



GPU Nuclear
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April 28, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-17/03L



This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-17/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-17/03L

Report Date

April 28, 1982

Occurrence Date

March 25, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing, the normal auxiliary power bus 1C relay (NK1) failed and the service water pump trip time delay relay (SK8A) failed to operate within the time given in the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, Item M.1 and 3.1.1, Item M.4, respectively.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the refuel mode with reactor temperature less than 212°F.

Description of Occurrence

During the performance of the normal Emergency/Interlock Test on March 25, 1982, the failure of the NK1 relay and the incorrect time delay setting on the SK8A relay were discovered. The NK1 relay performed its function correctly on January 25, 1982, during the containment spray operability test. The SK8A relay performed its function correctly on March 23, 1982, during testing after a plant circuit change.

Inspection of the NK1 relay found an open coil. Testing of the SK8A relay found it to have no time delay while the Technical Specifications require a 10 second +15% time delay.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence for the NK1 relay is a random failure. This relay has been in service at least 13 years and is normally energized.

The cause of the occurrence for the SK8A relay was instrument repeatability.

Analysis of Occurrence

Relay NK1:

The relay is energized when normal auxiliary power is available to the 4160 bus 1C. If the relay is burned out, it will not allow auto-starting of the Containment Spray System I despite the availability of the auxiliary power following a power transfer from emergency to normal power or following the system dynamic test. The loss of NK1 alone will not stop System I from auto-starting with emergency power available. Manual start capability for System I was continuously available. Auto-start capability for System II was not affected by the failure of NK1.

Relay SK8A:

The relay is set to automatically trip service water pump 1-2 10 seconds following a loss of cooling accident concurrent with Emergency Power available to the 1D bus. The instantaneous actuation of the relay contact would trip the service water pump immediately upon obtaining the above conditions. The immediate tripping of the pump during such conditions is acceptable.

This relay, prior to modification, timed in 120 sec. on a relay range of 10-200 sec. In the new version, the relay is timed to 10 sec. which is the minimum for the relay and is apparently not repeatable about that point.

The safety significance of these failures is considered minimal since the redundant system would operate.

Corrective Action

Relay NK1:

The relay was replaced and the surveillance procedure performed satisfactorily.

Relay SK8A:

The relay was replaced and the surveillance procedure performed satisfactorily. The replacement relay used was an Agastat 7012 PD which has a timing range of 5-50 sec. which will increase repeatability and reliability with the same set point. In addition, the redundant relay SK7A will be replaced with an Agastat 7012 PD when operating conditions and availability of a replacement permit.

Failure Data

<u>Relay</u>	<u>Manufacturer / Model / Serial No.</u>
NK1	Agastat (TDR) / 2422 PB / 1274161
SK8A	Agastat (TDR) / 2414 PE / 4870364