

50.55(e) Report

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

P. O. BOX 21666 • PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85036

April 19, 1982

ANPP-20737-GHD/BSK

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
Creskide Oaks Office Park
1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Chief
Reactor Construction and
Engineering Support Branch

Subject: Final Report - DER 81-45
A 50.55(e) Report Relating to Unit 1 Pressurizer Missing
Lockwires on Cover Plate Cap Screws
File: 82-019-026
D.4.33.2

Reference: (A) Telephone Conversation between J. Eckhardt and
B. Kaplan on December 3, 1981
(B) ANPP-19808, dated December 31, 1981, Interim Report
(C) ANPP-20221, dated February 19, 1982 (Extension)

Dear Sir:

Attached, is our final written report of the deficiency referenced above,
which has been determined to be Not Reportable under the requirements of
10CFR50.55(e).

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President
Nuclear Projects
ANPP Project Director

EEVB Jr/GHD:skc

Attachment

cc: See Attached Page 2

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Chief
ANPP-20737-GHD/BSK
April 19, 1982
Page 2

cc: Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

J. A. Roedel
D. B. Fasnacht
G. C. Andognini
A. C. Rogers
B. S. Kaplan
W. E. Ide
J. Vorees
J. A. Brand
A. C. Gehr
W. J. Stubblefield
W. G. Bingham
R. L. Patterson
R. W. Welcher
R. M. Grant
D. R. Hawkinson
L. E. Vorderbrueggen

R. L. Greenfield
Assistant Attorney General
Bataan Memorial Building
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503

Ms. Patricia Lee Hourihan
6413 South 26th Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85040

FINAL REPORT - DER 81-45
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNIT 1

I. Description of Deficiency

During Bechtel's modification work on the Combustion Engineering Pressurizer (Tag #IMRCEX02), it was discovered that lockwire had not been installed to the cap screws securing the heater discharge cover plate. Combustion Engineering confirmed that lockwire is to be installed. The problem would have gone undetected had it not been for the rework.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications


APS and Bechtel concur with the Combustion Engineering evaluation (attached Letter V-CE-16034) that the condition is Not Reportable. Should this condition have remained undetected and/or unrepaired, it would not represent a safety significant condition.

III. Corrective Action

Nonconformance Report NC-602 will be dispositioned to retorque screws and install lockwire as directed by Combustion Engineering in compliance with Section V of the Pressurizer Instruction Manual (N001-6.04-32-2).

C-E Power Systems
Combustion Engineering Inc
1000 Prospect Hill Road
Windsor, Connecticut 06095

Tel 203/688-1911
Telex 99297



V-CE- 16034

March 8, 1982

Mr. W. G. Bingham
Project Engineer
Bechtel Power Corporation
12400 East Imperial Highway
Norwalk, CA 90650

Subject: Arizona Nuclear Power Project
Bechtel Job 10407
Pressurizer Unit #1, Der No. 81-45
ANPP File N.6.04
Missing Surge Screen Cover Lockwires

Reference: (A) Bechtel Letter # B/CE-E-37492, dated
December 1, 1981

Dear Mr. Bingham:

CE has reviewed the deficiency outlined in Reference (A) and offers the following input as to the reportability of this deficiency. As stated in the Pressurizer Instruction Manual, C.E. Book No. 78373/79373/65373, the surge screen is provided with a removable cover to be utilized for purging and remote inspection of the back side of the weld during welding of the surge nozzle to surge line. This manual provides procedures for the removal and replacement of the surge screen cover and specifies periodic inspection of internal parts of the pressurizer, including all fasteners and bolts, after extended use or long lay-up of the pressurizer.

Justification that the lack of lockwire and/or loose cap screws of the surge screen cover would not cause significant safety related problems, assuming that all the cap screws eventually unscrewed and released the cover during an incoming surge of water is as follows:

1. The breach of a heater sheathwall would not result in a safety hazard since (1) the heater sheath(s) and the redundant 5000 psi internal pressure seal would both have to suffer extensive damage to result in appreciable leakage of primary coolant. (2) A twenty inch length of unheated compressed magnesium oxide (which is like concrete) would have to be forced out through the necked down pressure seal area or the heater sheath to complete the flow path.
2. Should a loose cap screw fall into the open surge screen assembly and reach the hot leg pipe to the steam generator, it would eventually become trapped in the steam generator high pressure head and not reach the circulating pumps because it would be too large to pass through the tubes.

162459
JOB 10407
FILE N.6.04
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2	PE - STENS
1	APR KEITH
	APR NAJARIAN
	APR ALEY
	RE BRACK
	COGRU 1
	COGRU 2
	PGE
	PS
	PE - WPT (S)
	PA DA
	ARCH
	C
	CONTROL
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	NUCLEAR
	PLANT DES'G
	STR & SUP
	CLIENT
	PRO FILE
	WJS
	R. WELCHER
	R. STWERTINK
	VR

3. The functional loss of the temperature gauge inserted in the lower temperature nozzle would not be safety related.
4. If the cover were forced off the surge screen it is logical to assume that it would fall to the bottom of the pressurizer in a region of low turbulence and remain there.

Evaluation of the above scenario provides the basis of CE's conclusion that this deficiency is not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

Very truly yours,

C. Ferguson / MFB

C. Ferguson,
Project Manager

CF/JJS:jlb

V-PSP-768

cc: E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
F. W. Hartley
W. H. Wilson
R. H. Holm
W. L. MacDonald
G. A. Butterworth
S. N. Mager
G. C. Andognini
D. B. Amerine