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Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

July 19, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-327/93016

The enclosed LER provides details concerning a manual Phase A isolation, an auxiliary building isolation, and containment ventilation isolation in accordance with plant procedures as a result of a fuel assembly not remaining upright after being released into position. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event that resulted in the manual actuation of an engineered safety feature.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

270056

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cc (Enclosure):
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NRC Form 366 (6-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4) A Phase A Isolation, Auxiliary Building Isolation, and Containment Ventilation Isolation Were Manually Initiated as a Result of Fuel Assembly Failing to Remain in an Upright Position After Being Released

EVENT DAY (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8
0 6	1 9	9 3	9 3	0 1 6	0 0	0 7	1 9	9 3		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following)(11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
J. W. Proffitt, Compliance Licensing	6 1 5 8 4 3 - 6 6 5 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 19, 1993, at 1054 Eastern daylight time (EDT), during fuel loading activities, a fuel assembly immediately tilted over after being released into position. The fuel assembly came to rest against the south core baffle plate leaning at an angle approximately 18 degrees from vertical. At 1154 EDT, a Phase A isolation, auxiliary building isolation, and containment ventilation isolation were manually initiated in accordance with abnormal operating procedures in response to the fuel-handling event.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. PLANT CONDITIONS

Unit 1 was in Mode 6 in a refueling outage with core-loading activities in progress with 43 fuel assemblies in the core.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event

On June 19, 1993, at 1054 Eastern daylight time (EDT), a fuel assembly immediately tilted over after being released into position. The fuel assembly came to rest against the south-core baffle plate leaning at an angle approximately 18 degrees from vertical. At 1154 EDT, a Phase A isolation, auxiliary building isolation (ABI), and a containment ventilation isolation (CVI) were manually initiated in accordance with abnormal operating procedures in response to the fuel-handling event.

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems That Contributed to the Event

None.

C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences

June 19, 1993	Core-loading activities were in progress with 43 fuel assemblies in the core.
June 19, 1993 at 1054 EDT	The next fuel assembly loaded immediately tilted over after being released into position.
June 19, 1993 at 1055 EDT	All fuel movement was stopped, the manipulator crane was positioned over the internals set-down area, and power was secured.
June 19, 1993 at 1154 EDT	A Phase A isolation, ABI, and CVI were manually initiated in accordance with abnormal operating procedures.

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected

None.

E. Method of Discovery

The fuel assembly was observed by Operations personnel during performance of core-loading activities.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

F. Operator Action

Upon discovery of the leaning fuel assembly, Operations personnel stopped all fuel movement, the manipulator crane was positioned over the internals set-down area, and power was secured. A notice of unusual event was declared and the a Phase A isolation, ABI, and CVI were manually initiated.

G. Safety System Response

The equipment required to operate after the manual Phase A isolation, ABI, and the CVI performed as expected.

III. CAUSE OF EVENT

Cause

The Phase A isolation, ABI and CVI were manually initiated in accordance with abnormal operating procedures following discovery of the leaning fuel assembly.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Plant equipment required to operate after the manual Phase A isolation, ABI, and the CVI performed as expected. There was no radiological release as a result of the event and the event is bounded by the Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, it can be concluded that there were no adverse consequences to the plant personnel or to the public as a result of this event.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTION

A. Immediate Corrective Action

Upon discovery of the leaning fuel assembly, Operations personnel stopped all fuel movement, the manipulator crane was positioned over the internals set-down area, and power was secured. A Phase A isolation, ABI, and CVI were manually initiated.

B. Action to Prevent Recurrence

None

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components

None.

B. Previous Similar Events

Although there have been previous engineered safety feature actuations (ESF), there were no previous similar reportable events associated with a fuel-handling event resulting in an ESF.

C. Other

The cause of the fuel-handling event was that the fuel-handling instruction was not completely followed when the fuel assembly was inappropriately unlatched from the manipulator crane. The refueling senior reactor operator relied on visual inspections and other indications rather than the required indication.

A contributing cause to this event was that the fuel-handling instruction did not contain sufficient criteria for determining when the fuel assembly could be unlatched.

The appropriate fuel-handling instruction has been revised to include appropriate criteria for unlatching of a fuel assembly.

VII. COMMITMENT

None.