50-245



## UNITED STATES NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30555-0001

September 17, 1996

MEMORAN NUM TO:

Chairman Jackson Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan

FROM:

James M. Tavlor Executive Director for Opt 1.15

SUBJEC1 :

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT INSPECTION RESULTS AND PLANMED IMPROVEMENTS

In my memorandum to Chairman Jackson dated December 28, 1995, the staff committed to conduct activities that would measure the extent to which problems encountered at Millstono Unit 1 regarding compliance with the final savety analysis report (FSAP) existed at other facilities. This remorandum provides the results of the broad-based FSAR inspections and discusses the significance of the identified discrepancies. It also describes shore term and long-term planned improvements, as well as licensee actions.

## Background and Methodology

On January 25, 1996, the Office of Viclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued short-term inspection guidance to and regional offices to supplement the existing level of FSAR reviews that were accomplished during routine NRC inspections. The revised guidance required inspectors to verify selected FSAR commitments by reviewing the applicable portions of the FSAR during inspection preparation and verifying that the commitments had been properly incorporated into plant practices, procedures, and/or design. the guidance was extended indefinitely on March 15, 1996.

The s' 1, monitored the progress of the inspections and compiled a table of FSAR discrepancies that were identified during the period from January 25 through April 26, 1996. In my memorandum to the Commission dated May 21, 1996, I provided the table of inspection results and a copy of the interim inspection guidance. The May 24 memorangum noted problems and potential vielations relating to FSAR ccuracy, design control, and 10 CFR 50.59 implementation by several licensees.

The staff requested and obtained additional information for the most significant discretincies (categorized as violations or potential escalated enforcement issues) to determine whether the actions of the licensee and the NRC staff relating to the identification and resolution of these issues had been timely.

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The table of inspection results has been modified to reflect this additional information (see attachment).

Finally, the staff performed a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) screening of all 219 FSAR discrepancies to evaluate their potential risk (safety) significance, to ensure that individual issues of potential significance were included in inspection follow-up and enforcement processes.

## Results

#### Inspection Results

The short-term inspections, which were documented in 130 inspection reports from 70 sites, identified 219 discrepancies from January 25 through April 26, 1996. The staff documented all findings, regardless of their significance. The findings in the table of inspection results do not include the results of licensee self-as essments. The staff reviewed the discrepancies and noted the following:

- Without regard to the safety significance of the specific discrepancy or the scope of the inspection activity, FSAR discrepancies were identified at more than 85 percent of the plants. About one-third of the inspections did not identify any FSAR
- discrepancies.
   Approximately two-thirds of the discrepancies were identified by the NRC
- staff; one-third were identified by the licensee.
- The types of discrepancies were divided nearly equally between design, operations/pr cedures, and administrative.<sup>1</sup>
- Plant change. may be required to resolve approximately 20 of the 219 FSAR discrepancies.
- The significance of approximately 85 percent of the discrepancies was minor.

## Analysis of Significant Findings

Eight of the discrepancies have been or will be the subject of escalated enforcement action. Seven of these eight discrepancies were design problems (either design errors or improperly performed modifications) and had poor 10 CFR 50.59 implementation as a significant root cause. Although several of the design issues had existed in the plants for many years, in most cases

Design - a discrepancy between the plant and the design as described in the FSAR.

**Operations/Procedures** - a discrepancy between a plant procedure or operation and the FSAR.

Administrative - minor editorial discrepancy or administrative problem with the FSAR.

licensees initiated prompt corrective actions shortly after the identification of the issues. All but one of these issues were addressed in a timely manner after the NRC staff became involved. In that case (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning isolation campers installed in reverse), untimely follow-up by the licensee and the NRC staff allowed it to remain uncorrected for about 4 years. This case is being considered for escalated action.

Twenty-seven discrepancies (approximately 12 percent) resulted in severity level IV violations.<sup>2</sup> The types of discrepancies included 10 design problems, 14 operations/procedures problems, and 3 administrative problems. All but one of these issues were addressed in a timely manner after the NRC staff became involved, but several of these issues also had existed in the plants for many years. In most cases, licensees initiated prompt corrective actions shortly after identification of the issues.

Thirty-four discrepancies (approximately 15 percent) are still being reviewed by the regional offices as unresolved items (URIs).<sup>5</sup> On the basis of the NRC staff's preliminary review of the URIs, only a few appear to be potentially safety or programmatically significant. One such URI involved a plant that performed an extensive FSAR self-assessment and identified several hundred minor FSAR discrepancies. The regional office responsible for this plant is closely reviewing the licensee's corrective actions.

NRR staff members knowledgeable in PRA performed a 'RA screening review (qualitative) of the 219 FSAR discrepancies (summary descriptions only) and did not identify any generic risk implications. However, seven individual discrepancies were identified as having some potential risk significance. These discrepancies primarily involved the potential for common cause failures of redundant trains of safety equipment or spacial interaction (e.g. high temperature steam environment, flooding).

All seven of these discrepancies were identified as naving some safety significance by the inspection and enforcement programs; three of the discrepancies resulted in escalated enforcement actions, two resulted in level

The staff notes that its review of the 219 discrepancies identified that in some cases, discrepancies were identified as deficiencies or weaknesses when violations should have been issued. NRR has concluded that the most risk significant issues have been appropriately dispositioned. Therefore, the staff does not intend to revisit the enforcement decisions made or initiate actions where enforcement was not initiated. The consistency of future actions should be increased by use of the revised Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600) following its approval by the Commission (SECY 96-154, July 5, 1996; a revision to the Enforcement Policy to address departures from the FSAR in violation of 10 CFR 50.59 and for failures to update the FSAR in violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e)).

<sup>3</sup>An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a deviation, or a violation. For these FSAR discrepancies, the starf will obtain additional information and resolve the issue based on safety and regulatory significance. IV violations, and two remain under staff review as unresolved items. The staff believes the current inspection and enforcement programs treated these issues appropriately.

On the basis of the results (small number of potentially significant issues and the fact that current inspection and enforcement programs successfully identified the potentially significant discrepancies), further detailed (quantitative) PRA analysis does not appear to be warranted.

# Relationship to Millstone Lessons Learned Group Activities

The FSAR inspection results were provided to the NRC Millstone lessons learned group for consideration in a broader context. In this regard, it should be noted that the level of design information contained in a licensee's FSAR varies greatly, depending on the vintage of the plant. Even for the most recently constructed plants, however, the FSAR is only a small part of the information that forms a plant's design bases. 10 CFR 50.2 defines design bases as, "... that information which identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system, or component of a facility, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design." A complete design bases document would consist of the design bases (contained in such documents as the Code of Federal Regulations, industry codes and standards, and applicable Regulatory Guides) and supporting design information such as computer codes, analyses and calculations, reports and engineering studies, and engineering evaluations. Therefore, the FSAR review effort does not get at the heart of a licensee's design bases.

Recent inspection findings have indicated that design bases information has not been appropriately maintained and implemented at certain plants. These findings raise questions as to whether licensee programs to maintain confi, ration control are sufficient to demo strate that plant physical and functional characteristics are consistent with the design bases and whether operating plants are being maintained in accordance with their design bases. Several errors in the FSARs were identified, reflecting a programmatic weakness in maintaining the accuracy and the consistency of information in the FSAR. However, the staff identified much more significant deficiencies involving engineering calculations and analyses and inadequate design modifications at some sites (including Millstone and Haddam Neck). Corrective actions for generic design deficiencies beyond the scope of the FSAR inspections will be addressed by other staff actions, such as the Millstone lessons learned group reports.

## Planned Improvements

## Complete or Short-Term Improvements

- On March 15, 1996, the short-term FSAR inspection guidance was extended indefinitely, pending a permanent change to the NRC Inspection Manual.
- 2. The staff will review NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase," and the operations, maintenance, and engineering core (required) inspection procedures and revise them as necessary to highlight the review and use of the FSAR implementation. Review of FSAR requirements will continue to be a part of future NRC inspections.
- 3. The NRC staff will be reminded of the significance of including the FSAR in all inspection activities. This task will be accomplished through greater emphasis on the FSAR at Technical Training Division courses, Fundamentals of Inspection courses, and in upcoming counterpart meetings between headquarters and regional staff.
- 4. The staff will resolve violations involving future FSAR discrepancies in accordance with the revised Enforcement Policy, once it is approved by the Commission. The Office of Enforcement will review Notices of Deviations, i.e., FSAR discrepancies which do not constitute violations, prior to issuance. These steps should improve the consistency of the agency-wide treatment of FSAR discrementes.

## Ongoing or Long-Term Improvements

- Most licensees with FSAR discrepancies have initiated corrective actions that range from performing routine FSAR updates to performing detailed reviews of their FSARs to determine the extent of inaccuracies. NRC regional offices will review the effectiveness of significant licensee corrective actions including the results of licensee FSAR reviews.
- The staff will selectively perform safety system functional inspections (SSFIs) at those sizes with significant FSAR and 10 CFR 50.59 concerns and at those sizes where more information is needed to determine the extent of FSAR and 10 CFR 50.59 implementation problems.

## Conclusion

On the basis of the limited (3-month duration, single-methodology) FSAR inspections and the staff's assessment of the significance of the identified discrepancies, the star, has found few significant FSAR discrepancies. However, the staff identified many minor problems and potential violations related to FSAR accuracy, design control, and 10 CFR 50.59 implementation. These results indicate that the staff must continue to focus on this area to verify that any significant programmatic problems are identified and corrected. The staff will no longer compile FSAR discrepancy lists. Instead, NRC regional office staffs will review and resolve individual FSAR discrepancies in accordance with approved enforcement guidance. The staff is closely reviewing licensee corrective actions and will independently assess their effectiveness. SSFIs will be used, as appropriate, to aid in the identification and assessment of licensee's problems with their FSARs and 10 CFR 50.59 implementation.

When the short-term and long-term improvement actions are complete, FSAR review will be fully integrated into the normal inspection and enforcement processes.

Attachment: As stated

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The staff of the NRC regional offices will review and resolve individual FSAR discrepancies in accordance with approved enforcement guidance. The staff is closely reviewing licensee corrective actions and will independently assess their effectiveness. SSFIs will be used, as appropriate, to aid in the identification and assessment of licensee's problems with their FSARs and 10 CFR 50.59 implementation.

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# Continuous or Long-Term Improvements

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 NRC regional offices will resolve plant-specific FSAR discrepancies in accordance with approved enforcement guidance.

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## FSAR ISSUES SUMMARY

The following table was developed following performance of special inspection instructions provided to inspectors regarding the review of the final safety analysis report (FSAR) during preparation and performance of routine inspection activities between January 25 and April 26, 1996. The notes listed below provide descriptive text associated with identification of the issues, the types of issues identified, whether the discrepancy may result in a change in the plant or the way the plant is operated, and the type of followup activities described in the inspection report documenting the FSAR reviews.

NOTES

1. How the issue was identified (Identified):

NRC - identified by the NRC during inspection LIC - identified by the licensee

2. Type of issue identified (Category):

DESIGN - discrepancy between the plant and the design as described in the FSAR. PROC/OPS - discrepancy between a plant procedure or operation and the FSAR. EDIT - minor editorial discrepancy or administrative problem with the FSAR.

 The discrepancy may result in a change in the plant or in the way the plant is operated (Chg Op/Eq):

Yes No Unk - Unknown

Followup described in inspection report (Followup):

EEI - violation considered for escalated enforcement IFI - inspector followup item N/A - no followup required NCV - noncited violation NRR - assistance being requested from NRR URI - unresolved item VIO - violation DEV - deviation no entry - follow up not discussed in inspection report

			FSAR Issues Sur	nmary				27-Aug-96
Region Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Ec	Followup Addit	ional Information
I Beave Valle	r 96-02 y	3/19/96	Licensee identified need to revise emergency diesel generator shutdown procedures or modify the shutdown circuitry in order to meet their UFSAR commitment to IEEE Standard 387-1972 for a scenario which could occur within 140 seconds of diesel shutdown. Mod scheduled next outage.	LIC	Design	Yes	N/A	
	96-02	3/19/96	The inspectors found control room habitability UFSAR design requirements difficult to interpret. Although the emergency breathing air supply was being maintained in accordance with the UFSAR, the length of time breathing air needs to be supplied was identified as a design basis question the licensee will resolve with NRC.	NRC	Design	No	NRR	
	96-03	4/19/96	Unit 1 UFSAR has a shorter rod drop acceptance criteria (2.2 seconds) than does Technical Specifications (2.7 seconds - changed in 1989 amendment) and the Unit 1 UFSAR also states that rod drop testing is done at no flow cold conditions, contrary to actual practice.	NRC	Edit.	No		
	96-03	4/19/96	Unit 2 UFSAR described a separate Manager of Operations for each unit and a General Manager Nuclear Operations. Since the last annual UFSAR update, DLC has combined these three positions into one with the title of General Manager Nuclear Operations. UFSAR revision planned.	NRC	Edit.	No		
	96-03	4/19/96	Chemical treatment of the 'Init 2 diesel coolers is different than UFSAR description. UFSAR describes adding chemicals to the emergency diesel generator coolers for wet layup from a chemical addition tank to prevent undue corrosion. However, since initial unit startup, it has not been the licensee's practice to place the diesel heat exchangers in chemical wet layup other than with chemical injection points provided for controlling algae, macro invertebrate growth, and silt deposition, and corrosion inhibitors were only recently added.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
FitzPatr	ick 96-02	5/3/96	Use of HPCI & RCIC in pressure control mode as RCS depressurization method is not described in FSAR. FSAR to be revised.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	N/A	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Fellowu	p Additional Information
I	Ginna	96-01		The licensee has never exercised the Assessment Facility (backup lab for analyzing PASS samples) for analyzing both onsite and offsite samples during an emergency. Also, the licensee does not have procedures for using this facility as a radiological laboratory. Violation of 50.47(b).	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	VIO	Issue identified by NRC during EP inspection (96-01) 3/11- 14/96. Licensee will develop procedures for the Assessment Facility and exercise handling samples.
		96-01	5/8/96	UFSAR did not provide any acceptance criteria for air- cleaning system ventilation tests (control room & aux bldg ventilation systems & plant vent), and the listed values for airflow capacity were vague relative to design requirements. UFSAR to be reviewed & updated.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	URI	
		96-01	5/8/96	Emergency response plan states Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) is responsible for evaluating plant conditions, reviewing decontamination activities and necessary repairs prior to giving approval for plant reentry. The inspectors reviewed the PORC charter and noted that it did not mention their recovery phase responsibilities. Emergency plan also states members of the recovery organization will be given recovery training annually. Licensee could not verify all PORC members had received this training. PORC charter to be revised.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes		
	Haddam Neck	95-27	1/25/96	An apparent violation exists for a condition in which LPSI system flowrate is nonconservative in relationship to assumptions in the accident analysis. Related performance issues are the lack of LPSI design basis testing and errors in the supporting analytical calculations for LPSI design basis flowrates. Based on review of this issue, one inservice test procedure for LPSI substantial flow testing did not bound the assumptions used for LPSI design flowrate. Nonconservative accident analysis assumption errors have occurred in the past, that indicate inadequate completeness in reviews.	LIC	Design	Yes	EEI	NRC notified by licensee 12/13/95. System engineer had noticed low flow since 1993. OE awaiting NRR team report on issue prior to issuing enforcement action. Corrective actions: Operability confirmed. safety assessment undertaken. 50.72 notification made, additional testing performed. Licensee looking at modifying LPSI system to increase flow. confirming testing, and reviewing sureveillance procedure.

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	hg Op/Eq	Followu	p Additional Information
I	Haddam Neck	95-27	1/25/96	UFSAR states that containment narrow range sump level monitoring system and containment gaseous and particulate monitoring systems can detect a one gpm leakrate within one hour. The inspector took into account instrument accuracy of the containment narrow range sump level indicator, the low and high level alarms on the control board annunciator, and the frequency of operators recording the sump level indication (every 8 hours), and concluded that operators are provided no means to alert them of a one gpm leakrate within four hours when considering containment narrow range sump level indicator as independent from the other parameters to measure reactor coolant system leakage. This conclusion, and the inconsistences between the UFSAR and a TS amendment concerning a sensitivity description of the leakrate monitoring system will be evaluated in future inspections.	NRC	Design	Unk	IFI	
		96-01	3/11/96	Service Water temperature lower than UFSAR design basis. During review of proposed TS change for containment air recirc fans noted that plant was operating outside design basis due to cold SW temperatures. UFSAR assumes minimum ultimate heat sink temperature of 35 F. River temperatures as low as 29 F have been noted in the past. Licensee evaluated the condition and operation was qualitatively evaluated for a new SW supply temperature of 28 F.	Lic	Lesign	No	URJ	
		96-01	3/11/96	Failure to meet Operating License DPR-61 Condition #4, Fire Protection, in the failure to provide a combustible gas detection system for the chemistry laboratory. Although a combustible gas detection system was installed during the 1980 refueling outage, it was not turned over to operations for use. The licensee identified the failure to meet License Condition #4 by letter to the regional administrator dated August 30, 1985, along with a plan to make the system operable. As of February 20, 1996, the combustible gas detection system had not been turned over to operations for use.	Lic	Design	Yes	VIO	The basis for the violation is that the licensee was never able to get the detection system to function properly. Issue known to NRC & licensee since late 1970s. In 1985 licensee committed to perform weekly chc.ks for flammable gasses in the lab. Plant maintenance and engineering personnel repaired and calibrated the system. The system was released to operations for unrestricted use on 2/28/96

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Ec	g Followup Additional Information
I	Haddam Neck	96-01	3/11/96	NRC inspection report 95-27 described the licensee identification of a long standing condition in which LPSI system flow rate was less /nan assumed in the accident analysis. This condition was reported in LER 95-22.	Lic	Design	No	URI
		50.72 Notificat ion	3/11/96	Commenced TS plant shutdown due to 48 containment isolation valves not being verified closed. The valves are minor instrumentation valves or drain valves in MS or AFW systems. Stopped rampdown at 94%. Later recommenced rampdown when 8 add'l valves were identified. These valves are MS PORV vent valves. Stopped rampdown at 79% when these valves were verified closed and were added to containment isolation surveillance procedure.	JIC	Proc/ Ops	No	N/A
		96-02	4/26/96	Two instances of setpoint errors concerning high containment pressure isolation of control room ventilation, and annunciator audible alarm at 4 psig above atmospheric pressure in UFSAR.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	
		96-02	4/26/96	Two service water valves (SW-V-852 and SW-V-853) are listed in UFSAR table, but were not installed in plant nor described in plant documentation.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-02	4/26/96	UFSAR Table 3.9-1 was more prescriptive than technical specification table 5.7-1 on limiting transients for reacted vessel fatigue analysis.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-02	4/26/96	Operating practices, procedures and logs for PRT pressure & temperature ranges differ from UFSAR.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-02	4/26/96	UFSAR table of containment isolation valves did not list fifty-six main steam line vent, drain, test, and auxiliary feedwater flowpath valves.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	URI
		96-02	4/26/96	Licensee team identified a large number of discrepancies between UFSAR and operating practices, ranging in significance from minor editorial changes, to more significant changes needed to assure UFSAR clearly t "lected the current plant design (e.g. the updated nuclear instrumentation system). These findings indicate an apparent weakness in licensee program to update UFSAR and/or assure consistency between operating practices and the licensing basis.	LIC	Edit.	Unk	

Region	i Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eu	f Followu	p Additional Information
I	Hope Creek	96-80 RATI	4/24/96	Discrepancies noted in safety related battery electrolyte temperature requirements between the UFSAR, the TS and design load calculations.	LIC	Design	Unk	URJ	
		96-80	4/24/96	Minor organization and qualification discrepancies noted when comparing the actual organization with that described in UFSAR.	NRC	Edit.	No		
		96-03	4/26/96	Procedures that fulfill technical specification required surveillance testing of drywell-to-torus vacuum breakers did not implement a "one hour hold" requirement before test commencement after initial test conditions were established, contrary to the FSAR description.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
		96-03	4/26/95	Reactor core isolation cooling and high pressure coolant injection system test procedures did not verify automatic operation of all the system valves required by test description in the FSAR.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
		96-03	4/26/96	Fifteen pairs of reactor building backdraft isolation dampers installed in HVAC supply ductwork were installed in a reverse orientation such that protection of important-to-safety equipment following a high energy line break was not adequately demonstrated.	NRC	Design	Yes	EEI	Damper problem first documented in inspection report 92-02 as open item which was closed later in 1992 after analysis and promise to correct. Issue resurfaced 2/96 with LER stating dampers were still installed backwards. Dampers reversed 3/96. Enforcement conference scheduled for 6/11/96.
		96-03	4/26/96	Full core offloads had been conducted during refueling outages 3 and 4. It was noted that the operation was accomplished such that design heat rejection rates of the normal spent fuel pool cooling system were not exceeded.	NRC	Design	Unk	URI	

However, it was also found that certain sections of the FSAR indicate that the heat load calculations for the SFP

cooling system assumed that core shuffling would occur during refueling outages 3 and 4. NRC is reviewing the acceptability of full core off-load on a generic basis.

Region Site	Ref No	f No Date Issue	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information				o Additional Information
I Hope Creek	96-03	4/26/96	Engineering personnel determined that, following a station service water system flow balance, that flow to the safety auxiliaries cooling system had been insufficient to meet the post-accident design criteria specified in the FSAR since initial plant operation.	NRC/ LIC	Design	Yes	EEI	First known to NRC & licensee during this inspection (2/96). Further analysis & flow balancing of SW system completed. Licensee plans to conduct integrated SW system inspection.
	96-03	4/26/96	25 containment penetration isolation devices found that are not verified closed by station operating procedure nor listed in TS.	LIC	Edit.	No		
	96-03	4/26/96	Procedure that governs control rod speed measurement and adjustment did not preserve accident analysis assumptions for a continuous rod withdrawal accident during reactor startup. FSAR section which analyzes rod withdrawal malfunctions lists a maximum rod speed of 6 ips with the speed control valve failed fully open. This speed corresponds to a full stroke time of 24 seconds. Yet, at least six of the eleven rods (some with directional control valves replaced) reviewed exceeded this maximum speed. These speeds should not have been possible since they represented the theoretical maximum speeds achievable under worst case conditions. The licensee reported the occurrence of excessive rod speed as a condition outside the design basis per 10 CFR 50.73. Regarding the excessive control rod speeds (greater than 5 ips), the inspector noted that the May 10, 1992 test of rod 22-35 resulted in four results with rod speeds at or above 5 ips. Yet, the licensee restored the rod to an operable status and continued to operate for five more months until the rod was tested during the fourth refueling outage (RFO- 4). Full travel stroke time was 20.9 seconds which exceeded both the expanded GE limit, and the FSAR worst case limit. The licensee dic not address this as a condition outside the design basis, and tool no corrective action at the time. This constitutes an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI. Corrective Action.	NRC	Design	Yes	EEI	NRC discovered & notified licensee of issue during 3/96 inspection. Rods were tested satisfactorily. Additional actions pending upcoming enforcement conference.

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
1	Hope Creek	96-03	4/26/96	Concern regarding operating procedures that implement TS surveillance testing of Automatic Depressurization System valves during reactor startup. Licensee changed the description of the test in the FSAR (to accommodate valve vendor recommendations and current operating practice) in a manner which appears to conflict with the intent of TS requirements.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	URI
		96-03	4/26/96	Station personnel discovered that drywell cooling fans have been routinely operated (in compliance with operating procedures) in a manner inconsistent with their characterization in FSAR.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	
	Indian Point 2	96-01	3/27/96	An inconsistency was identified between the plant radiation zone descriptions in the UFSAR and actual plant radiation levels. Radiation dose rates in several plant radiation zones were in excess of the values specified in the UFSAR.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI
		96-01	3/27/96	UFSAR lists minimum service water design temperature as 35 F. Lower river temperatures have occurred this winter. To be addressed in a future UFSAR update.	NRC	Design	No	
	Indian Point 3	96-01	3/27/96	Waste gas system is described in FSAR as an automatic system. The waste gas system currently is operated manually per SOP-WDS-2. NYPA had previously identified this discrepancy and a NSE was approved on 2/21/96, which determined that manual operation was acceptable. Operation of the waste gas system went from automatic to manual operation after the retirement of the waste evaporator in the mid-1980s and procedure SOP- WDS-2 was changed accordingly. The inspector noted that a 50.59 evaluation was not completed at that time.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI
		96-01	3/27/96	While investigating oxygen intrusion into the waste gas system, licensee identified that 2 vent header containment isolation valves were in positions contrary to those specified in the FSAR. Result of inadequate 50.59 review of procedure change.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	URI
		96-01	3/27/96	Discrepancy noted between the FSAR and the plant's emergency operating procedures (EOPs) regarding the termination of NaOH addition.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
1	Indian Point 3	96-01	3/27/96	The previous three examples and other recent occurrences such as the lifting of the CCW relief valve indicate that plant procedures may not have been consistently and adequately evaluated agains: the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.59. This issue is left unresolved pending further NYPA evaluation and NRC review to ensure plant procedures are reflective of the licensing basis.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI
		96-01	3/27/96	Procedure SOP-EL-5 provided instructions for cross- connecting 480 v buses while transferring offsite power sources. Performing this procedure would have resulted in both RHR pumps being powered from the same, cross- connected buses. NYPA determined that further evaluation was required prior to performing this procedure. NRC review noted that the FSAR described the RHR system as having redundant components, and further stated that equipment was arranged electrically so that multiple items received their power from different sources.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI
	Limerick	96-01	3/22/96	UFSAR states a formal ALARA review is conducted every three years by the Nuclear Review Board. By review of licensee records, the most recent formal ALARA review conducted by the NRB was dated October 26, 1992. This ALARA review was conducted by the Limerick Nuclear Quality Assurance Group and reviewed by the Nuclear Review Board. The Limerick Nuclear Quality Assurance Group performed another ALARA program review in March of 1994. In the audit report introduction section, it states, "Health Physics Operations/ALARA is not a Tech. Spec. Assessment therefore NRB concurrence was not solicited." The inspector determined that the intent of the UFSAR had been met by performance of a biennial ALARA review; however, the perspective of the NRB was not obtained. The Rad Engineering staff wrote an action request to evaluate the appropriateness of the UFSAR requirement.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	

Region Site		Ref No	o Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information					
I	Limerick	96-01	3/22/96	UFSAR states, "Two separate shutdown cooling pump and heat exchanger loops are provided," and, "Inter-ties are provided between the suction and discharge lines of the RHR pump in the direct injection LPCI loop (C and D pumps) and the associated RHR pump in the heat exchanger loop (A and B pumps, respectively) to allow use of the C and D pumps in the shutdown cooling mode, thus providing greater maintenance flexibility." Inspectors concluded that the LGS interpretation of the SDC loops, with four possible, was incorrect in that only two loops, were possible. Violation for draining down with only one RHR SDC mode loop operable.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issue when identified by inspectors during report period. TS change submitted; in the meantime will comply with TS.	
		96-01	3/22/96	UFSAR analysis for decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool assumes offloading one third of the core, and one and one half year cycles. However, both plants are on two year cycles and typically more than one third of the core is changed out. UFSAR has not yet been updated to reflect the changes.	NRC	Edit.	No			
	Maine Yankee	96-01	4/2/96	Latest core performance analysis repe', credits SG blowdown isolation on SG low level for mitigating consequences of a loss of feedwater event (an FSAR design basis event). The recently installed SG blowdown isolation system is designed to safety-related requirements, but is not covered by TS. System is controlled by administrative procedures. Licensee proposed to add the blowdown system isolation valves to TS when the issue was raised during the inspection. Staff considers the equipment adequate for credit in FSAR safety analysis. Preparing TS amendment.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes			
	Millstone	96-01	4/12/96	FSAR table outlining manual operator actions to align the ECCS from injection to the cold leg recirc mode, was not up to date in detailing and sequencing EOP and "Cold Leg Recirc Array" steps.	NRC	Edit.	No			
		96-01	4/12/96	FSAR discrepancy in the description of "safety grade cold shutdown" (SGCS) requirements, implying that RHS initiation, rather than the required cold-shutdown conditions, was the desired SGCS endpoint. The licensee recognized this discrepancy will revise FSAR.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	URI		

Region Site		Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followrp Additional Information					
I	Milistone	96-01	4/12/96	Hydrogen monitor operability concern. Containment air enters the hydrogen monitor through pressure regulators that are set for 10 psig. No procedure checks that the regulator is set for 10 psig and it has not been checked since post-installation testing of the hydrogen monitors. FSAR states that the hydrogen analyzers will not be subjected to containment pressure, utilizing a pressure regulator in each sample line to limit sample pressure to less than 5 psig. The licensee failed to recognize that the both trains of the hydrogen monitors have always been inoperable because the surveillance procedure was not written to duplicate, as close a practicable, the post- accident conditions in which the equipment would be required to function. The failure to test safety-related systems in this manner has been a recurrent problem at Millstone and has been the subject of previous violations.	NRC	Design	Unk	URI		
		96-01	4/12/96	FSAR is inaccurate with respect to design bases for time requirements for initiation of containment hydrogen monitors and Post Accident Sampling System.	NRC	Design	Unk			
		96-01	4/12/96	Number of stan shutdown cycles exceeded the number of cycles indicated in the Unit 1 UFSAR. Table 3.9-1 states that the number of design cycles for the facility licensed lifetime is 120 cycles. To date, the plant has experienced 126 startup/shutdown cycles. The licensee now estimates that the plant will experience 170 cycles over the facility licensed lifetime. The number of cycles attained has been found by the licensee to 1 acceptable, in that total cycles will not result in cumulative cycle usage factors greater than 1.0 over the operating lifetime of the plant. UFSAR to be revised.	NRC	Design	No			
	Nine Mile Point	96-05	3/29/96	Inconsistencies within and between the UFSAR and the Individual Plant Examination involving the value of the pressure relief capabilities of the blowout panels. Also, inconsistencies within the UFSAR regarding the design basis for the blowout panels and specific high energy line breaks.	NRC	Design	No	IFI		

Region	n Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup	Additional Information
I	Nine Mile Point	96-01	4/22/96	Licensee installed an emergency temporary mod which changed design of the Unit 2 circulating water system, as described in the U AR, prior to the completion of the written safety evaluation. NMPC common procedure GAP- DES-03, "Control of Temporary Modifications," Revision 4, allows emergency temporary mods to be installed prior to completion of required written 50.59 evaluations.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issue when it was identified by the inspectors in 2/96. Licensee completed 50.59, within 2 days of identification of issue. Procedure was revised to remove provision for temporary mods w/o prior written safety eval.
	Oyster Creek	96-02	4/17/96	An operating procedure provision allowed for operating the standby gas treatment system for a purpose other than described in the UFSAR. The specific provision and operational mode was found to be acceptable, however, the procedure bases did not specifically evaluate and document the provision. Licensee performed evaluation and determined that operation of the SGTS in this manner was no different from normal system running, including during surveillance testing.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
	Peach Bottom	96-01	3/25/96	Inconsistency between the Security Plan and plant practices found relative to de-vitalization of certain areas during outages. PECO revised the Plan to correct the inconsistency.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	N/A	
		96-01	3/25/96	Periodic inspections of Boraflex coupons in the spent fuel pool (SFP) have not been completed for either unit. An engineering evaluation of the SFP determined that the integrity of the Boraflex was good. The inspector concurred that the SFP was in a safe condition due to other existing surveillance methodologies: however, the testing required by the UFSAR was not tracked well in that the inspection was not performed in the last ten years.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	DEV	
		96-01	3/25/96	Review of spent fuel pool cooling system design documentation determined system design heat load was clearly defined. Inspecte noted, however, that it was not clear that the refueling procedure provided adequate controls to ensure SFP cooling system design requirements would be maintained during a full core offload. Procedure change now precludes fuel movement for 120 hours after shutdown. Licensee evaluating issue.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	N/A	

Region :	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category C	hg Op/Eq	Followuj	Additional Information
I	Peach Bottom	96-01	3/25/96	No discussion of the alteration of the circulating water discharge flow path in the UFSAR. Testing requirements for the alternate shutdown panels not documented in the UFSAR or an associated reference document.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A	
		96-01	3/25/96	PECO was not testing to ensure that the degraded grid UV relays on 4 KV safety-related buses functioned within the TS required settings (UFSAR specified testing). PECO had not been testing to within the TS allowable values since the relays had been installed in 1989. Further, PECO had not been treating as-found calibration data outside the TS allowable values as instrument failures. The inspector found that the overall safety significance of this issue was low since, although not known clearly to PECO at the time, the setpoints used were within the calculated analytical values. However, violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Controls and Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were cited because the testing was inadequate to verify operability and the calibration testing was inadequate to identify an adverse condition dealing with as-found settings.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issue when identified by inspectors during report period. Licensee reprised test procedure.
	Pilgrim	96-01	3/27/96	Groundwater inleakage to torus room not addressed in UFSAR. 50.59 & UFSAR change initiated.	NRC	Design	No	N/A	
	Salem	96-01	3/25/96	On 2/14/96 workers installed temporary jumpers in the energized 125VDC control circuit for Salem Unit 1 vital bus 1B without adequately determining if the jumpers modified the plant as described in the UFSAR (50.59 Violation).	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issue when discovered by inspectors during inspection period in January 96. Licensee performed 50.59 and changed procedure.
		96-01	3/25/96	UFSAR states spent fuel pool cooling is designed with the capability to remove heat from a full core discharge. UFSAR also states that a typical core off-load consists of about one-third of the core. UFSAR describes a full core discharge as unusual circumstances, however, the Salem Units typically perform complete core off-loads during refueling outages. This issue remains unresolved pending further inspection.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followuj	Additional Information
I	Salem	96-01	3/25/96	Salem does not operate the EDG jacket water cooling system as described in the UFSAR. Salem staff did not evaluate the change in system operation to determine if it constituted an unreviewed safety question (50.59 violation). UFSAR states that a ball-float valve controls the makeup water flow from the demineralized water system to the jacket water expansion tank. Contrary to this, operators maintain the demineralized water system isolated and manually make up to the expansion tank as necessary.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issue when discovered by inspectors during inspection period in January 96. Pending response to violation, licensee wrote 50.59 to change procedure.
		96-05	4/22/96	Items from spent fuel pool inspection: 1. Licensee has not analyzed spent fuel pool structures and associated systems for boiling. 2. No procedure for using the cross connect between the heat exchangers to support the one unit with a SFP excess heat load. 3. No procedure controls in place that assure that the SFP heat load is maintained below the analyzed value.	NRC	Design	Unk		
	Scabrook	96-80 IPAP	4/3/96	Instances where procedures do not conform with UFSAR requirements relating to the NUREG-0737, Item III.D.1.1 requirement for a program to reduce leakage from systems outside the containment that could contain highly radioactive fluid following an event. Specifically, UFSAR (Section 1.9) requires: a hand-over-hand type visual walkdown while the subject system is in operation (usually during a pump test), work request numbers initiated and recorded on data sheets when leakage is found, and the Hydrogen Detection subsystem of the Combustible Gas Control System, including sample lines for post-accident gas samples, to be included in the scope of the leakage reduction program and to be tested using helium detection techniques. Contrary to these requirements, the Leakage Reduction Program Procedure (EX1801.002): provides the option to perform the inspection after the system has been in operation, does not require recording work request numbers on the data sheets, and states the Combustible Gas Control System is excluded from the Leakage Reduction Program and is tested by procedure EX1801.003, which tests the system using air vice helium.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		

Region Site	Ref No	Date	Issue I	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information					
I Seabrook	96-80 IPAP	4/3/96	UFSAR should be considered when upgrading procedures, but discussions with procedure writers indicated a lack of emphasis in this area. Also, a word search program on the computer for writers to research regulatory, UFSAR, NRC and other commitments does not seem to be user friendly. Licensee plans to change to a new and more powerful program that would improve word search capability.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes			
	96-80 IPAP	4/3/96	UFSAR states each starting air system is capable of starting a diesel generator within 10 seconds at least five times without recharging the air receiver. During plant startup, the diesels were tested to meet five starts from an initial air pressure of 560 psig. The starting air compressors were set to start at 560 psig, which met the UFSAR intent. However, the low pressure alarm setpoint for the receivers was 460 psig, 100 psig below the design basis value. The low alarm is an early warning to the operators of compressor failure. Possibility exists of having the diesels in a condition where the five start basis could not be met.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk			
Susquehanna	96-03	4/3/96	Regarding the standby gas treatment and reactor building recirculation systems, use of probabilistic analysis as a measure of compliance with the single failure criterion of 10 CFR 50.55a(h), and the siting criteria of 10 CFR part 100 as a standard of system operability was unresolved pending further NRC review. An additional unresolved item concerned performance of 50.59 evaluations for longstanding degraded or nonconforming conditions.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	URI		
	96-03	4/3/96	Apparent violations involving insufficient attention to the plant licensing basis in operability assessments and failure to identify and correct design deficiencies in a timely manner: (1) an engineering evaluation of reactor water cleanup leak detection system capability did not reconcile conflicts between system sensitivity and licensing basis requirements; (2) longstanding single failure vulnerabilities involving the standby gas treatment and reactor building recirculation systems were not corrected in a timely manner; (3) seismic- monitoring instruments were installed contrary to technical specification (and FSAR) location requirements.	NRC/ LIC	Proc/ Ops. Design	Yes	VIO URI VIO	Licensee & NRC aware of issues when identified during reporting period. Actions for first violation: revised operability assessment & providing training (in progress). '.ctions for second violation: reperformed operability assessment. relocating some seismic instruments (in progress). FSAR to be changed.	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
1	Susquehanna	96-01	4/9/96	FSAR requires reactor building ventilation system to maintain air flow from areas of lesser contamination to areas of greater potential contamination. Contamination found outside CRDM room due to loss of negative pressure in room caused by dirty exhaust louvers and an almost closed exhaust damper. Licensee evaluating.	NRC	Design	Unk	N/A
		96-01	4/9/96	During a design basis accident condition, the water seals for the feedwater lines as described in the FSAR may not be achievable due to past high FW valve leakage during LLRTs. As the past as-found leakage results exceeded the criteria for maintaining off-site doses within the regulatory limit, the licensee reported the condition to the NRC. Recent modifications made to the valves decreased leakage, and acceptable test data from recent outages allowed continued plant operation. The licensee is reviewing various options for long term corrective artions.	LIC	Design	Unk	IFI
	TMI	96-01	3/15/96	Inspectors found that minimum ambient air temperature at the river water intake structure exceeds UFSAR minimum of 60 F. Review of the auxiliary operator log readings for the two electrical motor control cente, and pump bays revealed that the lowest ambient temperatures were 52 F and 56 F respectively. UFSAR to be revised based on results of engineering evaluation.	NRC	Design	No	N/A
11	Brown's Ferry	96-03	4/15/96	Several sections of the UFSAR associated with electrical systems have not been updated to reflect the return of Unit 3 to power operations.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-03	4/15/96	UFSAR states that fuel pool high or low levels will actuate alarms in the control room. The inspector determined that only low fuel pool level will actuate an alarm in the control room.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-03	4/15/96	The licensee's QA management directed that a detailed review of applicable portions of the UFSAR be included in assessment activities. This has resulted in one UFSAR inaccuracy being identified as well as several areas that should be clarified or enhanced. Several doors between the reactor building and the control building were not being used "for emergency use" as stated in the UFSAR. Corrective actions were initiated.	LIC	Edit.	No	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup	Additional Information
Ш	Brown's Ferry	96-03	4/15/96	UFSAR erroneously states that refueling takes place on an approximate annual basis, when in fact refueling takes place about every 18 months.	NRC	Edit.	No		
	Catawba	96-05		FSAR does not include any description of the containment Hydrogen Mitigation System (Igniters). The system is included in TS Section 3.6, Containment Systems.	NRC	Edit.	No		
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR figure included incorrect valve locations for valves 1SV027A and 1SV028A. Valves were shown to be associated with incorrect steam generators.	NRC	Edit.	No		
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR describes the refueling trolley and hoist and references Rod Control Cluster (RCC) mast/handling devices. The RCC was removed on Unit 1 in 1995. FSAR descriptions of interlocks are not valid for Unit 1.	NRC	Edit.	Unk		
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR described the design of the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and stated that no connections would result in inadvertent draining of the SFP below a level of ten feet above the racked fuel assemblies. The safe shutdown system interface to provide reactor coolant pump seal water could permit draining of SFP to top of racked fuel assemblies.	NRC	Design	Unk	VIO	Identified by licensee pre- inspection self assessment week of 3/4/96. FSAR being revised.
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR described the refueling bridge trolley and stated that raising of fuel assemblies was limited by a limit switch and mechanical stop to prevent raising fuel above a level required for shielding (10 feet of water above the fuel assembly). There was a limit switch, but no mechanical stop was provided.	NRC	Design	Unk		
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR describes effect on the SFP at maximum heat load of a Safe Shutdown event due to boil off and reactor coolant pump seal water supply. This description is not valid because with a full core off load required by the maximum decay heat load, RCP seal water was not required. Level loss in this condition would be due to boil off only. In the normal heat load condition, time to boiling would be different than the 24 hours stated.	NRC	Design	Unk		

Region Site		Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information						
IJ	II Catawba	96-02	4/22/96	Unit vent monitors contain charcoal elements. FSAR states elements contain silver zeolite	NRC	Design	No	VIO	First known to licensee & NRC when identified by inspectors 3/1/96. Licensee reviewing procedures, calculations, & collecting efficiency reviews of specific issue and performing complete FSAR review to identify and change all discrepancies.		
		96-02	4/22/96	FSAR described the SFP loading conditions for normal and maximum decay heat loads and included the criteria of a 7-day decay time before a full or one-third core offload. This decay time was included as an assumption in the decay heat load analysis for the loading conditions. No administrative controls assure this 7-day criteria is met. Licensee records indicate the criteria had not been exceeded.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk				
	Crystal River	95-21	2/26/96	A weakness was identified for failure to maintain the FSAR accurate for the engineered safeguards closure system for the containment purge valves.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No		FSAR to be revised		
		95-21	2/26/96	FSAR states that electrical systems satisfy the criteria of sufficient physical separation, electrical isolation, and redundancy to prevent common failure. While investigating the containment purge valve wiring, it was noted that the control circuitry was routed through a non- safety related cabinet.	LIC	Design	Yes	VIO	NRC informed via Licensee problem rpt. 1/25/96. Lic. aware 11/2/95, during resolution of precursor 95- 2501. Lic.evaluating alternatives for resolving isolation of safety and non- safety-related circuitry.		
		96-01	4/8/96	The licensee made a modification to the make-up system regarding an interlock installed to open the borated water storage tank isolation valves on a low MUT water level. A submittal to the NRC was made, but no revision was made to the FSAR.	NRC	Edit.	Unk	VIO	First identified by NRC in this report. FSAR will be revised.		
		96-01	4/8/96	UFSAR accident analysis for a HPI line SBLOCA concurrent with a LOOP and the loss of either vital battery train was not properly analyzed; it failed to consider several pieces of equipment.	LIC	Design	Yes	VIO	Identified in problem report 2/15/96. Hardware mods completed to meet FSAR requirements.		

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Follows	Additional Information
Ш	Cry tal River	96-01	4/8/96	The design basis of the spent fuel pool system was not incorporated into the UFSAR as follows. FSAR incorrectly states that 1180 fuel assemblies are allowed vs. the 1357 of license amendment 134; FSAR incorrectly states 16 refuelings can be handled vs 19 1/3 of license amendment 134; FSAR incorrectly references a max spent fuel pool temp of 140oF vs 157oF amendment 134. FSAR incorrectly states that leakage from the spent fuel pool through the leak trench is monitored daily.	NRC	Edit.	Unk	VIO	First identified by NRC in this report. FSAR will be revised.
	Harris	95-13	9/28/93	FSAR stated all leakage from ECCS post-LOCA recirculation system would be filtered by the Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System prior to release offsite. Certain portions of the system were not enclosed in the emergency exhaust system boundary and therefore could not be hitered during an accident.	LIC	Desig.	Unk		
		96-02	4/9/96	Spent Filel Pool Cooling System assumptions as described in FS AR were not consistent with actual plant configuration. Condition was identified during licensee review following recent industry issues on the subject. Prelim calculations indicate design basis of SFP cooling system was not exceeded as result of entires. FSAR revision to be submitted.	LIS	Design	Unk	IFI	
		96-02	4/9/96	Licensee has developed a FSAR improvement plan to be managed by site licensing group (ECD 3/30/97).		Info			

Region Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category C	Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information
II McGuire	96-01	4/3/96	(7) FSAR discrepancies noted: 1. Unit 1 operated with one component cooling water pump running. FSAR implies two pumps should be running. 2. The fuel crane underload switch opens the main fuel hoist drive circuit when the suspended load drops to 2100 pounds or less. This setpoint was actually 1740-1780 pounds due to a change to the calibration procedure based on manufacturer design specifications. 3. Manipulator cranes contain positive stops which prevent the top of the fuel pellets in a fuel assembly 1.1. Im being raised to within ten feet of normal water level. Actually, the upper limit envitches on cranes limit height but do not ensure ten feet of water cover. 4. The highest level above the fuel racks that the fuel assembly can be dropped is 3 feet, six inches. The re-rack modification changed the height of the fuel racks such that the highest level would be 3 feet, six inches. 5. The hoists supporting the weir gates were connected by two separate cables, each cable supporting the entire load. Actually, the weir gates are connected to hoist by one cable. The accident analysis accounts for dropped weir gate. 6. Spent fuel cask lifting height was limited to 12 inches with cask shock absorbing cover not installed. There were no admin. limits or physical restrictions on the crane to ensure this limit. This 12" limit is used in drop analysis. 7. Fuel lifting and handling devices were capable of supporting maximum loads under Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) conditions. No documentation was available to validate this seismic capability.	LIC	Design Proc/ Ops Edit.	Unk
	96-01	4/3/96	(3) FSAR discrepancies noted: 1. The reactor manipulator crane was designed to prevent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the gripper in an SSE. No documentation was available to support this seismic capability. 2. Decay heat of spent fuel as analyzed for twelve month refueling cycle there are analysis addressed refueling cycle of greater than twelve months. 3. Long term SFP makeup sources included the reactor makeup water storage tank (RMWST) and the refueling water storage tank, both at 2000 ppm boron. The RMWST was not a borated water source. (SER Supplement 6, Section 3.3)	LIC	Edit./ Design	Unk

Region S	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followuj	Additional Information
Ш	North Anna	96-01	3/21/96	In response to IN 95-54, licensee identified that administrative controls to limit component cooling water temperature were necessary to ensure that the 140 F SER limit associated with installation of high density storage racks not be exceeded for a normal (fuil core) off-load.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	URI	
		96-01	3/21/96	Operation of the non-seismic refueling purification system to purify water in the seismic RWST is discussed in the UFSAR; however, it was not clear if this was allowed at power. Also, operation of this system for RWST temperature control was a mode of operation not described in the UFSAR.	NRC	Design	Yes		
		96-01	3/21/96	The EDG testing technique specified on UFSAR page 8.3.21a was not being performed. An administrative oversight resulted in this page not being deleted when revision 23 was issued.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A	
		96-01	3/21/96	UFSAR stated that the process vent monitors were electrically powered from emergency 480 vac power panel 1°11-1. No mention is made of the alternate power supply panel 111-1.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A	
		96-01	3/21/96	Six blowout panels in instrumentation tunnel access hatch locked shut. FSAR requires they open on .5 psi differential pressure across the panel.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO	Issue identified by NRC during inspection period 2/13/96. Action taken to restore plant to original configuration.
		96-01	3/21/96	Incorrect pages found in UFSAR controlled copy. Licensee reviewed & corrected errors.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A	
	Oconee	95-30	2/22/96	Spent fuel pool level of 23.5 feet (required by FSAR) was maintained by plant procedures at 21.5 feet.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	DEV	

Region Site		Ref No	Date	te Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information				
II	Oconce	96-03	4/4/96	(4) Inaccuracies noted in SER: 1. An SER amendment stated that if SFP water temperature was initially 125 F, boiling would occur greater than 9 hours after loss of SFP cooling. Calculation OSC-4998 for Unit 1/2 Heat Up Rate, determined that the actual time to boil could be less than 9 hours for higher heat loads. 2. An SER amendment stated that the required make up rate will be less than 70 gpm for Unit 1/2 SFP. This addressed water loss due to boil off only and did not account for the 29 gpm RCP seal supply. Combined losses would exceed the 70 gpm value. This was not a concern since the refill capacity exceeded 150 gpm. 3. An SER amendment stated that the times of 15 and 5 hours for Unit 3 SFP boiling in the normal and abnormal heat load conditions respectively, were sufficient to provided emergency SFP makeup. The emergency procedure for Refilling SFPs specified 36 hours for completion of the pumping system for SFP refill and 72 hours as the upper limit to begin pumping to the poel. 4. An SER amendment references maximum normal and abnormal predicted heat loads, values which will not be accurate when the higher enrichment fuel assemblies are transferred to the SFP in future refueling outages.	NRC	DesignPr oc/ Ops	Unk		
	Sequoyah	96-02	4/22/96	Spent Fuel Pool evaporation rate in FSAR is incorrect. FSAR states 55 gpm under certain conditions, but licensee's calculations show it to be 103 gpm. FSAR revision planned.	LIC	Edit.	No		
		96-02	4/22/96	UFSAR states low pressure C <sup>A</sup> system is tested in accordance with code requires the CO2 system for the cable spreading room be the deen tested since 1982. This system is not listed to be entered and the tested system by the TS but is a backup to the automatic sprinkler system; therefore, the licensee does not consider this system is required to be tested. This item was identified by TVA during a 1995 audit. TVA's resolution was to remove this system from the cable spreading room and delete the UFSAR reference to this system. NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan requires a water suppression system for cable spreading rooms but does not require a backup CO2 system.	LIC	Design	No		

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followup	Additional Information
п	Sequoyah	96-02	4/22/96	UFSAR Section 6.8 described the licensee's pump and valve inservice testing program for the first 10-year inservice inspection period. However, the licensee commenced the second '0-year inservice inspection period in December 1995. The wanse intends to remove Section 6.8 from the UFSAR as discussed in NUREG-1482, GUIDELINES FOR INSERVICE TESTING AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.	LIC	Edit.	No		
		96-02	4/22/96	Spent Fuel Pool cooling section indicates it normally handles a 40 percent core offload although elsewhere FSAR clearly states that a full core offload is typical.	NRC	Edit.	No		
	St. Lucie	96-03	2/22/96	Unit 1 procedures for adding a mixture of demineralized water and boric acid to the RCS (manually to the suction of the charging pumps) did not implement the method stated in the FSAR (automatic and to the volume control tank) and had not done so since January, 1976.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	EEI	Identified by NRC during inspection period 1/22-23/96. Part of aggregate Level III viol. FSAR change prepared. Also received viol for inadequate 50.59 in making procedure change in response to FSAR inconsistency
		96-01	3/18/96	2B CS pump casing valve was leaking past it's seat and the 2A LPSI pump vent was also leaking. Licensee has not yet determined whether leakage is within assumptions of FSAR accident analysis.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	IFI	
	Summer	96-02	4/8/96	FSAR states that a special, narrow band, d-c voltage relay monitors Class 1E battery voltage and initiates an alarm in the control room if cattery voltage falls slightly below normal float voltage. With the current control room annunciator setting, this monitoring capability is not effective to indicate a slightly below normal float voltage.	NRC	Design	Unk		
		96-02	4/8/96	Isolation of feedwater pump discharge valve power circuits consists of a magnetic breaker, a contactor/thermal overload device and fuses. The control power to the contactor/thermal overload device was non-safety and hence, no isolation credit was taken for this device. A magnetic breaker without starter thermal overloads was not included in the FSAR description of Class 1E overcurrent devices. Licensee evaluating.	Ni C	Design	Unk	IFI	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
Ш	Summer	96-02	4/8/96	Inconsistency between FSAR and TS concerning time requirements for monthly operation of containment atmosphere cleanup trains to reduce moisture buildup. Licensee complies with TS.	NRC	Edit.	Unk	URI
	Surry	96-02	4/19/96	UFSAR section on Control Room and Relay Room Ventilation stated that 3 refrigeration chillers serve the ventilation system and that all chillers are located in MER- 3. The actual configuration of the refrigeration chillers had been modified by a design change to add two additional chillers located in a separate MER, called MER- 5. This design change added redundancy and separation to refrigeration chiller system. UFSAR revision planned.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-02	4/19/96	UFSAR describes outside containment isolation valve, 2- RH-MOV-200, as a motor operated gate valve. The motor has been electrically disconnected and this valve is now a manually operated gate valve. This inconsistency also exists in for the Unit 1 application.	NRC	Edit.	No	
	Turkey Point	96-02	4/22/96	Licensee self a. essment & audit of 9 UFSAR chapters in March 96 noted >5 conficiencies. Team wrote condition report & prepared UFSAR changes for Oct 96 update to resolve deficiencies.	LIC	Info.	Unk	
		96-02	4/22/96	<ul> <li>(5) UFSAR discrepancies noted: 1. UFSAR does not reflect the racetrack, ball field, and air show field in the transient population section. 2. UFSAR describes abandoned equipment in the rad waste building as active.</li> <li>3. Permanently installed equipment in the refueling cavity that has been abandoned in place still referenced in the UFSAR as active. 4. UFSAR does not reflect the primary use of temporary reactor cavity filtration systems nor temporary liquid radwaste processing systems. in place since the 1980's. 5. Black Start and C Bus modifications completed in the fall of 1995 are not updated in UFSAR.</li> </ul>	NRC	Edit.	Unk	URI
		96-02 95-19	4/22/96	Full core offloads for normal refueling outages were not analyzed for heat load in UFSAR. Also portions of UFSAR continue to reflect other than full core offload as normal refueling method.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	URI

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information	Followup Additional Information		
П	Vogtle	95-28	1/10/96	Unit 1 FSAR wording has normal core offload of one- third, max normal offload is 40%, and emergency offload is 100%. Normal practice has been to do a full core offload and ultimately end up with a third of the core in the pool. Wording in Unit 2 FSAR says normal is one- third but did analysis for up to 100% offload. SER Sup 8 (1989) says to do full core offload every refueling. FSAR change to be made to make U-1 FSAR read like U-2.	NPC	Edit.	No	N/A
	Watts Bar	96-02	3/7/96	FSAR outdated regarding the description of the main control room habitability system area. Reference was made to certain rooms by titles that are now used for other purposes. The licensee initiated an FSAR change.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A
Ш	Big Rock Point	96-02	4/10/96	UFHSR states that all work in radiation areas and all entrics to high radiation, contamination, and airborne areas requires the use of a RWP. However, Technical Specification 6.12.1 gives exemptions to entering high radiation areas without the use of a RWP under special circumstances. The licensee is currently in compliance with the TS and planned to initiate a change to UFHSR to incorporate the exemptions.	NRC	Edit.	No	
		96-02	4/10/96	The number of security officers used to counter security events during training drills exceeded the number of personnel available under the security plan criteria. The protection strategy employed does not agree with the security plans.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	IFI
	Byron	95-13	3/20/96	In the UFSAR referenced security plan some capabilities of certain security components were not accurately described. In each case however, the existing capabilities of the security components equalled or exceeded the capabilities described in the security plan.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI
	Cook	95-15	1/29/96	50.59 for design change package (DCP) for relocating EDG starting relays was inadequate. in response to the question "Does the proposed design change represent a change to the plant as described in the SAR. Emergency Plan or Security Plan?" the licensee responded with " The diesel generators are not explicitly described in the SAR. This design change does not affect the diesel generator controls as described in sections 6.1.1 and 8.4 of the UFSAR."	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	

Region S	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/E	q Followu	p Additional Information
ш	Cook	95-15	1/29/96	During review of the large bore piping reconstitution program support modification packages, the inspectors determined that the licensee was not performing specific operability evaluations for each support found to be outside the licensing basis.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
		96-02	4/2/96	The placement of a tarp inside the Unit 2 containment was performed without a 50.59 review of UFSAR commitments.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	VIO	Item identified by NRC during inspection period (report dated 4/2/96). Licensee removed tarp.
		96-02	4/2/96	UFSAR states that containment recirculation sump will have alarms and redundant level indicators reading out in the control room. The licensee removed the recirculation sump level indicators and moved them to the adjacent sump which is connected. The licensee failed to properly update all pertinent sections of the UFSAR at the time of the modification.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	IFI	
		96-02	4/2/96	New Fuel Vault criticality monitor was not addressed FSAR. Area radiation monitors/criticality monitoring devices were a part of the licensee's design and licensing basis that should be in the USAR.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	URI	
	2	96-03	4/17/96	UFSAR did not document acceptable temperature ranges for CVCS process fluid, 12% boric acid. The system in many cases was being maintained above the 175 F high temperature alarm setpoint.	NRC	Edit.	Unk		
		96-03	4/17/96	UFSAR indicated that the CVCS diaphragm valves were installed in a 200 F portion of the system. However, the system temperatures were not being maintained below 200 F. Subsequent review found that vendor data qualified the valves to 300 F.	NRC	Edit.	No		
		96-03	4/17/96	UFSAR did not document the permissible voltage ranges for acceptable system operation of 4160 volt electrical systems. The design basis provided by the licensee noted that the acceptable voltage range was 3600 to 4400 volts.	NRC	Edit.	No	*	
		96-03	4/17/96	UFSAR CCW fabrication description noted that the system was fabricated using stainless steel piping and components which were welded where applicable. The team noted that a temporary modification had installed a chemistry sampling unit to the supply and return lines of the CCW system using tygon tubing. The piping was considered to be safety related and could only be isolated manually.	NRC	Edit.	Unk		

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Region Site	Ref No	Date	Issue     I       17/96     CCW flow balance surveillance was not consistent with the UFSAR requirements specified for sample crocker flow (142 GPM vs 240 GPM). CCW flow through containment air restriculation units was not addressed during flow balance surveillance.	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information				
III Cook	96-03	4/17/96		NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		
	96-03	4/17/96	UFSAR indicated that gross gamma analysis of the reactor coolant system would be performed 20 minutes after sampling as well as a periodic analysis via gamma spectroscopy. Licensee was currently performing the gamma spectroscopy activities but were not performing gross gatama analysis. Licensee has a letter from the NRC relieving them from the gross gamma commitment based on the gamma spectroscopy that was done and plans a revision to the UFSAR.	NRC	Edit.	No		
Davis-Besse	95-09	2/8/96	UFSAR section on transient analysis indicated that if a LOOP were to occur with the unit at full power, the reactor and turbine would not trip. Near the end of the UFSAR LOOP analysis, the UFSAR indicated that the reactor may trip from 100 percent power. Although this "add-on" portion of the analysis appeared to be accurate, most of the analysis addressed a sequence of events that was no longer valid.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
	95-09	2/8/96	During review of an unexpected SFP radiation alarm, a UFSAR figure indicated that the maximum dose expected for general areas adjacent to the spent fuel pool while operating with 1 percent failed fuel was < 15 mr/hr. Fuel manipulation resulted in an approximately 23 mr/hr field in portions of the general area, about 1 1/2 times the UFSAR anticipated value.	NRC	Design	Unk	IFI	
	95-10	4/19/96	Valve MS-853 is considered a containment isolation boundary, but did not appear in the UFSAR listing. The UFSAR states the vertices of this type were controlled in other administrative programs such as the "blue cap" program. The licensee is determining if these valves should be placed into the UFSAR.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
	95-10	4/19/96	Some values for hot leg volumes as listed in UFSAR tables and Figure 5.1-1 were inconsistent. Potential errors in computing operating limits in the Core Operating Limits Report was a concern.	LIC	Design	No	IFI	

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Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup	Additional Information
ш	Davis-Besse	95-10	4/19/96	UFSAR has misleading description of Integrated Control System capability. UFSAR states that the ICS was designed to allow a 100% load reject via the turbine bypass valves and code safety valves without a scram. However, the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) setpoint was charged to a value above the overpressure trip setpoint and would have caused the plant to scram after a 100% load reject according to another UFSAR section.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
	Dresden	95-15	3/26/96	Scram discharge volume gallery steel structural design margins not met (AISC deviation). Unit 2 modification complete. Unit 3 at next refuel.	LIC	Design	Yes	IFI	
		95-15	3/26/96	Unit 1 ventilation practices, hot shop and contaminated storage on turbine deck, and asbestos removal deviations with respect to various decommissioning licensing documents. ComEd performing 50,59.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	URI	
		96-05	4/11/96	Undocurrented and unanalyzed structural steel load changes in LPCI corner rooms were known to exist since 1991 and the structural steel design margins were known to be exceeded since at least January 1994. Existing plans would not have resolved these nonconforming conditions until approximately six years after initial identification. (Apparent Violations for inadequate design control & failure to take prompt corrective actions)	LIC	Design	Yes	EEI	NRC learned of issue 8/24/95 during review of Quad Cicies document. Licensee corporate office aware in 1991, site aware of issue 8/95. 50.59 evaluation performed; plant modifications to be implemented to restore plant to code.
	Duane Arnold	95-11	1/25/96	(2) Discrepancies. 1. Certain MOVs were removed from the GL 89-10 program because they have no safety function to re-position. They are usually in their safety position, except for brief periods during surveillance testing or other "secondary modes" of operation. The UFSAR states that if an initiation signal occurs while HPC1 system is being tested, system valves align automatically to the injection mode. A 50.59 review was performed in 1994. 2. The licensee does not enter LCOs for technical specification required surveillance testing, even though in some cases, that testing may render the system technically inoperable (but usually "available" with some operator actions). There is no 50.59 review for this item.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk		

Region S	site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	hg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
ш	III Duane Arnold		4/12/96	6 150 gallons of water entered the HPCI turbine exhaust piping in Dec. 1995. The licensee concluded the water was drawn up from the torus due to a leaking check valve in the exhaust line, and that the installed vacuum breakers were functioning properly. UFSAR specifies that the installation of the vacuum breakers was to ensure that during HPCI system operation and subsequent shutdown no differential pressure would exist that could cause torus water to enter the exhaust lines and cause water hammer. This inconsistency will be reviewed during closure of LER 95-013.	LIC	Design	Unk	LER
		96-02	4/12/96	UFSAR describes the fire protection system as having pressure maintained by a jeckey pump and accumulator combination. The accumulator has been isolated and tagged out since 1992. No 50.59 safety evaluation had been performed.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	IFI
		96-02	4/12/96	In February 1995, the licensee identified, through testing, that the ESW makeup flow rate to the spent fuel pool was less than design and less than specified in UFSAR. A 50.59 evaluation documented the rationale for the conclusion that there was no unreviewed safety question. This inconsistency will be reviewed by NRR as part of the Spent Fuel Pool Licensing Basis Review	LIC	Design	Unk	
		96-02	4/12/96	DC powered RCIC steam supply valve MO 2401, electrically back seated, may exceed the UFSAR design closure time of 20 seconds under design basis conditions. Calculations showed that under degraded voltage and full flow conditions, stroke time would be 22.7 seconds. The licensee subsequently resolved the issue and documented the basis for operability, which included a statement that the values for closure time in UFSAR are nominal in nature and not based upon detailed analysis. This inconsistency will be reviewed further.	LIC	Design	Unk	IFI

Region S	ite	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
ш	Duane Arnold	96-02	4/12/96	The normal supply of compressed air for the safety-related standby gas treatment (SBGT) system is not safety- related. UFSAR specifies failure of the normal compressed air system will not affect operation of the system because of the safety-related seismic category I standby air compressors (1K-3 and 1K-4), available if the main plant compressed air system fails. The definition of operability in TS includes the statement that necessary attendant auxiliary equipment required for a system to perform its function are also capable of performing their related support function. Duane Arnold did not enter a TS LCO or consider the SBGT inoperable when 1K-4 was out of service on 1/2/96. This inconsistency will be reviewed further.	NRC	Design	Unk	IFI
	Fermi	96-02	4/3/96	UFSAR stated that the "heart of the permanent Fermi 2 solid radwaste system is the radwaste volume reduction and solidification system," and that a vendor system is to be used when the asphalt system (above) is not working or at plant management discretion. The system has not been used for several years. The vendor system has been used exclusively. The UFSAR also stated that two freon dry- cleaning units are used for cleaning contaminated laundry. However, the licensee used an offsite vendor facility for this purpose.	NRC	Edit.	No	URI
		96-02	4/8/96	UFSAR listed the maximum flow rate through the shell side of the EESW/EECW heat exchanger as 1450 gpm. Routine surveillance runs used a flow rate of 1670 gpm.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	IFI
		96-02	4/8/96	UFSAR stated safety equipment cabling was color coded orange for Division 1 and blue for Division 2, while BOP cabling was black, or magenta. During construction extra divisional color coded cabling was used to complete BOP electrical distribution.	NRC	Edit.	No	URI
	Kewaunee	96-03	4/15/96	USAR is not clear on which valves are required for turbine overspeed protection. One section states both the reheat steam stop and intercept valves close on overspeed while another section and the surveillance procedure imply operability testing of only the turbine stop and governor valves. However, periodic testing was performed on all turbine stop and governor valves and reheat stop and intercept valves.	LIC	Edit.	No	:F1

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additional Information
III	LaSalle	96-02 96-02	4/9/96	The humidification equipment installed in the control room and auxiliary electric equipment room ventilation systems were not seismically supported. 50.59 evaluation determined that an unreviewed safety question does not er ist. Modifications to be made to return the system to full compliance with the UFSAR.	LIC	Design	Yes	
		96-02	4/9/96	Refueling practices were not fully consistent with FSAR wording. The FSAR was open to interpretation on whether or not a full core offload is an emergency heat load. ComEd's calculations show that during cooler months v hen the lake temperature is much less than design temperature, a full core offload is not an emergency heat load on the spent fuel pool. As a result of the review, ComEd revised the FSAR to be consistent with the current refueling practices and clarify the wording.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A
		96-02	4/9/96	In 1994 ComEd discovered that the condenser mechanical vacuum pump did not have an automatic trip feature as described in the FSAR. A 50.59 was performed and determined to be a unreviewed safety question. Notification was made to the NRC and an was SER issued by NRC. The FSAR has not been up-dated to reflect this.	LIC	Design	Unk	N/A
	Monticello	96-02	3/21/96	USAR contained two maximum spent fuel pool temperatures. 125oF and 140oF. The licensee believed that 125oF referred to normal offloads whereas the 140oF referred to the emergency offload. USAR revision planned.	LIC	Edit.	No	IFI
		96-02	3/21/96	Inspectors observed instrument and control personnel lift covers off of instrumentation during surveillances. USAR stated that operations personnel must remove the cover plate, access plug, or sealing device from instruments. This discrepancy did not have safety consequences. The licensee planned to revise this requirement.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A
		95-10	4/9/96	Two containment isolation valves failed to meet separation criteria in that the recirculation system process sampling containment inboard and outboard isolation valves position indicators were powered from the same electrical source. A single failure of the power source would cause a loss of position indication for both valves which was contrary to the licensee's commitments in response to Generic Letter 82-33, "Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 Requirements for Emergency Response Capability."	LIC	Design	Yes	IFI

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Op/Eq	Followup Additi	onal Information
ш	Monticello	96-02	4/9/96	Discrepancies in documentation regarding tornado design requirements for the r.fuel floor area superstructure. One USAR section stated that the Class I structures except the steel superstructure were designed to withstand a tornado load. However, another section referenced a GE report, "Tornado Protection for the Spent Fuel Storage Pool," which stated that the superstructure was designed to withstand tornado winds. Licensee planned to submit a letter describing issue and corrective actions.	LIC	Des gn	Yes	IFI	
	Palisades	96-02	4/8/96	Palisades operating procedures did not comply with FSAR and 10 CFR 50 Appendix K regarding assumed instrument uncertainty in measuring reactor power. This may have resulted in the licensee operating the plant at power levels up to 100.99 percent, in difference to the assumed initial conditions for transient analysis in the "Safety Analysis" section of the FSAR.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	URI	
	Perry	96-02	4/11/96	UFSAR table showed an emergency lighting unit illuminates Emergency Closed Cooling Valve P42-F0551. The light was ineffective because it was too far away from the valve and there was a wall between it and the valve.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
		96-02	4/11/96	UFSAR states "Perry normally has a minimum of five operating shift crews. Four shift crews may be established during certain phases such as startup testing or extended outages to maximize training." Inspectors observed licensee was using three shifts during the refueling outage and that they had begun using the three shift schedule about 3 weeks before the outage. UFSAR being changed to delete reference to the specific number of shift crews required during plant shutdown conditions.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
		96-02	4/11/96	UFSAR does not address free fall of the polar crane's hook or whether the crane should be single failure proof. Licensee evaluating the need to make the polar crane single failure proof. An interim administrative control halted the use of the polar crane over the open reactor vessel cavity for activities not specifically addressed in the UFSAR.	LIC	Design	Unk	IFI	

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Chg Opr .	4 Followur	Additional Information
ш	Ретту	96-02	4/11/96	Structures supporting the suppression pool shield doors had not been analyzed for pool swell structural loads while open. Subsequent analysis revealed some scructural components were not adequate to meet design code requirements during a pool swell. License amendment requested. Approval of the amendment request would allow the doors to be open briefly at low reactor power levels until the next refueling outage.	LIC	Design	Unk	URI	
	Point Beach	96-02	4/17/96	Violation of 50.71 requirement to update FSAP annually or 6 months after each refueling outage. Minimum service water flow to the containment accident fan coolers is 920 gpm vice 1000 gpm as stated in FSAR. Actual operating average coolant temperature of both Units is 570 F vice 573.9 F as specified in FSAR. An analysis and a FSAR change increased the design service water temperature to 75 F; however, this temperature has not been updated in all sections of the FSAR for systems using service water cooling. These conditions existed a minimum of six months prior to the previous FSAR update.	NRC	Edit.	No	VIO	NRC identified issues during inspection period (11/95 - 2/96). FSAR being updated. Process review team reviewing entire FSAR for discrepancies as part of review/update process.
		96-02	4/17/96	Recently, station blackout mods have connected two additional diesel generators; so FSAR descriptions and diagrams do not accurately reflect the actual conditions. Licensee has provided operations temporary diagrams. Licensee updates its FSAR every June.	NRC	Edit.	Unk		
		96-02	4/17/96	Despite an analysis and FSAR change that noted design SW temperature change to 75 F. this temperature has not been updated in FSAR sections for systems using SW cooling.	NRC	Edit.	No		
		96-02	4/17/96	FSAR states there should be essentially zero leakage from the mechanical seal of RHR pumps. CS pumps and SI pumps. All these pumps exhibit leakage to some degree.	NRC	Design	Unk		
		96-02	4/17/96	FSAR indicates spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchanger inlet temperature is monitored. What is actually measures is SFP temperature at a location on opposite side of pool from suction line to the cooling system.	NRC	Edit.	No		

Region Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category (	Thg Op/Eq	Followu	p Additional Information
III Point Beach	96-02	4/17/96	FSAR regarding the leakage provisions of the spent fuel pool cooling system states "The normal operating pressure of the service water system is higher than the normal operating pressure of the spent fuel cooling system. In the event of a heat exchanger tube leak, this differential pressure will result in leakage from the service water system to the spent fuel pool cooling system." This is contrary to observed pressure drops across the heat exchanger. During in-service testing of the SFP cooling heat exchanger, SW inlet pressure was 52 PSIG, the outlet 7 PSIG. The SFP cooling inlet pressure was 30 PSIG, the outlet 6 PSIG. The pressure drop the pool water experienced while traveling through the tubes was 24 PSI. Therefore, if a tube leak occurred in the area near the shell side outlet the leakage would be the reverse of that stated above.	NRC	Design	Unž.		
	96-02	4/17/96	EDG starting air from the G-01 and G-02 storage tanks is listed in the FSAR as being admitted at a working pressure of 200 psi. This is the high pressure cut-off point for the air compressor pressure switch. The starting air pressure for these tanks is normally kept at 185-190 psi. with a Technical Specification basis mini. um pressure of 165 psig.	NRC	Edit.	No		
	96-02	4/17/96	Conflicting FSAR statements concerning location of spent fuel pool cooling system syphon breakers.	NRC	Edit.	No		
Prairie Island	95-14	2/6/96	Change made to the head bolting on one of the dry casks that resulted in less thread engagement and a longer bending radius for the head bolts than assumed in the USAR. Cask vendor had performed an engineering evaluation of the change but rot a documented safety evaluation in accordance wis 40 CFR 72.48. (Severity Level IV violation issued)	NRC	Design	No	VIO	NRC identified issue during inspection period (approx. 12/11/95). Licensee knew of bolting change mid-95, but didn't see the need for 72 <sup>18</sup> evaluation. Perform: 12/20/95. develop: screening form & trained staff: joined industry initiative on enhanced SE guidance: completed self-assessment on SE program using industry experts.

Region	n Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified B	y Category	Chg Op/E	q Followu	p Additional Information
ш	Prairie Island	95-14	2/6/96	Test to measure flow through the emergency intake line to the cooling water pumps should have been considered a special test and should have had a safety evaluation per 10 CFR 50.59. The test was described in the USAR as a preoperational test but had never been done at power before.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	VIO	NRC informed of issue via 50.72 call 11/20/95. Licensee revised earthquake abnormal procedure; revised Safety Evaluation to take credit for non-seismic canal- NRR currently reviewing.
		95-14	2/6/96	50.59 safety evaluation done for response of intake bay to seismic event may have resulted in an unreviewed safety question not identified by licensee. The licensee assumed that the sides of the bay would not instantly sluff off. That assumption, while probably reasonable, appears to be contrary to the licensing basis.	NRC	Design	No	URI NRR	
		96-02	3/19/96	USAR has a misleading description of material used to construct waste gas tanks.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A	
		96-02	3/19/96	Pipe rupture analysis for fire protection piping used assumptions that may be inconsistent with plant configuration.	LIC	Design	No	URI	
	Quad Cities	96-02	4/17/96	UFSAR and other plant procedures require revision to reflect the frequency of full core offloads and previous licensing commitments from the SER issued for high density fuel racks.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	IFI	
		96-02	4/17/96	FSAR design basis for ventilation system for control room, turbine building and reactor building assumes outside air temperature range of -6 F to 93 F. Temperatures during inspection period were as low as -28 F. Licensee evaluating.	NRC	Design	Unk	IFI	
		96-02	4/17/96	Some structural steel beams and connections supporting RHR heat exchangers were determined to be overstressed relative to U \AR allowable stress limits. ComEd completed an perability determination with supporting functionality evaluation. The operability determination showed that the analyzed beams meet functional criteria. but did not meet UFSAR allowable stress limits. Initial discovery was made during contractor reviews and walkdowns of associated piping supports, where a number of pipe supports were not accounted for in existing calculations.	LIC	Design	Unk	URI	

Region Site		Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information					
ш	Zion	96-05	4/5/96	A longstanding non-conforming condition where the licensee did not maintain operability of a three-hour rated fire barrier as specified in the UFSAR referenced fire hazard analysis report.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	DEV		
IV	Arkansas	96-14	3/13/96	Discrepancy between the Units 1 and 2 descriptions of a shared component contained in the UFSAR was identified.	NRC	Edit.	No			
		96-02	4/8/96	FSAR indicates maximum temperatures expected in fuel pools are based on a max lake temperature of 85 F, yet lake temperatures routinely exceed this value in the summer.	NRC	Design	Yes	URI		
		96-01	4/8/96	As a result of the problems identified at other plants, licensee has initiated their own review of FSAR accuracy.	LIC	Info				
		96-01 96-11	4/8/96	FSAR states that a complete description of the licensee's review and audit program is discussed in Section 6.0 of TSs. However, the licensee had moved the program descriptions to the Quality Assurance Manual. FSAR change initiated.	NRC	Edit.	No			
		96-01	4/8/96	A modification removed the flow balance function of the HPSI header isolation valves and installed manual throttling valves in each header to balance the flow between the headers. FSAR change request initiated.	LIC	Edit.	No			
	Callaway	96-02	4/2/96	Inconsistencies noted between FSAR, TS, & surveillance procedures regarding allowable EDG start times. FSAR changes initiated.	NRC	Edit.	No	N/A		
	Comanche Peak	96-01	3/19/96	UFSAR stated that the external alternate AC input source voltage was 120 Vac plus or minus 10 percent nominal (107 to 132 Vac). Procedure MSE-C0-5810, "10kVA Elgar Inverter Calibration and Adjustment," indicated that the reverse transfer lockout setpoint range was 131.4 to 132.6 Vac. This minor inconsistency was identified for their evaluation and correction, as appropriate	NRC	Proc/ Ops	No	N/A		

Region Site		Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information					
IV	Cooper	96-04	3/11/96	On 11/9/95, the licensee declared the main steam tunnel blowout panel sections inoperable due to a fiberglass coating, which strengthened the panels and would have prevented them from operating at 0.52 psig as designed. A 1985 modification to the panels, which was not reflected in the UFSAR, rendered them incapable of relieving at design pressures. Severity Level III 50.59 violation.	NRC	Design	Yes	EEI	Issue identified by NRC 11/15/95. Licensee corrected blowout panel to conform to safety analysis/FSAR, improved design control processes and maintenance work request implementation, and audited for other past unauthorized or unanalyzed modifications to the plant.	
		96-04	3/11/96	An apparent violation was identified for the installation of 0.25 inch diameter J-tubes on the DG muffler bypass valve solenoid exhaust ports without formal approval or analysis. The J-tubes intermittently prevented the muffler bypass valve from opening when actuated, resulting in potentially inoperable DGs under seismic and tornado conditions. (SL IV viol- App B, Crit III)	LIC	Design	Yes	EEI	Item identified during the inspection period (3/11/96 report) Licensee removed J- tubes to make installation conform to FSAR, improved design control processes and maintenance work request implementation, and audited for other unanalyzed plant mods.	
		96-03	4/15/96	Listing of penetration and a listing of IST boundary valves in UFSAR had many errors of minor safety significance. UFSAR change initiated.	NRC	Edit.	No			
	Diablo Canyon	96-02	4/10/96	Proficiency training required by fire protection program and the UFSAR for individuals assigned to the fire brigade was not completed.	LIC/ NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	VIO	Issue first known during inspection period (report 4/10/96) Licensee has established a new program for tracking fire brigade training and linked it with operator training, since all fire brigade members are in operations, with exception of fire marshals.	
		96-02	4/10/96	Apparent discrepancy in the assumptions utilized to determine the plant's radionuclide source term. UFSAR assumed the plant would operate on a 12-month cycle at a capacity factor of 80%. Currently, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 are operating on an 18-month cycle and have historically exceeded an 80% capacity factor. Licensee review determined current analysis bounds source term. UFSAR to be revised.	NRC	Design	Unk			

Region	Site	Ref No	Date	Issue	Identified By	Category C	hg Op/Eq	Followu;	Additional Information
IV	Diablo Canyon	Not yet iss'd	4/15/96	Licensee task force identified several hun, ed UFSAR deficiencies. Licensee plans to reissue UFSAR in its entirety; target date 11/96.	LIC	Info		URI	
	Fort Calhoun	96-01	4/8/96	Experiencing failures of incore detectors. USAR committed to having 21 incore detectors strings operable. After the fifth detector string (of 28 strings) was declared inoperable, a 50.59 evaluation to allow continued operation with as few as eight detectors, two per quadrant, was completed and approved. The licensec intends to incorpo ate evaluation results into the USAR.	LIC	Design	No	IFI	
	Grand Gulf	96-06	3/21/96	Storage locker in the remote shutdown panel room had not been seismically evaluated or properly secured in accordance with UFSAR guidance.	NRC	Design	Yes	VIO	NRC identified issue 3/21/96. Licensee secured cabinet & verified other items properly stored.
	River Bend	96-02	3/21/96	Control room habitability related to toxic chemicals is based on the amounts of chemicals stored and listed in USAR Table 2.2-5. The licensee stored freon onsite than the values listed in the table freon in the table. The licensee had not performed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The licensee is evaluating procedure changes to assure that materials brought onsite would be compared to the USAR requirements.	LIC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	NCV	
		96-01	4/18/96	Spent fuel pool and reactor cavity pneumatic gate seals were not controlled as safety-related equipment.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Unk	VIO	Issue identified by NRC during inspection period. Licensee corrective actions not yet determined.
	San Onofre	95-30	3/6/96	Possible unanalyzed release path concerning RWST suction isolation valves failing. UFSAR described the design basis as having these valves shut (manually) on a recirculation actuation signal, and because, with these valves not shut, a possible unanalyzed release path existed (from emergency sump to RWST), the issue was referred to NRR for further evaluation.	NRC	Design	No	NRR	
		96-02	4/11/96	UFSAR was inconsistent with respect to local controls for starting and stopping motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.	NRC	Edit.	No	IFI	
		96-02	4/11/96	RCS weld materials listed in UFSAR Table were not updated to reflect recent design changes.	NRC	Edit.	No	URI	

Region Site		Ref No	No Date	Issue	Identified By Category Chg Op/Eq Followup Additional Information					
IV	Waterford	95-22	3/26/96	The actual interval between performing the integrated leak test for systems containing primary coolant outside of containment (21 months) was not consistent with the FSAR, which required the test to be performed at intervals not to exceed each refueling outage (i.e., 18 months or less).	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	VIO	NRC identified issue during inspection period (report issued 3/26/96). Licensee revised the applicable procedures to specify the correct frequency for performance of the test.	
		95-22	3/26/96	Use of an unreviewed engineering evaluation was inconsistent with engineered safety features systems allowable leakage limits described in the FSAR.	NRC	Design	No	N/A		
		96-03	4/17/96	Multiple examples of conflicting information between UFSAR and other design basis info for EFW system design basis requirements.	NRC	Design	Unk	URI		
	WNP-2	96-02	3/19/96	Offgas system gas coolers have been operable for only 2.8 years out of 10. Violation of 50.59 for failure to perform written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that vault coolers described in the FSAR, but no longer operable, did not involve an unreviewed safety question.	NRC	Design		VIO	<ul> <li>C identified issue 3/19/96.</li> <li>S nsee aware of issue in 1988. FSAR to be changed.</li> </ul>	
		96-02	3/19/96	FSAR states that all three DG ventilation systems operate automatically to maintain ambient temperature at equipment operability limits during all modes of operation. Electric heaters are designed to maintain DG rooms at a minimum temperature of 70 F during extreme weather conditions. This provides a 7 F margin above the minimum temperature of 63 F, which is required to assure DG operability. The existing system cannot maintain the DG rooms above 70 F during extremely cold weather. Violation of 50.59 written for failure to perform safety evaluation.	NRC	Design	Yes	VIO	NRC identified issue 3/19/96. Licensee aware of issue in 1989. FSAR to be changed.	
	Wolf Creek	96-02	3/4/96	UFSAR lists minimum operating temperature for the electrical penetration room and the charging pump rooms as 60 F. During inspection observed 52 F in Electrical Penetration Room A on 1/23/96 and 52 F in Charging Pump B room on 2/6/96.	NRC	Proc/ Ops	Yes	DEV		
		96-02	3/4/96	Requirements removed from TSs by Amendment 89 were not concurrently added to the UFSAR. Caught by shift supervisor when document services was making change to TSs without a concurrent UFSAR change.	LIC	Edit.	No	N/A		