



CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1650 CALVERT CLIFFS PARKWAY • LUSBY, MARYLAND 20657-4762

CHARLES H. CRUSE
PLANT GENERAL MANAGER
CALVERT CLIFFS

July 9, 1993

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-317
Fire Detection Instrumentation Special Report
Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, ACTION Statement b

Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, ACTION Statement b, we hereby submit the attached Special Report concerning inoperable fire detection. Specifically the detection system in the Unit 1 Containment 11A and 11B reactor coolant pump motor bay was inoperable for greater than 14 days.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

CHC/CDS/DEB/bjd

Attachment

cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
R. A. Capra, NRC
D. G. McDonald, Jr., NRC
T. T. Martin, NRC
P. R. Wilson, NRC
R. I. McLean, DNR
J. H. Walter, PSC

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PDR ADOCK 05000317
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ATTACHMENT (1)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION SPECIAL REPORT

BACKGROUND

On June 8, 1993 the fire detection for the Unit 1 Containment No. 11A and 11B reactor coolant pump motor bay was disabled. The heat detection in 11A and 11B reactor coolant pump motor bay was disabled to prevent spurious trouble alarms. The heat detection could not be restored within the 14 days required by the Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.b.

Actions were taken to determine the cause of the alarm on June 8, 1993. It was concluded that there was not a fire initiating the alarm but unusually high temperatures in the containment causing the spurious alarm. This condition results in a hanging alarm at the fire alarm panel (1C24B) in the Control Room. To allow other plant alarms to be received and annunciate at the fire alarm panel, a temporary alteration was installed to disable the heat detection circuit.

As specified by Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 ACTION Statement b, a special report must be submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 if the detection system is not restored within 14 days.

EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATIONS

On June 8, 1993 with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the heat detection system was disabled in the 11A and 11B reactor coolant pump motor bay via a temporary alteration. The heat detection in this area is listed in Technical Specification Table 3.3.11 and is addressed by Technical Specification 3.3.3.7. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, ACTION Statement a, the containment air temperature is being monitored once per hour at the locations listed in Technical Specification 4.6.1.5.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES

An engineering evaluation is being conducted to identify the cause of the unusually high temperatures in the RCP bays and corrective actions will be taken during the next unit shutdown if required. The heat detection will remain disabled and appropriate action will continue in accordance with Technical Specification Requirements until the heat detection is restored to an operable status.