NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

(2) LICENSEE CODE: IA D A C 1 — (3) LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 — (4) LICENSE TYPE: 4 — (5) CAT:

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE: L (6) — DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 1 (7) — EVENT DATE: 0 3 0 2 8 2 (8) — REPORT DATE: 0 4 0 1 8 2 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

During normal operation while performing surveillance testing on the sta
ndby gas treatment (SBGT) system charcoal bed deluge system, the "A" SBG
T system charcoal bed was found to be wet. As required by Technical Spec
ification 3.7.B.3, a 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO) was en
tered. The redundant train of the SBGT system was operable. The 7-day LC
O ended after 5.8 days when the "A" SBGT system was made operable. There
have been no previous similar occurrences.

SYSTEM CODE: S C (11) — CAUSE CODE: E (12) — CAUSE SUBCODE: B (13) — COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X (14) — COMP SUBCODE: E (15) — VALVE SUBCODE: D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 2 — — SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 1 — OCCURRENC. CODE 0 3 — REPORT TYPE L — — REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN: B (18) — FUTURE ACTION: F (19) — EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) — SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) — HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 — ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) — NPRO-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) — PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) — COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: F 1 3 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Water in the "A" SBGT charcoal bed was caused by leaking deluge valve CV
-5837A and plugged orifice in the deluge drain line. Contributing cause
is the design of drain line piping. CV-5837A was reworked and orifice cl
eared. Charcoal in "A" SBGT charcoal bed was replaced. "A" SBGT was test
ed sat. and made operable. Drain line piping design review planned.

FACILITY STATUS: E (28) — % POWER: 1 0 0 (29) — OTHER STATUS (30): NA — METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B (31) — DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Surveillance Test

ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) — CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) — AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA — LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES — NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) — TYPE: Z (38) — DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES — NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) — DESCRIPTION (41): NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY — TYPE: Z (42) — DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY — ISSUED: N (43) — DESCRIPTION: NA

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NRC USE ONLY

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DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

Licensee Event Report - Supplemental Data

Docket No. 050-0331

Licensee Event Report Date: 4-1-82

Reportable Occurrence No.: 82-021

Event Description:

During normal operation while performing surveillance testing on the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system charcoal bed deluge system, the "A" SBGT system charcoal bed was found to be wet. As required by Technical Specification 3.7.B.3, a 7-day limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered. During the surveillance test, the level of charcoal in the "A" SBGT charcoal bed was found to be above the level of the deluge nozzles. When the excess charcoal was removed to inspect the deluge nozzles, it was discovered that the charcoal bed was wet. The redundant train of the SBGT system was operable. The 7-day LCO was ended after 5.8 days when the "A" SBGT system was made operable. There have been no previous similar occurrences.

Cause Description:

The water in the "A" SBGT system charcoal bed was caused by leaking charcoal bed deluge valve CV-5837A. In addition, the orifice in the deluge drain line downstream of the leaking valve was plugged which prevented the valve leakage from draining. A contributing cause of the wet charcoal bed is the design of the deluge system piping. Because the deluge drain line is located at the same elevation as the deluge nozzle header, leakage from the deluge valve would not be drained before reaching the deluge nozzle elevation.

Corrective Action:

Deluge valve CV-5837A was reworked to correct the leakage and the orifice in the deluge drain line was cleared. The charcoal in the "A" SBGT system charcoal bed was replaced. After these repairs, the "A" SBGT system was functionally tested satisfactorily and made operable. To preclude recurrence, a design review will be performed to consider changes to the deluge piping to both trains of the SBGT system charcoal beds. Potential changes include rerouting the deluge drain line to a low point in the piping downstream of the deluge valve and enlarging the orifice diameter in the deluge drain line.