UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-259/82-07, 50-260/82-07, and 50-296/82-07

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, TN 37401

Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-259, 260, and 296

License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68

Inspection at Browns Ferry site near Athens, Alabama

Inspectors: K. Butcher for — 3/11/82
R. F. Sullivan — Date Signed

K. Butcher for — 3/11/82
J. W. Chase — Date Signed

K. Butcher for — 3/11/82
G. L. Paulk — Date Signed

Approved by: A K Hardin — 3/12/82
A. Hardin, Acting Section Chief, Division of Project and Resident Programs — Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on January 26 to February 25, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, inspection involved 246 resident inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety, surveillance testing, maintenance, licensee event reports, plant physical protection, IE Bulletin and Circular follow up, previous inspection follow up, TMI action items, and reactor trips.

Results

In the areas inspected, no deviations or violations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

G. T. Jones, Power Plant Superintendent
J. R. Bynum, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
J. R. Pittman, Assistant Power Plant Superintendent
R. T. Smith, Quality Assurance Supervisor
W. C. Thomison, Engineering Section Supervisor
A. L. Clement, Chemical Unit Supervisor
A. L. Burnette, Operations Supervisor
R. Hunkapillar, Operations Section Supervisor
T. L. Chinn, Plant Compliance Supervisor
M. W. Haney, Mechanical Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. A. Tongue, Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor
R. E. Burns, Instrument Maintenance Section Supervisor
J. E. Swindell, Field Services Supervisor
A. W. Sorrell, Supervisor, Radiation Control Unit BFN
R. E. Jackson, Chief, Public Safety
R. Cole, QA Site Representative, Office of Power

Other licensee employees contacted included licensee senior reactor operators and reactor operators, auxillary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, QA & QC and engineering personnel.

2. Management Interviews

Management interviews were conducted on February 1, 5, 12 and 19, 1982, with the power Plant Superintendent and/or the Assistant Power Plant Superintendents and other members of his staff. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of their inspection activities.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Infraction (259/260/296/79-09-01): Failure to follow QA procedures and ANSI Standard. The inspector reviewed and evaluated the licensee response and current practices. The inspector nad no further questions.

b. (Closed) Open Item (296/79-14-07): OI 71 does not include FCV 71-10. The inspector reviewed OI 71 for adequate revision. The inspector had no further questions.

c. (Closed) Open Item (259/260/296/79-14-01): EOI 44 needs updating to include manual scram. The inspector reviewed EOI 44 for adequate revision. The inspector had no additional concerns.

d. (Closed) Unresolved (259/260/296/79-14-03): EOI 8 requires updating. The inspector evaluated the need to update EOI 8. The inspector had no further questions.

e. (Closed) Open Item (296/79-14-05): OI 74 requires update. The inspector reviewed OI 74 for adequate revision. The inspector had no further questions.

f. (Closed) Open Item (250/260/79-14-02): EOI 8 revision required. The inspector reviewed EOI 8 and had no further questions.

g. (Closed) Infraction (296/79-14-04): EECW system valves require locking. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and corrective action and had no additional questions.

h. (Closed) Open Item (296/79-14-06): EECW/RHR HEX valves require tags. The inspector had no further questions.

i. (Closed) Unresolved (259/79-09-02): Leak Rate Test temperature requirement. The inspector reviewed and evaluated current leak rate test procedures and had no additional questions.

j. (Closed) Open Item (259/79-13-01): Mechanical Maintenance Instructions lacked clarity. The inspector reviewed current MMIs and had no outstanding questions.

k. (Closed) Unresolved (260/79-24-01): Secondary Containment Leak Rate Tests. The inspector reviewed current leak rate test requirements and had no additional questions.

l. (Closed) Infraction (260/79-24-02): Failure to submit an LER. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action and had no further questions.

m. (Closed) Unresolved Item (259/79-28-01): The inspector reviewed the circumstances involved with smoke detector reportability. The inspector had no additional questions.

n. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/79-38-01): Loss of Secondary Containment. A new interlock system has been installed to prevent loss of secondary containment. The inspector had no further questions.

o. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/79-38-02): Inspection and Load Testing Lifting Devices. The inspector reviewed current load testing and procedural requirements. The inspector had no additional questions.

p. (Closed) Infraction (296/79-38-03): Temporary Hatch Cover on CRD Hatch. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and compliance with the leak rate test requirements. The inspector had no additional concerns.

q. (Closed) Unresolved Item (296/79-36-02): Refuel floor supervision criteria. The inspector reviewed the licensee compliance with refuel floor supervision and had no further questions.

r. (Closed) Open Item (259/77-26-03): Cleanliness of Cable Spreading Rooms. The inspector verified adequate cable spreading room cleanliness and had no further questions.

s. (Closed) Open Item (296/78-24-01): Supplemental LERs for 7821 and 7822. The inspector evaluated responses for LERs 7821 and 7822 and had no additional concerns.

t. (Closed) Infraction (259, 260, 296/79-25-01): Part 21 Procedure Implementation. The inspector reviewed the licensee reponse and corrective action and found it to be satisfactory. The inspector had no further questions.

u. (Closed) Open Item (259/80-02-03): Door Watch on Reactor Building Entry Hatches. New secondary containment interlocks are established and door watches are no longer required. The inspector had no further questions.

v (Closed) Open Item (259/80-02-02): Update of RTI 5. The inspector reviewed the test instruction compliance requirements and had no further questions.

w. (Closed) Infraction (296/79-33-01): Current calibrator C-4 was past calibration. The inspector reviewed the licensee's immediate and corrective action for adequacy. The inspector had no additional questions.

x. (Closed) Open Item (259/80-02-01): Plant Superintendent Review of RTI's. The inspector reviewed the compliance requirements for adequacy and had no additional questions.

y. (Closed) Violation (259/81-18-03): Correction of Procedures MMI 75, follow procedures on SP.14.5 and SP.10.3. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action taken. No further questions were required by the inspector.

z. (Closed) Violation (296/81-18-07): High Pressure Fire Protection Inoperative. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action and had no further concerns.

aa. (Closed) Violation (296/81-14-04): Inoperable auto start logic for high pressure fire pumps. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action and had no additional questions.

bb. (Closed) Violation (259/81-28-03, 260/296/81-28-02): Unescorted visitor in protected area. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action and had no further questions.

cc. (Closed) Deviation (259/81-28-07, 260/296/81-28-04): RHRSW Pump Room FSAR Commitments. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and

corrective action taken to update and correct MMI 19. The inspector had no further questions.

dd. (Closed) Violation (259/81-28-04): Personnel in High Radiation Area without SWP. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action taken. The inspector had no additional questions.

ee. (Closed) Open Item (260/81-09-02): Operation of Equalizing Valves. The licensee took permanent corrective action by installing protective screens over the Yarway and equalizing valves. The inspector had no further concerns.

ff. (Closed) Violation (259/81-09-01): Failure to Document Maintenance. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and recurrence control and had no additional questions.

gg. (Closed) Violation (259/81-09-02): Failure to have administrative controls on keys to high radiation areas. The licensee implemented new procedures and controls to assure high radiation area key accountability. The inspector had no further questions.

hh. (Closed) Violation (260/81-12-01): High Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Isolation was Jumpered. The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the event including prompt and corrective actions taken. The inspector had no additional questions.

ii. (Closed) Violation (260/81-12-02): LER 8113 submitted more than 30 days after event. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action. The inspector had no further questions.

jj. (Closed) Violation (259/260/296/81-14-01): Failure to follow procedure for control room emergency pressurization unit. The inspector reviewed the response and corrective action taken by the licensee. The inspector had no further questions.

kk. (Closed) Violation (259/260/81-14-02): Failure to have auto initiation logic for high pressure fire pumps. The inspector reviewed the corrective steps taken to avoid recurrence. The inspector had no additional questions.

ll. (CLosed) Violation (296/81-14-02): Failure to follow procedure during battery testing. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. The inspector had no further questions.

mm. (Closed) Violation (296/81-14-03): Failure to declare HPCI Inoperable. The inspector reviewed the licensee training, corrective action, and recurrence control. The inspector had no additional questions.

nn. (Closed) Violation (259, 260/81-35-03, 296/81-35-01): No SWP for C Zone Work. The inspector reviewed the licensee response and corrective action and had no further questions.

oo. (Closed) Violation (260/80-40-02): Failure to make 30-day report. The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee to ensure LRED's are not lost in routing. The inspector had no additional questions.

pp. (Closed) Open Item (259/260/80-09-01, 296/80-10-01): EOI 36 needs update. The inspector reviewed EOI 36 to verify deletion of Group 3 isolation on high drywell pressure. The procedure was adequately updated and the inspector had no further questions.

qq. (Closed) Open Item (259/260/80-09-02, 296/80-10-02): OI 74 revision to require opening containment spray isolation valves to initiate containment spray. The inspector verified corrections made to OI 74 and had no further questions.

rr. (Closed) Deficiency (259/260/296/81-19-24): Procedure to classify accident on site boundary. The inspector reviewed the Browns Ferry classification and emergency action level scheme relating to radiation effluent monitor parameters. Revisions have been made to IP-1, IP-3, IP-4, and IP-5 to relate radiation effluent monitor parameters to site boundary exposure rates for accident classification. The inspector had no additional questions.

ss. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-09): Radiation survey instrument availability. The inspector reviewed changes to IP-14 that set forth health physics personnel requirements and assignments. The inspector had no additional questions.

tt. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-01): Health Physics checkpoints at assembly areas. The inspector reviewed revisions to IP-14 and IP-8 to ensure that procedures have been established to set up health physics checkpoints. The inspector had no further questions.

uu. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-11): Alternate assembly areas. The inspector reviewed the procedural changes made to IP-8 which designated alternate assembly areas in case of high radiation levels at the primary assembly area. The inspector had no further questions.

vv. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-12): Near site decontamination area. The inspector reviewed the consideration of improvement for closed decontamination facilities. The inspector had no further questions.

ww. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-13): Health physics lab alternate location. The inspector reviewed changes to IP-14 which designated a new alternate health physics laboratory location. The inspector had no additional questions.

xx. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-14): Silver zeolite cartridges in REP van. The inspector reviewed revisions to IP-17 which added silver zeolite cartridges to the required emergency equipment on the REP van. The inspector had no further questions.

yy. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-21): Health physics procedure in IP-14. The inspector reviewed IP-14 for applicable reference to the applicable health physics section letter. The inspector had no further questions.

zz. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-22): Seismic event criteria for accident. The inspector reviewed the revision to IP-1 to ensure the seismic event criteria conformed to existing monitoring capabilities. The inspector had no further questions.

aaa. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-23): Guidance for NRC ENS line. The inspector reviewed the implementing procedures to ensure proper guidance is given to maintain the NRC ENS line open. The inspector had no additional comments.

bbb. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-16): Stack monitor on-scale in EOI 12. The inspector reviewed changes made to EOI 12 to ensure operator action is taken before the radiation monitor goes off scale. The inspector had no further questions.

ccc. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-17): Stack sample confirmation in EOI 12. The inspector reviewed changes to EOI 12 to ensure radio-chemistry notification for confirmatory samples was included. The inspector had no additional questions.

ddd. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-18): Maintenance of meteorological recorders. The inspector reviewed the requirements in SIL 16 to verify chart annotation requirements are adequately explained. The inspector had no additional comments.

eee. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-33): Repair and corrective action teams. The inspector evaluated the licensee consideration for emergency functions of repair and corrective action teams. The inspector had no additional comments.

fff. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-32): Designate alternate assembly areas. The inspector reviewed revisions to IP-8 for personnel accountability adequacy. The inspector had no further questions.

ggg. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-19-34): Clarify initiating conditions in IP-1. The inspector reviewed current IP-1 revisions for clarity. The inspector had no further comments.

hhh. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-21-01): Update Technical Specifications to include current organization. The inspector reviewed recent

Technical Specification changes for adequacy. The inspector had no additional comments.

iii. (Closed) Open Item (259, 260, 296/81-24-02): Lack of Supervision at Operational Support Center. The inspector reviewed changes to IP-7 and IP-21 which delineate organizational response and supervision. The inspector had no additional questions.

jjj. (Open) The inspector reviewed the licensee response to inspection report 259, 260, 296/81-19 for compliance to regulatory requirements. Item 81-19-27 had a completion of action commitment date of February 2, 1982. The inspector noted on February 19, 1982 the action was not complete. The inspector notified the plant superintendent during the weekly management meeting of February 19, 1982 that this item will be considered unresolved. (259, 260, 296/82-07-01)

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they area acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. New Unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 3 and 5.

5. Operational Safety

The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held each morning with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.

The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such the each was visited at least daily when an inspector was on site. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency standby systems; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarms; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and data sheet entries; and control room manning. This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited. Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; instrument readings; housekeeping; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; vital area controls; personnel badging, personnel search and escort; and vehicle search and escort. Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional areas during these tours. In addition a complete walk-down which included valve alignment, instrument alignment and switch positions was performed on the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EEWC) System.

During the walk-down of the EEWC system, in the diesel generator building for Unit 1 and 2, the inspector noted that the doors leading to the outside from each diesel generator room (four rooms) and the CO_2 room were manually opened and closed and not pneumatically operated as called for in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 12.2.8.2.1. Unit 3 Diesel Generator Building doors are pneumaticlly operated as required. The inspector has requested TVA to provide a copy of the safety evaluation performed on Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Building which allowed for the pneumatic operators to be deleted from the doors.

This item remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of the safety evaluation (259/82-07-02, 260/82-07-02).

6. Maintenance Observation

During the report period, the inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities for procedure adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to Technical Specifications, radiological controls, and adherence to Quality Control hold points.

a. Electrical Maintenance Instruction(EMI)-7- Inspection and Maintenance of 480-volt and 240-volt A-C Switchboards and Motor Control Center.

b. EMI-3-Diesel Generators

c. Torus Modifications on Unit 3.

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observation.

The inspectors observed the performance of the below listed surveillance procedures. The inspection consisted of review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system and a review of test date.

a. Surveillance Instruction-4.7.A.4-Vacuum Breaker Exercise

During the review of the above procedure, the inspector noted the following problem areas.

(1) Procedure does not address reducing the Drywell to Suppression Pool P below the technical Specification (T.S) limit. (Technical Specifications allow operating the reactors for up to four hours below the P specified for this test). The licensee will revise the procedure.

(2) The T.S. bases states that 0.25 inches of H_2O corresponds to 0.14 #/sec which is the maximum leakage allowed between the

Drywell and Suppression pool. 0.25 inches of H O actually corresponds to 0.09#/sec. the licensee plans to submit a T.S change.

The above two items are identified as open items (259/82-07-03, 260/82-07-03, 296/82-07-02).

8. TMI Action Items

a. II.F.1.6 Containment Hydrogen Monitor. This item required the licensee to install a hydrogen monitoring system for monitoring the containment atmosphere. Browns Ferry has installed a system which indicates continously in the Control Room during reactor operation. The scale is from 0-100% wide range and 0-20% narrow range. The only outstanding item is replacing the Unit 3 sample return pump with a higher capacity pump. This change is scheduled to be performed during the current Unit 3 outage.

This item is considered closed.

b. II.K.3.24 Space Cooling for High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). This item required the licensee to review their HPCI and RCIC systems to ensure the systems can operate effectively with a complete loss of off-site alternating-current power to their support systems, including space coolers, for two hours.

TVA's response to this item states that the RCIC system is in the same room as the Core Spray (CS) pumps which has a space cooler being supplied cooling water from the Emergancy Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The HPCI room however does not have a space cooler. TVA takes credit for the HPCI room having a large opening to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) room which is adjacent to the HPCI room, which has a space cooler supplied from EECW. This item will remain open pending NRR's response to TVAs submittal on the HPCI room.

c. II.F.1.3 High Range Radiation Monitors. This item requires the licensee to install radiation-level monitors in the containment with a maximum range of 10 rad/hr. These monitors are presently scheduled to be installed on Unit 1 during the spring refueling outage of 1983, on Unit 2 during the spring refueling outage of 1984 and Unit 3 during the fall refueling outage of 1984.

This item will remain open, pending the completion of the installation of the containment high range radiation monitors.

d. II.K.3.25 Effect of loss of Alternating-Current Power on Pump Seals. This item required the licensee to determine if the recirculation pump seals could withstand a complete loss of off-site power for two hours. The licensee stated, and the inspectors verified, that adequate seal cooling will be provided by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water

(RBCCW) system, which receives its emergency power from the shutdown boards or the Control Rod Drive Hydralic system if RBCCW failed.

The inspectors had no further questions and this item is considered closed.

In the above area, no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Reactor Trips

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed reactor trips during this report period. The review included determination of cause, safety significance, performance of personnel and systems, and corrective action. The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts, operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with operations, maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.

On January 26, 1982 Unit 1 scrammed from 1092 MWe. The scram was caused by a wrench being dropped on instrument panel 25-6A generating a spurious reactor high pressure trip. No relief valves actuated nor were any emergency core cooling systems initiated. All required safety systems performed satisfactorily.

On February 12,1982, Unit 1 scrammed from 100% reactor power. The cause of the scram was high water level in the moisture seperator C-2. This resulted in a turbine trip causing a reactor scram. Six relief valves actuated to reduce reactor pressure. No emergency core cooling systems were initiated. All required safety systems performed satisfactorily.

No deviations or violations were identified within the areas inspected.

10. Reportable Occurrence

The below listed licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC reporting requirements. The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.

LER No.	Date	Event
*259/80-11	2/1/80	Possible Loss of Primary Containment
*259/81-14	4/24/81	Excessive Leak Rate on MSIV's
259/81-49	9/3/81	Damaged Cables during CRD Maintenance

*259/81-54	9/15/81	Excess flow check valves would not restrict flow
*259/81-58	10/12/81	Main steam leakage into auxiliary boiler
259/82-06	1/12/82	Pressure switch out of specification
259/81-91	12/20/81	"B" Control Room emergency ventilation system inoperable
*259/81-92	12/18/81	RWCU floor drain high-temperature switches not seismically mounted.
259/82-07	1/13/82	Wind Speed Indicator Channel "C" Inoperable
*259/81-93	12/25/81	1 EN LPCI MG set inoperable
*259/81-94	12/26/81	"B" H -O sample pump inoperable.
259/82-01	1/3/82	Meterological instrument inoperable
*259/82-05	1/9/82	1 EN LPCI MG set Inoperable
*260/81-47	9/15/81	Core spray room coolers inoperable
*260/81-57	10/22/81	"B" H -O sample pump inoperable
259/82-09	1/17/82	Relay room smoke detector inoperable
*259/81-89	12/11/81	Diesel Generator "D" overspeed trip
*259/81-46R1	8/16/81	CAM Inoperable (1-RM-90-250)
*259/81-78	11/23/81	CAM Inoperable (1-RM-90-250)
*259/81-68R1	11/6/81	1B 480 Volt Shutdown Board Deenergized
259/82-08	1/16/82	CAM Inoperable (1-RM-90-250)
*259/82-10	1/12/82	Stack Monitor Inoperable
260/81-58R1	10/29/81	Drywell/Torus DP less than technical specification
*260/81-63	11/17/81	Core Spray room coolers inoperable
260/81-69	12/31/81	Scram discharge volume level switch inoperable

260/82-03		Low press switches out of tolerance.
296/81-37	7/23/81	"B" H_2 -O_2 sample pump inoperable
*296/81-68	11/15/81	3 EN LPCI MG set inoperable
*296/81-69	11/18/81	3 EN LPCI MG set inoperable
*296/81-73	12/22/81	Excessive leakage from MSIVs
296/81-75	12/21/81	Water level indicator out of calibration
*296/81-67	11/16/81	CAM Inoperable (3-RM-90-249)

No deviations or violations were identified within the areas inspected.

11. IE Bulletin Review

Licensee action on the below listed bulletins were reviewed to determine if the evaluation and action taken was appropriate to satisfy the concern described in the bulletin. The inspection consisted of records, drawings and procedure review and discussion with plant personnel. The below listed bulletins are considered closed:

79-08	Events Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident
79-15	Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies
79-5A	Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island
80-09	Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies
80-19	Mercury-wetted Matrix Relays
80-16	Rosemont Pressure Transmitters
81-02	Closure of Gate Type Valves
80-14	Scram Discharge Volume Capability
79-09	GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker

No deviations or violations were identified within the areas inspected.

12. I. E. Circular Review

Licensee action on the below listed circulars was reviewed to determine if the licensee evaluation and action taken was appropriate to satisfy the concerns described in circulars. The review by the inspectors consisted of

records review, procedure review, and discussions with plant personnel. The circulars listed below are considered closed:

78-18	UL Fire Test
79-13	Diesel Fire Pump Contactors
80-02	Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours
80-09	Internal Communication
81-12	Periodic Test of PWR Protection System
81-14	Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close

No deviations or violations were identified within the areas inspected.

13. Plant Physical Protection

During the course of routine inspection activities, the inspectors made observations of certain plant physical protection activites. These included personnel badging, personnel search and escort, vehicle search and escort, communications and vital area access control.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.