NORTHEAST UTILITIES

The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

General Offices · Selden Street, Berlin Connecticut

P.O.BOX 270
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July 6, 1993
MP-93-536

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-21
Docket No. 50-245
Licensee Event Report 93-006

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 93-006 required to be submitted within thirty (30) days pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Stephen E. Scace
Vice President - Millstone Station

SES/KEM:dlr

Attachment: LER 93-006

cc: T. T. Martin, Region 1 Administrator
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
J. W. Andersen, NRC Acting Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1

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NRC Form 366
(6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 5	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Technical Specificaiton Fire Penetration

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	
0 6	0 4	9 3	9 3	- 0 0 6	- 0 0	0 7	0 6	9 3		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.402(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73 (a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Kevin E. Murphy, Senior Engineer, Ext. 4901	AREA CODE 2 0 3 — 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On June 4, 1993, at 1450 hours, with the plant at 100% power (530 degrees Fahrenheit and 1030 psig), while performing the 18 month fire barrier penetration inspection, an unsealed fire barrier penetration was discovered in a Technical Specification fire wall. This penetration is located in a wall between the auxiliary boiler room (fire area T-6) and the maintenance shop (fire area T-7). This barrier is a Technical Specification fire barrier in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix A, and reduces the potential exposure to safety-related components created by the hazards on one side of the barrier. Fire detection and suppression systems governed by Technical Specifications, are installed, and were operable, in both fire areas. These fire areas are located in the same Appendix R fire area (F-3A), therefore, a postulated fire with an unsealed penetration would not adversely affect Appendix R safe shutdown scenarios. The available fire protection features provided in these areas, along with the low combustible loading, minimize any potential adverse impact on safety related equipment and safe shutdown capability. Immediate actions were taken to compensate for the unsealed penetration, and the penetration was properly sealed with an approved penetration seal design to meet the requirements of the barrier.

I. Description of Event

On June 4, 1993, at 1450 hours, with the plant at 100% power (530 degrees Fahrenheit and 1030 psig), while performing the 18 month fire barrier penetration inspection, an unsealed fire barrier penetration was discovered in a Technical Specification fire wall. This penetration is located in a wall between the auxiliary boiler room (fire area T-6) and the maintenance shop (fire area T-7). This barrier is a Technical Specification fire barrier in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix A, and reduces the potential exposure to safety-related components created by the hazards on one side of the barrier. Fire detection and suppression systems governed by Technical Specifications, are installed, and were operable, in both fire areas. These fire areas are located in the same Appendix R fire area (F-3A), therefore, a postulated fire with an unsealed penetration would not adversely affect Appendix R safe shutdown scenarios. The available fire protection features provided in these areas, along with the low combustible loading, minimize any potential adverse impact on safety related equipment and safe shutdown capability. Immediate actions were taken to compensate for the unsealed penetration, and the penetration was properly sealed with an approved penetration seal design to meet the requirements of the barrier.

II. Cause of Event

The cause of this event has been attributed to incomplete previous inspections due to lack of detailed procedural guidance. The procedure used in previous inspections was vague and lacked detailed instructions on the methods of inspection, and lacked detailed acceptance criteria for penetration seals. The current procedure, which is being used for the first time for the ongoing inspection, was recently upgraded as part of the Millstone Procedure Upgrade Program. This procedure has been significantly expanded to include detailed inspection guidance, acceptance criteria for seal inspections and seal acceptability, and improved wall and floor penetration maps for use during inspection of fire barriers.

III. Analysis of Event

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B), which requires the reporting of any operation or condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications. Millstone Unit One Technical Specification 3.12.F.2 requires that with one or more required penetration fire barriers non-functional, within one hour establish a temporary fire barrier of equal effectiveness or establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration. Based on the results of the most recent inspection, it has been concluded that this barrier was never sealed, and therefore the Technical Specification requirements had not been met.

IV. Corrective Action

A fire watch, in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, was established to compensate for the unsealed penetration. This penetration has been properly sealed with an approved seal design to meet the requirements of the barrier. The upgraded inspection procedure currently in place, which provides more detailed guidance on penetration seal inspection and acceptance, should prevent recurrence of a similar event. At the present time, approximately 90% of non-high radiation area inspections have been completed. No similar penetration deficiencies have been identified under the improved inspection program.

V. Additional Information

Unsealed fire barrier penetrations have been previously reported under LER 92-27 and LER 91-11.