

# DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 12, 1982

TELEPHONE AREA 704  
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/82-02. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,




William O. Parker, Jr.

JFK/php  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management & Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1820 Water Place  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders  
NRC Resident Inspector  
Oconee Nuclear Station



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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/82-02

Report Date: March 12, 1982

Occurrence Date: February 22, 1982

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Group 8 Axial Power Shaping Rods Operated within the Restricted Region of the Technical Specification Curves for greater than two hours.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 96% FP

Description of Occurrence: On February 22, 1982, the Control Operator moved Group 8 control rods into the Technical Specification restricted region to clear a core axial imbalance alarm that occurred during power escalation to 100% FP. The Group 8 control rods remained in the restricted region for 4 hours and 23 minutes before the Control Operator on the subsequent shift recognized that the Group 8 control rods were in the restricted region.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this incident was a personnel error in that the Control Operators did not know or verify that the Group 8 control rod position exceeded Technical Specification limits.

Analysis of Occurrence: The basis of the APSR position limits (as it is for the imbalance, tilt, and in part, for the control rod position limits) is to prevent fuel cladding damage from exceeding the final acceptance criteria should a worst-case LOCA occur. This is accomplished by compliance with the core operating limits of Technical Specification Section 3.5 so that the linear heat rate values of Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 are not exceeded. According to the licensing analysis, all the core parameters (i.e., tilt, imbalance, control rod position, and APSR position) would have to be at their limits, and all the engineering uncertainty factors at their maximum values, for the linear heat rate to actually exceed the limit.

In this case only the APSRs were slightly outside their limit. Therefore, the actual linear heat rate would not have been expected to exceed the Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 limits. In addition, the computer's calculated values of maximum linear heat rate did not exceed the Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 limits, since no alarms on linear heat rate were received.

It is concluded that the APSR position limit violation did not constitute operation outside the conditions analyzed for a LOCA and that the purpose of Technical Specification Section 3.5 was met. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action: The Group 8 rods were moved to the allowable operating region. The startup procedure has been changed to require verification that all control rods, including Group 8, are within the proper position limitations prior to exceeding 80% power. At 80% power the rod position limitations become more restrictive.

The computer alarms and statalarms are being modified to include Group 8 position limits. This will give a computer alarm and a statalarm when either Group 8 or the Regulating Rods are within the restricted region. The Operations personnel have been counseled concerning this incident.