RELATED CORRESPONDENCE

April 29, 1982

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETED USNRC

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

'82 MAY -3 P3:51

In the Matter of	)	
	)	
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, Et Al.	)	Docket Nos. 50-440 50-441
	)	
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2)	)	(Operating License)
	)	

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OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY
SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO APPLICANTS

Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("OCRE") hereby propounds its second set of interrogatories to the Applicants, pursuant to the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of July 28, 1981 (LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175 (1981)).

Statement of Purpose

The following interrogatories are designed to ascertain the susceptibility of the Applicants' facility to the LOCA scenario resulting from a pipe break to the scram discharge volume postulated in NUREG-0785.

Interrogatories

2-1. Produce piping and instrumentation diagrams for the scram discharge volume (SDV) and scram discharge instrument volume (SDIV). Please reference the responses to the subsequent interrogatories to said diagrams when it is appropriate to do so.

DS03 S 1/1

2-2. Produce isometric drawings of the SDV and SDIV and all associated piping for these systems, showing their exact location within the plant, especially with regard to the

following:

(a) LPCI pumps (b) LPCS pumps

(c) HPCS pumps (d) CRD pumps

2-3. Is any of the equipment listed in (a) to (d) of interrogatory 2-2 above located at an elevation below that of the SDV system or any portion thereof? Provide elevation figures for each item listed in interrogatory 2-2 above and for the SDV system as well. Enumerate any differences in those figures for Units 1 and 2.

2-4. Are there valves upstream of all scram discharge piping which can be closed in the event of an SDV pipe break? If so, enumerate such valves, describing whether they are manually- or power-operated, and if power-operated, detailing any interlock systems or circuits which can prevent or delay the closure of such valves.

2-5. Does Applicants' design include redundant and diverse indication of an SDV pipe break? I.e., are there temperature, humidity, or radiation monitors at or near the SDV or SDIV? If so, to what extent?

2-6. What emergency operating procedures will the reactor operators have to assure appropriate response to a break in the SDV system?

2-7. Would water from an SDV pipe break in the PNPP design flow to or into the suppression pool? Illustrate why this would or would not happen.

2-8. Are the water level indicators in the reactor pressure vessel the only way a break in the SDV would be detected? If not, please explain.

2-9. How sensitive to water loss (gpm) is the PNPP reactor pressure vessel?

2-10. Does PNPP follow the GESSAR-238 standard design for the SDV? If not, enumerate and explain any deviations from that standard design.

2-11. Have there been any modifications in the FSAR due to regulatory efforts with regard to SDV pipe breaks? If so, at what points in the FSAR? Provide any such modifications.

2-12. Is there any way in which an SDV piping break can occur and not be isolated in the current PNPP design? If so, explain.

2-13. What are the dimensions of the largest piping in the SDV piping system? Identify that portion of the piping.

2-14. Is operability of the Hi-level scram independent of SDV venting or draining requirements as recommended in the 8/1/80 letter from Michelson (AEOD) to H. Denton (Office of NRR, NRC)?

2-15. Has the SDV system been installed in Unit 1? In Unit 2? If so, give the date of completion or present percentage of completion for each unit.

2-16. Identify the location in the SDV system of Unit 1 of the damage resulting from the suspected act of vandalism described in PNO-81-109 (December 9, 1981). Describe the measures taken to correct any damage caused thereby.

Respectfully submitted,

Susan L. Hiatt

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OCRE Interim Represnetative