

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 P A B V S 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 4 7 0 2 0 1 8 0 8 0 3 2 4 8 2 9
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 At 1038 hours on 2/1/80 during initial refueling, BVPS Unit 1 experienced a partial
0 3 loss of power due to loss of the 138 KV Bus that supplies the 4160V 1A Station
0 4 Service Transformer, the 4160V 1A and 1B Station Service Busses and the 1AE
0 5 Emergency Bus. During this transient, the No. 1 Diesel Generator (DG) auto load
0 6 sequencer failed. The effect on plant safety was negligible with the redundant DG
0 7 unit available with only minimal ESF equipment required operable at the time.
0 8
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

0 9 SYSTEM CODE E E 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 COMP. SUBCODE Z 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 0 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

ACTION TAKEN E 18 FUTURE ACTION Z 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NRPD-4 FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9 9 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Mis-wiring and a disconnected lead on the No. 1 DG auto sequencer ATC adjustable 180
1 1 second timer were discovered and corrected on 2/1/80. The No. 2 DG sequencer
1 2 wiring was verified correct. Integrated system testing on both DG's was
1 3 satisfactorily completed prior to the November, 1980, plant startup. Controls
1 4 to limit access to the sequencer cabinets have also been implemented.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 5 FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS N/A 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operator Observation 32
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A 36
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION N/A 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION N/A 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION N/A 43
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

PUBLICITY

NRC USE ONLY

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PDR ADCK 05000334
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER W. S. Lacey

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Attachment to LEP 80-049/03L-1
Beaver Valley Power Station
Duquesne Light Company
Docket No. 50-334

On February 1, 1980, at 1038 hours, BVPS unit 1 experienced a partial loss of power due to loss of the 138 KV Bus that supplies the 4160V 1A Station Service Transformer. The 1A Station Service Transformer, in turn, supplies the 4160V 1A and 1B Station Service Busses and the 4160V 1AE Emergency Bus. The loss of power to the 4160V 1A Station Service Bus provided the blackout signal which auto-started the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator. During this transient, the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator auto load sequencer failed.

During the investigation that followed, a neutral lead from alarm relay 74-SEQ1 was found disconnected inside the sequencer cabinet. Further checking with the wiring diagram also revealed that the sequence timer motor was mis-wired. After correcting the wiring problems, five manually initiated timer tests were run with satisfactory results.

Integrated system testing to demonstrate the operability of both Emergency Diesel Generators and the auto load sequencers was satisfactorily completed in October, 1980. Prior to these tests, locks were installed on both emergency diesel generator sequencer cabinets to limit and control access into them.

To improve the accuracy of the 180 second sequence timers, they are being replaced with similar models having a shorter timing range of 90 seconds. In addition, isolation switches for the timers are being added to preclude removing wires for testing purposes, which had caused loose connections. This work is being done during the present design modification outage.