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April 9, 1982

SBN-254 T.F. B 7.1.2



United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Frank J. Miraglia, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

References:

- (a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444
- (b) PSNH Letter, dated April 8, 1982, "Response to 460 Series RAIs; (Effluent Treatment Systems Branch)," J. DeVincentis to F. J. Miraglia

Subject: Response to 460 Series RAIs; (Effluent Treatment Systems Branch)

Dear Sir:

We have attached responses to the following RAIs:

460.23, 460.27, 460.36

These were not included with the Reference (b) responses.

Very truly yours,

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

mint

J. DeVincentis Project Manager

Attachment

1300/

B204130313 B20409 PDR ADDCK 05000443 A PDR

- 460.23 Which control panel monitors the discharge flow from the PAB filtered exhaust system?
- RESPONSE: Low flow in the PAB filtered exhaust system is alarmed on the main control board.

SB 1 & 2 FSAR

RA1 460.27

Section 11.3.2.2 states that some cubicles of the RGWS will be continuously monitored for H₂ and that in the event of high H₂ concentration:

- a) the affected components of the process stream will be isolated and/or the affected component purged with N₂;
- b) the affected cubicle will be ventilated to reduce the H₂ concentration; and
- c) unnecessary personnel will be evacuated from the area.

It appears that the ventilation to reduce H_2 concentration could result in the addition of air in the ventilation systems in the ambient carbon delay bed and the hydrogen surge tank area, thus resulting in a potentially explosive mixture. Another potential source of O_2 could be the air conc tioning units. Provide an analysis to show that the addition of air in these cubicles of the FGWS would not result in a deflagration or an explosion.

RESPONSE

Hydrogen analyzers will be set to alarm at less than 4%. In the event of a hydrogen leak from the RGWS, the defective equipment will be isolated and/or purged with nitrogen, diluting the H₂ concentration. The effected cubicle will be ventilated with air. We do not believe the ventilating with air to an existing air and hydrogen mixture will increase the risk of deflagration or explosion.

- 460.36 Does the design of the process and effluent monitoring systems meet the guidelines of Appendix 11.5-A of SRP 11.5, Regulatory Guide 4.15 (Position C), Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Position C and Table 2)?
- RESPONSE: The design of the radiation monitoring system conforms with the guidelines of Appendix 11.5-A of SRP 11.5 and Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Position C and Table 2). The design is sufficient to support the radiological monitoring program (Regulatory Guide 4.15).