50-275

September 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. H. Sniezek, Director, Division of Resident and

Regional Reactor Inspection, IE

FROM:

R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V

SUBJECT:

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON

In accordance with Inspection Procedure No. 94300B, the attached enclosures list the remaining open items that require resolution before a finding of readiness for operation may be endorsed by Region V. The significance of each identified item, relative to the planned issuance of the operating license, is discussed.

Original signed by R. H. Engelken

R. H. Engelken Director

Enclosures:

Appendix A - Outstanding Items Including Enforcement and Unrescived Items

Appendix B - Preoperational Testing Status

Appendix C - Construction Status


Appendix D - Status of Inspections Required by MC 2512, MC 2513, MC 2514, MC 2593, MC 2594 (Summary)

cc: H. D. Thornburg, Director, DS&RSI

B. K. Grimes, Director, DEP D. Thompson, Director, E&I

N. C. Moseley, Director, DPD&A

L. J. Cobb, Director, T&A



IE01

8110020212 810928 PDR ADOCK 05000275 A PDR

OFFICE RV 3/20 3 STERNBERG ENGELKEN NORDERHAUG FAVLKEN BERRY BONE Jaw DATE 9/20/8/ 9/28/8/ 3288 9/28/8/ 9/28/8/ 9/28/8/ 9/28/8/ 9/28/8/ 9/28/8/

Appendix A

Outstanding Items Including Enforcement and Unresolved Items

I. Operations

A. Enforcement Items

 Inadvertent operation of LPSI pumps with shut suction valves (requires verification of licensee corrective action).

B. Unresolved Items

None

C. Follow-up Items

- Applicant to complete Operating Instruction Index and IE to insure conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.33.
- Review applicant's corrective actions for RCS instruments that did not meet vendor's specified tolerances.
- Review corrected Instrument Error Analysis for CILRT to be submitted by applicant (does not affect acceptability of CILRT).*
- 4. Verify upgrading of calibration requirements for permanent plant instrumentation used during testing.

II. Construction

A. Enforcement Items

Inadequate cable separation in cabinets.

B. Unresolved Items

Class 1E instrument tubing connected to non-class 1E tubing.

C. Follow-up Items

1. IE Bulletins

- a) IEB-79-14: Seismic analysis of as-built safety-related piping system.
- b) IEB 80-05: Vacuum conditions resulting in damage to holdup tanks.

^{*}Does not need to be completed prior to fuel loading.

- c) IEB-79-15: Material deficiencies in Inger-Rand pumps used for hi/lo pressure core spray and RHR pump.
- d) IEB-80-05: ESF reset controls

2. 50.55(e) Items

- a. Excess bypass or recirc flow for HPSI pumps which reduces the net discharge flow of the pumps below specified requirements.
- b. HFA relays manufactured by GE and supplied by ITE have cracked coil spool insulators which might result in failure of relay to operate properly.
- c. Premature time-out condition exhibited by certain Agastat Model 7000 Series time delay relays.
- d. Use of incorrect material in keys between motor drive shaft and pinion gear on Model SMB-4 Limitorque valve operators.
- e. Loss of DG set output due to unit tripping on high crankcase pressure signal during preop. testing.
- Improper assembly of coaxial connectors in elec. containment penetrations.
- g. Steam generator feedring deformation.
- Pressurizer safety valve operability instabilities during test.
- Cracks on hard facing of guide lug inserts for RV internals.
- Flammable spray adhesive on fireproof insulation for elec. cable.
- k. Diesel generator engine camshaft bracket failure.
- Incorrect weiding procedure used on reactor vessel head vent.
- m. Equipment did not remain in emergency mode upon reset after ESF actuation signal.

III. Security

Outstanding Enforcement, Unresolved, or Follow-up Items

IV. Radiation Protection

Outstanding Follow-up Items

- Confirm appropriate calibration of process and effluent radiation monitoring systems.
- 2. Representativeness of particulate and iodine sampling of the gaseous effluent stream needs justification.
- 3. One entrance to a potential high radiation area adjacent to the fuel transfer tube was not controlled.
- 4. Confirm that the 9.5 millicurie calibration source is NBS traceable and appropriate documentation exists.
- 5. Confirm procedures require periodic sampling of nonradioactive systems which is final action to complete response to IEB 80-10.
- 6. Confirm corrective action identified as the result of IEC 80-14.
- 7. Confirm any corrective action taken as the result of IEC 81-07.

Appendix B
PREOPERATIONAL TESTING STATUS

Test Type	No.	Percent Complete			
		Procedures Approved by TWG	Tests Completed	Results Approved by TWG	Test Completion Due
Preoperational/ Acceptance Tests	92	100%	86%	30%	OL Issuance
Post Core Loading Hot Functional Tests	8	40%	0%	0%	Before Low Power Physics Tests
Low Power Physics Tests	7	57%	0%	0%	Before Power Ascension Tests
Power Ascension Tests	17	20%	0%	0%	Before Full Power

Appendix C

Construction Status

Construction is greater than 99% complete. Systems/structures requiring significant repair effort to complete include:

Steam generator feed ring repair (est. compl. 11/3/81)*
Pressurizer relief valve piping (est. comp. 10/15/81)

^{*}Not needed for fuel loading.

Appendix D

Inspection Program Status

I. Construction Inspection Program (MC 2512)

The bulk of the effort remaining in this area involves review of records and as-built drawings. A small amount of "observation of work" remains to be completed for electric components and systems, and inspection of the permanent fire loop installation and "procurement, receiving, and storage" remains to be completed.

II. Preoperational Inspection Program (MC 2513 & 2593)

A. Operations

Areas requiring significant inspection effort include the following:

Verification that Plant, Operating, and Maintenance procedures have received the required reviews and approval.

Review of the draft facility Technical Specifications.

Witnessing of Tests of Engineered Safety Features, and Reactor Protection System and Evaluation of the Results of these tests.

Verification that test results are evaluated by the licensee, and comparison of as-built plant to the FSAR description.

B. Construction

N/A

C. Security

The applicant does not presently have an approved physical security plan for Unit 2, and should have one prior to a security pre-operational inspection and licensing. The applicant is presently negotiating with the NRC staff to achieve an approved security plan. None of the preoperational security and safeguards inspection has yet been conducted. However, based on discussions with the applicant's security representatives, a mutually acceptable time for this team inspection (October 13-23, 1981) was selected.

D. Radiation Protection

23

1. Environmental Protection (Final Preop. Inspection)

- 2. Emergency Planning (covered by special IE Appraisal Program)
- Completion of Initial/Retraining of Health Physics Staff for Unit 2. Also radiation safety/emergency planning training of other Unit 2 personnel (except NRC licensed individuals).
- 4. Review of Health Physics (radiological protection) procedures.
- 5. Review Health Physics portable instrumentation and equipment, and laboratory instrumentation and related calibrations.
- Review respiratory protection procedures to be completed, approved, and implemented after July 24, 1981.
- 7. Verify the preoperational testing of the Coolant Radwaste, Coolant and Boric Acid Recycle and Miscellaneous Liquid Radwaste Systems and examine the test results.
- 8. Verify the preoperational testing of the Gaseous Radwaste System and examine for test results.
- Inspect the HEPA and charcoal filter systems and examine the results of inplace testing of these systems.
- 10 Verify initial calibration of liquid effluent tank volumes and flow measuring devices.
- 11. Verify installation of containment purge and vent stack wide range, main steam lines, and normal sample lab isolation monitors.
- 12. Evaluate the licensee's Units 2/3 capability for measuring radioactivity in various types of samples. Examine the quality control program for analytical measurements.

III. Startup Program (MC 2514)

A. Operations

The principal outstanding inspection requirement in this area is the completion of the TMI-related inspection defined in Enclosure 1 to Temporary Instruction TI-2514/01. The present status is that inspection of these areas is just commencing.

Another area which is incomplete is that of review of startup test procedures. The remaining effort required in this area, however, is limited to verifying that the procedures have received proper final review and approval.

B. Construction, Security and Radiation Protection
N/A