



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech  
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

July 16, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-327  
Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NUMBERS 50-327 AND  
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 and DPR-79 - SPECIAL  
REPORT 93-12

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability  
of the fire suppression water system in the auxiliary building as  
initially reported by telephone at 1600 Eastern daylight time (EDT) on  
July 2, 1993, and confirmed by facsimile on July 6, 1993, as required by  
Technical Specification (TS) Action Statements 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) and  
3.7.11.1(b)(2)(b), respectively.

Details are provided in the enclosure. The condition involves both  
Units 1 and 2 and is being reported in accordance with TS Action  
Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(c).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone  
C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

9307220194 930716  
PDR ADOCK 05000327  
S PDR

*JE22*

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Page 2  
July 16, 1993

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
One White Flint, North  
11555 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739

NRC Resident Inspector  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
2600 Igou Ferry Road  
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624

Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711

ENCLOSURE

14-DAY FOLLOW-UP REPORT  
SPECIAL REPORT 93-12

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.11.1 requires that the fire suppression water system be operable through the last valve ahead of the water-pressure alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe and the last valve ahead of the deluge valve on each deluge or spray system in the auxiliary building.

Description of Condition

On June 21, 1993, at 2100 Eastern daylight time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 6 for a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 5 for a maintenance outage, LCOs 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were entered.

A portion of the fire header in the auxiliary building was removed from service (isolated) on June 21, 1993, at 2100 EDT, to facilitate preplanned maintenance activities for repairing and replacing leaking piping. This portion of the auxiliary building fire protection piping was the first of several segments of piping to be repaired during the current unit outages. Appropriate compensatory measures, i.e., backup fire suppression and fire watches, were established before the header was isolated.

On July 2, 1993, it was discovered that during the evolution described above, TS Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) had not been complied with when the auxiliary building fire protection header was isolated. The 24-hour telephone call required by LCO Action Statement 3.7.11.1(b)(2)(a) had not been made. Therefore, upon discovery of the missed notification, NRC was informed by telephone at 1600 EDT on July 2, 1993, and the LCO action statements were complied with.

The piping was repaired, the applicable portion of the system was returned to service, and LCOs 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.4 were exited at 1900 EDT on July 5, 1993.

TVA has initiated an incident investigation (II) associated with not complying with the LCO 3.7.11.1 action statement. Corrective action(s) will be formulated and implemented as specified in the II report. The details of the event and the corrective action(s) to prevent the recurrence of this event will be reported to NRC in a following licensee event report.