too, will be affected by the growth of various organisms, particularly muscles, I guess, and that the method that the Applicant was going to be using to address this was going to be periodically, either shutting down or decreasing power output from the Plant, reversing the flow of water to the tunnels and killing all those organisms by thermal shock by intentionally putting through these tunnels water at such a temperature that they couldn't survive. I believe it is 120 degrees farenheit at the discharge, during the back-flushing operation. We have recently learned in the Public Information Hearing held in Seabrook with the Staff that the Applicant is now considering that it may want to abandon that method of bio-fouling control in favor of a method of chlorine injection.

Both the State and the EPA permits the Applicant now has contain very strict limitations in the amount of residual chlorine that would be allowed to be added to the cooling water. It appears that the Applicant is again changing its plans, or may be.

This contention is directed toward that; because SAPL has had a particular interest in the quality of the marine environment and has been particularly interested in those issues, and the response that we get is that this is

premature from the Applicant.

Well, I submit, Madam Chairman, if the Applicant is reserving to itself, as I think it is, the possibility of going back to the Environmental Protection Agency for an amendment to its permit, and for approval for a new system, using a biocide instead of heat killing, that we are certainly appropriately entitled, and it is not premature for us to reserve the right to contend that that makes the operation of the plant inappropriate on a cost benefit basis. And, that's what we are suggesting with that contention.

With regard to contention number three, which is, that the operation of the proposed nuclear plant, will have an unreasonable adverse affect upon the economic well being of the seacoast area. The response that we got to this was, that this had been litigated in the construction permit proceedings.

Indeed, Madam Chairman and Members of the Board, it is true. This issue was raised, in a construction permit proceedings. However, in reading the regulatory decisions, issued by licensing boards, I would submit that this issue is still ripe for consideration in this operating license proceeding. I wanted to cite particularly the Alabama Power Case, which is a decision of the Commission in 1974.

have

JUDGE HOYT: Do you/a citation of that cas	DGE HOYT	GE HOYT: Do you/a	citation	OI	that	case,	sir?
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MR. BACKUS: CLI-7412 and it looks like my Xerox copy did not get the NRC number.

MR. LESSY: It would be 7AEC 210.

JUDGE HOYT: That's 7--

MR. LESSY: 7 Atomic Energy Commission Reports, beginning at page 210.

JUDGE HOYT: 210?

MR. BACKUS: Right. There the Commission said that the doctrines of res judicata collateral estoppel between construction permit proceedings and operating licensing proceedings should be applied with "sensitive regard for any supported dissertion of changed circumstances or the possible existence of some special public interest factors in the particular case."

The Commission also said, "In the future we shall ex ct licensing boards to solicit a response from any prospective interveners whose contention is attacked by another party on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds, prior to deciding a matter."

Now, with that in mind, Madam Chairman, I respectively submit that this contention, and the next one where we get the same objection, should be admitted in this proceeding on the grounds of changed circumstances.

At the time we did the construction permit proceeding, of course, there were Regulations that required protective action

be limited to the so-called low population zone. In the case of the Seabrook reactors, that was a circle that was originally drawn a mile and a half around the reactors. As a result of subsequent appeals, it was subsequently reduced, those appeals resulting in a different decision on what the population center was, the circle was drawn into a mile and a quarter.

In any event, the decisions made in the construction permit proceeding were that there was an LPZ a mile and a quarter around the reactors and that the Commission did not have the authority and therefore, did not need to consider taking protective action for people beyond a mile and a quarter from the reactors.

Today, as everybody in this room I am sure is aware and certainly members of this Board are aware, we have Regulations declaring that the protection of people not within the Low Population Zone, but within an Emergency Planning Zone of approximately ten miles from plume exposure, and a fifty mile zone for ingestion exposure, must be given consideration. That, I think is a changed circumstance and has always been a consideration of the seacoast. This is a heavily tourist dependent area as the Board will be aware and can see that the operation of this plant with its risk of hazard and even the reports of a hazard, and even the reports of hazard at another facility, will have a devastating impact on the major business in this area which is tourism.

Now, that issue was dealt, as I say, in the construction

pemit proceeding but under different standards. The change today is that we now have legal standards embodied in the Commission's Regulations which recognize that that hazard extends beyond a mile and a quarter around the plant.

In addition, of course, we've just had the operating history of nuclear plants since that time. In particular we have had the event at Three Mile Island with the recommended evacuation around that plant, and the spontaneous evacuation far in excess of that that was recommended by that of the Governor of Pennsylvania. All of these, I think, require that this operating license proceeding that the issue of the economic operation of this plant on the citizens within the area within the emergency protection zone, where ever that may be drawn, need to be considered and I submit that this is an appropriate contention to be considered in this proceeding.

The fourth contention we filed originally met the same objection, Madam Chairman. That was that the decommissioning of the Seabrook Plant, should it receive its operating permit and actually operate, will have a major long term impact on the health and well being of the citizens in the area of the facility.

There again, it is true that there was some testimony at the construction permit proceeding on the decommissioning of the Seabrook plant. At that time, we were told that all that was necessary was that there was a general demonstration of the

capability for decommissioning the plant, that no particular plan for decommissioning had to be devised, that there did not need to be a choice made between mothballing and total removal whatever.

Today, we are talking about not siting the plant but an operating license for the plant. I think there again, there are changed circumstances that require that this issue now be looked at in greater detail.

For example, one of the things that my clients and many of the others in the area are concerned about, is whether or not in the construction of this facility itself which we will be examining in detail in this proceeding, has provision to facilitate the decommissioning of this facility when its going to be ending its useful life, whenever that be. In other words, I am suggesting that a different standard was applied at the construction permit proceeding when the only concern was, is there a technology out there that can handle this problem? No need to consider the likelihood of what the choice of technology, is there a technology out there.

I think the operating licensing proceeding, it is appropriate and we think necessary to look at this issue with somewhat more detail with full awareness that decommissioning, if the plant operates, is granted an operating license, is not something that is going to happen now but something that will become inevitable and we will be dealing with a particular

design, with particular construction features which need to be considered in the area of decommissioning.

That basically, Madam Chairman and members of the Board, is my additional comments on the four issues we originally submitted and my response to the written objection that we got from the Applicant and the Staff.

JUDGE HOYT: Dr. Paris?

JUDGE PARISH: Mr. Backus, are you suggesting with regard to Contention No. 1 that you want the language changed to read

Emergency Planning cannot reasonably assure that the public health and safety will be protected in the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone?

MR. BACKUS: Yes.

JUDGE PARISH: With regard to No. 3, you talked about the Emergency Planning Zone with reference to that contention.

I didn't quite get the nexus you were making between that and economic well being. Can you say anything/illuminate that for me?

MR. BACKUS: Okay, I'll try. What I was addressing was the contention that this issue had already been determined at the construction permit stage. The nexus is that the Commission has itself now, as a result of Regulation changes resulting out of Three Mile Island, recognized that a possibility exists for protective action within the entire Emergency Planning Zone. Now the concern here is that we have a massive nuclear facility located right behind the State's most popular tourist

attraction, Hampton Beach. The characteristics of this region are such--Let me back up. Hampton Beach is not the only beach in New England. It's not the only place that people can go for vacations.

The evidence we would present on this issue would involve some historical evidence about past problems, the beach, tourist business, in light of problems, problems at the beach, problems or riots, disorder and so forth and the kind of impact you can have on business at the beach.

What we intend to try and show this Board, and we think the Applicant has a duty to respond or a duty to prove that this affect will not occur, is that the Seabrook plant if it has an accident or a report of an accident, even reports of accidents at other similar facilities at a time when the booking season is at its height in this area, it can have a devastating economic impact. It seems to me that the Commission in saying that there is an Emergency Planning Zone, now is not going encompass just the marsh as with the case with LPZ, but Hampton and Seabrook, North Hampton beaches, and a good many towns around them where there are major tourist facilities, that that is a recognition that we have a concern for economic well being that will be generated out of the drawing of that circle at that level.

JUDGE PARISH: So in other words, you are contending that if Seabrook and Hampton Beach are, when they become incorporated in the Emergency Planning Zone, tourists will go

MR. BACKUS: That's the idea.

JUDGE PARISH: Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: Dr. Luebke?

JUDGE LUEBKE: Mr. Backus, I'm looking at the initial decision dated June 29, 1976 and up in the corner it says LBP 77-26 which I think is some kind of reference number. I'm on page 881 on the subject of tourism which says that Intervenors contend that the facility will have an adverse impact on the tourism industry in the Hampton-Seabrook beach areas.

Paragraph 92 says, "The Board finds that while there is no way to determine the exact impact on tourism in Hampton-Seabrook which would result from the plant, there is no basis at this time for finding that Seabrook would have any adverse affect on tourism."

Do I understand you to say you intend to carry this thing--you keep mentioning ten and fifty miles, does that mean you are talking about beaches fifty miles up and down the coast here? Is that your intention? I think the Seabrook-Hampton area was litigated in the construction permit from what I read here.

MR. BACKUS: All I'm saying, sir, is that I am trying to meet the language of the case I just cited, the Commonwealth Edison Case. Before res judicata is applied to an issue that was dealt with in the construction permit, it has to be with a sensitive regard to what actually was litigaged and with regard

me absolutely clear that there are changed circumstances, it seems to me absolutely clear that there are changed circumstances here, changed circumstances as a result of the accident of Three Mile Island itself and as a result of the Commission's response to that.

The concern we may have had during the construction permit was by this Commission's Regulations in essence, limited to the Low Population Zone. The Board was entitled to take account of that. Now we have going on, as a result of this Commission's change of its Regulations, enormously controversial attempts to plan Emergency Planning in each of the towns within the Emergency Planning Zone. All of that, I submit, makes a proper contention as to whether or not that concern, if the plant operates, will be translated into an adverse economic affect. I think this is an entirely appropriate issue to be admitted.

Now, of course, we are only talking here about whether a contention could be admitted before this Board. We don't have any evidence on the issue yet. I think the decisions of the Commission and its Appeal Board and its Licensing Board have been very clear that this Board is not going to decide on the merits of anything at this point, simply whether we have a contention that should be brought forward.

I can tell you, sir and members of this Board, I think there is no issue of greater concern in this area than this one.

I think there are people here also that could speak to that better than I perhaps since I don't happen to live in this area. I do

think there are changed circumstances about this issue and the decision of the Licensing Board that you just quoted there, certainly should not be res judicata on this point.

Indeed, from what I heard you read, they said at this time. Well, a lot has happened since that time.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, if I understand you correctly, your changed circumstances emphasize more things like Three Mile Island incident than it does ten and fifty mile Emergency Zones.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Backus, are the changed circumstances that you are addressing the same as those that were addressed in the interim policy statement, issued June 13, 1980 and contained in 45, Federal Register 40101?

MR. BACKUS: Well, we have a supplemental contention on that, Madam Chairman.

JUDGE HOYT: This is in regard to your contention number three, which is what you were discussing.

MR. BACKUS: Well, as I understand it, and I don't have the June 13, 1980 policy statement here with me--

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Dignan, do you happen to have that with you?

MR. DIGNAN: I was just looking, Madam Chairman. It may be in the CCH.

JUDGE HOYT: Wait a moment. If it can be located fairly rapid. I don't want to put you through too much trouble.

Let me approach this, Mr. Backus, in another direction, then.

MR. BACKUS: I'm generally familiar with the policy.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I'm sure you are. The Applicant's response to the supplement to the Petition to Intervene and for Further Statement, contentions on behalf of the Seacoast Anti Pollution League, filed by the Applicant, suggested an alternative wording of your contention number three. What I'm really driving at is whether or not you would be willing to

accept the alternative proposal of the Applicant. Are you aware of that?

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson, I think some confusion is getting into the record. As I understood Mr. Backus, and he will correct me if I'm wrong, he was addressing his original Contention No. 3, not his supplemental Contention No. 3.

MR. BACKUS: That's right.

MR. DIGNAN: I stand-- Mr. Gad will address it at the appropriate time. We stand on the position that No. 3, original, should stay out. It is true, we did try to reword the supplemental contention. I thought that was what Mr. Backus was addressing at this time.

JUDGE HOYT: That's what I was trying to determine.

You've answered the question, and I think, Mr. Backus, that takes care of that.

MR. BACKUS: That's right.

JUDGE HOYT: It's the original Contention No. 3 that you were addressing.

MR. BACKUS: Yes, ma'am.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you want to add anything to your remarks on the supplemental No. 3?

MR. BACKUS: From the way you started, ma'am, I thought you were going to have me address my original Contentions, and then maybe Mr. Kinder, who also filed at that time, before he went on to the supplemental ones, but--

JUDGE HOYT: Perhaps that would be the better way to proceed. I agree with you, sir. Thank you.

Mr. Lessy, do you have anything you want to say?

MR. LESSY: There are a few points, your Honor. We have, first of all, a response to Mr. Backus -- If the Board pleases, I would like to remain sitting, because there are so many papers here.

JUDGE HOYT: Please do, Mr. Lessy. No problem.

MR. LESSY: Thank you. The test, under the Farley
Decision, which Mr. Backus referenced in terms of his Contention
Nos. 3 and 4, to which there was this question of the fact,
as he previously stated, was litigated, is not just merely
the test of changed circumstances. In Farley, the Commission
barred licensing Boards to reconsider matters at the operating
license stage, which were considered by construction permit
boards, absent two things. First, and I quote: "Significant
supervening developments, having a possible material bearing
upon previously adjudicated issues." And the second is, and I
quote again: "The presence of some unusual factor, having
special public interest implications." That language would be
at 7 AEC, Atomic Energy Commission Reports, at Page 216.

I would read that language as opposing a higher thresh-hold than Mr. Backus argued, simply-- Maybe he was referring to it in a shorthand manner, as changed circumstances.

"Significant supervening developments, having a possible material

bearing upon previously adjudicated issues."

The second thing that was not addressed, and I would just like to underscore, since it is in our filings, is that we are here talking about an environmental issue, and the Commission's regulations which implement NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, state that review of the operating license stage is, as a general matter, limited to a consideration of relevant information which has arisen since the authorization of the construction permit.

That's interpreted as-- Again, you wouldn't necessarily have to use the term, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but it's used in a jurisdictional sense, to mean, the scope of environmental review at the OL stage, by regulation and by one Court Decision, limits the scope of the OL Hearing for that.

T've cited those regulations and the relevant court case on Page 5 of my response to SAPL's original Petition. It's 10CFR, Section 51.21, and Section 51.23d.

I, like some of the Board members, apparently didn't really see the rexus between the change in Emergency Planning Rules, and Economic Effect.

I think litigation of Emergency Planning Contentions is one thing; relitigation of the economic effects of the construction of the Seabrook Facility, is something entirely different.

With respect to the first Contention that Mr. Backus

addressed, he mentioned briefly, in his amended Emergency Planning question, in terms of Contention, we have Notice Pleading here.

That is true, but it is also true, by the Commission's Decisions, that we shouldn't have to engage in Discovery to find out really what you want to litigate.

The Contention, as reworded, is vague, and not specific, for the reasons as outlined on Page 6 in my Pleading. I thought there was a problem.

On the second Contention, which concern the proposed condenser cooling system, as I listened to the argument, I think Mr. Backus realized that there is no Proposal before the NRC to modify the existing construction permit, as I understand it.

There may be pending requests for modification before the Environmental Protection Agency, or other such requests.

If the Application were to be modified and produce a change in the cooling system, by a number of decisions, the EPA must first approve that. So, I don't know if it's efficient for the Licensing Board to spend time-- you know, us to spend time on Discovery and Litigation of a non-change, or non-proposal in the plant.

That underscores the basis for our staff's position on this one, at this point at least, the proffered contention is speculative and premature.

If, in fact, there's an amendment to the Application before the NRC, then that's a different story.

One final comment on SAPL's fourth proposed original contention, which is decomissioning. I believe we pointed this out in our original response. As I read it, there was a question raised by SAPL as to the financial qualification of the Applicants to implement a decomissioning plan, and almost coterminously with the filing of that contention, in 47 Federal Register, 13750, and I don't believe Mr. Backus is aware of this, that the Commission has acted to eliminate the consideration of financial qualification issues at the operating license stage.

Not only was this litigated previously, but the scope of that contention really isn't an operating license issue jurisdictionally, in any event. Basically, that's another point with respect to SAPL's proposed fourth contention that I wanted to briefly emphasize.

That's all I have at this point, unless the Board has any questions.

JUDGE HOYT: Dr. Paris?

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Lessy, then I take it you would not consider the institution of a Ten Mile Emergency Planning Zone, as opposed to the Low Population Zone, that was initially approved, to meet the test in Farley? With regard to economic impact?

MR. LESSEY: That's correct.

MR. LESSY: If you want me to elaborate on the point, as I indicated Emergency Planning Contentions can be crafted to be litigated in this context but the economic affects in this area were litigated before as Judge Luebke pointed out and I don't see that a change in drawing of the lines is going to affect the question of tourism in the area. I don't think that meets the rather significant threshold of what the Commission set forth in Farley and is set forth in the Commission's Regulations.

in Emergency Planning context.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson, members of the Board, with your permission, my partner, Mr. Gad will address the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Mr. Gad.

MR. GAD: May it please the Board, the Applicant too has filed written response as to SAPL's original contentions and did so on April 15th. I don't want to be duly repetitious when measured either against that or with what we've heard this morning so I will just summarize.

SAPL's first proposed Contention relates to Emergency Planning. We've already stated that we think it is a legitimate contention that the Applicant's proposed plans do not meet the requirements of the EPZ Regulation and the EPZ Appendix. The difficulty we suggest, with the phraseology of SAPL's first proposed contention, is not limited solely to its on site or

off site scope but includes the fact that as drafted, the sample proposed Contention would measure these Emergency Plans against some standard other than the Regulations. The decisions of this Agency are fairly plan that if the application meets the Regulations, that's the end of the inquiry.

Hence, we suggest a revision in the draftsmanship of SAPL's proposed First Contention but as revised, we agree that it ought to be admitted.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Would you read that into the record just for completeness?

MR. GAD: Yes, Dr. Luebke.

The Applicants have suggested and I'm referring now to page 4 of our April 15th response, that the appropriate contention and admissible contention is, "The Applicants have failed to comply with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR, Section 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E."

The second proposed Contention relates to the condenser cooling system and the affect of operating this condenser cooling system. Once again, the Contention is somewhat ambiguous to the extent that it proposes to relitigate all of the environmental impacts of the operation of the Seabrook condenser cooling system. That relitigation is barred by the prior litigation and prior adjudication in this Agency to the extent that contention is limited to a contention that says, notwithstanding current licenses and current plans, there may be a change in the way that system

will be operated, then we suggest that the Contention is both premature and speculative and that it is addressed to the wrong forum. The emissions on this cooling system are set by EPA and I think Section 511 of the Clean Water Act says the EPA alone sets those emissions limits. So that we cannot litigate it here, how much chlorine ought to be in the condenser cooling system discharge. If EPA were to entertain and grant a change in the discharge permit, then perhaps there might be a litigable contention here under NEPA as what the impact of that change is on the overall cost benefit balance. It's a long time before we reach that issue. For the moment there has been no change in the EPA Permit and the EPA Permit governs.

With respect to Nos. 3 and 4, once again the decision to which Mr. Backus refers, I believe from the citation is the Farley Decision. The basic principle of the Farley Decision as stated is, "An operating license proceeding should not be utilized to rehash issues already ventilated and already resolved in the construction permit stage."

What is proposed in Contention No. 3 is to rehash economic impact, which is an NEPA Issue, of tourism. We agree with the Staff Counsel that the fact that the NRC has since set forth an additional, not a substitute but an additional safety related planning consideration does not rise to the level of a significant supervening effect necessary to get around resignificant which Farley in subsequent decisions say is a matter

of rule and not necessarily a matter of discretion.

Moreover, what is proposed here is not to litigate simply the impact of the fact that we now have a ten mile EPZ. What is proposed is to reopen the tourism impacts all over again and that we say is barred by Farley. It is also barred by, as Counsel for the Staff has pointed out, the environmental Regulations of this Agency, specifically Sections 50.21 and 23.

With respect to decommissioning, once again, the issue has been litigated. There has been no suggestion that the economic effects or the environmental affects rather, which is the NEPA issue of decommissioning will be--that there is any reason now to believe there will be any different than there was to believe at the time.

In so far as the Contention addresses financial qualifications, as Counsel for the Staff has pointed out this morning and as we have pointed out in our written response, that is no longer an operating license litigable issue.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Gad, you referred to 10 CFR something just now and I thought you said 50.21 and 50.23. I must have misheard you.

MR. GAD: I may have mistated myself. I intended to say Sections 51.21 and 51.23 which go to the scope, Dr. Paris, of the Applicant's environmental report and the Agency's environmental impact statements in the operating license case.

DR. PARIS: Let me ask you another question while I'm

talking to you now. Has the Applicant applied the EPA or approval to change its bio-fouling prevention measures?

MR. GAD: I understand that the Applicant has.

JUDGE PARIS: When do you expect the decision to come down or do you know?

MR. DIGNAN: I have been informed, and I would like a chance to check this, Dr. Paris, so that my statement is absolutely correct in the record. As I understand it, they are in a draft permit stage over at EPA. That is to say, they would publish that as a draft which would then set in motion the various procedures of EPA such as layoff. I would like leave to check that at the first recess because I want to be absolutely sure I'm correct with the Board.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. Anymore information you could give us would be helpful. Thank you, Mr. Dignan.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Dignan, may I add in terms of timeframes that there be some decision on that.

MR. DIGNAN: I'll be glad to.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

MR. DIGNAN: I might respectfully suggest that again we attempted a rewording of this contention with a view to the fact that this thing might be something that was between desks when we had to settle this and we put as a conditional phrasing in a contention to the affect that if EPA should change the permit, it is contended that this would tip the cost benefit

analysis which we think is the one litigable issue that can come out of this. We have phrased that in our response to the SAPL Contention in writing and would not object to that contention as we phrased it being admitted.

JUDGE HOYT: That's the same one that you have on page 5 of your response then as I understand it?

MR. DIGNAN: I believe it is on page--

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Backus, could you give us your reaction to the Applicant's proposed rewording of your Contention No. 2 and Contention No. 1?

MR. BACKUS: Yes. On Contention No. 2 the Applicant suggests that the only litigable issue will be to say that if EPA changes the bio-fouling control mechanism to the use of chlorine instead of thermal shock, that this will tip the cost benefit balance against the operation of the facility. I think that's a very difficult issue for this Commission to manage in those terms, rather this Board.

The Commission has, as I understand it, very recently eliminated the need for power as an issue in operating license proceedings by Regulation. My understanding is that the only benefit of building nuclear power plants is the power they are to produce. If you can't consider the benefits, I'm not sure just exactly on what basis you are supposed to deal with measuring the costs against the benefits anymore. It's a conundrum I don't know the answer to, but it does occur to me it's a real dilemma

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With they way it's been worded by the Applicant here. I think and I think the Applicant has conceded that the affects of the operational cooling system, if they are changed by EPA, still have to be dealt with in approving an operating license that the costs have to be figured in. I don't think they can be figured in the way the Applicants worded the Contention.

The Emergency Planning Contention as they reworded that,

I agree in general that the Emergency Planning has to be set

against a standard to be set up by the Commission, but the standard

the Commission has set up is a very, very general one. It's

whether or not there is reasonable assurance that adequate,

protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a

radiological emergency. I think that is the gist of it and I

think that's what our Contention is directed to. It is whether

or not Emergency Planning cannot reasonably assure that the public

health and safety can be protected, and I suppose that should be

and I would agree it could be amended to be, adequately protected

in the area of the Seabrook LPZ.

JUDGE HOYT: Does that leave us, Mr. Backus, with an outright rejection of the alternative phrasing of your Contention?

MR. BACKUS: Well, I think given what the Commission has done to the benefit side of the equation by eliminating it by rule, and I'm not quite sure that can be squared with the requirements of NEPA, I think that the contention as we have framed it is appropriate in terms of unreasonable adverse affect.

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JUDGE HOYT: I'm not sure you answered the question, Mr. Backus, but thank you.

MR. BACKUS: Well, I'll be glad to try again but I don't think I can say anymore about it.

DR. PARIS: The point you raised there is one I have not considered and it is an interesting one but I have a feeling we could get around that one way or another.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: No, your Honor.

MR. BACKUS: One other thing, Madam Chairman, just if I could just quickly say. Everybody here on this issue has addressed my contentions that they are tacking on res judicata collateral estoppel, has cited this Farley Decision. I'm sure that the Chairman and members of the Board will take a close look at it but I do point out the language includes, "It was expressly pointed out that there was no claim in the case that they are distinguishing in either significant supervening developments having a possible material bearing upon any of the issues previously adjudicated in the construction permit proceeding or the presence of some unusual factor having public interest implications. I submit that with the issues that we are seeking to have brought forward for consideration in this proceeding, that both of those things are present: that is as to the economic impact of the problems of station operation or reports of problems with station operations. There have been significant supervening

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developments; namely, the Three Mile Island event in particular.

I think that's the most significant intervening development in
the nuclear power industry in many years. I think everybody
recognizes that.

The presence of unusual factors, I think, Madam Chairman and members of the Board, that there is no issue of more concern to the people of this area than this issue. I think there is enormous public concern about this issue here. I just do not imagine it would be acceptable for this Board to not deal with the issues of most concern with the people here in the course of this proceeding.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Backus, the Board will consider all the arguments that you have forwarded in regard to your Contentions, and those other arguments which may come forward in the other intervener's contentions, which they will present later on in this Hearing.

I would like to also leave it on this record that the public does have mechanisms to ensure that there will be a full exploration of their concerns. Probably one of the methods, of course, is the limited appearance statements of any public member, at the appropriate time.

As our Order read on the Proceedings this morning, we will not take any public testimony. I am concerned that your statement may have indicated that the public will be foreclosed, and I want to be certain that this record is very clear that the public is not going to be foreclosed in the participation in these Hearings. Thank you.

MR. BACKUS: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I did not take your statement in that view, but, of course, we are concerned that there be not merely limited appearances, but an opportunity to litigate, on the record, those issues which are of concern to the affected public here.

MR. HOYT: As I've indicated to you, sir, we will.

Do you want to go ahead with your Supplemental?

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, I suggest that we go forward with the State's contentions first.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's have about a five minute recess.

(Recess)

JUDGE HOYT: Will everyone take their seat, please? Will the Hearing come to order. Let the record reflect that all the parties to the Hearing are present when the Hearing recessed, and are again in the Hearing room.

All right, sir.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairlady?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir.

MR. DIGNAN: I wanted to report something. I said I would report further on this business of the EPA Permit. My understanding is this, that this preliminary draft permit has been authored, written, or whatever, at EPA. That EPA plans to, or has in fact, turned it over to NRC; that it will be included as an appendix in the NRC draft Environmental statement.

Beyond that, we now go into the question of a comment period at EPA, I frankly do not feel comfortable speaking for EPA timing.

Perhaps the Board will want to send a letter of inquiry over to EPA Region 1, on what they were looking at. I, frankly, don't know, and it takes a greater lawyer than me to predict progress in that Agency towards the Hearing. I just really don't know how fast that will move at this point.

If this issue is to get in at all, I urge this conditional phrasing, which we could litigate it, and then wait

for the Decision to come out either way. In other words, if it's chlorine, it's good, if it's chlorine, it's bad; if it's not chlorine it's good; if it's not chlorine, it's bad, under the conditional phrasing of the contention I've offered to the opponents.

But, that's as much as I know at this point, in the EPA situation. So, there can be no doubt, and I don't want anybody misled, that the company will be urging EPA to permit this chlorination. We feel this is the way to go.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you anticipate that there will be an EPA Hearing on this?

MR. DIGNAN: I have no idea. I am not familiar enough with what they do with the two permits in between, or whether there would be one requested, or whether a request is necessary.

JUDGE HOYT: That's not under the Clean Air; that's under the Clean Water?

MR. DIGNAN: It would be the clean water.

JUDGE HOYT: I believe Dr. Paris has something to say.

JUDGE PARIS: Or, the Water Pollution Control Act, I

guess is the formal name of it.

JUDGE HOYT: One or the other. Dr. Paris has some questions.

JUDGE PARIS: Can Mr. Lessy, or the staff, get any information from the EPA about their timing?

MR. LESSY: I would be happy to try, your Honor.

The information which Mr. Dignan related about the inclusion of that draft EPA document or permit into the draft Environmental Statement is correct, as I understand it, and the DES will be issued this week.

In addition, we'll contact EPA by letter, and ask for a status of it, and any response we get we'll submit to the Board and parties.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: Please be certain, Mr. Lessy, that it is served on all the parties when you have it, if you will. Thank you.

All right, is the State of New Hampshire ready?

MR. KINDER: We have filed twenty-two Contentions. I

will proceed in any way that you like, but I would suggest that

perhaps that perhaps if we took them one by one, it would be a

little easier for everyone involved.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder, we want to proceed in whatever manner is most helpful to you in the presentation of your case.

If you feel comfortable with that, go right ahead.

MR. KINDER: I can ak it will be helpful to the Board and the rest of the page to do that, with your approval.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Go ahead.

MR. KINDER: The first contention that we have raised relates to a Reliability Evaluation Program that we feel is necessary, in order for this plant to be properly licensed.

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The staff and the Applicant have both objected to this contention on the grounds that there is no regulatory requirement for such an evaluation and study.

I'd like to submit on that point that, as so have indicated in the basis of our contention, the Three Mile action Plan, NuREG 0737, at Part IC(1), refer to a requirement to perform analyses of transients and accidents.

Now, that is similar, and in fact, a part of what we are proposing, that should be required in our contention.

I would also like to refer the Board to the comments of Chairman Palladino, that he made on April 5th of this year. I can make a copy of those comments available to the Board. In summary, he refers to the probabilistic Risk Assessment Technique, which is being considered by NRC now, as to whether it will be required for plants, and how it might be used in a licensing procedure.

Chairman Palladino indicates in his remarks, and I believe he's speaking for the NRC, that probabilistic Risk Assessment studies are felt to be valuable in licensing procedures.

The Applicant has made statements to that effect in its newsletter, which it makes available to anyone who wants it, I guess. It has indicated that the company feels a probabilistic Risk Assessment study will be useful in licensing proceedings.

The State of New Hampshire certainly feels that such

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a study would be valuable to licensing proceedings, and certainly beyond that. In fact, there is legislation pending before the New Hampshire Legislature which would require that a Probabilistic Risk Assessment study be performed for Seabrook.

In summary, I take that to mean that the NRC, the Applicant, the State of New Hampshire, all feel that such a study would be beneficial, and would be beneficial to this Licensing Proceeding, be beneficial to developing any design for programatic changes that might be necessary for the Seabrook Facility, and would be helpful to the Applicant and the NRC as a dynamic document, even beyond the Licensing Proceeding.

For those reasons, and further based on the requirements of NuReg 0737, I believe that this contention should be allowed in this Proceeding, and that a Probabilistic Risk Assessment approach to a reliability evaluation study of the safety systems, and the operation procedures of the plant, should be done, and should be reviewed by the Licensing Board.

with the Board's indulgence, those are my comments on this contention. I would be happy to answer any questions.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have any questions?

MR. LESSY: I went first the last time. Does the Applicant want to respond first and then I'll respond, or I can go ahead.

JUDGE HOYT: I don't know that it makes a great deal of difference, but whichever one of you gentlemen who wishes to

respond, you may toss it among you.

MR. LESSY: I just don't want us both leaping forward, and talking at the same time.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson and Members of the Board. My learned friend, Mr. Kinder, as usual, has been eloquent, but he has pointed yet to no regulation of the Commission, and I submit upon a careful reading of ICl, in NuREG 0737, nothing in that.document, which, by Commission Decision, has been made a regulation, which requires a PRA.

It is true that the Applicant is having a PRA done at his plant. It's well publicized. I doubt that it will be finished before these Hearings are over.

On the other hand, the fact that we are doing a PRA, does not make a matter for this Board to concern itself with.

The PRA, the Applicant has indicated, in public, we believe to be a very good engineering tool; we believe it is something that's on the cutting edge of analysis, and something valuable for us to have.

But, the scope of this Board's jurisdiction, I respectfully submit, are items regarding compliance with the Commission's Safety Regulations. That principle was first laid down in Maine Yankee - Automic Power Company, ALAB 161, 6AEC, 1003. It was affirmed by the Commission, and it was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in the case of Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC

524 Fed 2nd, 1291.

It seems to me that the interesting thing about the argument for PRA is that no one attempts to point to a regulation which requires it. So, as long as that be the case, it may well be that the regulations will change as we move through this Hearing. It is not a safety issue for litigation before a Licensing Board, or an operating license, or construction permit here.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: I essentially agree with that position.

As we stated in Page 10 of our Response, there is no statutory or regulatory basis to show that compliance with 10CFR, Section 50.46, which is Acceptance Criteria for core cooling systems, for nuclear power reactors, requires the submittal of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The fact that the Public Service Company of New Hampshire has a news release which talks about its desirability, or the fact that they can be useful in certain cases, does not mean that that is a criterion against which the adequacy of the safety of the operation of a Seabrook Plant, which is the concern of this Hearing, will be evaluated.

Therefore, we oppose its admission. Nuclear power plants are licensed routinely without such assessment.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Dignan, what is Public Service going to do with the PRA when it gets it? That's just out of curiosity.

MR. DIGNAN: The PRA is viewed by the company as a number of things. One, as I said, is an engineering tool. It will give them a view of future analysis.

The second thing we hope it will do, whether we are successful in this, I don't know, is that it will provide, in our judgment, an unbiased analysis of this plant, which hopefully will assure the public as to the plant.

I'm not asking every member of the public to jump up and agree that it will, but we do think that the uncommitted person who is honestly looking at this will get some assurance out of the Risk Assessment.

Finally, quite frankly, and I always try to keep my reputation for candor with the Boards - one of the reasons that that decision was made was the theory that the Commission Regulations could change. What I didn't want to do is have a licensing hearing where we had a major hiatus, because we hadn't even gotten the ball rolling.

That does not mean that the regulations have changed as of today. I don't know whether they will change or not during the course of the Hearing.

That's the value of the thing from our business point of view.

JUDGE PARIS: Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: You indicated that that would be some time after these Hearings, that it would be made available.

MR. DIGNAN: If I understand the schedule of the completion of the PRA, by that I mean the final report on the table, against one scheduling scenario I've seen, the entire run of the operating licensing proceeding, the final report will come out after the Evidentiary Hearings are over, and maybe after the Decision was out - the final report.

It's no doubt that, as the Hearing progresses, the dynamics of the thing are such that some things may become available that would be capable of putting in testimonial form, if necessary.

But, we do not expect a completed report to be out before, as I see, the present schedule of the Hearings. Of course, if there's slippage in the Hearing Schedule, I'm sure there will be slippage in the PRA, too.

JUDGE PARIS: When do you think the PRA will be available?

MR. DIGNAN: Eighteen months from now.

JUDGE HOYT: What parts of it will be available earlier than that, if you know.

MR. DIGNAN: Could I reply to that after a recess?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes.

MR. DIGNAN: Because you are now pressing me in the areas where I want to consult with technical people before I answer.

JUDGE HOYT: Of course, yes. I would like your best

estimates from your staff, if you would give them to us, at the time that you have it available.

MR. DIGNAN: I would be glad to.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

MR. LESSY: May I make an additional comment?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes.

MR. LESSY: The contention is, Judge Paris, that such a plan is necessary to ensure compliance with 10CFR, Section 50.46. The staff proposes that on the grounds that it's an illegally incorrect premise for that contention.

JUDGE PARIS: I understand, Mr. Lessy, but we are just trying to get some handle on some dates. We are going to talk about dates later.

MR. KINDER: Madam Chairman, if I may?

JUDGE HOYT: Of course, Mr. Kinder.

MR. KINDER: I would like to make one comment in response before I go on to the second contention.

That is, as you know, I've advised the Board in writing that these contentions were put together on what I felt, given the seriousness of this matter, on rather short notice. I recognize that the phraseology in some of these contentions might be improved and I would be happy to consider revising phraseology on this or any other contention but with regard to this particular contention, it appears to me that the requirements of Section ICl of NUREG 0737 overlaps to a considerable extent with what we have raised in Contention No. 1.

For example, it would require a multiple failure analysis of NUREG 0737 and it also requires consideration of human error in accident sequences.

Therefore, if the Board so desires, I would be happy to consider rephrasing that Contention.

DR. LUEBKE: You would then limit the scope of the contention?

MR. KINDER: Well, my feeling is that a full reliability evaluation should be done but should the Board not agree with me on that, I would consider terminology which would limit the scope of that contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. Just one other point, Mr. Kinder, that

I would like to make. If you do have some changes in the wording of your contention, we would like for you to negotiate that with the opposing parties here and determine what the language could be and would be acceptable to the parties on that basis.

MR. KINDER: We have discussed among some of us this morning that that might be helpful for us to meet perhaps over the lunch break to see if we can't resolve--

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) We don't want to limit
you to some hastily conceived language but we would certainly,
as a Board, be willing to accept any changes that you had
negotiated out perhaps by letter or telephone conversation, however
you wish to do it.

Specifically, what language would you want to amend or revise?

MR. KINDER: I don't have any particular language to present at this time?

JUDGE HOYT: I said it as a matter of interest rather than--All right, the second contention if you have nothing else on that one.

MR. KINDER: Yes. Contention No. 2 relates to the problem of Systems Interaction. In general, this is the concept of the interaction between safety and non-safety systems in a manner which they render the safety systems not capable of performing their functions in the manner that they were designed for. The Applicant has claimed that there is no requirement, no

regulatory requirement that such an interaction analysis be performed. The Staff has indicated that it feels that the State of New Hampshire should show some special circumstances and appparently be more specific.

My comments are that this concern arose in large part out of the incident at Three Mile Island, although certainly the concern existed prior to that. It has been identified as an unresolved safety issue by the Staff. It is numbered A-17 as an unresolved safety issue.

I believe that our contention is specific enough to qualify it as a contention in these proceedings. I won't go over the standards for specificity since Mr. Backus has referred to them. We are in a notice pleading kind of circumstance here and I think the parties recognize what the problem of Systems Interactions is and what appropriate responses to that are.

Under the Law that has developed out of the Virginia Electric Decision which held that unresolved safety issues must be addressed in the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, I believe that this contention must survive at least until the Safety Evaluation Report is available. At that time the Intervenors will have an opportunity to review the extent to which the Staff has considered this particular unresolved safety issue, Systems Interaction, and we will be able to further refine, if necessary, this contention.

So in summary, I believe the contention adequately states

an issue that should be considered by this Board and at least until that Safety Evaluation Report is made available, it should be included as a contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Before you respond, Mr. Lessy, could you give us an idea of when your Safety Evaluation Report will be held?

MR. LESSY: The Safety Evaluation Report, your Honor, is scheduled for issuance in September of 1982 and that's in addition to our response on page 13 of our pleading in which we felt that the decision in Diablo Canyon controlled this. I don't we should hold open a contention to which you couldn't even engage in discovery until next September. If the State of New Hampshire or any other party feels that the treatment of that particular issue is inadequate in the Safety Evaluation Report, then that's the time to file a contention and our rules specifically provide for that.

On the other hand, we feel that you still haven't identified any statutory or regulatory basis to establish that Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires the analysis of Systems Interactions which your contention requires. Diablo went slightly beyond that in which it said they might consider such a matter in the event of special circumstances and they haven't been alleged. We feel at this time we would continue to oppose that contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have any idea what special circumstances you are referring to there?

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MR. LESSY: A special circumstance of the plant concerning the adverse interaction between safety and non-safety systems, something you need to design of that facility as I understand it.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Dignan.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson, members of the Board, I can be just as brief again.

Again, I have not heard from Mr. Kinder what portion of NUREG 0737 he claims requires requires this analysis. That being the case, I believe under the cases cited, that it is not a matter for this Board.

Having said that, and having also addressed the PRA, I feel as a lawyer I must call to the attention of the Board a decision which came into my possessionyesterday from another Licensing Board. It is as far as I know, unpublished. This Board should probably should peruse before ruling. I think it is wrongly decided but it is fair to say that that Board coalesce a PRA contention and a Systems Interaction contention into one contention and cast it in terms of a general design criteria. I feel that as a lawyer I simply must point it out to the Board because it cuts against the argument I am making and it is a decision of the Licensing Board of the Commission. It came down in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Docket Nos. 50-322-OL, 50-322-CPA, decided March 15, 1982. The Board members were Judges Brenner, Carpenter, and Shon.

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As I say, my view in this decision is it was wrongly decided. I think the Board reached to get a contention on these issues. On the other hand, I feel duty bound to point its existence out/the Board and they may wish to review it before ruling.

MR. DIGNAN: That opinion is referenced on page 13 of the Staff's response.

JUDGE HOYT: S-H-O-N, Shon.

MR. LESSY: I apologize to the Board for not referring to it. I have no means of getting the unpublished opinions from Boston and it was shown to me last night.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

Mr. Lessy, did you say you had some reference to that on page 13?

MR. LESSY: Yes, page 13 and page 10. The longer reference is on page 10.

JUDGE HOYT: You were citing it as the Shoreham Case?

MR. LESSY: Yes, that's right.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. I have that. Thank you.

Do you want to do some rebuttal, Mr. Kinder?

MR. KINDER: Yes, ma'am. Thank you.

I appreciate the candor of both Mr. Dignan and Mr. Lessy.

If Mr. Dignan has trouble getting these unpublished things in

Boston, you can imagine now much difficulty we have up here.

I did try to obtain a copy of the Shoreham Decision

which was cited by Mr. Lessy and was unable to do so prior to my coming here today.

JUDGE HOYT: The Board will just share with you their concern too. We have problems getting them also.

MR. KINDER: I would like to say as far as citing the particular regulatory statutory requirements, I have cited in the contention as a basis for NUREG 0737, again the same section which I referred in my discussion of the first contention. I believe there is an overlap between the Systems Interaction Issue and the requirements of that Section of NUREG 3707. I have also referred to the Virginia Electric Decision which I think requires the Staff to consider unresolved safety issues in its Safety Evaluation Report.

So I believe the legal foundation for the entrance of this contention. Naturally, had I been able to read the Shoreham Decision, I feel sure I would have cited it as a basis for the contention.

I would like to also note that Mr. Jordan, on behalf of his client, has included Systems Interaction as a contention.

I don't know how the Board wishes to proceed, whether they would like Mr. Jordan to comment on this contention at this time or whether you would like him to reserve his comments for a discussion of his contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, the Board wishes to have that done later.

MR. KINDER: I'm going to proceed to my next contention.

As Mr. Backus has referred to in his comments, the Seabrook site is quite unique in terms of its proximity to the beach area which is intensely populated. In fact, it is one of the most intensely populated portions of New Hampshire at times. It is also that area of the seacoast that is very important economically to the State of New Hampshire.

For that reason the analysis of accidents is very important and should be given great consideration in this proceeding. The State feels that further analysis is required.

I think that's reflected by two previous contentions which overlap with this one as well as with several of the following contentions.

It's been noted that the draft Environmental Impact
Statement is not available to any of the parties in this
proceeding. When it becomes available, we may be able to provide
further specificity on this contention. As it stands right now,
we do not feel that the Environmental Report adequately treats
Class 9 Accidents and we do not feel that the requirements of
NUREG 0737 of Section 1Cl have been complied with.

Further, Judge Hoyt referred earlier to 45 Federal Register, 40101, which by the way I have located a copy of if the Board would like to see it. I don't believe that the Applicant's FSAR complies with the standards that are presented in that document. The objection that has been raised by Public Service Company is that only the requirements of this Federal

Register apply and the Staff has indicated that the contention is too general and should be rejected.

I disagree obviously with both of those positions and feel that there is a firm basis in the Regulations of the Commission for this contention to be accepted.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: Mr. Perlis will respond if the Board please.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Perlis?

MR. PERLIS: The problem that the Staff has with the contention as phrased, that there is no rational given for the allegation that the Applicant has not adequately considered a Class 9 Accident.

The only real basis given are New Hampshire statement that methodology in WASH 1400 has been discredited by the Commission. The Staff has searched the Commission's statement on WASH 1400 and has not found any discrediting of the methodology used.

Secondly, there is one bare statement that the Applicant's Environmental Report does not consider the impact of human factors on the probability of an event occurrence and that's really the only basis we are left with. The Staff's position is that that is not a sufficient basis to support a contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

MR. DIGNAN: I would like to take a little time with

this contention because/illustrative of a problem that I'm going to have with a number of contentions as we discuss them further.

Perhaps one dissertation of this would assist the Board and I wouldn't have to repeat it.

One of the problems I'm having with a number of the contentions is the insistance of a punative party to state the contention not in terms of the Applicant doesn't meet Regulation X but rather to state it, the Applicant must do this because Regulation X so requires. If I accept that contention, I accept their view of what the Law is as to Regulation X. That is what I find difficult to accept.

This is a classic. It says, the Applicant has not presented, contrary to the requirements of 50 CFR 51.20 (a), (d) a complete assessment of the risks posed by the operation of Seabrook.

Now that certainly isn't in hygerver from 51 (a) or (d). It isn't even close to it. What I don't know is what is complete assessment ever mean? You can always assess something a little further. I would have no trouble with a contention from the State of New Hampshire that said, the Applicant and Staff have not complied with the applicable provisions of the Commission's interim policy statement of June 13, 1980 which incidently is the thing that governs the consideration of Class 9 Accidents before Licensing Boards specifically, not the general provisions of 51.20.

A contention stated that way, I can deal with. It leaves open to the parties, whatever their position may be, freedom as to the law and freedom as to the facts to develop their case.

When you start freighting onto the contention your interpretation of the Regulations saying by the wording of the contention that the Regulation has certain legal requirements in it, that's when the problem starts.

New Hampshire wishes to rephrase their contention that there has not been proper compliance with the Class 9 interim policy statement. I have no trouble with the contention but freighting 51.20 (a), (d) with some spongy words like complete assessment, I maintain, is not a proper contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Then would you e willing to accept the contention reworded in some agreed fashion that you can work out with Counsel?

MR. PERLIS: Reworded in the way I simply just stated, yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you find any basis upon which you might conduct some out of the hearing and negotiations with Counsel concerning that?

MR. PERLIS: I suspect we may be able to find some.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's leave it at that point at this time and urge Counsel, again as we indicated earlier, that the Board would entertain and free wording of the contention to meet the objections of all the parties.

Anything else on that , Mr. Kinder?

MR. KINDER: No, I have nothing further. I'm not sure if Mr. Lessy commented.

Based on Mr. Dignan's comments, I feel that I would be happy to discuss with him whether we can reach an agreement on wording. I'd be happy to talk with him but I don't know whether his position is the same.

JUDGE HOYT: I'm certain that Mr. Lessy would make it clearly known to you on any discussion. So we urge all parties to participate in them fully.

It's approaching the noon hour and I would like to determine since I am a total stranger to this area, I don't know how long it would take Counsel to have the appropriate lunch break. Do you have any desires?

Please, just because no one else has spoken other than Mr. Kinder, it doesn't mean that you cannot participate.

MR. AHRENS: If you are looking at me, your Honor, I'd be happy to invite everyone to Maine but I don't think we would make it back this afternoon.

JUDGE HOYT: The Board will go with you, sir.

Very well, I guess we should have asked Mr. Kinder. He's our host here.

MR. KINDER: Yes. I was going to suggest that I guess I am the host but I think I would like to refer to Mr. McDermott who is more familiar to the local area.

JUDGE HOYT: We're passing it around, Mr. McDermott. It seems to be your turn.

MR. MCDERMOTT: Again, we welcome you all to the area. I would guess that you'll need at least an hour to get everyone out, fed, and get everyone back. I suggest on the safe side an hour and fifteen minutes or an hour and a half. All the local restaurants are in the direction of the busy part of town.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairman, I was also going to inquire as to the Board's usual practice in terms of a quitting hour.

That's just to let people know. Do you have a usual hour in which you adjourn?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir. The appropriate one. Whatever the business before the Board appears to be a good point at which we can break off the session without it interfering with Counsels' presentation and any arguments back and forth. I don't like to leave a matter hanging in mid air overnight. I like to complete all the work and I think that my colleagues on the Board feel pretty much the same way. If they don't, they probably just adopted that with me hopefully.

All right, we'll adjourn then to meet at--

MR. JORDAN: (Interrupting.) Madam Chairman?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir.

MR. JORDAN: Excuse me. I'm sorry. It has occurred to me actually from the Applicant's response to our contentions

in addition to discussions with other Intervenors and the most recent contention, that discussions are probably very useful on language that could be adopted I think particularly on Emergency Planning. I mentioned it very briefly with Mr. Dignan over the last recess.

It seems to me it may be useful to take an extra or allot an hour in which we are put in the "boiler room" to talk about that.

JUDGE HOYT: We had anticipated that that would take place overnight, Counsel and you would have a more free and informal atmosphere in which to conduct your talks. There is one thing that I almost forgot to mention and that is. I would like to caution persons behind the bar in the public section of this Hearing Room not to enter as someone did earlier and moved the microphones around. I do not wish to have the Counsel for any of the Intervenors, Applicant and the NRC Staff, interrupted in that fashion again.

I'm sure it was inadvertently done and it will not occur again and we thank you for that.

We will adjourn and convene at 1:30.

(Off the record.)

(The hearing continued at 1:30 p.m.)

JUDGE HOYT: The hearing will come to order. Let the record reflect that all parties to the hearing were present when the hearing recessed are again present in the hearing room.

I believe that you--I am sorry. Do you have some representation?

MR. DIGNAN: I had some information for the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: Please.

MR. DIGNAN: I had an inquiry as to the status of the PRA. Work has started. The first phase is expected to be completed in August of '82, and the first phase is defined as bascially a work-through of all the issues with a view to determining what are the ones that really control and will get the indepth treatment that is necessary for them.

Then there will be a draft of the full study completed plus or minus on this time about March of '83. The final report with the backup would be ready in October of '83.

If I might be permitted to add one word in connection with this whether this issue should be admitted, there was reference to the speech by Chairman Palladino concerning this matter, and I think if we are going to put part of that in the record, at least we ought to add also the statement he made, "but we emphasized that they" meaning PRA's and safety goals, "are not a substitute for our regulations, and that individual licensing decisions will continue to be based principally on

compliance with those regulations."

So, I don't think that that speech of the Chairman is in any way inconsistent with the position which you have heard either from the Applicant or the Staff today.

JUDGE HOYT: Could we identify that speech in the record any further?

MR. DIGNAN: Yes, ma'am. It was remarks by Nunzio J.

Palladino, Chairman, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at the

American Nuclear Society Executive Conference, entitled Methods

for Probabalistic Risk Assessment, delivered in Arlington, Virginia

April 5, 1982.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Is there anything else before we continue with this? Please.

MR. KINDER: Just a comment on Mr. Dignan's comment.

Then I will go on. Rather than rely on whatever Mr. Dignan or

I may choose to read out of the remarks into the record---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Let me stop you at this point, counsel, and say that we will take judicial notice of the remarks of the Chairman of this Commission on the date in question. Thank you, very much. Go ahead.

MR. KINDER: That is what I was going to suggest.

The next contention relates to anticipated transients without SCRAM, which I prefer to refer to as HEWS from now on, with the Chair's permission.

JUDGE HOYT: No problem. Go ahead.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

MR. KINDER: This is, of course, the concern over events that would occur without the reactor shutdown mechanism coming into play. It has been identified as an unresolved safety issue. I believe that there is—the Commission is involved in rule making at present on this issue, and I believe in November of 1981 presented some proposed rulemaking. As an unresolved safety issue, I believe that the doctrine set down in the Virginia Electric case which I have referred to before which states that the Staff must deal with it in the SER provides the legal basis for this to be a contention in this proceeding. Since we don't have the SER at present, I think the contention should be admitted subject to further refinement when that SER becomes available.

I also believe as further legal basis for this contention the section of NUREG 0737, which I have referred to before as well, Section 1(c)(1) also relates to this concern.

I have nothing further on that issue.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well.

MR. PERLIS: Again, the NRC Staff has drafted its contention principally on the basis that there is no real basis for the contention. As we read it, the contention generally states that the risk from an ATWS event must be greater analyzed, and as we see it, the Commission has already stated that during the period of interim rulemaking, unless special circumstances are shown, the risk, in part, because of interim steps taken to

develop procedures and train operators from an ATWS event, is acceptable. We think that New Hampshire to keep this contention should have to show why the interim steps taken in Seabrook, in light of the Commission's statement, are not sufficient, and it has not done so.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Dignan?

MR. DIGNAN: Very briefly, Madam Chairman. First of all I took the position in my written response to this at the time that I wrote it that it was simply in rulemaking and relying on an ALAB 655, and ALAB 218, the Douglas Point Decision, it is my view that ATWS ought to be out.

This package of unpublished Decisions that landed on my desk last night had a lot of surprises. Again, I would have to inform you, I think Mr. Lessy, as usual, being a better scholar than me, has probably cited it, which I did not. That Long Island case I cited to you this morning let an ATWS issue in. Although in this case I don't think think this does New Hampshire any good, because I think it comes right along the lines that the Staff has given you for an arguement, because there, there was a very specific contention as to a system that the Intervenor said should be required on the plant under the view that it was necessary as an interim matter until the generic issue was resolved.

As I read New Hampshire's contention, what they want you to do is conduct the rulemaking here. They want a general

runthrough of ATWS, which is a problem which has been around this industry since back in the early '70's, at least when I first stumbled into this quagmire called Nuclear Regulation, and it doesn't seem to me that the Commission or anyone else is authorizing Licensing Boards to take it up in its true generic form.

Now, if New Hampshire can restate to say that there is a specific system that they are contending is necessary to provide the interim assurance, it seems to me that under this Long Island Lighting case, if the Board were to follow it, and I have already given my views generally on that decision, then they have got something, but this blanket request that we go into ATWS, I think, is still out of bounds on the basis of the general rule that matters that are before the Commission in generic rulemaking should not be taken up in individual licensing proceedings.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder, do you want to respond to that, also to my question of whether or not you will take this also under consideration in any discussions that you have with counsel.

MR. KINDER: Yes, I would be happy to discuss anything with any counsel at anytime. My further comment on that--pardon me?

JUDGE HOYT: I was just thinking, that was a very big order, but if you want to try it, go ahead.

MR. KINDER: Well, this is a very big case, as far as

I am concerned. I would like to point out by way of emphasis, it's in our written basis of contention, what the Applicant is relying on, the Westinghouse Study that was prepared prior to 1974, as its method of dealing with ATWS concerns, and based on everything that has gone on since 1974, we feel that that is inadequate. I say that in part. Quite honestly, I have not had the ability to obtain that Westinghouse Study. It is very difficult to read and identify by detail at this time what parts of it we feel need improvement, but with regard to development of the contention, I think we have raised an issue here that certainly has a basis both in law and in fact as something that this Board should be concerned with, and I think as to refinement of specifically what issues we will present evidence on is something that can be refined as we go along.

JUDGE LUEBKE: This is just one of the list of items which will appear in a supplementary SER sometime by the Staff for response?

MR. PERLIS: The Staff will be responding to all the end result safety issues that are relevant.

JUDGE LUEBKE: And this is just one of the list?

MR. PERLIS: Right, either in the SER or later.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Correct. Then it would be premature at this time to be very positive about it one way or the other until you do your writing.

MR. PERLIS: Yes.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Dignan, you mentioned the Shoreham Order, again; was that the March 15, 1982, Shorelam Order?

MR. DIGNAN: Yes, it was, doctor.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder? We got down now to the systems.

MR. KINDER: Yes. This contention raises the issue that a complete study of the impact of a radiological release through the liquid pathway, that is, ground water or surface water, might have in the event of an accident. Again I would call the Board's attention to the location of the site primarily its proximity to beach areas, and its importance as an economically viable area to the State of New Hampshire. For those reasons, we feel that it is essential to have as complete a knowledge as possible of the hydrologic workings in the area of the site.

I don't believe that the hydrologic work that the utility has done to date is sufficient to do that.

The Applicant and the Staff--I'm sorry--The Applicant has objected to this contention on the basis that there is no regulation that requires a liquid pathway study. The Staff apparently claims that the statement of policy on the study of Class 9 accidents that has been referred to before; that is, 45 Federal Register 401.01 is the standard and that there must be some special basis for Seabrook.

The contention recognizes that the draft Environmental Impact Statement is not yet out, and certainly we would expect that to have some comment on this problem from the Staff's point 300 7TH STREET, S.W., REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

of view. The Environmental Report, we submit, is not adequate, and that is the basis of our contention at this point.

I believe that this contention is specific enough to advise the parties of what the issue is. Quite obviously we are concerned about releases to the ground water in the area. of the Se prook site. Obviously it can be further refined when the draft Environmental Impact Statement is made available, but I think it can be admitted as a contention at this point.

MR. PERLIS: I think we can. We give this as another Class 9 Accident question. The Commission policy statement was to provide the Board with guidance as to how to deal with Class 9 contentions, and with how the Applicant and the staff should address Class 9 Accidents in their Environmental Reports.

We don't read the contention as alleging that this violates the Commission's policy statement, and until New Hampshire can show how the Commission's policy statement is violated in its treatment of Class 9 accidents, through liquid pathways, the contention should be rejected.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairperson, may I respectfully ask the Chair to inquire of Mr. Kinder as to what is his contention of Class 9, because I, like the staff, had thought it was from reading it. He talks about the need for core catchers, and things like that. I responded in that genre, and pointed out that Seabrook vintage plants simply weren't required to have these devices.

Then I heard Mr. Kinder say that what he really is upset about is he coesn't think hydrologic studies have been done. I'm not sure that's open, because presumably the construction permits settled that question.

I certainly am in some confusion now as to precisely what it is that Mr. Kinder wants to litigate. Maybe the best thing to do is to move aside from this one and leave it to counsel to try to thrash it out.

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But, I certainly read it as the staff did, as being a contention that we had to design Seabrook against a Class 9 accident, that would result in the release of a Liquid Path Way, and he specifically mentions core catchers and other devices that would have to be included in the design. And, I responded in that thing. But, if I heard him correctly, that's not the contention he is making.

I would just ask the Board to ask counsel for New Hampshire to say, yeah, or nay, as to what he is proposing here, because I'm in a bit of a quandry.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I would go back a step further, and that is Mr. Kinder said his contention is related to the Applicant's Environmental statement, which is, as I understand it, has the function of providing information to the staff who eventually puts out the official environmental statement - first in draft form, then in final form.

So, I would be inclined to view this matter as being premature until the staff writes what it writes. Is that a fair statement as to the staff, as to how things go?

MR. LESSY: Yes, your Honor. The DES is to be in med soon, so Mr. Kinder would have an opportunity to review that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then he could be more definite about his contentions.

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: When you say soon, on that DES, what are

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we working with regarding timeframe?

MR. LESSY: It should be issued by next week, your Honor.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we will go on now to your sixth contention, unless you have something else you wanted to add.

MR. KINDER: I would be happy to respond if the Board wishes to Mr. Dignan's request.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, if you say it would be helpful, go ahead.

MR. KINDER: All right. This is a Class 9 related contention. It is based, in part, on the information contained in the environmental report, which says, in effect, that the Liquid Pathway you need not be concerned about in regard to Seabrook. Pardon me, if I'm paraphrasing it improperly, but because it is less important than the atmospheric Pathway, I don't feel that that is an adequate approach.

I'd also like to point out that Mr. Dignan seems to interpret this as the State's position that core catchers should be required in the Seabrook design. That is not our position.

Our position is that the Liquid Pathway has not been adequately studied, and should be, as to whether core catchers would be required in the design or not, is something that further study should tell us.

MR. DIGNA: With that edification then, I would stand precisely on the remarks of the staff, to wit: It's a Class 9

contention; it simply does not meet the interim policy statement, and should be excluded.

JUDGE PARIS: Do you want to respond to that?

MR. KINDER: No.

JUDGE HOYT: Then go ahead with the sixth contention.

MR. KINDER: Contention No. 6 relates to the Environmental Qualification of safety related equipment. The position of the State of New Hampshire is that the Applicant h.s not satisfied the-- has not demonstrated that the requirements of general design criteria for the DOR guidelines, and the provisions of NUREG 0588, have been complied with.

I will point out for the Board's information that one of the other interveners in this proceeding, Mr. Jordan's client, has raised specific contentions with regard to environmental qualifications of both electrical and mechanical equipment.

The Public Service Company's position on this contention is that it is acceptable, I believe, if it is rephrased, as Mr. Dignan has indicated earlier. He would like to see contentions raised. And the Staff seems to take a similar position.

I believe the contention should be admitted, based on both factual and legal foundations that is set forth in our basis.

JUDGE HOYT: Do I read that to mean that you reject the alternative language?

MR. KINDER: Yes. Although, as I've said before, I'm willing to discuss phraseology of these contentions with counsel.

MR. LESSY: I don't think, Mr. Kinder, that our position is the same, or quite the same as Mr. Dignan's, as you indicated. I feel your contention here, the staff feels, violates the specificity requirements of 10CFR 2.714, as well as the Peach Bottom case, saying that contentions had to be specific.

There is a lot of safety related equipment in a nuclear power plant, such as Seabrook. The contention merely states that the Applicant has not demonstrated that all equipment important to safety will comply with the applicable requirements.

We need to know what specific categories, or what specific equipment you feel does not meet those requirements, and then we'll have something to litigate. We shouldn't be required to engage in Discovery to find out what you really mean by this contention.

Because of the lack of specificity, it's too vague to be litigated, and we oppose it.

MR. DIGNAN: My position is stated in the writing.

Unless the Board has any questions to elaborate on it, beyond to say that I pushed for my rewording if it's going to stay in.

The contention as it's now worded freights upon the regulations, legal interpretations, factual interpretations of those

regulations. The contention should not do that.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have any specific category of equipment that you were thinking of in this contention, in phrasing it, Mr. Kinder?

MR. KINDER: I guess I would have to defer to the areas that have been raised in the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Contentions, and leave it at that.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Let's go to the seventh contention, then, Mr. Kinder.

MR. KINDER: This contention relates to the instrumentation, and raises the question of whether instrumentation
is adequate to monitor variables under both accident and normal
operating conditions.

This is a contention that rises in large part out of the incident at Three Mile Island, and NUREG 0737, which has been referred to in the contentions, contains a number of requirements that relate to this issue.

A similar contention has been raised by other interveners in this proceeding. The objection of the Staff, which has been mentioned, with regard to other contentions, is that it's not specific enough to allow them to know how to itigate this particular contention.

The Public Service Company, on the other hand, appears to want the contention to be phrased in a more general manner.

I find myself in between the two, I'm afraid, as I do on other

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contentions.

With regard to this circumstance, which I guess we'll discuss in other contentions as we go along here, I feel that the-- Well, I understand the staff's concern for specificity. It seems to me that we are in a circumstance here of defining general issues that will be litigated in this proceeding, and the specificity that the staff seems to want to require, would put us in the position of placing all our evidence in the form of a contention, which I don't think we are required to do.

As long as we provide sufficient notice to the staff and the Applicant, of the general area in which we intend to bring evidence before the Board, I think that's sufficient.

And the specificity that they desire, they can obtain through Discovery, and in further proceedings before the Board.

This contention is based on general design criteria No. 13, and uses as a factual basis also, Regulatory Guide No. 1.97.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder, let me interrupt you for a moment?

MR. KINDER: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Isn't that something Mr. Lessy brought up a short time ago, and that is, why should we go through the ritual of a discovery when if you have the information and you know you are going to have to give it up anyway, eventually, why not just play the cards now instead of waiting until you

are queried by some interrogatory or deposition?

MR. KINDER: As you know, Judge Hoyt, each one of these contentions is an exceedingly complex area in itself.

JUDGE HOYT: That's what I'm trying to say. I'm trying to indicate to you that we'd like to avoid the difficulty of having counsel go through that, when maybe we can expedite matters and make it a bit smoother running process, by simply having you give the information the first opportunity that you've had.

Now, you've had something in mind when you framed the contention. If you do, can we know what it is now?

MR. KINDER: I'm not prepared to make a statement of all the particular items of instrumentation that we feel should be improved upon, or that the Applicant is not included in the FSAR today, and I don't think that I'm required to in order to have a contention entered in this proceeding.

If the contention satisfies the requirement to place the Applicant and the staff mentally on notice as to what the issue is going to be that's litigated, and we're talking about instrumentation for the monitoring of the various variables that one should be concerned with in the operation of nuclear power plants, then I think the staff and the Applicant, and I certainly expect them to provide us with interrogatories at the first opportunity which states: State all the ways in which you feel the instrumentation for the Seabrook Facility is inadequate, or

does not comply with the requirements of General Design Criteria
No. 13, and NUREG 0737. It's certainly an allowable
interrogatory which we should respond to.

But, as I've said, I'm not prepared to, this morning, or this afternoon, to try to delineate all the areas of this contention that we expect to produce evidence on.

JUDGE HOYT: Our problem, Mr. Kinder, in my thinking, and I certainly want the other members of the Board to express theirs if they have any, is that if we can do this up front, you can give the Board a clearer understanding of your contention is based on. Then we have some ammunition which we can use in ruling.

As it is now, we just seem to have a great deal of straw in there and a little more, and I want something more substantive. What I'm asking you now is, can we get it? When can we get it, and will you cooperate with us in getting it to us?

MR. KINDER: I would be happy to.

JUDGE HOYT: Otherwise we are going to have to make rulings in almost a vacuum, and I don't like that idea at all. I want to have as much information as possible, because I think it gives you a fair opportunity to have your concerns litigated in this proceeding, and we'll get to them more quickly and thoroughly if we do it up front.

MR. KINDER: Yes, I agree. I wish to point out, as

you are well aware, the State of New Hampshire was very concerned when it found it had to file its contentions by April 6th, I think was the date.

JUDGE HOYT: Oh, now, Mr. Kinder, you can't expect the Board to think that you were not aware that these contentions were going to have to be framed, because somewhere between November, when this Board was constituted, and the audit came out in March, you knew we were out there, and you knew you were going to be putting out a prehearing order somewhere along the line.

MR. KINDER: Absolutely.

JUDGE HOYT: So, let's not claim surprise.

MR. KINDER: Well, I will claim surprise as to the date, and I think the other--

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting) Not when you read the regulations, and we should have acted probably sooner. So, I don't think that's going to carry a great deal of weight with the Board. Let's move along and see where we are in the contentions. Do you have anything else on that?

MR. LESSY: Yes, your Honor. We have, in our Response, indicated some contentions which we felt that New Hampshire had met the basis and specificity requirements of the controlling regulation and the Commission's Decisions, but this one is just a generalized statement. We objected in our Pleading on the grounds of lack of specificity, and I'm also going to add to

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that, a lack of basis.

The only thing Mr. Kinder says, and the State of New Hampshire says, and this contention is that Seabrook design does not provide adequate instrumentation to monitor variables. He hasn't indicated any category of instruments; there hasn't been an indication of what kind of instrumentation, and the only basis for that contention is the citation. There were some regulations cited, but the citation was that the Three Mile Accident also demonstrated, and I'm quoting from Page 20 of his pleading - the inadequacy of post-accident monitoring, etc.

I think the State of New Hampshire wants to litigage a contention dealing with instrumentation, but before you can litigate it, in the staff's view, and the NRC proceeding, you are going to have much more detail and much more basis.

We've objected on the grounds of basis and specificity. Ther's more work to be done before this can meet the threshhold of our regulation. It's just a generalized statement that instrumentation is important. I would agree with that. That doesn't meet the requirements as some of your others have.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, the Board has asked that Mr. Kinder give us that, and give us the basis upon which we can make an intelligent and appropriate ruling.

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MR. DIGNAN: I have only this to say, your Honor. I have not objected on the grounds of specificity which should not necessarily be taken to mean that I disagree with my brother, Lessy.

However, what is disturbing about this contention to me is this is the first one that we have discussed of this nature today. One of the things they want us to meet is Reg. Guide 1.97. As I rephrased it, I left out Reg. Guide 1.97 and I put a footnote on page 5 of our response indicating. Why is, because I'm trying to do this the first time it comes so you don't have to hear it from ad infinitum is if there is anything that is abolutely clear in Commission practice, an Applicant does not have to meet a Reg. Guide. It is not a contention to say that an Applicant doesn't meet Reg. Guide 1. whatever it is. That was decided in the Vermont Yankee Case back in ALAB 179, is an unbroken string of Commission and Appeal Board Decisions holding that up, and finally the Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit in 1976 weighed in and said the same thing in the Porter County Case which I've cited at page 5.

Now I'm sorry to take time on what maybe is an issue that we are passing through but I want to make this point now and I won't make it again. I will just indicate reference back to these authorities but New Hampshire wants to freight that Reg. Guide onto the Regulations the way they've stated this contention. That's why I've reworded. I said, as long as it's

stated in terms of the Regulations, I would accept the contention. I think, frankly, the specificity remarks are well taken. I basically feel unlike the Staff, we have to satisfy them first that we're built right, so I'm assuming if my people can get by the Staff, that they've satisfied GDC 13, that I will have enough to satisfy Mr. Kinder and the Board in time. So I don't get as worried about the factual specificity as the Staff does but they see it from a different perspective than I do. I think the remarks are well taken because it's not that easy to list all the instruments that have to meet GDC 13.

JUDGE HOYT: I think the Counsel is well aware of what revision you want and I'm sure we're going to find another ream of paper with all the appropriate references made. So let's go ahead and see what we come up with on Contention No. 8.

MR. KINDER: Did you have a particular timeframe in mind in which you wanted a response on this?

JUDGE HOYT: The deeper we get in this and the deeper the responses are getting, the longer I look in terms of what it is going to require you to do. I'm also going to ask you, sometime during this hearing, to give us an idea. I think we better go through them all to see how much work you are going to have to put into it.

MR. KINDER: Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: That's also an opportunity for all other parties here that must respond, the Applicant and the Staff, will

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be given, of course, an appropriate opportunity to reply to any amended, revised, contention.

Go ahead.

MR. KINDER: Yes. The next contention relates to the Hydrogen Control System. The Applicant feels that this could be admitted provided that it's limited to satisfaction of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.44.

The Staff takes the position that the credible scenario for a situation developing an amount of hydrogen in excess of 50.44 must be shown. This contention or facsimiles thereof, have been raised both by the State and the New England Coalition.

My feeling or my belief is that this contention should be allowed based on the fact that the design assumptions of 10 CFR 50.44 have been shown to be inaccurate by the Three Mile Island Accident in which the amounts of hydrogen well in excess of those set forth in 50.44 were produced.

As for a credible scenario, I submit that what happened at Three Mile Island is a credible scenario and is one that could occur at a reactor such as Seabrook.

Also, facts relating to this contention are also raised in NUREG 0737. I believe that based on the information that is available to the Board and to the parties in this case from the Three Mile Island Accident, this contention should be admitted and there is a legal basis in NUREG 0737 and in the general understanding of the hydrogen generation problem.

MR. PERLIS: The Staff thinks its answer really speaks for itself.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. Is that all?

MR. PERLIS: No. I just wanted to respond to one other thing that Mr. Kinder said. I believe it's the Federal Register Notice that is cited in our answer. If not, I would be happy to supply the Board with the citation.

It has been determined that the Three Mile Island . scenario is no longer an acceptable scenario for the generation of hydrogen in excess of 50.44. Precautions are now taken to guard against that particular scenario. So the existence of the Three Mile Island Accident by itself is not enough.

MR. LESSY: If I might just double team for a second.

As I understand in the hydrogen matters under the Commission's

Decision in CLI 80-16 which we cite, there is really a two step

process here for litigation of such a contention.

First, there must be some sort of pleading demonstration that there is a credible scenario here for the generation of hydrogen in excess of the 50.44 design basis. Once you do that, you get to the question of whether or not the other requirements of 2.714 are met. If you don't have that decision I can provide it to you.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you need it, Mr. Kinder?

MR. KINDER: I believe I have it.

JUDGE HOYT: Sir?

MR. KINDER: I have nothing to add.

JUDGE HOYT: Fine. Then we can move on into radioactive monitoring which is Contention No. 9 of the State of New Hampshire.

MR. KINDER: This contention appears to have been accepted by both the Applicant and the Staff, although it is my understanding that the Applicant would like to see a change in phraseology. I don't know whether the Board would like me to continue on with it or not.

JUDGE LUEBKE: What is your position on the suggested change in phraseology?

MR. KINDER: As I understand it, the change left out of the reference to NUREG 0800 which was used in our contention, I'm not sure on what basis that was left out by the Applicant in its request of change of terminology.

Other than that I have no problem with it.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. I think that's another one of those matters that could be resolved in conference.

Mr. Dignan, could you make a note of that please?

MR. DIGNAN: Yes, ma'am.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. If we have nothing else, let's go on to Contention No. 10 which is the Control Room Design.

MR. KINDER: Yes. This Contention as well has been accepted by the Applicant and the Staff provided again, I assume, that we could arrange mutual agreement on the phraseology.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well.

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MR. DIGNAN: I'm not sure that does it because to say it is accepted by the Applicant provided we can reach an accomodation of phraseology is a little understating the case. I don't want to make a speech. The Board might review what I said I would accept and that's about it. It's a lot shorter than New Hampshire and it doesn't have a lot of adverbs and adjectives in it and it goes right at the Regulation. I think those contentions are broad enough. It doesn't pin them down, it doesn't pin me down out of a legal theory or anything. is the Applicant's position. It is not merely trying to substitute my draftsmanship for another lawyer and I certainly would never try to do that with one as able as Mr. Kinder.

On the other hand, the change in draftsmanship is a substantive to my client. It is not just a question of phraseology. I don't think these contentions which contain within them an interpretation of the Regulation should fly in that phraseology.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's go then into the 11th contention that you've stated, Mr, Kinder, which is the deviation from current regulatory practice.

MR. KINDER: Yes. This has been objected to by both the Staff and the Applicant on the grounds that there is no regulatory requirement. I'll be frank, there is no regulatory requirement that demands that this contention be complied with.

However, it is my position that it makes very good sense for this Board and the parties before us to have a systematic

approach to just how the Seabrook design and construction has been dealt with in relation to regulatory requirements. For that reason, I believe that there should be produced by the Staff and the Applicant, for inquiry in this proceeding, a statement that as to how regulatory practices have either been complied or not complied with in the course of this proceeding or in the course of the review of the Seabrook application.

JUDGE HOYT: That's current regulatory practicies of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Is that what you are saying?

MR. KINDER: Yes. For that reason I believe that this shouldbe allowed in as a contention.

MR. LESSY: There is no such requirement, your Honor, and we oppose it on that basis. In addition, Licensing Boards have pretty much uniformly rejected such proposed contentions. Even the Shoreham Board which issued this famous Order of not too long ago, rejected this contention. If the State of New Hampshire feels that that should be a requirement in our Regulations, there are procedures to add that to the Regulations but not to be litigated in an individual licensing proceeding. There is nothing in the basis in addition that refers to Seabrook.

JUDGE PARIS: Did the Shoreham Board reject it in the same Order?

MR. LESSY: Yes. In pages 14 and 15 of Judge Brenner's starting to be well known Order.

JUDGE PARIS: There have been Shoreham Boards and

Shoreham Boards.

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JUDGE HOYT: I think we only have one Shoreham Board here though that we've been concerned with so far. Let's leave it at that.

Is that pretty much ditto with you?

MR. DIGNAN: I have nothing to add to Mr. Lessy's plan.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Just as a matter of clarification, there is an exchange of questions in the form of correspondence between the Staff and the Applicant and all these questions are a matter of record, are they not? You ask questions, the Applicant answers, and you say it's not good enough. Try again. Then it goes back and forth, correct?

MR. LESSY: That is correct, sir.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then there is no need for us then to spend the whole bunch of hearing time going through all of that literature.

MR. LESSY: Policing that correspondence, that is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that public correspondence? Can the parties get that?

MR. LESSY: Yes. Correspondence is public correspondence between--

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Freedom of Information Act to reach it or just plain--

MR. LESSY: Put it in the local public document rooms

and things of this nature.

JUDGE HOYT: I wasn't sure whether it required a public information request or whether it was part of the document.

MR. LESSY: We routinely provide public copies of such correspondence.

MR. KINDER: I might just point out on this contention that, as you are well aware, the terminations of compliance with regulatory practice are voluminous and I believe it makes sense to view that in systematic manner then to provide that in one place for use by this Board in this proceeding.

That's the basis of this contention.

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairman, to the extent that that is the problem, I would respectfully suggest that in the FSAR of this plant there is a section, which is Compliance with the Reg Guides. The Staff asked you to do it. There is no reugirement to do it, and we have done it. As last I saw the Reg Guides are "Current Regulatory Practice," and we have a section in which we take each of the Reg Guides and see where we deviate from them and where we are in compliance with them.

JUDGE HOYT: And that is on file?

MR. DIGNAN: It is part of the Application, which I am very sorry to hear the Board members don't have. The usual practice was, up to now, when we filed the 60 copies, three are reserved for the appointed Board. Now, why the three were not delivered to you people by the Agency---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Let me say, we just one copy of it.

MR. DIGNAN: Okay, would you have one addressed to you then, Madam Chairman, or do the other two members want a copy of their own?

JUDGE HOYT: We will, but before we can share that one copy.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Just send us one. We don't have enough shelf space.

JUDGE HOYT: We just have the 4th floor.

MR. DIGNAN: I am very sorry. In the past--I have

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not been on top of what apparently has been current practice in the past. Three of the 60 copies that we actually filed, I believe, are sent to the Board once they are appointed, and I just assumed that had been done. Otherwise I would have done it.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, I spent an afternoon looking, and I can tell you it is not on the 4th floor.

MR. DIGNAN: I am sure it isn't.

JUDGE HOYT: I am somewhat in sympathy with your problem of running for these things, Mr. Kinder, but there has to be some sort of central point. I think there is in the FSAR.

MR. DIGNAN: Well, I am aware, of course---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) Excuse me, I am just catching up with this conversation here, and my recollection says that I have seen it FSAR, but that it was incomplete with respect to amendments. I think amendments went up to No. 22, and somebody was talking about Amendment No. 46; is that a fair statement?

MR. DIGNAN: I don't know if it is 46, doctor, but it certainly is a lot higher than 22. We will send down---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) And so my reaction to it was that at some suitable time before we go to evidentiary hearing we would like to get a set of books in which all of the Amendments have been brought up to date.

MR. DIGNAN: What we will do is sent down one as it is currently amended, and my practice is to have another one available for the Board at the start of the hearing which will

have picked up all current Amendments that took place after the first one was sent down, if you haven't been able to keep it up to date down there; so we will have one in the hearing room anyway.

JUDGE HOYT: You follow the Amendments then as they are filed with FSAR.

MR. DIGNAN: The Amendments are filed with the Office of the Secretary in the case of a case in hearing under the rules laid down of an Appeal Board Decision, or two of them.

All parties are also served with all Amendments, because that is part of Staff and Applicant correspondence, and the Board would be receiving their individual copies of the Amendments also.

one FSAR and wants to authorize the furnishing of only one set of Amendments each time, we would be glad to do that also, but we are also glad to furnish three separate ones. They make nice wall decorations. They are 22 volumes. If you want to take one home, they will fill one book shelf.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I am staking them on the floor now, Mr. Dignan.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we have discussed that to the ultimate. I think we ought to move along now. Let's see if we can get into---I am sorry. Did you have something else, Mr. Kinder?

MR. KINDER: I had just one further comment on that.

I am aware of a section of the FSAR which sets forth whether or not Regulatory Guides have been complied with. Naturally, I am interested in that, but I am interested as well in whether or not current regulations have been complied with, with regard to the Seabrook design and construction, and it is that information that I am looking in that contention as well.

JUDGE HOYT: Just a moment. Mr. Lessy, you are very helpful in giving us the information about the NUREG's, now how about the question that Mr. Kinder just brought up. Is there any other way that he can check that, whether or not the Applicant was complying with the Regulatory Requirements?

MR. LESSY: I don't believe that it is summarized other than through individual correspondence.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is the main function of the Staff that goes on month after month after month.

MR. LESSY: Yes. That would be a roomful of documents.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder, let's move on if you have no

further comment on that into the 12th Contention, which is the

Quality Assurance.

MR. KINDER: Yes. This contention, Public Service apparently finds their contention acceptable again which is their concern over phraseology. The Staff is looking for more specific instances that the State of New Hampshire would itemize, I guess. I believe that the contention is satisfactory as it is phrased. It has a basis. It states a number of instances

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which have caused us concern over the question of whether the Quality Assurance Program is adequate and has been properly implemented.

I note for the Board's information that the New England Coalition has filed a contention which is similar and has substantial detail contained in that contention. I don't think it makes sense for the State of New Hampshire to list the number of pages, or the quantity of particular references, to areas where we feel that Quality Assurance may not—the Quality Assurance requirements have not been followed at this time. Obviously, that will be important as part of the evidentiary portion of this proceeding, but I feel that the contention is acceptable as it is presently phrased.

MR. LESSY: The Staff stands by its written response.

MR. DIGNAN: Again, I wish to expand on the reason I went for a rephrase. I rephrased it in terms of the Seabrook Quality Assurance Program does not comply with the '10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Again, it is a matter of substance. The way that New Hampshire has phrased this, it seems they want to get into what has gone wrong out on the site of construction. This Board does not sit to police construction of the Seabrook Station. It sits to decide whether the Quality Assurance Program proposed for operation is in conformity with the REGS or not. If somebody wishes to contend, for example, that this company can't run a QA Program, and our evidence is that this is what went on during

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construction, that is a matter of evidence that may or may not be relevant under that sort of a contention; but what you can't contend before this Board is that QA out at the site today is no good.

If you want to police QA out at the site today, you bring a 2206 to the attention of the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and you go from there. So, the phraseology, again, is a matter of substance, because when you phrase strictly in terms of the REG, then the issue is the right issue, which is whether the QA Program proposed for the operational phase is in compliance with the Regulations. Whether the CPQA Program was any good, whether it was adhered to and followed out, whether they were doing a good job of constructing, is not a matter that is an issue before this Board.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Is it correct, though, that if they had a specific example to state where they said it was not in compliance, that might be a contention?

MR. DIGNAN: What it would be is a piece of evidence to back a different kind of contention. I wouldn't object to a contention that said :Is the Contention of the State of New Hampshire that the Reactor Vessel isn't welded right?" And in conformity with design criteria such and such. And then as part of that evidence, they through in a bunch of QA reports that they ask you to infer from that we weren't doing the welding right, let us say.

That is using it as evidence. It is not proper to take a contention before this Board as to whether the Quality Assurance Program during the construction phase was proper or whether it has been properly carried out. That is in the hands of other forae; not this Board.

MR. LESSY: The one thing I would add is one of the problems that we had with the State of New Hampshire's contention is the first statement of basis, they say this contention is supported by, but not limited to, the following, and a couple examples were given. You really have to, for litigation purposes, have to focus on specific instances where New Hampshire alleged that Quality Assurance Program functioned improperly during construction of the Plant.

If you just think about it in an evidentiary context that there was a contention as general as the one proposed by the State, we would have to have a whole stream of witnesses saying what and how the Quality Assurance Program, in fact, functioned. If you have specific examples, you can litigate those. In the absence of the specific examples, it is almost impossible and too general to proceed with. I think one of the other Intervenors has given a little more specificity in that regard.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that one of those contention, counsel, that perhaps you would like to rework in any fashion?

MR. KINDER: As I said, I feel it is acceptable now.

to want, I guess I will say this just once more and then quit,
that I don't feel it is necessary to require for the State of
New Hampshire to list the evidentiary points that it is going to
make at this stage of the proceeding. At some future stage,
obviously we have to do that, but it appears to me that what
the Staff wants is point by point what the State of New Hampshire
raised at an evidentiary proceeding, and I can tell you right
now, I am not prepared to do that.

MR. LESSY: Then what is the basis for the conclusion,
if the Board please, that there is a defect in the QA Program?

MR. KINDER: There are four bases listed on Page 31.
Those are not intended to be all inclusive. We may well provide

additional evidence on that point.

With regard to the specificity that the Staff seems

JUDGE LUEBKE: Just as an idea it might work out to admit the general front end of this thing to which there seems to be some objection, and make several contentions out of Page 31.

MR. KINDER: We will certainly consider that. I would be happy to consider your comments.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I join with Judge Luebke in that request to you, Mr. Kinder. Let's move along into Contention No. 13, Operation Personnel Qualification and Training.

MR. KINDER: Yes, this contention, I believe, has been accepted by the Applicant and the Staff, although; I guess,

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again the Staff wants the specifics. The issue relates to the requirements set forth in NUREG 0660 and 0737, and it is my belief it is specific enough. It puts the parties on notice what the issue is, and it should be acceptable.

JUDGE HOYT: That means you want to limit it to the Qualifications and Training of those five categories that you list on Page 32.

MR. KINDER: It relates Operations Personnel. Those five are examples of that. There may be other Operations Personnel that we would be concerned with as far as the evidentiary proceeding is concerned.

MR. LESSY: At the risk of talking too much, our position was that we would be--that there was less specificity and basis to litigate these five categories of Operations Personnel. As we said in our Footnote 8, on Page 19, if New Hampshire wishes other Personnel Categories to be included in the contention, they should identify the categories as clearly as possible.

In response to what the Assistant Attorney General just said, we can't wait to the hearing for us to be prepared to litigate any other categories; you got to get it as soon as possible; now, or soon thereafter, because you can't wait for the hearing--you know--the Staff and the Applicant have procedural rights, too. We can't wait to the hearing to see if there are other categories added to it. If you have any other

add them; if you don't, my contention is that you litigate it now. If one comes up, there is a procedure in the Regulations to handle that.

MR. KINDER: Obviously, we would be limited by whatever our discovery responses were in litigating this contention.

MR. KINDER: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: You list in the category the Operating Personnel. That is such a broad term, I find that one a little difficult to understand, but the term that he used in his oral presentation was Operating Personnel, am I correct on that?

MR. LESSY: Staff has agreed to a contention, which of the five categories on Page 32 of New Hampshire submittals the Station Manager, the Assistant Station Manager, the Senior Reactor Operator, Reactor Operator, and Shift Technical Advisor; there are, of course, a lot of other Operating Personnel which, in my view, you have not specified sufficiently for us or the Board to be able to litigate at this point.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that, again, is one of those things that you may have to rethink. All right, let's see if the Applicant--

MR. DIGNAN: (Interrupting) I have nothing beyond what is written in my--

JUDGE HOYT: I believe you wanted to limit it.

MR. DIGNAN: I just rephrased in my usual way, to mail it to the Regulation, NUREG 0737.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. We'll go on fourteen.

Reliable operation under the on-site emergency power, (diesel generator units).

MR. KINDER: Yes, this relates, as you've just observed, to the diesel generator units. This is an unresolved safety problem, identified as Task B-6.

The concern here, of course, relates to the availability of diesel generator units in circumstances where there has been a loss of off-site power.

I believe that there is an overlap here, with the contention that we discussed earlier, relating to the Three Mile Island Action Plan requirement, that's 0737, Section 1(c)(1), which requires an analysis of accidents and transients, which obviously diesel generator units are important safety aspects.

As an unresolved safety issue, this is an issue that must be addressed by the staff in its Safety Analysis Report - Safety Evaluation Report. I don't know whether it will be

treated in the Impact Statement, or not.

JUDGE HOYT: Can you answer that for us, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: It will not be treated until the SER.

It will not be in the Environmental Statement.

MR. KINDER: Under the Virginia Electric determination it would be treated in the SER. On that basis, I feel that there is a legal foundation and a factual one to allow this contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything from the Staff?

MR. PERLIS: The staff's problem with this contention, again we know that the State is concerned with the reliability of diesel generators, but we are never exactly sure why. And, there's just no real basis for their concern.

MR. DIGNAN: This is my turn to be on the business of basis, I guess. If one reviews this contention, and its basis as its set out, there's almost the whole thing I can agree with, that you should have a diesel, and it ought to work and all that. And, there's a big speech in that. Then, at the end, we are told Applicant's FSAR 9.5 fails to adequately address problems associated with diesel generator reliability, in the event of loss of outside power and in the event of loca.

Now, diesels at Seabrook, there are four of them two per unit. They are 6.2 megawatts each, and they are great
big machines. I would like at least a glimmer of what control
instrument or other things the State is worried about, before

I try this issue.

It's a little difficult to walk in here and try to figure out what's in their mind as to what components they are claiming the Seabrook diesels are deficient in, that are necessary to meet a regulation. And, this is a classic lack of specificity. These machines are of a size that a regular electric generator used to be years ago in the system. They are great big things, with lots of pieces and lots of parts.

And to be thrown a contention that says, Mr. Dignan, we think your diesels aren't any good, and you haven't described why they are good, I have no idea of even how to start to prepare a witness on that basis.

They've got to come in and tell me, we are worried about this switch, and we are worried about that device, or we are worried about that piece of pipe.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me ask you something about those machines. Where in your filings, your application or elsewhere, any documents, do you have any listings of this equipment; its performance ratings.

MR. DIGNAN: Absolutely. The FSAR covers them in depth. They are one of the safety systems that have to be very thoroughly covered in the FSAR, reviewed by the staff, and I'm sure the staff will devote a section of the SER to it.

JUDGE HOYT: Is there anything that you have available in your documents that may add something to what has

already been filed, that would give them the operating specifications on the machines, for example, in any more complete detail that has already been given?

MR. DIGNAN: It would be impossible to detail one of these things in more detail than you do in an FSAR, I think, with the exception of the actual drawings. But, the engineering drawings I couldn't read them, and I don't think there are very many lawyers who could. But, the point is, the State of New Hampshire has had that FSAR, and it's all laid out in the FSAR. There are pictures; there are figures; there are specifications, and everything else - A to Z.

You are told the criteria to which it has been built; the performance criteria that its required to meet, and so forth. And you just come in and tell me, well, I've read 9.5, which is where this all is; I've read all of 9.5, and you haven't shown me anything, I really don't know how a lawyer is expected to prepare his case, when that's all he's got to go on, that they are upset about.

Now, what I can do, is waste this Board's time by bringing in a couple of top flight engineers; having them sit up on a witness stand and say, now Madam Chairman, we are going to describe for you diesel generators - ad nauseum. And, perhaps New Hampshire will jump up in the middle of its description and say - Aha, it's that piece of pipe that I'm worried about.

Well I suggest the piece of pipe ought to be listed right now. so we can shorten this hearing up; so I can put a guy on who knows about the piece of pipe; get him off, and move onto the next issue. This thing is really without basis as its set here with this piece of machinery.

MR. KINDER: If Mr. Dignan feels that we need to go through the presentation of witnesses, there is a procedure for disposition of issues that would make it unnecessary for this Board to sit through listening to technical testimony on the specifications of diesel generators.

The point is here, I think, that the State has raised an issue on the question of reliability of these diesel generator units, to perform the function that they are safety functions, that they are designed to perform.

The only question is, could we allow that in as a contention. And I submit that we should, based in part on the fact that it's an unresolved safety issue; that it might be addressed in the SER. And based secondly, upon the claim that the State of New Hampshire has raised that 9.3 fails to address the problems of diesel generator reliability.

DR. LUEBKE: Is not in the category of some other contention where we are really waiting on the appearance of this SER and the analysis it makes, to see how more complete it is, and whether you still then have questions of, is it adequate, or not adequate, and in what respect?

MR. KINDER: The SER may well allow us to further refine this contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's see from Staff what you have on that. Are you going to comment on that on your SER?

MR. LESSY: Yes. We can't admit a contention now on the possibility that you find something wrong with the SER discussion next Fall. You either have to have a sufficient basis now for it, or you have to get a contention in at that time. There's a procedure to do that in our regulations.

If we asked you a Discovery question on what you know about these kinds of diesels, you couldn't answer it. And then to go out on summary disposition. So why let it in to begin with? Why don't you wait until September?

MR. KINDER: Presuming as to whether we'd be able to answer the question.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's have counsel address their questions through the Board. We might get a little personal otherwise.

Let's try fifteen and see what we can do with Contention No. 15, Unresolved Safety Issues.

MR. KINDER: I suspect that we've discussed a very large part of this in this last contention. Since, in this contention, the State of New Hampshire identifies the number of unresolved safety issues, which it feels should be addressed in the course of this proceeding.

Now, whether or not the staff's comments in the SER will be adequate from the State of New Hampshire's point of view, we don't know at this point.

I recognize that it may be premature to be raising them. But, quite frankly, the reason I did is that I did not want the State to be put in a position where it did not raise a contention at this stage of the proceeding, and might therefore be somehow foreclosed in raising it later on.

Clearly we need the SER in order to refine what our position is in these various unresolved safety issues.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we can move along. I don't think the problem needs any further response, unless you feel compelled to make one.

Let's do an examination of Contention No. 16, then we'll have about a fifteen minute break.

MR. KINDER: This contention relates to the heat sync or the combination of the Atlantic Ocean and the combine tower on the site, as the place for heat discharge.

I will be frank that the basis for this contention is based on staff request for additional information in February of this year, which identified a concern of the staff, as to whether or not the tower make-up water was sufficient to maintain the plant in safe shutdown for the period required.

I have no other basis for this contention. When I see

the response, and perhaps it's been made, and I haven't seen it yet, to the staff's request for additional information, I may well withdraw this contention.

MR. LESSY: We would rely on our written response and not supplement it.

MR. DIGNAN: We, too. We feel it was litigated fairly well, the construction permits.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Any additional response?

MR. KINDER: No.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's have a fifteen minute recess.

JUDGE HOYT: The hearing will come to order. All the parties to the hearing who were present in the hearing room at the recess are again present.

Okay, Sir, I believe you have some more contentions, and I think we will go back to No. 17, is that correct?

MR. KINDER: Yes, it is.

JUDGE HOYT: Environmental Impact.

MR. KINDER: The major basis of this contention as its name indicates on the Environmental Impact Statement, which is not yet available, but I understand from Mr. Lessy's earlier comments, may be available in a week or so. For that reason, I am not sure that it would be constructive to discuss this further. I think the State may be filing contentions based on the Environmental Impact Statement, and this was intended to reserve our rights to do so.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. I think I will dispose of that one, gentlemen, pretty much, unless you have something else to ask the Applicant.

Very well. Does that also take care of Contention No. 18, Health and Environmental Monitoring?

MR. KINDER: Well, no.

JUDGE HOYT: We tried. Go ahead, sir.

MR. KINDER: This relates to, as you may recall, there was an earlier Contention No. 9 which related to Radiation Monitoring in plant. This contention relates to Radiation

Monitoring external outside the plant facility.

The objection opposed by the Applicant and the Staff is that this has already been litigated and that therefore res judicata should be applied. I disagree with that position. I think that this aspect of the plant's design may well have been litigated. Certain aspects of it were in the construction permit proceedings but much has gone on since then in the nuclear industry and in fact standards have changed.

NUREG 3707 does have requirements relating to radiological monitoring and I believe that a contention is appropriate on the question of whether or not the facility complies with the standards that have come into place for Environmental Monitoring since the construction permit decision.

On that basis, I feel that this contention should be admitted.

JUDGE HOYT: Contention No. 18 is radiation outside and No. 9 was inside? Is that correct?

MR. KINDER: Yes, essentially, yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: I think the Applicant will argue first on this one, if the Board please?

JUDGE HOYT: Surely. Go ahead.

MR. DIGNAN: I can do no more than refer the Board to the initial decision on the construction permit. Page 877 of that initial decision spots out Intervenors, State of New Hampshire

- contends the Applicant's Offsite Radiation Monitoring Program is inadequate to protect public health and safety as a result of:
- (1.) Inadequate redundancy in equipment.
- (2.) Inadequate equipment to provide a meaningful monitoring program.
- (3.) An imadequate number and placement of monitoring stations.

 In short, a gambit.

There are a number of findings and the last two findings are: The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program exceeds the monitoring requirements of the recommended minimum level environmental surveillance program around nuclear reactors recommended by EPA.

The last finding the Board finds that the Offsite Radiation Monitoring Program contemplated by the Applicant is sufficient and appropriate.

If it is anything that was litigated thoroughly, it was New Hampshire that injected the issue, it was tried out, witnesses were put on, and it was resolved. I have heard no reason other than just sort of a general thing that time has passed as per a supervening event which indicates that res judicata in its purest sense shouldn't apply to New Hampshire on this one.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else?

MR. DIGNAN: Madam Chairman, incidently, the page I read from is cited in my brief on the matter.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. Well, it was the decision that I was referring to.

I believe Mr. Lessy had --

MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) We would just rely on our written response, your Honor.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. Thank you.

Go ahead.

MR. KINDER: I think the point of this is not that it wasn't litigated to before which I would stipulate to but I guess I don't have to, but that the Regulations have changed and if that's the case it is certainly open for litigation again.

JUDGE HOYT: Would you like to indicate to us, Counsel, what Regulations have changed? Can you be specific as to how you feel any further litigating basis on this contention?

MR. KINDER: Yes. As I have indicated, NUREG 0737 does contain requirements that relate to Radiation Monitoring.

I may be wrong, perhaps some of the more knowledgeable here can correct me and I'm sure they will, but I recollect that Appendix I has also been amended since then but I'm sure that Mr. Lessy can tell me if I'm correct or not.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, can you respond to that? If you wish?

MR. LESSY: Yes. My recollection is that there have been some amendments to Appendix I but I don't know of any such amendments that would materially bear on the desire of the State

of New Hampshire to re-open this particular contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything further on Contention No. 18?

Contention No. 19, Financial Qualifications, I believe the Staff response and the Applicant's response both indicate that the ground rules on that the Commission have changed and Financial Qualifications is no longer before this Commission, a litigable contention?

MR. KINDER: Yes. I did not have that ruling when that contention was drafted. I recognize the position of that issue before the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: I think the citation to it was in the Federal Regulations of March 31, 1982 so it is very new.

All right. Let's go on to Contention No. 20, the Emergency Assessment Classification and Notification.

MR. KINDER: Yes. Mr. Bisbee from my Office will respond to the remaining contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well.

MR. BISBEE: Madam Chairwoman, members of the Board, the State of New Hampshire's three remaining contentions all relate to the Emergency Planning Issue generally. So I would like to treat all of them together with the Board's leave.

JUDGE HOYT: Does that pose any problem for Counsel? Well, let's treat them as a whole.

MR. BISBEE: The Applicant has responded by objecting to the language we have used in the three separate contentions

by suggesting the same one Emergency Planning Contention that was discussed earlier today, this morning, in relation to SAPL's Emergency Planning Contention.

While I'm sure we will discuss that contention along with the others that we will be talking with the Applicant's Counsel about, it is still our position that by organizing the Emergency Planning Issue into the three categories that the State of New Hampshire has done is an appropriate way of handling the issue and it may be a little bit more manageable fashion of litigating the issue of Emergency Planning.

The Staff has also indicated that it would not object to certain Emergency Planning Contentions.

It has, however, objected to a contention relating to offsite planning due to the fact that many of the localities have not yet submitted Emergency Plans nor has the State of New Hampshire.

We do not feel that that issue is premature, however, in that the mere absence of those Emergency Plans is a sufficient basis for a contention that the Applicant's Emergency Plan is not yet complete.

The Staff further indicates that the Onsite Emergency
Planning that we have contended is inadequate, our Contention
Nos. 20 and 21, is not sufficiently specified. We feel that there
is a sufficient basis for our contention that in Contention No. 20
that Emergency Assessment Classification and Notification has

not been demonstrated in the FSAR or in the Emergency Plan and that protective measures for Onsite personnel has not been demonstrated to be sufficient either.

I would add, however, a reference to 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix E, Section IV, Sub-section (e) for a basis of those

specific requirements that we are contending have not yet been

met in the FSAR and the specific section on Emergency Planning.

In our final contention, we raise the issue of the demarcation of the Emergency Planning Zones. The Staff has responded that that is not a proper contention in that the Applicant does not have the burden of showing that there are special circumstances that would require a different zone other than the ten and fifty mile radii zones that is the demarcation used unless there is a demonstration that there are special circumstances.

It is our position, however, that it is the Applicant that should demonstrate that it has considered the factors that are included in Section 50.47 and in Appendix E as well as in NUREG 0654. I would refer specifically to that NUREG of page 17, Table I that judgment should be used in adopting the distances for demarcating the size of the EPZ, based on local conditions such as demography, topography, land characteristic access routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries.

Nothing further.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Applicant?

MR. DIGNAN: I don't have anything to add beyond a short statement in there that I think if we phrase—I am prepared to concede. The Emergency Planning Contention has to be litigated in this proceeding. It seems to me that best way to state it, the broadest way, nobody is going to be cut out on whatever their individual gripe in life is on this plan is, is to just phrase in terms of the REGS, to wit, the Applicant has not been or there has not been compliance with 50.47, 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.

If you do that, everybody's complaints about the Emergency Planning process are in and we don't get into the business of trying to twist the Regulation one way or the other by the statement of contention.

Just there we heard that New Hampshire apparently wants to apparently take the position that you've got to comply with NUREG 0646. No, we don't have to comply with NUREG 0646. It's not even a Regulatory Guide. You just phrase it this way and nobody is going to get hurt. Nobody is going to get harmed. Everybody is going to be able to take the legal positions they want to with respect to this brand new essentially Regulation and nobody is going to be foreclosed out.

I respectfully suggest if we get into the business of nit picking our way through with fifteen contentions, the hearing is going to be longer and people are going to be spending hours arguing legal positions to the Board with every question that is asked as being objectionable, as irrelevant under my

interpretation of the REGS.

on the other hand, we accept the burden of proof. We've got in on every Regulation. We have got to satisfy you that we have complied with the Regulations. All I ask is that the contention be phrased that way, without any nuances as to what the contention might or might not require. Let the Board deal with the legalities and the specifics of whether this or that is required as the points come up in the hearing.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy?

MR. PERLIS: The Staff just pretty much would stand on its response here. We do want to address the issue of off site planning. As Mr. Bisbee stated, the Offsite Plans do have to be made and I think everyone here recognizes that. If they are going to be litigated in terms of specifics, there doesn't seem to be any point in mentioning specifics until the actual plans come out.

JUDGE HOYT: At which time you would have, interpose, I take it, both Staff and I have no objection to contentions being then framed and---

MR. PERLIS: (Interrupting.) Based on the Offsite Plans?

JUDGE HOYT: --- At that time. I think that's the theme that's run through these hearings this afternoon.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I would like to ask the Staff to clarify the mechanics. Is this an additional separate report that comes out sometime in addition to the supplementary SER?

MR. PERLIS: No. The Offsite Plans have to be developed by the local government bodies with the EPZ's.

JUDGE LUEBKE: The plans are written on a piece of paper and provided to whom?

MR. PERLIS: The plans have to be accepted by the local governments and then they will be reviewed by FEMA.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So another government organization comes into the picture?

MR. PERLIS: FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

JUDGE PARIS: FEMA reports to the NRC. Is that right?
MR. PERLIS: That's correct.

MR. LESSY: Let me just clarify. FEMA makes a finding which is entitled to a rebuttable presumption in NRC proceedings.

JUDGE HOYT: The concern that I would like to express to the State of New Hampshire, since I think that it would be your Emergency Planning that will be up for discussion here, is that now in the planning stage?

MR. BISBEE: Yes, Madam Chairwoman. The State of
New Hampshire has contracted with the private consulting firm to
develop the State Plan as well, as I understand, many of the
localities within the Emergency Planning Zones.

JUDGE HOYT: What timeframes are you working with, with this consultant.

MR. BISBEE: As I recall, the final draft of that plan

is not to be submitted until December of this year. There will be earlier drafts prepared in the fall and throughout the fall until December.

JUDGE HOYT: Does that include your City of South Hampton, sir?

MR. EDELMAN: I believe you are talking about the Sun Valley? They are part of the Town of Hampton.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, Hampton.

MR. EDELMAN: Right. I believe it will include that area.

JUDGE HOYT: What other areas are covered by that?

MR. BISBEE: I'm not sure of the exact number of localities that would be included. They are localities both in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, as I understand it.

JUDGE HOYT: Ms. Shotwell ---

MR. BISBEE: (Interrupting.) Each town has agreed to take part in this, having decided to do their own Emergency Plans on their own.

JUDGE HOYT: ---What is your position, Ms. Shotwell, for the State of Massachusetts? Do you know what the local communities are doing?

MS. SHOTWELL: As I understand it, it is the same timetable, Madam Chairwoman.

JUDGE HOYT: Is it the same firm that is developing it?

MS. SHOTWELL: With respect to the localites, yes. I

understand that it is. Now I also understand that there is also an Area Plan that comes out of the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency. Whether that is part of the same package, I am really not sure but it relates to the State response as opposed to individual localities.

JUDGE HOYT: Could you get that information then and relate it to all the parties, all the participants?

MS. SHOTWELL: Information specifically as to the timetable?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, and who is doing what, when, where and how. I think that's going to be helpful.

Yes, ma'am?

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: Madam Chairman, if I could I would like to say that that legislation is in the Supreme Court. There is a belief in the communities that involved the legislation called for the local units of government to be involved in the initiation stage in hiring the firm and they were not. So that is in the Supreme Court. There have been several towns that have taken that to the Supreme Court.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have something?

MR. AHRENS: No. I was just going to volunteer providing the civil information for the towns within the southern part of the State of Maine if the Board would like?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. We will take them all from Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire. That's a ten mile radius

and fifty.

MR. BACKUS: I just thought the Board might want to know that Ms. Hollingworth was talking about may, of course, have an impact on the schedules that you've been asking about that the New Hampshire Legislation under which this Plan is being funded is under challenge in the State Supreme Court. I don't believe the case has been argued that but it is pending there and it might, of course, depending on how that decision goes, have an impact on when the results of this Plan would be available, I assume.

JUDGE PARIS: The question is whether the State can appropriately allocate funds for that?

MR. BACKUS: As I understand it, Ms. Hollingworth is really the appropriate person to speak. The challenge is to the method by which this Plan was implemented that the Legislation under which this contract was awarded. It was contemplated that it would start out with consultation in the local communites and the claim that she is making, and she is a State Representative with another State Representative who is also here in the room today, is that that process was not followed. Therefore, the contract wa not validly awarded. That went before the

New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission which made a decision in the matter which was in favor of the contract and that is now under appeal in the State Supreme Court.

JUDGE HOYT: Is it your organization that is taking the appeal to the Supreme Court?

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MS. HOLLINGWORTH: Madam Chairman, as a Representative I was involved in the Legislation and because I am also from Hampton and involved in the community there, our Selectmen in most of the surrounding seventeen surrounding communities, there have been two that have chosen to work with the firm rather than wait for the appeal come down. That is extra. They have not gone ahead and done anything other than say that they will contemplate working with the firm in Newburyport, Massachusetts which has met with the firm. All other towns have refused to have any meetings with the firm because they feel that legislation was not adhered to.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, how is that going to fit into what we are ---

MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) Might I ask, who are the Appellants or the Plaintiffs in that action?

MR. BACKUS: You've just heard one speak. The other one is a Civil Defense Director of the Town of Hampton Falls, Representative Roberta Pevear who happens to be here today. They are the moving parties in the State Supreme Court.

MR. LESSY. For my own information, what was SAPL's position with respect to that law suit to your clients?

MR. BACKUS : I don't know as there was any position taken by SAPL. I am not representing any of the parties in that law suit.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, it's not uncommong for this

Emergency Plan to be the tail ending thing in these proceedings, right?

MR. LESSY: That's true. We have to go forward and do everything we can to make sure the deadlines are met with respect to some of these other matters. Maybe even some of the individuals in the room would be participant to some of these other pieces of litigation.

If the rules to provide a mechanism for dealing with contentions from documents that arise if these matters come up after the close of discovery, the rules do provide a means to add additional contentions and also there are cases as to reopening discovery if in fact, there are disputes about the adequacy of these plans after this proceeding is in a post discovery phase. That's the way we'll have to deal with it.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: Madam Chairman, if I could go further. There is some disagreement there because in the legislation it calls for initiation and that initiation, seventeen towns have called a Risk Assessment before going forward with the evacuation. So, of course, if that were brought into play it would bring on several other things.

I think perhaps if we could bring our legal counsel, and this would be something we would discuss later on in the hearing if you prefer, rather than argue that argument now. That is something I will address in my statement anyway later on.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that would be very well if we could have the legal counsel available.

JUDGE PARIS: The counties want a Risk Assessment before evacuation is gone into?

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: What they called for is the counties to be involved at the initiation stage and the counties, prior to that and 165 legislators requested a Risk Assessment in the beginning. Of course, in the bill it's very lengthy and I really don't think you want the time to be taken up on it now. That will be addressed.

JUDGE HOYT: Can you just tell me this one additional fact? How many of the seventeen communities that you have indicated here within the radius of ten to fifty miles?

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: All of them.

JUDGE PARIS: I would just like to observe. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

JUDGE HOYT: Back on the record. The other Representative indicated that she was in the back of the room. Since we have heard from one of the Representatives, is there anything that you would have that would be helpful to us on this issue? Perhaps you would like to come forward and sit up here with your colleagues.

MS. PEVEAR: Thank you. I hadn't realized I was going to be speaking.

I am the Civil Defense Director of the Town of Hampton Falls.

JUDGE HOYT: You are not an attorney, are you, ma'am?

MS. PEVEAR: No, I am not. I am also the Town

Representative on the southeast New Hampshire Regional Planning

Commission which I understand this firm has gone to for some

assistance.

I am on the Executive Board for the County which is a legislative delegation. It is a consensus, the majority of the towns, Selectmen and Legislators, now this is not all of the people in all of the towns, but the majority have backed us in that position that the legislation has not been adhered to and we have taken it to the Supreme Court. That's where it lies at this moment.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you happen to have any information, ma'am, as to when the case will be heard by the Supreme Court?

MS. PEVEAR: I've heard nothing from the Supreme Court.

MR. KINDER: Madam Chairwoman, perhaps I should interject that the Attorney General, of course, represents the Public Utility's Commission in situations such as this and my office not myself, I'm not familiar with the litigation, is handling that appeal. I'm sure I can provide information as to "schedules" and so forth to the extent that they are predictable.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that would be helpful for planning purposes here because I would not want to see us get bogged down

with the case and have this lying around. It is a very difficult issue to have to hear after we have taken the evidence on every other issue which will be ultimately be admitted.

Does Applicant have any statements here to make?

MR. DIGNAN: I have nothing to add.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Fine.

Yes, sir?

MR. KINDER: If I may, Madam Chairwoman, one very small point for the purposes of the record.

We refer to NUREG 0654 in our Emergency Planning
Contention only to the extent that is referenced in 10 CFR
Section 50,47 (b), it's in Footnote 1. It's just a supplement to
the requirements in the CFR.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we have completed all the submission of the New Hampshire---

MR. KINDER: (Interrupting.) Yes. That's correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Did you indicate that you wanted to do something after the presentation of New Hampshire?

MR. AHRENS: As I understood the way you were breaking this hearing up this morning, it at least had the appear of those who had filed on time---You did mention two parties have filed on time and left the others hanging I think.

The State of Maine has filed its appearance in this as an interested state and it is my understanding of the rules that we need nothing further.

To the extent that there is any question about filing on time or not on time, I would like to just state my position.

I believe that Maine has done all that it need to, to participate as an interested state and that it did it on time in the Board's interpretation.

Would also like to indicate to you, is after the Board has made its ruling on all of the contentions by all the Intervenors who will become parties---I ask that you, on behalf of the State of Maine, indicate to the Board what issues you wish to participate in since you will have the right of cross examination. It may be that you will not wish to participate in all of the various contentions that will be litigated. If you will advise as soon as possible on that we would appreciate it.

MR. AHRENS: I will. As I understood the Order for today's proceeding that you would not take any comments other than the issue of the contentions and I had nothing for today.

JUDGE HOYT: That's correct.

MR. AHRENS: We will be prepared to explain what issues we would like to participate in.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

MR. AHRENS: Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: It is my understanding that the Staff has taken the position that the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League has no problems in participating in this Hearing today.

MR. LESSY: It is the Staff's position, on the original contentions filed by Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, where none of the four original contentions was satisfied by the requirements of the regulations.

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League filed an amendment to its Petition in which it filed approximately four or five others. Staff does believe that one of those contentions does satisfy the requirements of the regulations. We haven't discussed those yet. We didn't have any objection to the standing of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, so long as they had one valid contention.

I think, under the last pleading, they did make it, although, in our view, they didn't under the first.

JUDGE HOYT: All right, we'll take up the balance of yours.

MR. BACKUS: I take it then, Madam Chairman, that the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League meets everybody's agreement as a participant here, since I recall that the Applicant found one of our first submissions, as to contentions, to be acceptable, if they choose to reword it.

With regard to the supplemental contentions, I think I can be pretty brief, because I think most of the material has been covered in what's gone over with Mr. Kinder from New Hampshire.

I'll just make a few comments in response to the Applicant's response to the supplement to the Petition for Leave to Intervene.

I do not have, and I don't know if Mr. Lessy filed, any

JUDGE HOYT: I believe he was asked to give those on the record here today, haven't you not, Mr. Lessy?

written response to our supplemental contentions on the Staff.

MR. LESSY: Yes, that's correct. Our response would not be due until sometime next week, from the date that you filed your supplement, sir.

MR. BACKUS: Okay.

JUDGE HOYT: Are you prepared to give your response today?

MR. BACKUS: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Fine. Now, if you'll go through yours, at this time.

MR. BACKUS: Okay. The first supplemental contention was another phrasing of the Systems Interaction concern that the State expressed in their second contention.

The Applicant again says, and this recalls the discussion with Attorney Kinder, that they want to be advised as to which safety systems are being talked about; which worse case accidents are being talked about; what non-safety components we are talking about, and a more specific legal reference. I'll just say a few words about each of these things.

Basically, the point I want to make in all of these is, that I'm still coming, on behalf of SAPL, from the perspective that we are dealing here, with notice type pleading, and that all is required is reasonable specificity. And I think that what's reasonable has to be decided in the context of what we've got before us at this time.

What we've got is an enormous amount of Staff material in the form of an FSAR, environmental report, and various other materials. We do not have a safety evaluation report; we do not have access to the site. We cannot go down there and say which part of the frazmus they haven't torqued correctly.

I think that all that we are required to do, and I'm just going to make this general argument for all of these contentions, is to give proper notice at this time of the area in which we are going to be concerned, and in which we are going to try and specify the issue, through the Discovery process. I frankly think that's all that should be required.

I think that these contentions do have reasonable specificity at this time. We do know that the Commission, through various studies that have been cited, does have unresolved safety issues, generic unresolved safety issues, that this Board is going to have to find are not a problem for this particular application.

If we have that, and we've indicated the area within those unresolved safety issues, where we think that the Applicant

and the Staff should direct their attention, pending the receipt of additional information and the opportunity for Discovery, to find out, for example, what part of those diesel generators might not work, it seems to me that we have met the requirements of the regulation for admission of a contention.

One of these licensing Decisions, and I think it's the Allen's Creek Decision, 11NRC 542, dealt with an intervener that wanted to raise an alternative of a bio-mass farm for the nuclear facility. In reversing a Licensing Board Decision, I believe, that that was not an admissible contention. The Appeal Board said, we are not concerned with the merits of the contention at this early stage.

I think, really, that the Applicant asked too much of interveners that have access to nothing except their own material, when we were asked to be more specific than this at the very start of this proceeding in the very first prehearing conference.

I guess that's what I have to say about supplemental Contention No. 2, and the Applicant's response thereto.

JUDGE HOYT: I believe Applicants had also filed a Motion to Respond Late to the Supplement Petition, and that will be granted.

Do you wish to do it here on this record today?

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, together with the Motion, we did file a written Response.

JUDGE HOYT: Oh, I'm sorry, you did. That was my next paper, and I've already read it. Thank you. We will consider it, of course. Go ahead, sir. Is there anything else?

MR. BACKUS: What I've said in regard to supplemental Contention No. 1, is also what I would say in regard to supplemental Contention No. 3, which was also raised in different form by the State, about the environmental qualification of safety related equipment over the lifetime of the plant. Unless there is a question I could answer, I don't think there is anything more I can say about that.

The third contention does deal with the Commission's

Interim Statement of Policy on Class 9 accidents, and I note that
the Applicant in response believes that that's an appropriate
contention, and wants it reworded in a way they've suggested,
which basically, I think, I have no quarrel with.

We do feel that the Seabrook site is a unique site, and is one where the consequences of a Class 9 accident require analysis under the Commission's policy statement of June 13, 1980.

JUDGE PARIS: Then the Applicant's wording on that is satisfactory to you?

MR. BACKUS: Yes. Supplement Contentions Nos. 4 and 5, you will recall, related to need for power and financial qualifications, to which we merely stated to reserve our rights, in the event that the Commission's regulations eliminating those matters from consideration in this proceeding should be,

for any reason, set aside.

I've already suggested earlier this morning that I see a substantial problem in the elimination of the need for power argument, and it's going to make it very difficult, I think, for this Board to deal with striking the cost benefit analysis under NEPA, and to the extent that this Board is going to do that and consider that there's some benefit from the power allegedly to be produced, I don't know quite how that's going to be worked out.

The last thing we did, as you are aware, is that we joined in selectively, certain of the contentions as stated by the State of New Hampshire, and I don't know that the Applicant, which has responded to that, objects to it. They've gone a CF, see Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant case, which frankly I do not have, and cannot respond to. It was the practice in the construction permit proceeding for parties to join in contentions, and to then— and I would commend this procedure hereto designate among themselves a lead party on those contentions, but with the parties having the right to make argument and offer cross-examination on the contentions that were joined.

That was the purpose for doing that, rather than making more burdensome paper requirements for us and the Board by repeating a lot of contentions that had already been raised by the State.

JUDGE HOYT: I think the Board is going to want to take that into consideration. We will present our Ruling on that in the Order that will come out of this Hearing. Is there anything else?

MR. BACKUS: No, I think that's all.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: We haven't filed a written Response. Why don't we let the Applicant go first on this, and then I'll supplement with additional comments, based upon their orals afterwards, if the Board pleases.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. Are you prepared, sir?

MR. GAD: Yes, indeed, Madam Chairman. Once again,
we did file a written document. I don't want to rehearse it,
but I am going to modify it just a little.

With respect to Contention No. 1, Mr. Backus is correct. This is Systems Interaction again. We have two responses to this. The first is, it is not substantively a litigable issue. The second is that this contention, as framed, is hopelessly vague.

On the first question on whether or not this is a litigable issue - the <u>Diablo Canyon</u> Decision, which we've cited in response to New Hampshire - somehow didn't make it into our written Response to SAPL, but it ought to have. The citation is 14NRC 325, at Page 331. It's a Licensing Board Decision flatly holding that this is not a litigable contention.

Now, having made an amendment, I have to make an amendment to the amendment, because since we submitted these written documents we learned about the Shoreham Decision.

Frankly, the burden of the Board now is going to be to select between the <u>Diablo Canyon</u> result, and the <u>Shoreham</u> result, and figure out which of the two is correct.

On that, the best that we can offer is, if you read the Shoreham Decision, you expect to find in there a contrary judgment. In fact, there is a regulation requiring Systems Interaction. That is what you'd logically expect to find, and yet, if you turn to Page 10 of the Decision, and it's a little hard to read because the Shoreham Decision is treating three contentions together, but they seem to acknowledge straight up that these things are not required. And I quote for Shore an, "in the sense that the failure to do one, is not, per se, insufficient under the regulations."

Diablo Canyon Board reached, namely that there is no requirement in the Regulations; that you do an Systems Interaction Study.

It seems to us that the conclusion reached by Shoreham is something of a non sequitur. In any event, this Board is going to have to select from between those two authorities. Only one of them, obviously, can be right.

On the second ground of objection to the first supplemental contention, it is, as we said in our written

response, hopelessly vague. If Mr. Backus doesn't know which frazmus was in tort, then how are we supposed to know which frazmus we are supposed to defend, bearing in mind that virtually the entire plant can be said to be a system.

The most aggregious example, however, of the vagueness of this contention as framed, is its reference to 10CFR, Part 50. Because for our purposes today, 10CFR, Part 50, is not a part of the Regulations that the design is supposed to comply with, but it's the entirety of the Regulations. I mean, it's the book. It simply does no good to tell us that somewhere in the book we have missed something.

The second contention is environmental qualification of some unstated equipment. Once again, the contention is wholly without any specification of what equipment is of concern, is therefore wholly without any basis. It gives us, and everyone else, no notice whatsoever as to what is to be litigated; what we are to defend; what testimony we are to prepare and submit. It essentially advances the process not a whit, and therefore should be denied.

Number 3 is Class 9 accidents. Again, we've been through this this morning. Mr. Backus finds the proposed language of the Applicant acceptable, and I think that puts that one to rest.

Numbers 4 and 5 - The notion of standing up at this stage and saying, well, we reserve the right to raise a

contention later, is troublesome, because I don't know what it means. I don't think anyone else knows what it means. I think it suffices today to say that the issues stated in Nos. 4 and 5, are not litigable issues, and like all proposed contentions that relate to issues that are not litigable, they ought to be denied. Thank you.

MR. LESSY: Your Honor, on the general agreement with Mr. Gad's very well stated arguments, Counsel for Seacoast Anti-Pollution League referred to the Allens Creek Decision. That is discussed in detail on pages 4-6 of the Staff response to the original SAPL Petition dated 4-21-82. I don't think Allens Creek is interpreted as a change in the bases and specificity requirements of the Regulations for admission of contentions by Intervenors.

On that basis we oppose the admission of SAPL's supplemental contention on the grounds that it is vague, hopelessly vague, and has an adequate basis.

As we do SAPL Contention No. 2, Contention No. 2 which I just will focus on for a minute states, "The Applicant has not provided assurance that safety related equipment will be able to perform adequately in an accident environment or the projected lifetime of the plant." We have no idea what SAPL means or what particular equipment is meant by safety related equipment, what the phrase means to SAPL, which equipment if not all of the equipment, we do not know what SAPL means by an

accident environment.

Without the specificity that the Regulations require and indeed the Allens Creek Decision which SAPL's Counsel relies upon, the Contention does not meet the requirements of our Regulation for admission.

SAPL Contention No. 3, however, concerning Class 9
Accidents is acceptable to the Staff for litigation or for
discovery in the manner restated by Applicant's Counsel.
Therefore, that is the one contention in our view which SAPL
has proferred which gets it over its threshold for admission
into the proceeding.

SAPL's Contention Nos. 4 and 5, I think SAPL's Counsel realizes Financial Qualifications and Need for Power have both been prohibited in Operating License Proceedings. I sense that, except for preserving some right in the event of change, that SAPL is not really pursuing those a litigable contentions at this point anymore.

SAPL'S No. 6 Contention is an incorporation by reference. It is certainly an acceptable practice that once contentions are admitted, a party may incorporate by reference under certain circumstances or join in the lead presentation as to who is the lead counsel. As Mr. Backus indicated, lead counsel can be indicated, or lead intervener on a particular contention. A particular intervener cannot bootstrap its intervention on the basis of someone else's. You simply cannot just copy a portion

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of someone else's pleading.

Therefore, we would have a real problem with SAPL's 6th Supplemental Petition if we did not already have a satisfactory contention by SAPL's 3rd. Since we have one satisfactory contention by SAPL's Supplemental No. 3, we don't need to get into the question of whether that bootstrapping is permitted.

I would just view the State of New Hampshire's contentions as submitted and as argued upon and not permit the bootstrapping here but it doesn't become a serious issue because of the one adequate contention by SAPL.

MR. BACKUS: The only thing I was going to say, Madam Chairman, and I haven't been able to find the citation in my regulatory issuances——I'm having to get use to them again after something of a hiatus but I do recall a Licensing Board or an Appeal Board Decision, that in support of a contention one did not have to, in the basis, cite the authority relied upon. That was not the requirement for the admissibility of a contention. If I can find the cite of that, I will bring it to your attention. This was in response to the Applicant's contention that the reference to Part 50 was an inadequate citation to the Supplemental Contention No. 1.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that all?

MR. BACKUS: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. This appears to be perhaps

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to be a good breaking point in today's business unless there is something else that you wish to bring up this afternoon?

MR. LESSY: I would just like to go off the record for a moment and if necessary we can go back on.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me ask you what's the nature of your--I'm very leery of taking things off the record. Let's just go
ahead and put it on.

MR. LESSY. I thought it might be helpful if we could just kind of a get a rough agenda as to what the Board would like to cover in the second session tomorrow.

JUDGE HOYT: The Board had discussed this and determined that what we would like to take on tomorrow morning and I take it since it's the end of the week there is not going to be a mass desire to much beyond the early part of the afternoon, we would like to just have the standing of the remaining interveners determined as far as we can in these hearings tomorrow morning.

We also had determined that we would like to get some ideas and perhaps over the evening hours you can make some determinations and give the Board an indication tomorrow, of the timeframes which I think some of them you have given us, Mr. Lessy, today. I believe the State of New Hampshire gave us one and perhaps there were some others. I think you had one that you gave us also, one statement that you were coming out with at the end of the year.

MR. DIGNAN: I had indicated my view of the process

that we are about start down the road of. My hope, dream, is that we would look at a hearing in the spring of 1983 and I did that simply out of the basis that that was the kind of timeframe that was being kicked around in the so-called Bevill Reports that went up to Congress of the scheduling.

I think that if no one would be offended by it, it

I think that if no one would be offended by it, it might be useful, and I would be glad to do it or perhaps

Mr. Lessy is the more appropriate one to do it, to present a suggested schedule to the Board and the parties that at least could give us a reference point to start talking about. If somebody needs Xerox facilities I could probably provide those. If Mr. Lessy wants to present something, I don't know how he would feel about that.

MR. LESSY: I have been thinking in that regard and I would be happy to not only present something but to discuss that with the other Counsel to the extent we can in the appropriate intervals.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Dignan, could I ask what is the Company's projected construction completion date?

MR. DIGNAN: Fuel load date projected for Unit I is November of 1983.

JUDGE HOYT: Unit II?

MR. DIGNAN: Working numbers are always two years later on any given license schedule.

JUDGE PARIS: So for Unit II you are projecting as

of right now 1985?

MR. DIGNAN: No. It's a little longer than that. It's February of 1986.

MR. LESSY: The Bevill date that we have for the issuance of the OL would be 11-83. I understand there are such things as case load panel forecasts and they discuss any deltas or differences between the two but that's the date that I'm carrying all the latest information on. In order to meet that date a Licensing Board Decision prior to that time of approximately October 1983 would be required.

The Bevill scheduled hearing date for the beginning of the hearing is March of 1983. What I have been thinking about and I've shown a brief copy of it to one of the intervener's counsel who we have worked with before and also the Applicant's Counsel, is working back from that date to see, using the guidelines, the timeframes, and the commissioned rules of practice——the intervals and what we have to accomplish in that interim have begun to work back in terms of a discovery schedule, etc. in order to meet that current date. Maybe it's just somethin, that we can present and would be happy to present in detail tomorrow and leave it open for consideration and discussion by the parties and ultimately by the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: Nothing we say here should indicate to any of the other counsel representing any of the other interveners

that you would be precluded from making some sort of schedules or proposals yourselves. Indeed, we would either ask you to join with counsel or the Staff to make your individual presentations tomorrow, if you wish.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Lessy, you've mentioned the Bevill date several times. Perhaps you would like to explain to the audience what Bevill refers to?

MR. LESSY: That's the Congressional Bevill Committee.

I'm not an expert in it but these are the dates that the Staff

and the Commission have used in terms of the licensing cycle

of nuclear power plants. These include the Staff issuance dates

and the projected hearing dates for this. It's public information.

As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Backus wrote me and requested some of those dates some time ago.

JUDGE PARIS: In other words, this is a Congressional Oversight Committee that the Commission reports to and gives these dates to, chaired by Mr. Bevill?

MR. LESSY: Yes. That is true, Judge.

MR. SHOTWELL: If the Chair pleases, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has submitted only four contentions, all of which relate to the issue of Emergency Planning. I'm wondering and this is just a suggestion, if it might leave more time tomorrow for other matters, if we could be heard on our contentions. If the Applicant have not objected to them, then I believe it could be handled fairly expeditiously. I think

there may be some discussion of the notice question under the Order. I'm simply suggesting that it may be something you could deal with quickly at this time.

JUDGE HOYT: I think as Counsel from Maine indicated to you, we have only taken up those matters that were filed in accordance with the Order of the Commission, Ms. Shotwell, and I think yours came in late. As a matter of fact, you gave me an alternative invitation instead of meeting the Order of the Board.

MS. SHOTWELL: Due to non-receipt of the Order. That's right.

JUDGE HOYT: No, ma'am. We won't hear yours today or tomorrow. We will hear them later and we will indicate to you tomorrow what we intend to do with those.

JUDGE LUEBKE: To clarify this, we intend, I think, to have another prehearing conference in the future to take up the late filed contentions after Staff and Applicant have made suitable responses, is that correct?

anticipated me a bit. I was going to bring up tomorrow and ask for some indications. I guess this is as good a time as any to have some indications as to when we could do the next prehearing conference which would take up contentions that were not otherwise discussed at this hearing conference.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So tomorrow we are just going to talk

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about the standing of the Petitioner's that were offered in their original intervention letters way back.

JUDGE HOYT: And the schedule.

MR. LESSY: Maybe since that second prehearing conference would be a scheduling matter, what I would prefer as the Chair initially indicated, to deal with that tomorrow in terms of the overall schedule.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. I think Judge Luebke's design, I'm sure that I join with them, these are the matters that we will be discussing tomorrow.

JUDGE HOYT: There are certain Board members who have commitments to other matters. Mr. Paris, for example, has commitments through—— Is it through September, Mr. Paris?

JUDGE PARIS: Well, I have a very heavy schedule of prehearing conferences and hearings through September, so it will have to be just fitted in somewhere. I'll stop by here on the way to some place else.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Paris joined us yesterday after coming from Champagne, Illinois, by a very slow aircraft.

MS. SHOTWELL: Madam Chairwoman.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. SHOTWELL: For the record I must object to the treatment of the Commonwealth's contentions as late filed. I would like to state for the record, and I will do so under oath, that I never received the Order of this Board setting this prehearing conference, or regarding the deadline for filing any documents, any contentions, until April 9, three days after the date that the Board now indicates the contentions were due.

I simply state this for the record. I will do so under oath, if the Board or any party feels that that will be necessary.

JUDGE HOYT: That's not necessary, counsel.

MS. SHOTEWELL: Due to certain suggestions made earlier, with respect to checking files, I also want to state for the record that I checked my files thoroughly. Not only my files,

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but also the files of every other individual in the Office of the Attorney General to whom the documents could have been sent, on the ground that their names appeared on our original Petition.

I would sum up by saying, we did not receive the Order.

Our contentions were filed within the deadline that is

prescribed in the regulation. We could not meet the deadline

in the Order, because we never received it until after the

deadline passed.

Therefore, I don't believe that the contentions were late filed, and I think it would be appropriate for them to be addressed at this time.

I certainly don't mean to deprive any party of their right to respond to the contentions, but I believe that I've heard responses, and I think the contentions could be dealt with at this time.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me share with you, and other counsel here, why we asked for the particular timeframes that we did.

This case came to this Board in November of 1981. And, from November, until the issuance of the Order on March 12, this Board had not taken any action. We really, I think, by regulation, should have taken probably some action earlier. But, there were commitments of all members of this Board, to other cases that prohibited us from meeting those particular times.

As a result, in discussions by the Board, we

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determined that all Members of the Board have other commitments. As we've just indicated to you, Mr. Paris had another hearing earlier this week, and was only able to join us here in Portsmouth yesterday by virtue of the fact that he had to come a very long distance. So, we had determined that these times were needed, that is the thirty days prior to the hearing, because the Board members simply had no other way to fit the considerations, and to simply read and analyze the pleadings that were being filed with the Board.

I think that that is perfectly within the prerogatives of the Board to do so, and acting in the best interest of all parties, we did that.

Now, you had other options which you could have exercised, one of which was not to file with us an optional timeframe which you thought was more appropriate, simply because it was fifteen days before the Hearing conference date of May 6th.

The Orders of the Board are not invitations to be accepted. They are Orders. And they will be acted upon as such.

. We do not intend the State of Massachusetts being deprived in any fashion of the full participation in these Hearings. Not only is it the obligation of this Board to hear the party, but it is also the right of the intervening party to receive the fairest treatment possible.

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If we hold one of the Interveners to the deadline as set forth in our Order, and I do not think we can vary from that, and give the party you represent, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, another timeframe.

If anything, this Board is going to be abundantly fair, and you may follow your contentions, and they will be considered later. But, they will not be considered at this prehearing conference.

MS. SHOTWELL: With respect, just for the record, I would state that I believe that you can distinguish, because we never received the Order - we are distinguishable from parties who received the Order.

MR. LESSY: Does the State of Massachusetts have oral notice of the provisions of that Order?

MS. SHOTWELL: We did in respect to the timing of the oral notice; the nature of the oral notice - I believe were all set forth in the written documents. I don't want to go over that. I think that's unnecessary at this point.

I'm simply stating, for the record, that I believe that it is not proper not to treat us differently. We did not receive the Board's Order. We take the Board's Orders with the utmost sign ificance; we take this proceeding with the utmost significance. I wish everybody to believe that. It is certainly the truth. I checked my files, and the files of other persons in my office, only out of an excess of caution, because I never

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would have not noticed an Order coming from this Board, addressed to myself, or to anyone in the Office. I certainly would have given it tremendous significance.

I say that I did not get the Order, therefore, I could not comply with it. I do think that to the extent that you treat these as late file contentions, nothing could state better cause for the contentions being filed late.

There has been some talk of the fact that the documents that I filed should have been termed a Motion, rather than a Notice, and some have interpreted that as arrogance on my part, or on the part of the State.

JUDGE HOYT: The Board certainly hasn't indicated that to you, Ms. Shotwell.

MS. SHOTWELL: I think we want to indicate that there was no arrogance meant or intended.

JUDGE HOYT: And none was taken. I can assure you of that.

MS. SHOTWELL: We simply wanted to file something on the record indicating the cause for our failure to comply with the deadline, which was apparently set by the Board, in which we simply could not comply. We have made every effort to file, I believe, a very detailed bases for the contentions which we are seeking to introduce into this proceeding.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you, ma'am. That's all on the record for you.

MR. JORDAN: Madam Chairman?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir.

MR. JORDAN: I'm not really sure I want to jump into this full text, but on behalf of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, I'm sure you are aware that we had a different reading of your Order than apparently you did. And, we stand by that. But, we have no desire to confuse matters. If it is indeed my understanding that our contentions, as we have suggested, that the Applicant and Staff will be given opportunity to respond in writing and we will then be able to address them in a second prehearing conference.

We have no objection, but with the one proviso that I do not believe they can be subjected to any concerns or standards for late filing.

Perhaps the Board is already of a mind to either accept them as not being late filed, in that sense, or to grant them as late filed - in which case I'm not going to worry about it.

But, I am concerned that we acted according to the language of the Order and I don't feel we should jump over any other hoops, such as the 2.714, Late Filed Contention Requirements.

I wonder if the Board has a sense that we have to make some sort of showing, or whether you intend simply to go ahead with argument, and then deal with it on the basis of substance.

JUDGE PARIS: Well, we have that question under

consideration. If we want you to meet the criteria for late filing, we'll let you know.

MR. JORDAN: That's fine. That will be fine, thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: We will give you a reading on it tomorrow, I'm sure. Dr. Luebke, did you have anything?

JUDGE LUEBKE: I was just going to comment - we are giving an opportunity to give twice as many contentions.

MR. LESSY: I wouldn't want to double the number they've already submitted.

MR. JORDAN: Neither would I.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else this afternoon?

JUDGE PARIS: I'd just like to say to Ms. Shotwell that we recognize that the mail service is not infallible, and perhaps our docket service room is not infallible. And we believe that you didn't get it. If anyone has good cause for late filing, and we think you have good cause for a late filing--

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, sir?

MR. AHRENS: Excuse me. Do you expect to address tomorrow the scheduling of the second prehearing conference?

JUDGE HOYT: It has discussion potential.

MR. AHRENS: Including the dates of the other Actions.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, we want to get some sense of when we can have our second prehearing conference.

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JUDGE PARIS: There might be several options. Maybe not the date, but maybe two or three possibilities.

MR. AHRENS: I urderstand.

JUDGE HOYT: The scheduling of the conference will be determined by the schedules that all the parties here have to meet, and certainly members of this Board will also have to meet.

That was the point that I would make, to MR. LESSY: see that no other schedules could go, unless it also included the date of the second hearing.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. We will have to do that.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Lessy, are you going to come up with a proposed schedule for us?

MR. LESSY: I'm going to try to, your Honor.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. And, you'll have in there the second prehearing conference, recognizing that it may have to be shifted a bit?

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay.

NDGE HOYT: I think that does it for the day, unless there's something else that needs to be discussed.

Very well. Thank you, and the meeting will be adjourned until 9:30 in the morning.

(Meeting adjourned until 9:30 in the morning)

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

This	is	to	certify	that	the	attached	proceedings	before	the
	Atomic Safety and			Licensing Board					
	1.51								

in the matter of: PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, SEABROOK STATION UNITS I & II.

Date of Proceeding: May 6, 1982

Docket Number: NRC Nos. 50-443-01 & 50-444-0L

Place of Proceeding: Portsmouth, New Hampshire

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commission.

Robert E. Mayer/Janet Hills
Official Reporter (Typed)

Robert & Mayer/Jaccothias.

Official Reporter (Signature)