DUKE POWER COMPANY

Power Building 422 South Church Street, Charlotte, N. C. 28242

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WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR. VICE PRESIDENT STEAM PRODUCTION

April 16, 1982

TELEPHONE: AREA 704 373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/82-06. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

U. Tark William O. Parker, JC

JFK/php Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

> Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1820 Water Place Atlanta, Georgia 30339



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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/82-06 Report Date: April 16, 1982 Occurrence Date: April 2, 1982 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: The Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust System was inoperable during movement of fuel.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Cold Shutdown

Description of Occurrence: On April 2, 1982, a spent fuel assembly was moved from the Oconee 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pool racks to a sipping can which was located in the Oconee 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pool cask pit. During the time this fuel assembly was being moved the Spent Fuel Pool Filtered Exhaust System was cut of service for performance of the Main Purge Filter test procedure. This constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.12.

<u>Apparent Cause of Occurrence</u>: The apparent cause of this occurrence is a personnel error in that the individuals moving the fuel assembly failed to properly verify the operability of the Spent Fuel Pool Filtered Exhaust System in accordance with the Fuel and Component Handling procedure.

Analysis of Occurrence: One fuel assembly was moved with the Spent Fuel Pool Filtered Exhaust System inoperable. The offsite doses for the fuel handling accident without the fans in operation are within 10 CFR 100 limits; thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

<u>Corrective Action</u>: The immediate corrective action was to suspend fuel handling operations until the Spent Fuel Pool Filtered Exhaust System was returned to service.

The individuals involved have been counseled to ensure that procedural Limits and Precautions are understood and followed throughout the performance of a procedure. Additionally, the requirement to verify operability of the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System will be reviewed with all currently qualified Fuel Handlers.

The Fuel Sipping Test Procedure has been modified to require personnel performing fuel sipping operations to verify that the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System and RIA monitor are operable prior to fuel movement and once per shift until the work is completed.

The qualification requirements for Fuel Bridge Operators will be modified to include a review of the requirements to verify RIA and Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation operability with the control room personnel.