



**GPU Nuclear**

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 29, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-13/03L



This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-13/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

It is recognized that due to various administrative delays the submittal of this Reportable Occurrence is not in accordance with the time limitation specified in paragraph 6.9.2.b. of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler  
Vice President and Director  
Oyster Creek

PBF:kdK  
Enclosures

cc: Director (40)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Director (3)  
Office of Management Information  
and Program Control  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Forked River, N. J. 08731

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General Public Utilities System

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report  
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-13/03L

Report Date

March 29, 1982

Occurrence Date

January 28, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing of the low voltage annunciator relay settings for the Main Station Batteries B and C and Diesel Generator No. 2 Battery, relay settings were found outside the limits allowed by Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.7.B.3.b.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the cold shutdown mode with reactor coolant temperature less than 212°F and the reactor vented.

Description of Occurrence

Surveillance testing revealed that the low voltage annunciation reset and initiation setpoints were outside the Technical Specifications limits. The following are the subject test data:

	Low Voltage Annunciation Relay For Battery				
	Main Station		Diesel Generator		
	B	C (Battery Charger)			
		C1	C2	1	2
Tech Spec Limits (VDC):					
- Pick-Up (Reset)	125±1	125±1	125±1	*	*
- Drop-Out (Setpoint)	115±1	115±1	115±1	112±1	112±1
As Found (VDC):					
- Pick-Up (Reset)	123.9	125.3	125.0	121.3	121.5
- Drop-Out (Setpoint)	117.8	114.3	111.2	111.3	113.4
As Left (VDC):					
- Pick-Up (Reset)	125.0	125.3	125.0	119.5	119.9
- Drop-Out (Setpoint)	115.1	115.1	115.0	112.5	112.2

\*Limits not specified in Technical Specifications. However, the Surveillance Procedure acceptance criteria limits pick-up voltage to 120±1 volt DC.

#### Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause is attributed to this being the first surveillance test performed on these devices.

#### Analysis of Occurrence

##### Main Station Batteries:

The plant has two safety-related Main Station Batteries, namely B and C. Batteries B and C are the redundant Class 1E power sources. The Technical Specifications for Low Voltage Annunciation (LVA) were revised in August 1981. Previously, the low voltage annunciators had not been required to be surveillance tested and were set to manufacturer's recommended settings, which vary slightly from the setpoints which were incorporated into Technical Specifications.

The above surveillance test data indicates that the LVA setpoint for the B battery was found out of specification in a conservative direction while the reset point was found in a nonconservative direction. Once the alarm (LVA) is reset at a desired high voltage, it does not play any roll in the LVA. Hence, the safety significance of the reset point being in a nonconservative direction is considered minimal. For the C battery, there are two battery chargers, C1 and C2. The surveillance test data indicates that the LVA setpoint for the C2 battery charger was found out of specification in a non-conservative direction. However, the C battery was on float charge and was fully operable according to the weekly battery surveillances. In addition, the B battery was available which is redundant to C battery. Therefore, the safety significance of the C2 battery charger setpoint being out of specification is considered minimal.

##### Diesel Generator (DG) Batteries:

The Low Voltage Annunciation initiation setpoint for DG-2 battery was found out of specification in a conservative direction. As a result, the safety significance is also considered minimal.

#### Corrective Action

All alarm relays were reset to the value required within tolerances specified in the Technical Specifications.

Failure Data

Battery	Low Voltage Annunciation Relay Make/Model No.
B (Main Station)	Exide Voltage Relay/Type No. 101085501
C (Main Station) - Battery Charger C2	The relay nomenclature is DSLV included in the battery charger furnished by Power Conversion Products, Inc./ Battery Charger Model #3S-130-500CE
DG-2	Exide/LVR Card #101085512F VDC DO 105

Note: None of the relays above were considered "Failed".