SCE&G
SCANA

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
P.O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
(803) 345-4040

John L. Skolds
Vice President
Nuclear Operations

July 8, 1993
Refer to: RC-93-0184

Mr. S. D. Ebneter
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II, Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, GA 30323

Dear Mr. Ebneter:

SUBJECT: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION
DOCKET NO. 50/395
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12
SPECIAL REPORT (SPR 930006)

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is submitting this report pursuant to the requirements of Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 131A, "Fire Service Equipment/Systems Operability Requirements."

On June 9, 1993, during a walkdown associated with engineering activities, a mechanical penetration in a fire rated barrier was found unsealed. Compensatory action as required by SAP-131A was initiated and a Nonconformance Notice (NCN) was written documenting the as-found condition, for evaluation and recommended repair. Following an evaluation by engineering, disposition of the NCN was to fill the penetration with silicone foam based sealant. This action was taken June 14 and following a twenty-four hour cure time the penetration was inspected and declared operable June 15, 1993.

The cause of this event was due to the unique configuration of the fire barrier penetration which was located near the ceiling and involved a spray shield which precluded an adequate visual inspection. Also contributing to this event was a transposition error in the penetration number which identified the penetration as being located in a non-fire rated barrier. This error resulted in a failure to properly seal the penetration as required by the specification for fire rated barriers.

The following action was taken as a result of this event. Design Engineering reviewed all fire barrier penetrations with similar design requirements installed under the same specification to identify any additional rupture restraints or spray shields which could preclude a visual inspection. From this review, five additional penetrations were identified with rupture restraints or spray shields that could potentially preclude an adequate inspection. These penetrations were visually inspected, and none were found to be obscured by the installed rupture restraints or spray shields.

Should you have any questions, please call at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

140062

MD Quinton

John L. Skolds for

RJB:lcd
c: See Page 2

9307190051 930708
PDR ADOCK 05000395
S PDR

JE22 1/1

c: O. W. Dixon
R. R. Mahan
R. J. White
G. F. Wunder
L. D. Shealy
NRC Resident Inspector
J. B. Knotts Jr.
Marsh & McLennan
Document Control Desk
INPO Records Center
NSRC
RTS (ONO 930043)
File (818.05 & 818.08)
Central File System