

# PROCEEDINGS OF NRC ANNUAL PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT RESEARCH WORKSHOPS I-IV

2015–2019 Rockville, MD

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U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville, MD 20852

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Research Information Letter Research Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

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## ABSTRACT

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) is conducting a multiyear, multi-project Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program to enhance the NRC's risk-informed and performance-based regulatory approach with regard to external flood hazard assessment and safety consequences of external flooding events at nuclear power plants (NPPs). It initiated this research in response to staff recognition of a lack of guidance for conducting PFHAs at nuclear facilities that required staff and licensees to use highly conservative deterministic methods in regulatory applications. Risk assessment of flooding hazards and consequences of flooding events is a recognized gap in NRC's risk-informed, performance-based regulatory framework. The objective, research themes, and specific research topics are described in the RES Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Plan. While the technical basis research, pilot studies and guidance development are ongoing, RES has been presenting Annual PFHA Research Workshops to communicate results, assess progress, collect feedback and chart future activities. These workshops have brought together NRC staff and management from RES and User Offices, technical support contractors, as well as interagency and international collaborators and industry and public representatives.

These conference proceedings transmit the agenda, abstracts, presentation slides, summarized questions and answers, and panel discussion for the first four Annual U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Workshops held at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD. The workshops took place on October 14–15, 2015; January 23–25, 2017; December 4–5, 2017; and April 30–May 2, 2019. The first workshop was an internal meeting attended by NRC staff, contractors, and partner Federal agencies. The following workshops were public meetings and attended by members of the public; NRC technical staff, management, and contractors; and staff from other Federal agencies. All of the workshops began with an introductory session that included perspectives and research program highlights from the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and also may have included perspectives from the NRC Office of New Reactors and Office of Nuclear Regulation, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and industry representatives. NRC and EPRI contractors and staff as well as invited Federal and public speakers gave technical presentations and participated in various styles of panel discussion. Later workshops included five focus areas:

- (1) leveraging available flood information
- (2) evaluating the application of improved mechanistic and climate probabilistic modeling for storm surge, climate and precipitation
- (3) probabilistic flood hazard assessment frameworks
- (4) potential impacts of dynamic and nonstationary processes
- (5) assessing the reliability of flood protection and plant response to flooding events

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	III
ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS	X
INTRODUCTION	xxxvII
BACKGROUND	xxxvII
WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES	xxxvII
WORKSHOP SCOPE	xxxvIII
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS	xxxvIII
Related Workshops	xxxix
1 FIRST ANNUAL NRC PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT RES WORKSHOP	
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1.1.1 Organization of Conference Proceedings	
1.2 Workshop Agenda	1-3
<ul> <li>1.3 PROCEEDINGS</li> <li>1.3.1 Day 1: Session I: Program Overview</li> <li>1.3.1.1 Opening Remarks</li> <li>1.3.1.2 NRC PFHA Research Program Overview</li> <li>1.3.1.3 NRO Perspectives on Flooding Research Needs</li> <li>1.3.1.4 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Perspectives on Flooding Research Ne</li> <li>1.3.2.1 Regional Climate Change Projections—Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities</li> <li>1.3.2.1 Regional Climate Change Projections—Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities</li> <li>1.3.3.1 Estimating Precipitation</li> <li>1.3.3.1 Estimating Precipitation—Frequency Relationships in Orographic Regions</li> <li>1.3.3.2 Numerical Simulation of Local Intense Precipitation</li> <li>1.3.3.3 SHAC-F (Local Intense precipitation).</li> <li>1.3.4 Day 2: Session IV: Riverine and Coastal Flooding Processes</li> <li>1.3.4.1 PFHA Technical Basis for Riverine Flooding</li> <li>1.3.4.2 PFHA Framework for Riverine Flooding</li> <li>1.3.4.3 State of Practice in Flood Frequency Analysis</li> <li>1.3.4.4 Quantification and Propagation of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Storm Surge M</li> <li>1.3.5.1 Effects of Environmental Factors on Flood Protection and Mitigation Manual /</li> <li>1.3.5.2 Flooding Information Digests</li> <li>1.3.5.3 Framework for Modeling Total Plant Response to Flooding Events</li> <li>1.3.5.4 Performance of Penetration Seals</li> </ul>	
1.4 Summary	1-265
1.5 Workshop Participants	1-267
2 SECOND ANNUAL NRC PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT F WORKSHOP	

2.1 INTRODUCTION	2-1
2.1.1 Organization of Conference Proceedings	2-1
2.2 Workshop Agenda	2-3
2.3 PROCEEDINGS	2-7
2.3.1 Day 1: Session 1A - Introduction	2-7
2.3.1.1 Welcome	
2.3.1.2 PFHA Research Needs for New and Operating Reactors	2-12
2.3.1.3 Use of Flooding Hazard Information in Risk-Informed Decision-making	2-22
2.3.1.4 Flooding Research Needs: Industry Perspectives on Development of External Flood Frequency Methods	
2.3.1.5 NRC Flooding Research Program Overview	
2.3.1.6 EPRI Flooding Research Program Overview	
2.3.2 Day 1: Session 1B - Storm Surge Research	
2.3.2.1 Quantification of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Storm Surge Models	
2.3.2.2 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment—Storm Surge	
2.3.3 Day 2: Session 2A - Climate and Precipitation	
2.3.3.1 Regional Climate Change Projections: Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities	
2.3.3.2 Numerical Modeling of Local Intense Precipitation Processes	
2.3.3.3 Extreme Precipitation Frequency Estimates for Orographic Regions	
2.3.3.4 Local Intense Precipitation Frequency Studies,	
2.3.4 Day 2: Session 2B - Leveraging Available Flood Information I	
2.3.4.1 Development of Flood Hazard Information Digest for Operating NPP Sites	
2.3.4.2 At-Streamgage Flood Frequency Analyses for Very Low Annual Exceedance Probabi	
from a Perspective of Multiple Distributions and Parameter Estimation Methods	
2.3.4.3 Extending Frequency Analysis beyond Current Consensus Limits	
2.3.5 Day 2: Session 2C - Leveraging Available Flood Information II	
2.3.5.1 Collection of Paleoflood Evidence	
Records of Past Floods for Improved Flood Frequency Analysis	
2.3.6 Day 2: Session 2D - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response I	
2.3.6.1 EPRI Flood Protection Project Status	
2.3.6.2 Performance of Flood-Rated Penetration Seals	
2.3.7 Day 2: Daily Wrap-Up Question and Answer Period	
2.3.8 Day 3: Session 3A - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response II	
2.3.8.1 Effects of Environmental Factors on Manual Actions for Flood Protection and Mitigation	
Nuclear Power Plants	
2.3.8.2 Modeling Total Plant Response to Flooding Event	
2.3.9 Day 3: Session 3B - Frameworks I	. 2-303
2.3.9.1 Technical Basis for Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment	2-303
2.3.10 Day 3: Session 3C - Frameworks II	. 2-318
2.3.10.1 Evaluation of Deterministic Approaches to Characterizing Flood Hazards	2-318
2.3.10.2 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Framework Development	
2.3.10.3 Riverine Flooding and Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flood (SHAC-F),	-
2.3.11 Day 3: Session 3D - Panel Discussion	
2.3.11.1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service (NOAA	
	,
2.3.11.2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	
2.3.11.3 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)	
2.3.11.4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)	2-387
2.3.11.5 Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire	2-391

2.3.11.6 Discussion	
2.3.12 Day 3: Session 3E - Future Work in PFHA	
2.3.12.1 Future Work in PFHA at EPRI	
2.3.12.2 Future Work in PFHA at NRC	2-407
2.4 SUMMARY	2-417
2.5 PARTICIPANTS	2-419
3 THIRD ANNUAL NRC PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT RESEA	
WORKSHOP	
<b>3.1 INTRODUCTION</b> 3.1.1 Organization of Conference Proceedings	
3.2 Workshop Agenda	3-3
3.3 PROCEEDINGS	3_9
3.3.1 Day 1: Session 1A - Introduction	
3.3.1.1 Welcome	
3.3.1.2 NRC Flooding Research Program Overview	
3.3.1.3 EPRI Flooding Research Program Overview	
3.3.2 Day 1: Session 1B - Climate and Precipitation	
3.3.2.1 Regional Climate Change Projections: Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities	
3.3.2.2 Numerical Modeling of Local Intense Precipitation Processes	
3.3.2.3 Research on Extreme Precipitation Estimates in Orographic Regions	
3.3.3 Day 1: Session 1C - Storm Surge	
3.3.3.1 Quantification of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Storm Surge Models	
3.3.3.2 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment – Storm Surge	
3.3.4 Day 1: Session 1D - Leveraging Available Flood Information I	
3.3.4.1 Flood Frequency Analyses for Very Low Annual Exceedance Probabilities using H	
and Paleoflood Data, with Considerations for Nonstationary Systems	
3.3.4.2 Extending Frequency Analysis beyond Current Consensus Limits	
3.3.4.3 Development of External Hazard Information Digests for Operating NPP sites	3-149
3.3.5 Day 1: Session 1E - Paleoflood Studies	3-163
3.3.5.1 Improving Flood Frequency Analysis with a Multi-Millennial Record of Extreme Flo	ods on
the Tennessee River near Chattanooga,	3-163
3.3.5.2 Collection of Paleoflood Evidence	
3.3.6 Day 2: Daily Wrap-up Session / Public Comments	
3.3.7 Day 2: Poster Session	
3.3.7.1 Poster Abstracts	
3.3.7.2 Posters	
3.3.8 Day 2: Session 2A - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response I	
3.3.8.1 Performance of Flood- Rated Penetration Seals	
3.3.8.2 EPRI Flood Protection Project Status	
3.3.8.3 A Conceptual Framework to Assess Impacts of Environmental Conditions on Manu	
Actions for Flood Protection and Mitigation at Nuclear Power Plants	
3.3.8.4 External Flooding Walkdown Guidance	
3.3.8.5 Erosion Testing of Zoned Rockfill Embankments	
3.3.9 Day 2: Session 26 - Frameworks I 3.3.9.1 A Framework for Inland Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessments: Analysis of Extre	
3.3.9.1 A Framework for Inland Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessments: Analysis of Extre Water Equivalent in Central New Hampshire	
3.3.9.2 Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding (SHAC-F) for Rive	
Flooding	

	3.3.10 Day 2: Session 2C - Panel Discussions	. 3-316
	3.3.10.1 Flood Hazard Assessment Research and Guidance Activities in Partner Agencies 3.3.10.2 External Flooding Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA): Perspectives on Gaps and	
	Challenges	
	3.3.11 Day 2: Session 2D - Future Work in PFHA	. 3-375
	3.3.11.1 Future Work in PFHA at EPRI	3-375
	3.3.11.2 Future Work in PFHA at NRC	
	3.3.12 Day 2: Final Wrap-up Session / Public Comment	. 3-388
	3.4 SUMMARY	3-389
	3.5 WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS	
4	FOURTH ANNUAL NRC PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT RESEAR WORKSHOP	
	4.1 INTRODUCTION	4-1
	4.1.1 Organization of Conference Proceedings	4-1
	4.2 WORKSHOP AGENDA	4-2
	4.3 PROCEEDINGS	4-9
	4.3.1 Day 1: Session 1A - Introduction	
	4.3.1.1 Introduction	
	4.3.1.2 NRC Flooding Research Program Overview	
	4.3.1.3 EPRI External Flooding Research Program Overview	
	4.3.1.4 Nuclear Energy Agency, Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI): Wo Group on External Events (WGEV).	rking
	4.3.2 Day 1: Session 1B - Coastal Flooding	
	4.3.2.1 KEYNOTE: National Weather Service Storm Surge Ensemble Guidance	
	4.3.2.2 Advancements in Probabilistic Storm Surge Models and Uncertainty Quantification Us	
	Gaussian Process Metamodeling.	
	4.3.2.3 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Using the Joint Probability Method for Hurric	ane
	Storm Surge.	
	4.3.2.4 Assessment of Epistemic Uncertainty for Probabilistic Storm Surge Hazard Assessme	
	Using a Logic Tree Approach	
	4.3.2.5 Coastal Flooding Panel	
	4.3.3 Day 1: Session 1C - Precipitation	
	4.3.3.1 KEYNOTE: Satellite Precipitation Estimates, GPM, and Extremes	4-98
	4.3.3.2 Hurricane Harvey Highlights: Need to Assess the Adequacy of Probable Maximum	
	Precipitation Estimation Methods.	
	4.3.3.3 Reanalysis Datasets in Hydrologic Hazards Analysis	
	4.3.3.4 Current Capabilities for Developing Watershed Precipitation-Frequency Relationships Storm-Related Inputs for Stochastic Flood Modeling for Use in Risk-Informed	
	Decisionmaking	
	4.3.3.5 Factors Affecting the Development of Precipitation Areal Reduction Factors	
	4.3.3.6 Precipitation Panel Discussion.	
	4.3.4 Day 2 Session 2A - Riverine Flooding	
	4.3.4.1 KEYNOTE: Watershed Level Risk Analysis with HEC-WAT	
	4.3.4.2 Global Sensitivity Analyses Applied to Riverine Flood Modeling	
	4.3.4.3 Detection and Attribution of Flood Change Across the United States	
	4.3.4.4 Bulletin 17C: Flood Frequency and Extrapolations for Dams and Nuclear Facilities 4.3.4.5 Riverine Paleoflood Analyses in Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Improving Hydrologic	
	4.3.4.5 Riverine Paleonood Analyses in Risk-miorined Decisionmaking, improving Hydrologic Loading Input for USACE Dam Safety Evaluations	

4.3.4.6 Improving Flood Frequency Analysis with a Multi-Millennial Record of Extreme Floods	
the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, TN	
4.3.4.7 Riverine Flooding Panel Discussion 4.3.5 Day 2: Session 2B - Modeling Frameworks	
4.3.5 Day 2. Session 2B - Modeling Frameworks 4.3.5.1 Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding (SHAC-F)	
4.3.5.1 Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding (SHAC-F)	
4.3.5.3 Development of Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization Framework for Flooding	4-272 a.of
4.5.5.5 Development of Risk-informed Safety Margin Characterization Framework for Flooding Nuclear Power Plants.	
4.3.5.4 Modeling Frameworks Panel Discussion.	
4.3.6 Day 2: Poster Session 2C	
4.3.6.1 Coastal Storm Surge Assessment using Surrogate Modeling Methods	
4.3.6.2 Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding	
Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.	4-312
4.3.6.3 Modelling Dependence and Coincidence of Flooding Phenomena: Methodology and	
Simplified Case Study in Le Havre in France	
4.3.6.4 Current State-of-Practice in Dam Risk Assessment	
4.3.6.5 Hurricane Harvey Highlights Challenge of Estimating Probable Maximum Precipitation	
4.3.6.6 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis for Hydraulic Models with Dependent Inputs	
4.3.6.7 Development of Hydrologic Hazard Curves Using SEFM for Assessing Hydrologic Ris	
Rhinedollar Dam, CA.	
4.3.6.8 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant in Korea 4.3.7 Day 3: Session 3A - Climate and Non-Stationarity	
4.3.7 Day 5. Session 5A - Climate and Non-Stationarty	4-329
4.3.7.1 KEYNOTE: Hydroclimatic Extremes Trends and Projections: A view from the Fourth National Climate Assessment	1 220
4.3.7.2 Regional Climate Change Projections: Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities	
4.3.7.3 Role of Climate Change/Variability in the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season	
4.3.7.4 Climate Panel Discussion.	
4.3.8 Day 3: Session 3B - Flood Protection and Plant Response	
4.3.8.1 External Flood Seal Risk-Ranking Process	
4.3.8.2 Results of Performance of Flood-Rated Penetration Seals Tests	
4.3.8.3 Modeling Overtopping Erosion Tests of Zoned Rockfill Embankments	
4.3.8.4 Flood Protection and Plant Response Panel Discussion	
4.3.9 Day 3: Session 3C - Towards External Flooding PRA	4-423
4.3.9.1 External Flooding PRA Walkdown Guidance	4-423
4.3.9.2 Updates on the Revision and Expansion of the External Flooding PRA Standard	4-435
4.3.9.3 Update on ANS 2.8: Probabilistic Evaluation of External Flood Hazards for Nuclear Fa	cilities
	4-446
4.3.9.4 Qualitative PRA Insights from Operational Events of External Floods and Other Storm	
Related Hazards.	
4.3.9.5 Towards External Flooding PRA Discussion Panel	4-464
4.4 SUMMARY	4-475
4.5 Workshop Participants	4-477
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	5-489
5.1 SUMMARY	5-489
5.2 Conclusions	5-489
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5-490

5

## **ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS**

σ	sigma, standard deviation
°C	degrees Celsius
°F	degrees Fahrenheit
<sup>13</sup> C-NMR	carbon-13 nuclear magnetic resonance
<sup>14</sup> C	carbon-14
17B	Guidelines for Determining Flood Flow Frequency—Bulletin 17B, 1982
17C	Guidelines for Determining Flood Flow Frequency—Bulletin 17C, 2018
1-D	one dimensional
20C	20th Century Reanalysis
2BCMB	Level 2—DPR and GMI Combine
2-D	two dimensional
3-D	three dimensional
AAB	Accident Analysis Branch in NRC/RES/DSA
AB	auxiliary building
AC, ac	alternating current
ACCP	Alabama Coastal Comprehensive Plan
ACE	accumulated cyclone energy, an approximation of the wind energy used by a tropical system over its lifetime
ACM	alternative conceptual model
ACME	Accelerated Climate Modeling for Energy (DOE)
ACWI	Advisory Committee on Water Information
AD	anno Domini
ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ADCIRC	ADvanced CIRCulation model
AEP	annual exceedance probability
AEP4	Asymmetric Exponential Power distribution
AFW	auxiliary feedwater
AGCMLE	Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement in NRC/OGC/GCHA
AGCNRP	Assistant General Counsel for New Reactor Programs in NRC/OGC/GCHA
AGFZ	Azores–Gibraltar Transform Fault
AGL	above ground level
AIC	Akaike Information Criterion

AIMS	assumptions, inputs, and methods
AIRS	Advanced InfraRed Sounder
AIT	air intake tunnel
AK	Alaska
AM	annual maxima
AMJ	April, May, June
AMM	Atlantic Meridional Mode
AMO	Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation
AMS	annual maxima series
AMSR-2	Advance Microwave Scanning Radiometer
AMSU	Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit
ANN	annual
ANO	Arkansas Nuclear One
ANOVA	analysis of variance decomposition
ANS	American Nuclear Society
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ANVS	Netherlands Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
AO	Assistant for Operations in NRC/OEDO
AOP	abnormal operating procedure
APF	annual probability of failure
APHB	Probabilistic Risk Assessment Operations and Human Factors Branch
API	application programming interface
APLA/APLB	Probabilistic Risk Assessment Licensing Branch A/B in NRC/NRR/DRA
APOB	PRA Oversight Branch in NRC/NRR/DRA
AR	atmospheric river
AR	Arkansas
AR4, AR5	climate scenarios from the 4th/5th Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Reports / Working Groups
ARA	Applied Research Associates
ArcGIS	geographic information system owned by ESRI
ARF	areal reduction factor
ARI	average return interval
ARR	Australian Rainfall-Runoff Method
AS	adjoining stratiform
ASM	annual series maxima

ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASN	French Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire)
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
ATMS	Advance Technology Microwave Sounder
ATWS	anticipated transient without scram
AVHRR	Advance Very High Resolution Radiometer
B&A	Bittner & Associates
BATEA	Bayesian Total Error Analysis
BB	backbuilding/quasistationary
BC	boundary condition
Bel V	subsidiary of Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC)
BHM	Bayesian Hierarchical Model
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BMA	Bayesian Model Averaging
BQ	Bayesian Quadrature
BWR	boiling-water reactor
CA	California
CAC	common access card
CAPE	Climate Action Peer Exchange
CAPE	convective available potential energy
CAS	corrective action study
CAS2CD	CAScade 2-Dimensional model (Colorado State)
Cat.	category on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale
CBR	center, body, and range
CC	Clausius-Clapeyron
CC	climate change
CCCR	Center for Climate Change Research
CCDP	conditional core damage probability
CCI	Coppersmith Consulting Inc.
CCSM4	Community Climate System Model version 4
CCW	closed cooling water
CDB	current design basis
CDF	core damage frequency
CDF	cumulative distribution function

CE	common era
CEATI	Centre for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation
CEET	cracked embankment erosion test
CENRS	National Science and Technology Council Committee on Environment, Natural Resources, and Sustainability
CESM	Community Earth System Model
CFD	computational fluid dynamics
CFHA	comprehensive flood hazard assessment
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CFSR	Climate Forecast System Reanalysis
CHIPs	Coupled Hurricane Intensity Prediction System
CHiRPs	Climate Hazards Group infraRed Precipitation with Station Data
CHL	Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory
CHRP	Coastal Hazard Rapid Prediction, part of StormSIM
CHS	Coastal Hazards System
CI	confidence interval
CICS-NC	Cooperative Institute for Climates and Satellites—North Carolina
CIPB	Construction Inspection Management Branch in NRC/NRO/DLSE
CIRES	Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences
CL	confidence level
CL-ML	homogeneous silty clay soil
CMC	Canadian Meteorological Center forecasts
CMIP5	Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5
CMORPH / C- MORPH	Climate Prediction Center Morphing Technique
CNE	Romania Consiliul National al Elevilor
CNSC	Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
СО	Colorado
CoCoRaHS	Community Collaborative Rain, Hail & Snow Network (NWS)
COE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (see also USACE)
COL	combined license
COLA	combined license application
COM-SECY	NRC staff requests to the Commission for guidance
CONUS	Continental United States
COOP	Cooperative Observer Network (NWS)

COR	contracting officer's representative
CPC	Climate Prediction Center (NOAA)
CPFs	cumulative probability functions
CR	comprehensive review
CRA	computational risk assessment
CRB	Concerns Resolution Branch in NRC/OE
CRL	coastal reference location
CRPS	continuous ranked probability score
CSNI	Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations
CSRB	Criticality, Shielding & Risk Assessment Branch in NRC/NMSS/DSFM
CSSR	Climate Science Special Report (by the U.S. Global Change Research Program)
CSTORM	Coastal Storm Modeling System
CTA Note	note to Commissioners' Assistants
CTXS	Coastal Texas Study
Cv	coefficient of variation
CZ	capture zone
DC	District of Columbia
DAD	depth-area-duration
DAMBRK	Dam Break Flood Forecasting Model (NWS)
DAR	Division of Advanced Reactors in NRC/NRO
DayMet	daily surface weather and climatological summaries
dBz	decibel relative to z, or measure of reflectivity of radar
DCIP	Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs in NRC/NRO
DDF	depth-duration-frequency curve
DDM	data-driven methodology
DDST	database of daily storm types
DE	Division of Engineering in NRC/RES
DHSVM	distributed hydrology soil vegetation model, supported by University of Washington
DIRS	Division of Inspection and Regional Support in NRC/NRR
DJF	December, January, February
DLBreach	Dam/Levee Breach model developed by Weiming Wu, Clarkson University
DLSE	Division of Licensing, Siting, and Environmental Analysis in NRC/NRO

DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
Dp	pressure deficit
DPI	power dissipation index
DPR	Division of Preparedness and Response in NRC/NSIR
DPR	Dual Frequency Precipitation Radar
DQO	data quality objective
DRA	Division of Risk Assessment in NRC/NRR
DRA	Division of Risk Analysis in NRC/RES
DREAM	Differential Evolution Adaptive Metropolis
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects in NRC/R-I
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety In NRC/R-I and R-IV
DSA	Division of Systems Analysis in NRC/RES
DSEA	Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis, formerly in NRC/NRO, now in DLSE
DSFM	Division of Spent Fuel Management in NRC/NMSS
DSI3240	NCEI hourly precipitation data
DSMS	Dam Safety Modification Study
DSMS	digital surface models
DSPC	USACE Dam Safety Production Center
DSRA	Division of Safety Systems, Risk Assessment and Advanced Reactors in NRC/NRO (merged into DAR)
DSS	Division of Safety Systems in NRC/NRR
DSS	Hydrologic Engineering Center Data Storage System
DTWD	doubly truncated Weibull distribution
DUWP	Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs in NRC/NMSS
DWOPER	Operational Dynamic Wave Model (NWS)
dy	day
EAD	expected annual damage
EB2/EB3	Engineering Branch 2/3 in NRC/R-IV/DRS
EBTRK	Tropical Cyclone Extended Best Track Dataset
EC	Eddy Covariance Method
EC	environmental condition
ECC	ensemble copula coupling
ECCS	emergency core cooling systems pump

ECs	environmental conditions
EDF	Électricité de France
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EF	environmental factor
EFW	emergency feedwater
EGU	European Geophysical Union
EHCOE	NRC External Hazard Center of Expertise
EHID	External Hazard Information Digest
EIRL	equivalent independent record length
EIS	environmental impact statement
EKF	Epanechikov kernel function
EMA	expected moments algorithm
EMCWF	European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
EMDR	eastern main development region (for hurricanes)
EMRALD	Event Model Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams
ENSI	Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
ENSO	El Niño Southern Oscillation
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPIP	emergency plan implementing procedure
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
ER	engineering regulation (USACE)
ERA-40	European ECMWF reanalysis dataset
ERB	Environmental Review Branch in NRC/NMSS/FCSE
ERDC	Engineer Research and Development Center (USACE)
ERL	equivalent record length
ESCC	Environmental and Siting Consensus Committee (ANS)
ESEB	Structural Engineering Branch in NRC/RES/DE
ESEWG	Extreme Storm Events Work Group (ACWI/SOH)
ESP	early site permit
ESRI	Environmental Systems Research Institute
ESRL	Earth Systems Research Lab (NOAA/OAR)
EST	Eastern Standard Time
EST	empirical simulation technique
ESTP	enhanced storm transposition procedure

ET	event tree
ET	evapotranspiration
ET/FT	event tree/fault tree
ETC	extratropical cyclone
EUS	eastern United States
EV4	extreme value with four parameters distribution function
EVA	extreme value analysis
EVT	extreme value theory
EXHB	External Hazards Branch in NRC/NRO/DLSE
Exp	experimental
f	annual probability of failure (USBR, USACE)
F1, F5	tornado strengths on the Fujita scale
FA	frequency analysis
FADSU	fluvial activity database of the Southeastern United States
FAQ	frequently asked question
FAST	Fourier Analysis Sensitivity Test
FBPS	flood barrier penetration seal
FBS	flood barrier system
FCM	flood-causing mechanism
FCSE	Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards & Environmental Review in NRC/NMSS
FD	final design
FDC	flood design category (DOE terminology)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FFA	flood frequency analysis
FFC	flood frequency curve
FHRR	flood hazard reevaluation report
FITAG	Flooding Issues Technical Advisory Group
FL	Florida
FLDFRQ3	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation flood frequency analysis tool
FLDWAV	flood wave model (NWS)
FLEX	diverse and flexible mitigation strategies
Flike	extreme value analysis package developed University of Newcastle, Australia

FLO-2D	two-dimensional commercial flood model
FM Approvals	Testing and Certification Services Laboratories, originally Factory Mutual Laboratories
f-N	annual probability of failure vs. average life loss, N
FOR	peak flood of record
FPM	flood protection and mitigation
FPS	flood penetration seal
FRA	Flood Risk Analysis Compute Option in HEC-WAT
FRM	Fire Risk Management, Inc.
FSAR	final safety analysis report
FSC	flood-significant component
FSG	FLEX support guidelines
FSP	flood seal for penetrations
FT	fault tree
ft	foot
FXHAB	Fire and External Hazards Analysis Branch in NRC/RES/DRA
FY	fiscal year
G&G	geology and geotechnical engineering
GA	generic action
GCHA	Deputy General Counsel for Hearings and Administration in NRC/OGC
GCM	Global Climate Model
GCRP	U.S. Global Change Research Program
GCRPS	Deputy General Counsel for Rulemaking and Policy Support in NRC/OGC
GEFS	Global Ensemble Forecasting System
GeoClaw	routines from Clawpack-5 ("Conservation Laws Package") that are specialized to depth-averaged geophysical flows
GEO-IR	Geostationary Satellites—InfraRed Imagery
GEV	generalized extreme value
GFDL	Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Lab (NOAA)
GFS	Global Forecast System
GHCN	Global Historical Climatology Network
GHCND	Global Historical Climatology Network-Daily
GIS	geographic information system
GISS	Goddard Institute for Space Studies (NASA)

GKF	Gaussian Kernel Function
GL	generic letter
GLO	generalized logistic distribution
GLRCM	Great Lakes Regional Climate Model
GLUE	generalized likelihood uncertainty estimation
GMAO	Global Modeling and Assimilation Office (NASA)
GMC	ground motion characterization
GMD	geoscientific model development
GMI	GPM microwave imager
GMSL	global mean sea level
GNO	generalized normal distribution
GoF	goodness-of-fit
GPA/GPD	generalized Pareto distribution
GPCP SG	Global Precipitation Climatology Project—Satellite Gauge
GPLLJ	Great Plains lower level jet
GPM	Gaussian process metamodel
GPM	global precipitation measurement
GPO	generalized Pareto distribution
GPROF	Goddard profile algorithm
GRADEX	rainfall-based flood frequency distribution method
Grizzly	simulated component aging and damage evolution events RISMC tool
GRL	Geophysical Research Letters
GRS	Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit—Global Research for Safety
GSA	global sensitivity analysis
GSFC	Goddard Space Flight Center
GSI	generic safety issue
GUI	graphical user interface
GW-GC	Well-graded gravel with clay and sand
GZA	a multidisciplinary consulting firm
h	second shape parameter of four-parameter Kappa distribution
h/hr	hour
H&H	hydraulics and hydrology
HAMC	hydraulic model characterization

HBV	rainfall runoff model Hydrologiska Byråns Vattenbalansalvdening, supported by the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
HCA	hierarchical clustering analysis
HCTISN	Supreme Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety (France)
HCW	hazardous convective weather
HDSC	NOAA/NWS/OWP Hydrometeorological Design Studies Center
HEC	Hydrologic Engineering Center, part of USACE/Institute for Water Resources
HEC-1	see HEC-HMS
HEC-FIA	Hydrologic Engineering Center Flood Impact Analysis Software
HEC-HMS	Hydrologic Modeling System
HEC-LifeSim	Hydrologic Engineering Center life loss and direct damage estimation software
HEC-MetVue	Hydrologic Engineering Center Meteorological Visualization Utility Engine
HEC-RAS	Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System
HEC-ResSim	Hydrologic Engineering Center Reservoir System Simulation
HEC-SSP	Hydrologic Engineering Center Statistical Software Package
HEC-WAT	Hydrologic Engineering Center Watershed Analysis Tool
HEP	human error probability
HF	human factors
HFRB	Human Factors and Reliability Branch in NRC/RES/DRA
HHA	hydrologic hazard analysis
HHC	hydrologic hazard curve
НІ	Hawaii
HLR	high-level requirement
HLWFCNS	Assistant General Counsel for High-Level Waste, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Security in NRC/OGC/GCRPS
HMB	Hazard Management Branch in NRC/NRR/JLD, realigned
HMC	hydraulic/hydrologic model characterization
HMR	NOAA/NWS Hydrometeorological Report
HMS	hydrologic modeling system
HOMC	hydrologic model characterization
hPa	hectopascals (unit of pressure)

HR	homogenous region
HRA	human reliability analysis
HRL	Hydrologic Research Lab, University of California at Davis
HRRR	NOAA High-Resolution Rapid Refresh Model
HRRs	Fukushima Hazard Reevaluation Reports (EPRI term)
HRU	hydrologic runoff unit approach
HUC	hydrologic unit code for watershed (USGS)
HUNTER	human actions RISMC tool
HURDAT	National Hurricane Centers HURricane DATabases
Hz	hertz (1 cycle/second)
IA	integrated assessment
IA	Iowa
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBTrACS	International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship
IC	initial condition
ICOLD	International Commission on Large Dams
ID	information digest
IDF	intensity-duration frequency curve
IDF	inflow design flood
IE	initiating event
IEF	initiating event frequency
IES	Dam Safety Issue Evaluation Studies
IHDM	Institute of Hydrology Distributed Model, United Kingdom
IID	independent and identically distributed
IL	Illinois
IMERG	Integrated Multi-satellitE Retrievals for GPM
IMPRINT	Improved Performance Research Integration Tool
in	inch
IN	information notice
INES	International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	individual plant examination
IPEEE	individual plant examination for external events

IPET	Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce for the Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System
IPWG	International Precipitation Working Group
IR	infrared
IR	inspection report
IRIB	Reactor Inspection Branch in NRC/NRR/DIRS
IRP	Integrated Research Projects (DOE)
IRSN	Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (France's Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute)
ISG	interim staff guidance
ISI	inservice inspection
ISR	interim staff response
IT	information technology
IVT	integrated vapor transport
IWR	USACE Institute for Water Resources
IWVT	integrated water vapor tendency
J	joule
JJA	June, July, August
JLD	Japan Lesson-learned Directorate or Division in NRC/NRR, realigned
JPA	Joint Powers Authority (FEMA Region II)
JPA	joint probability analysis
JPM	joint probability method
JPM-OS	Joint Probability Method with Optimal Sampling
К	degrees Kelvin
KAERI	Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
KAP	Kappa distribution
k <sub>d</sub>	erodibility coefficient
kg	kilogram
kHz	kilohertz (1000 cycles/second)
km	kilometer
KS	Kansas
LA	Louisiana
LACPR	Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Study
LAR	license amendment request

L-C <sub>v</sub>	coefficient of L-variation
LEO	low earth orbit
LER	licensee event report
LERF	large early release frequency
LIA	Little Ice Age
Lidar	light imaging, detection and ranging; surveying method using reflected pulsed light to measure distance
LIP	local intense precipitation
LMI	lifetime maximum intensity
LMOM / LMR	L-moment
LN4	Slade-type four parameter lognormal distribution function
LOCA	localized constructed analog
LOCA	loss-of-coolant accident
LOOP	loss of offsite power event
LOUHS	loss of ultimate heat sink event
LPIII / LP-III, LP3	Log Pearson Type III distribution
LS	leading stratiform
LS	local storm
LSHR	late secondary heat removal
LTWD	Left-truncated Weibull distribution
LULC	land use and land cover
LWR	light-water reactor
LWRS	Light-Water Reactor Sustainability Program
m	meter
MA	Massachusetts
MA	manual action
MAAP	coupling accident conditions RISMC tool
MAE	mean absolute error
MAM	March, April, May
MAP	mean annual precipitation
MASTODON	structural dynamics, stochastic nonlinear soil-structure interaction in a risk framework RISMC tool
mb	millibar
MCA	medieval climate anomaly
MCC	mesoscale convective complex

MCI	Monte Carlo integration
MCLC	Monte Carlo Life-Cycle
MCMC	Markov chain Monte Carlo method
MCRAM	streamflow volume stochastic modeling
MCS	mesoscale convective system
MCS	Monte Carlo simulation
MCTA	Behrangi Multisatellite CloudSat TRMM Aqua Product
MD	Maryland
MDL	Meteorological Development Laboratory (NWS)
MDR	Main Development Region (for hurricanes)
MDT	Methodology Development Team
MEC	mesoscale storm with embedded convection
MEOW	Maximum Envelopes of Water
MetStorm	storm analysis software by MetStat, second generation of SPAS
MGD	meta-Gaussian distribution
MGS Engineering	engineering consultants
MHS	microwave humidity sounder
MIKE SHE/ MIKE 21	integrated hydrological modeling system
MLC	mid-latitude cyclone
MLE	maximum likelihood estimation
mm	millimeter
MM5	fifth-generation Penn State/NCAR mesoscale model
MMC	mesh-based Monte Carlo method
MMC	meteorological model characterization
MMF	multimechanism flood
MMP	mean monthly precipitation
MN	Minnesota
MO	Missouri
Mode 3	Reactor Operation Mode: Hot Standby
Mode 4	Reactor Operation Mode: Hot Shutdown
Mode 5	Reactor Operation Mode: Cold Shutdown
MOM	Maximum of MEOWs
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPE	multisensor precipitation estimates

mph	miles per hour
MPS	maximum product of spacings
MRMS	Multi-Radar Multi-Sensor project (NOAA/NSSL)
MS	Mississippi
MSA	mitigating strategies assessment
MSFHI	mitigating strategies flood hazard information
MSL	mean sea level
MSWEP	multisource weighted-ensemble precipitation dataset
MVGC	multivariable Gaussian copula
MVGD	multivariable Gaussian distribution
MVTC	multivariable student's t copula
Ν	average life loss (USBR, USACE)
NA14	NOAA National Atlas 14
NACCS	North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study
NAEFS	North American Ensemble Forecasting System
NAIP	National Agricultural Imagery Program
NAM-WRF	North American Mesoscale Model—WRF
NAO	North Atlantic Oscillation
NARCCAP	North American Regional Climate Change Assessment Program
NARR	North American Regional Reanalysis (NOAA)
NARSIS	European Research Project New Approach to Reactor Safety Improvements
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAVD88	North American Vertical Datum of 1988
NBS	net basin scale
NCA3/NCA4	U.S. Global Change Research Program Third/Fourth National Climate Assessment
NCAR	National Center for Atmospheric Research
NCEI	National Centers for Environmental Information
NCEP	National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NOAA)
ND	North Dakota
NDFD	National Digital Forecast Database (NWS)
NDSEV	number of days with severe thunderstorm environments
NE	Nebraska
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency

NEB	nonexceedance bounds
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NESDIS	NOAA National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service
NEUTRINO	a general-purpose simulation and visualization environment including an SPH solver
NEXRAD	next-generation radar
NHC	National Hurricane Center
NI DAQ	National Instruments Data Acquisition Software
NID	National Inventory of Dams
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NLDAS	North American Land Data Assimilation System
nm	nautical miles
NM	New Mexico
NMSS	NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOED	notice of enforcement discretion
NPDP	National Performance of Dams Program
NPH	Natural Phenomena Hazards Program (DOE)
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPS	National Park Service
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRCS	Natural Resources Conservation Service
NRO	NRC Office of New Reactors
NRR	NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis
NRR	NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NSE	Nash-Sutcliffe model efficiency coefficient
NSIAC	Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee
NSIR	NRC Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
NSSL	National Severe Storms Laboratory (NOAA)
NSTC	National Science and Technology Council
NTTF	Near-Term Task Force
NUREG	NRC technical report designation
NUVIA	a subsidiary of Vinci Construction Group, offering expertise in services and technology supporting safety performance in nuclear facilities
NWS	National Weather Service

NY	New York
OAR	NOAA Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research
OE	NRC Office of Enforcement
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEDO	NRC Office of the Executive Director for Operations
OGC	NRC Office of the General Counsel
OHC	ocean heat content
OK	Oklahoma
OR	Oregon
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OSL	optically stimulated luminescence
OTC	once-through cooling
OWI	Ocean Wind Inc.
OWP	NOAA/NWS Office of Water Prediction
Ρ	present
P/PET	precipitation over PET ratio, aridity
Ра	pascal
PB1	Branch 1 in NRC/R-I/DRP
PBL	planetary boundary layer
PCA	principal component analysis
PCHA	probabilistic coastal hazard assessment
PCMQ	Predictive Capability Maturity Quantification
PCMQBN	Predictive Capability Maturity Quantification by Bayesian Net
PD	performance demand
PDF	probability density function
PDF	performance degradation factor
PDS	partial-duration series
PE3	Pearson Type III distribution
PeakFQ	USGS flood frequency analysis software tool based on Bulletin 17C
PERSIANN-CCS	Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information using Artificial Neural Networks—Cloud Classification System (University of California at Irvine Precipitation Algorithm)
PERT	program evaluation review technique
PET	potential evapotranspiration
P-ETSS	Probabilistic Extra-Tropical Storm Surge Model

PF	paleoflood
PF/P-F	precipitation frequency
PFAR	precipitation field area ratio
PFHA	probabilistic flood hazard assessment
PFM	potential failure mode
PI	principal investigator
P-I	pressure-impulse curve
PIF	performance influencing factor
PILF	potentially influential low flood
PM	project manager
PMDA	Program Management, Policy Development & Analysis in NRC/RES
PMF	probable maximum flood
PMH	probable maximum hurricane
PMP	probable maximum precipitation
PMW	passive microwave
PN	product number
PNAS	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
PNNL	Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
POANHI	Process for Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard Information
POB	Regulatory Policy and Oversight Branch in NRC/NSIR/DPR
POR	period of record
PPRP	participatory peer review panel
PPS	Precipitation Processing System
PR	Puerto Rico
PRA	probabilistic risk assessment
PRAB	Probabilistic Risk Assessment Branch in NRC/RES/DRA
PRB	Performance and Reliability Branch in NRC/RES/DRA
PRISM	a gridded dataset developed through a partnership between the NRCS National Water and Climate Center and the PRISM Climate Group at Oregon State University, developers of PRISM (the Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model)
PRMS	USGS Precipitation Runoff Modelling System
Prométhée	IRSN software based on PROMETHEE, the Preference Ranking Organization METhod for Enrichment Evaluation
PRPS	Precipitation Retrieval Profiles Scheme

PS	parallel stratiform
PSA	probabilistic safety assessment, common term for PRA in other countries
PSD	Physical Sciences Division in NOAA/OAR/ESRL
PSF	performance shaping factor
psf	pounds per square foot
PSHA	probabilistic seismic hazard assessment
PSI	paleostage indicators
PSSHA	probabilistic storm surge hazard assessment
P-Surge	probabilistic tropical cyclone storm surge model
PTI	project technical integrator
PVC	polyvinyl chloride
Pw/PW	precipitable water
PWR	pressurized-water reactor
Q	quarter
QA	quality assurance
QC	quality control
QI	Quality Index
QPE	quantitative precipitation estimates
QPF	quantitative precipitation forecast
R	a statistical package
R 2.1	NTTF Report Recommendation 2.1
R&D	research and development
R2	coefficient of determination
RAM	regional atmospheric model
RASP	Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook
RAVEN	risk analysis in a virtual environment probabilistic scenario evolution RISMC tool
RC	reinforced concrete
RCP (4.5, 8.5)	representative concentration pathways
RELAP-7	reactor excursion and leak analysis program transient conditions RISMC tool
RENV	Environmental Technical Support Branch in NRC/NRO/DLSE
REOF	rotated empirical orthogonal function
RES	NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

RF	riverine flooding
RFA	regional frequency analysis
RFC	River Forecast Center (NWS)
RG	regulatory guide
RGB	red, green, and blue imagery (NAIP)
RGB-IF	red, green, blue, and infrared imagery (NAIP)
RGC	regional growth curve
RGGIB	Regulatory Guidance and Generic Issues Branch in NRC/RES/DE
RGS	Geosciences and Geotechnical Engineering Branches now in NRC/NRO/DLSE, formerly in NRC/NRO/DSEA
RHM	Hydrology and Meteorology Branch formerly in NRC/NRO/DSEA
RI	Rhode Island
R-I, R-II, R-III, R-IV	NRC Regions I, II, III, IV
RIC	Regulatory Information Conference, NRC
RIDM	risk-informed decisionmaking
RILIT	Risk-Informed Licensing Initiative Team in NRC/NRR/DRA/APLB
RISMC	risk information safety margin characterization
R <sub>max</sub>	radius to maximum winds
RMB	Renewals and Materials Branch in NRC/NMSS/DSFM
RMC	USACE Risk Management Center
RMSD	root-mean-square deviation
RMSE	root mean square error
ROM	reduce order modeling
ROP	Reactor Oversight Process
RORB-MC	an interactive runoff and streamflow routing program
RPAC	formerly in NRC/NRO/DSEA
RRTM	Rapid Radiative Transfer Model Code in WRF
RRTMS	RRTM with GCM application
RS	response surface
RTI	an independent, nonprofit institute
RV	return values
SA	storage area
SACCS	South Atlantic Coastal Comprehensive Study
SAPHIR	Sounding for Probing Vertical Profiles of Humidity

SAPHIRE	Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations
SBDFA	simulation-based dynamic flooding analysis framework
SBO	station blackout
SBS	simulation-based scaling
SC	safety category (ANS 58.16-2014 term)
SC	South Carolina
SCAN	Soil Climate Analysis Network
SCRAM	immediate shutdown of nuclear reactor
SCS	curve number method
SD	standard deviation
SDC	shutdown cooling
SDP	significance determination process
SDR	Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction
SECY	written issues paper the NRC staff submits to the Commission
SEFM	Stochastic Event-Based Rainfall-Runoff Model
SER	safety evaluation report
SGSEB	Structural, Geotechnical and Seismic Engineering Branch in NRC/RES/DE
SHAC-F	Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding
SHE	Systém Hydrologique Européan
SITES	model that uses headcut erodibility index by USDA-ARS and University of Kansas "Earthen/Vegetated Auxiliary Spillway Erosion Prediction for Dams"
SLC	sea level change
SLOSH	Sea Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (NWS model)
SLR	sea level rise
SMR	small modular reactor
SNOTEL	snow telemetry
SNR	signal-to-noise ratio
SOH	Subcommittee on Hydrology
SOM	self-organizing map
SON	September, October, November
SOP	standard operating pressure
SPAR	standardized plant analysis risk
SPAS	Storm Precipitation Analysis System (MetStat, Inc.)

SPH	smoothed-particle hydrodynamics
SPRA	PRA and Severe Accidents Branch in NRC/NRO/DESR (formerly in DSRA)
SRA	senior reactor analyst
SRES A2	NARCCAP A2 emission scenario
SRH2D/SRH-2D	USBR Sedimentation and River Hydraulics—Two-Dimensional model
SRM	staff requirements memorandum
SRP	standard review plan
SRR	storm recurrence rate
SSAI	Science Systems and Applications, Inc.
SSC	structure, system, and component
SSHAC	Senior Seismic Hazard Assessment Committee
SSM	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (Strål säkerhets mydigheten)
SSMI	Special Sensor Microwave Imager
SSMIS	Special Sensor Microwave Imager/Sounder
SSPMP	site-specific probable maximum precipitation
SST	sea surface temperature
SST	stochastic simulation technique
SST	stochastic storm transposition
SSURGO	soil survey geographic database
ST4 or Stage IV	precipitation information from multisensor (radar and gauges) precipitation analysis
STEnv	severe thunderstorm environment
STM	stochastic track method
StormSIm	stochastic storm simulation system
STSB	Technical Specifications Branch in NRC/NRR/DSS
STUK	Finland Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
STWAVE	STEady-state spectral WAVE model
SÚJB	Czech Republic State Office for Nuclear Safety
SWAN	Simulation Waves Nearshore Model
SWE	snow-water equivalent
SWL	still water level
SWMM	EPA Storm Water Management Model
SWT	Schaefer-Wallis-Taylor Climate Region Method
TAG	EPRI Technical Assessment Guide

TC	tropical cyclone
TCI	TRMM Combined Instrument
Td	daily temperature
TDF	transformed extreme value type 1 distribution function (four parameter)
TDI	technically defensible interpretations
TELEMAC	two-dimensional hydraulic model
TELEMAC 2D	a suite of finite element computer programs owned by the Laboratoire National d'Hydraulique et Environnement (LNHE), part of the R&D group of Électricité de France
T-H	thermohydraulic
ТІ	technical integration
ТІ	technology innovation project
TL	training line
ТМІ	Three Mile Island
ТМІ	TRMM Microwave Imager
TMPA	TRMM Multisatellite Precipitation Analysis
TN	Tennessee
TOPMODEL	two-dimensional distributed watershed model by Keith Beven, Lancaster University
TOVS	Television-Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS) Operational Vertical Sounder
TP-#	Test Pit #
TP-29	U.S. Weather Bureau Technical Paper No. 29
TP-40	Technical Paper No. 40, "Rainfall Frequency Atlas of the U.S.," 1961
TR	USACE technical report
TREX	two-dimensional, runoff, erosion, and export model
TRMM	Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
TRVW	Tennessee River Valley Watershed
TS	technical specification
TS	trailing stratiform
TSR	tropical-storm remnant
TUFLOW	two-dimensional hydraulic model
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
ТХ	Texas
U.S. or US	United States
UA	uncertainty analysis

UC	University of California
UH	unit hydrograph
UKF	uniform kernel function
UKMET	medium-range (3- to 7-day) numerical weather prediction model operated by the United Kingdom METeorological Agency
UL	Underwriters Laboratories
UMD	University of Maryland
UNR	user need request
UQ	uncertainty quantification
URMDB	Uranium Recovery and Materials Decommissioning Branch in NRC/NMSS/DUWP
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (see also COE)
USACE-NWD	USACE NorthWest Division
USBR	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USDA-ARS	United State Department of Agriculture—Agricultural Research Service
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
USGS	United States Geological Survey
UTC	coordinated universal time
VA	Virginia
VDB	validation database
VDMS	Validation Data Management System
VDP	validation data planning
VIC	Variable Infiltration Capacity model
VL-AEP	very low annual exceedance probability
W	watt
WAK	Wakeby distribution
WASH-1400	Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants [NUREG-75/014 (WASH-1400)]
WB	U.S. Weather Bureau
WBT	wet bulb temperature
WEI	Weibull distribution
WGEV	Working Group on External Events
WGI	Working Group I
WI	Wisconsin

WinDamC	USDA/NRCS model for estimating erosion of earthen embankments and auxiliary spillways of dams
WL	water level
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRB	Willamette River Basin
WRF	Weather Research and Forecasting model
WRR	Water Resources Research (journal)
WSEL/WSL	water surface elevation
WSM6	WRF Single-Moment 6-Class Microphysics Scheme
WSP	USGS Water Supply Paper
XF	external flooding
XFEL	external flood equipment list
XFOAL	external flood operation action list
XFPRA	external flooding PRA
yr	year
yrBP	years before present
Z	Zulu time, equivalent to UTC

## INTRODUCTION

#### **Background**

The NRC is conducting a multiyear, multi-project Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program. It initiated this research in response to staff recognition of a lack of guidance for conducting PFHAs at nuclear facilities that required staff and licensees to use highly conservative deterministic methods in regulatory applications. The staff described the objective, research themes, and specific research topics in the "Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Plan," Version 2014-10-23, provided to the Commission in November 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. <u>ML14318A070</u> and <u>ML14296A442</u>). The PFHA Research Plan was endorsed in a joint user need request by the NRC Office of New Reactors and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (UNR NRO-2015-002, ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML15124A707</u>). This program is designed to support the development of regulatory tools (e.g., regulatory guidance, standard review plans) for permitting new nuclear sites, licensing new nuclear facilities, and overseeing operating facilities. Specific uses of flooding hazard estimates (i.e., flood elevations and associated affects) include flood-resistant design for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety and advanced planning and evaluation of flood protection procedures and mitigation.

The lack of risk-informed guidance with respect to flooding hazards and flood fragility of SSCs constitutes a significant gap in the NRC's risk-informed, performance-based regulatory approach to the assessment of hazards and potential safety consequences for commercial nuclear facilities. The probabilistic technical basis developed will provide a risk-informed approach for improved guidance and tools to give staff and licensees greater flexibility in evaluating flooding hazards and potential impacts to SSCs in the oversight of operating facilities (e.g., license amendment requests, significance determination processes (SDPs), notices of enforcement discretion (NOEDs)) as well as licensing of new facilities (e.g., early site permit applications, combined license (COL) applications), including proposed small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced reactors. This methodology will give staff more flexibility in assessing flood hazards at nuclear facilities so the staff will not have to rely on the use of the current deterministic methods, which can be overly conservative in some cases.

The main focus areas of the PFHA Research Program are to (1) leverage available frequency information on flooding hazards at operating nuclear facilities and develop guidance on its use, (2) develop and demonstrate a PFHA framework for flood hazard curve estimation, (3) assess and evaluate application of improved mechanistic and probabilistic modeling techniques for key flood-generating processes and flooding scenarios, (4) assess potential impacts of dynamic and nonstationary processes on flood hazard assessments and flood protection at nuclear facilities, and (5) assess and evaluate methods for quantifying reliability of flood protection and plant response to flooding events. Workshop organizers used these focus areas to develop technical session topics for the workshop.

#### Workshop Objectives

The Annual PFHA Research Workshops serve multiple objectives: (1) inform and solicit feedback from internal NRC stakeholders, partner Federal agencies, industry, and the public about PFHA research being conducted by the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), (2) inform internal and external stakeholders about RES research collaborations with Federal agencies, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the French Institute for Radiological and Nuclear

Security (IRNS) and (3) provide a forum for presentation and discussion of notable domestic and international PFHA research activities.

#### Workshop Scope

Scope of the workshop presentations and discussions included:

- Current and future climate influences on flooding processes
- Significant precipitation and flooding events
- Statistical and mechanistic modeling approaches for precipitation, riverine flooding, and coastal flooding processes
- Probabilistic flood hazard assessment frameworks
- Reliability of flood protection and mitigation features and procedures
- External flooding probabilistic risk assessment

### Summary of Proceedings

These proceedings transmit the agenda, abstracts, and slides from presentations and posters presented, and chronicle the question and answer sessions and panel discussions held, at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Annual Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Workshops, which take place approximately annually at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD. The first four workshops took place as follows:

- 1st Annual NRC PFHA Research Workshop, October 14–15, 2015
- 2nd Annual NRC PFHA Research Workshop, January 23–25, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. <u>ML17040A626</u>)
- 3rd Annual NRC PFHA Research Workshop, December 4–5, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17355A071</u>)
- 4th Annual NRC PFHA Research Workshop, April 30–May 2. 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML19156A446</u>)

These proceedings include presentation abstracts and slides and a summary of the question and answer sessions. The first workshop was limited to NRC technical staff and management, NRC contractors, and staff from other Federal agencies. The three workshops that followed were meetings attended by members of the public; NRC technical staff, management, and contractors; and staff from other Federal agencies. Public attendees over the course of the workshops included industry groups, industry members, consultants, independent laboratories, academic institutions, and the press. Members of the public were invited to speak at the workshops. The fourth workshop included more invited speakers from the public than from the NRC and the NRC's contractors.

The proceedings for the second through fourth workshops include all presentation abstracts and slides and submitted posters and panelists' slides. Workshop organizers took notes and audio-recorded the question and answer sessions following each talk, during group panels, and during end-of-day question and answer session. Responses are not reproduced here verbatim and were generally from the presenter or co-authors. Descriptions of the panel discussions identify the speaker when possible. Questions were taken orally from attendees, on question cards, and over the telephone.

#### **Related Workshops**

An international workshop on PFHA took place on January 29–31, 2013. The workshop was devoted to sharing information on PFHAs for extreme events (i.e., annual exceedance probabilities (AEPs) much less than  $2x10^{-3}$  per year) from the Federal community). The NRC issued the proceedings as NUREG/CP-302, "Proceedings of the Workshop on Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA)," in October 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML13277A074</u>).

#### 2 SECOND ANNUAL NRC PROBABILISTIC FLOOD HAZARD ASSESSMENT RESEARCH WORKSHOP

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter details the 2nd Annual NRC Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Workshop held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters in Rockville, MD, on January 23–25, 2017.

The workshop began with an introduction from Mike Weber, Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). Following the introduction, NRC licensing staff and industry representatives presented their perspectives on PFHA research needs and priorities. Finally, NRC RES and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) staff presented descriptions of their flooding research programs.

Following the introduction session, NRC and EPRI contractors and staff gave technical presentations and answered clarifying questions. Partner Federal agencies took part in a panel discussion on their PFHA research and applications. At the end of each day, participants had an opportunity to provide feedback and ask generic questions about research related to PFHA for nuclear facilities.

#### 2.1.1 Organization of Conference Proceedings

Section 2.2 provides the agenda for this workshop. The program is also located at ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C495.</u>

Section 2.3 presents the proceedings from the workshop, including abstract, presentation slides, and summaries of the question and answer session for each of the technical sessions.

The summary document of session abstracts for the technical presentations can be viewed in the PFHA Research Workshop Program at ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C495</u>. The complete workshop presentation package is available at ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17040A626</u>.

Section 2.4 provides a summary of the workshop and section 1.1 provides a list of the workshop attendees, including remote participants.

#### 2.2 Workshop Agenda

Session 1A - Introduction

#### 2nd Annual NRC Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Workshop at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland

13:00–13:10	Welcome	
13:10–13:25	Introduction Mike Weber, Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research	1A-1
1325–13:45	PFHA Research Needs for New and Operating Reactors NRC/NRO/DSEA	1A-2
13:45–14:05	Use of Flooding Hazard Information in Risk-Informed Decision-making Mehdi Reisi-Fard, NRC/NRR/DRA	1A-3
14:05–14:40	Flooding Research Needs: Industry Perspectives on Development of External Flood Frequency Methods Ray Schneider*, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and Joe Bellini*, Aterra Solutions	1A-4
14:40–14:55	NRC Flooding Research Program Overview Joseph Kanney*, Meredith Carr, Tom Aird, Elena Yegorova, Mark Fuhrmann, and Jacob Philip, NRC/RES	1A-5
14:55–15:10	EPRI Flooding Research Program Overview John Weglian, EPRI	1A-6
15:10–15:25	BREAK	
Session 1B - Stor	rm Surge Research	

15:25–16:05	Quantification of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Storm Surge Models Norberto C. Nadal-Caraballo*, Victor Gonzalez and Jeffrey A. Melby, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory	
16:05–16:45	Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment—Storm Surge John Weglian, EPRI	1B-2
16:45–17:05	Daily Wrap-Up and Public Comments/Questions	

AGENDA: DAY 1: JANUARY 23, 2017

\* indicates speaker, ^ indicates remote speaker

#### Agenda: Day 2, January 24, 2017

#### 08:00–08:05 Welcome, Day 2

#### Session 2A - Climate and Precipitation

08:05–08:40	Regional Climate Change Projections: Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities	2A-1
	L. Ruby Leung^, Rajiv Prasad*, and Lance Vail, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory	
08:40–09:20	Numerical Modeling of Local Intense Precipitation Processes M. Lev Kavvas*, Kei Ishida*, and Mathieu Mure-Ravaud*, Hydrologic Research Laboratory, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Davis	2A-2
09:20–09:55	Extreme Precipitation Frequency Estimates for Orographic Regions Andrew Verdin*, Kathleen Holman, and David Keeney, Flood Hydrology and Meteorology Group, Technical Services Center, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation	2A-3
09:55–10:10	BREAK	
10:10–10:50	Local Intense Precipitation Frequency Studies John Weglian, EPRI	2A-4
Session 2B - Lev	reraging Available Flood Information I	
10:50–11:20	Development of Flood Hazard Information Digests for Operating NPP Sites Curtis Smith* and Kellie Kvarfordt, Idaho National Laboratory	2B-1
11:20–12:00	At-Streamgage Flood Frequency Analyses for Very Low Annual Exceedance Probabilities from a Perspective of Multiple Distributions and Parameter Estimation Methods <i>William H. Asquith</i> ^, <i>U.S. Geological Survey, Lubbock, TX; and</i> <i>Julie Kiang, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA</i>	2B-2

12:00–12:30 Extending Frequency Analysis Beyond Current Consensus Limits 2B-3 Keil Neff\* and Joseph Wright, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Service Center, Flood Hydrology and Meteorology

12:30–13:45 LUNCH

#### Session 2C - Leveraging Available Flood Information II

13:45–14:25	Collection of Paleoflood Evidence John Weglian, EPRI	2C-1
14:25–15:05	Paleofloods on the Tennessee River—Assessing the Feasibility of Employing Geologic Records of Past Floods for Improved Flood Frequency Analysis Tessa Harden*, USGS Oregon Water Science Center, and Jim O'Connor*, USGS Geology, Minerals, Energy, and Geophysics Science Center, Portland, OR	2C-2
15:05–15:20	BREAK	
Session 2D - Re	liability of Flood Protection and Plant Response to Flooding Events I	
15:20–16:00	EPRI Flood Protection Project Status David Ziebell and John Weglian*, EPRI	2D-1
16:00–16:40	Performance of Flood-Rated Penetration Seals William (Mark) Cummings*, Fire Risk Management , Inc.	2D-2
16:40–17:00	Comments/Questions from Public	
17:00–17:10	Daily Wrap-Up	

### Agenda: Day 3, January 25, 2017

08:00–08:05 Welcome, Day 3

#### Session 3A - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response to Flooding Events II

08:05–08:45	Effects of Environmental Factors on Manual Actions for Flood Protection and Mitigation at Nuclear Power Plants Rajiv Prasad*, Garill Coles^, and Angie Dalton^, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; Kristi Branch and Alvah Bittner, Bittner and Associates; and Scott Taylor, Battelle Columbus	3A-1
08:45–09:25	Modeling Total Plant Response to Flooding Events Zhegang Ma*, Curtis L. Smith, Steven R. Prescott, Idaho National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Management Services, and Ramprasad Sampath, Centroid PIC, Research and Development	3A-2
Session 3B - Fra	meworks I	
09:25–10:05	Technical Basis for Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Rajiv Prasad* and Philip Meyer, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory	3B-1

10:05–10:20 BREAK

#### Session 3C - Frameworks II

10:20–11:00	Evaluation of Deterministic Approaches to Characterizing Flood Hazards <i>John Weglian, EPRI</i>	3C-1
11:00–11:40	Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Framework Development Brian Skahill*, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, Hydrologic Systems Branch, Watershed Systems Group	3C-2
11:40–12:20	Riverine Flooding and Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding (SHAC-F) Rajiv Prasad* and Robert Bryce, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and Kevin Coppersmith*, Coppersmith Consulting	3C-3

12:20–13:35 LUNCH

#### Session 3D - Panel Discussion

13:35–15:05 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Activities in Partner 3D Agencies, Panel Chair: Joseph Kanney, U.S. NRC

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service Sanja Perica

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Christopher Dunn, Norberto Nadal-Caraballo, John England

Tennessee Valley Authority Curt Jawdy

U.S. Department of Energy Curtis Smith, Idaho National Laboratory

Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (France's Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN)) *Vincent Rebour* 

15:05–15:20 BREAK

#### Session 3E - Future Work in PFHA

- 15:20–15:50Future Work in PFHA at EPRI<br/>John Weglian\*, EPRI3E-115:50–16:20Future Work in PFHA at NRC<br/>Joseph Kanney, Meredith Carr\*, Tom Aird, Elena Yegorova,<br/>Mark Fuhrmann, and Jacob Philip, NRC/RES3E-2
- 16:20–16:40 Public Comments/Questions
- 16:40–16:55 Final Wrap-Up

#### 2.3 Proceedings


#### 2.3.1 Day 1: Session 1A - Introduction


There are no abstracts for this introductory session.

**2.3.1.1** *Welcome*, Michael Weber, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. NRC (Session 1A-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C496</u>)


2.3.1.1.1 Presentation

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment
Welcome!
Michael Weber Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> PFHA Research Workshop</b> NRC HQ, Rockville, MD January 23-25, 2017
Why PFHA Research?
<ul> <li>Address gap in Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Commission policy to use risk-informed approaches to the extent practical</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Other external hazards (e.g., wind, seismic) are evaluated using probabilistic approaches</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Current regulatory framework for flooding hazards (Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plan) is deterministic</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Events over the past 15 years highlight need to risk-inform flood hazard assessment and consequence analysis</li> </ul>
2












**2.3.1.2 PFHA Research Needs for New and Operating Reactors**, Andrew C. Campbell, Ph.D., Deputy Director, Division of Site Safety & Environmental Analysis, Office of New Reactors, U.S. NRC (Session 1A-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C497</u>)

2.3.1.2.1 Presentation



# Outline

- Introduce External Hazards Center of Expertise
- Post-Fukushima Activities
  - Flood Hazard reviews: status
  - Periodic Re-looks going forward

# Have you heard about "EHCOE"?

- The Commission approved Center of Expertise for External Hazards was formed on Oct 1, 2016.
- Expected benefits:
  - Enhanced ability to shift resources in a changing environment
  - More effective knowledge management and maintenance of critical skill sets
  - Enhanced decision making
  - Cross-office standardization

# Scope of EHCOE

- All external hazard evaluations associated with reactor licensing (Chapter 2 of the SRP)
- All responsibilities of the NRC's Dam Safety Officer
- Hazards included in the COE:
  - Everything flood-related (external to buildings)
  - Everything climate-driven or climate-related
  - Atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides
  - Everything geology related
  - Everything related to seismic motion
  - Everything related to geotechnical engineering
  - Potential man-made hazards (pipelines, railways, airplanes)

# **Details Regarding EHCOE**

- Located within the Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis in New Reactors.
- Approximately 35 staff, including support staff, and transfer of 4 staff Operating Rx Office.
- Work planning and tracking tools in development.
- Commission requested self-assessment of EHCOE creating/implementation due Sept 2017.

# Post-Fukushima Response: NTTF Report – Recommendation 2

#### **Recommendation 2**

The Task Force recommends that the NRC require licensees to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of SSCs for each operating reactor.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission direct the following actions to ensure adequate protection from natural phenomena, consistent with the current state of knowledge and analytical methods. These should be undertaken to prevent fuel damage and to ensure containment and spent fuel pool integrity:

- 2.1 Order licensees to reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites against current NRC requirements and guidance, and if necessary, update the design basis and SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards.
- 2.2 Initiate rulemaking to require licensees to confirm seismic hazards and flooding hazards every 10 years and address any new and significant information. If necessary, update the design basis for SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards.
- 2.3 Order licensees to perform seismic and flood protection walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance for protection features such as watertight barriers and seals in the interim period until longer term actions are completed to update the design basis for external events.

## Post-Fukushima Response: NTTF Report – Recommendation 2


R2.3 - Walkdowns


R2.1 – Hazard Reevaluations


R2.1 - Risk/Plant Response Evaluation


R2.1 - Regulatory Actions (if needed)


R2.2 – Periodic Reevaluations of new and significant information














#### 2-21

#### 2.3.1.2.2 Questions and Answers

#### Question:


NUREG-2150, "A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework," issued April 2012, recommends the risk-informed-based approach and defense in depth. How will this approach involve defense in depth?

#### Response:

This is not a risk-based approach but a risk-informed approach. The agency has adhered to that perspective since the policy was developed in the 1990s. In 2006, the NRC developed the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) policy. It is important that defense in depth be part of that. Recently I was at a plant with a couple of inspectors and staff from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and we looked at all of the plant's FLEX equipment and the plant has defense in depth. It has multiple ways of pumping water to where it is needed. The facility has multiple ways of providing power to the plant. This is an example of defense in depth. Even if it were possible, on a probability basis, to determine that the likelihood of an event occurring is miniscule, from the plant's perspective and the NRC's regulatory perspective defense in depth is not quantifiable directly but it is something that makes a great deal of sense not only in the history of the NRC's approach to regulation but going forward. The concern with moving to only a probability basis is understandable, but that is not what the NRC is doing. Instead, this is using a risk-informed approach. The NRC believes it is beneficial to have many ways to solve a problem.

**2.3.1.3 Use of Flooding Hazard Information in Risk-Informed Decision-making**, Mehdi Reisi-Fard, Ph.D., Reliability and Risk Analyst, PRA Licensing Branch, Division of Risk Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. NRC (Session 1A-3; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C498</u>)

2.3.1.3.1 Presentation



## Background: NRC Regulations Overview




- Designed to withstand effects of natural phenomena, such as floods (10 CFR 50 Appendix A)
  - Appropriate consideration of most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported. With sufficient margin for limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time for accumulated\_historical data
  - Reflect the importance of the safety functions to be performed
- Current Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance references deterministic methods for hazard evaluation
  - Reliance on concept of "probable maximum" scenarios

## Background: Risk Measures and PRA Policy




- Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants Policy Statement (51 FR 30028; August 21, 1986) established goals that broadly define an acceptable level of radiological risk.
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement (60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995) formalized the Commission's commitment to risk-informed regulation through the expanded use of PRA.
  - The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state of the art in PRA methods and data, and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.





#### 2-25



### SDP Analyses Following Fukushima Response



- In light of the effects from the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, on the NPPs at Fukushima, NRC concluded U.S. NPPs needed to reaffirm their existing ability to resist quakes and flooding.
- On March 2012, NRC requested that all US NPP licensees implement flood protection walkdowns (Recommendation 2.3) to capture any degraded, nonconforming conditions, and cliff-edge effects for flooding
  - Plants completed their walkdowns by November 2012; NRC inspectors have done follow-up inspections and the agency has issued plant-specific assessments of the licensee's walkdown reports.
  - Flooding walkdowns resulted in identification of a number of performance deficiencies associated with external flooding.

# Findings Related to External Flooding



Inadequate Flood Procedures		Degraded or Missing Flood Barriers/Seals	
2010 - Fort Calhoun inadequate flood procedure	YELLOW	2004 - Oconee access cover impacting shutdown capability	WHITE
2013 - Watts Bar/Sequoyah inadequate procedures	WHITE	2011 - Brunswick degraded flood barriers	WHITE
2013 - Watts Bar inadequate procedures/plant realignment	YELLOW	2013 - Sequoyah degraded flooding seals	WHITE
2013 - Dresden inadequate flood procedure	WHITE	2013 - Three Mile Island missing flooding seals	WHITE
2013 - Monticello flood protection plan	YELLOW	2013 - Watts Bar protection of safety- related equipment	GREEN
2013 - Point Beach inadequate sandbagging protection	WHITE	2014 - Arkansas Nuclear One inadequate flood protection	YELLOW
		2014 - Ginna unsealed cable penetrations	WHITE
substantial safety significance		2014 - St. Lucie unsealed conduits	WHITE
low to moderate safety significance		2014 - Brunswick inadequate flood	
very low safety significance		protection	GREEN

# Some Insights from Recent SDP Analyses



- <u>Uncertainty associated with flood Frequencies</u> in the range of interest to the NRC is significant. Qualitative insights from plant response and principles of risk-informed decisionmaking should be appropriately considered.
- <u>Full range of hazard curve (containing frequencies of both extreme events</u> and flood elevations below the probable maximum flood) may be needed in some cases for appropriate consideration of impact at various elevations.
- Credit for operator actions as part of <u>human reliability analysis</u> methods for evaluating flood mitigation actions, such as construction of flood protection is a focus area.
- Assumptions about <u>advanced warnings</u>, <u>duration of the events</u>, <u>reliability of</u> <u>components</u> could impact flood mitigation.

## NRR Priorities from PFHA User-Need



- Provide guidance/develop methods for extending frequency analysis methods to ranges of interest for NRC applications (in many cases beyond current consensus limits for estimating flood frequencies)
- Provide guidance for consistent application of statistically based flood-frequency estimates at sites where historical or paleoflood information may be available (at-site or from regional information)
  - For future updates to Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook (known as RASP Handbook)
- Probabilistic treatment of flood protection structures including temporary barriers

## NRR Priorities from PFHA User-Need (Cont.)



- Characterize the impact of environmental factors on operator manual actions associated with flood protection and mitigation (e.g., installation of flooding protection, construction of barriers, etc.) during extreme flooding events.
- To support Recommendation 2.1 regulatory decision-making, identify, to the extent possible, technically-supported approaches currently available for developing estimates of hazards with a frequency of 10<sup>-3</sup> to 10<sup>-4</sup> per year (*or proxy*) for certain mechanisms that exceed plant design bases.


# **Recent Activities**



- Revised RASP Handbook to facilitate continued consistency in assessment of external flooding events
  - Sources of Information
  - Credible Extrapolation Ranges
  - Human Reliability Considerations
  - Experience from recent SDP analyses


**2.3.1.4 Flooding Research Needs: Industry Perspectives on Development of External** *Flood Frequency Methods*, Ray Schneider\*, Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and Joe Bellini\*, P.E., P.H., D.WRE, C.F.M., Aterra Solutions (Session 1A-4; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C499</u>)

2.3.1.4.1 Presentation








- Hurricane Storm Surge Joint Probability Method (JPM) guidelines available for nuclear applications in NUREG/CR-7134
- $\geq$  Local Intense Precipitation NOAA Atlas 14 ( $\geq 10^{-3}$ ); EPRI, Local Precipitation-Frequency Studies, Development of 1-Hour/1-Square Mile Precipitation-Frequency Relationships for Two Example Nuclear Power Plant Sites (EPRI, 2014); or site-specific studies
- Dam Breaches and Failures USBR and USACE, Best Practices in Dam and Levee Safety Risk Analysis, Version 4.0, July 2015; ICOLD Bulletin 130 (2005)



*A*TERRA







## Evolution of Standards Requirement: ANS 2.8

- External Flood Hazard Frequency Guidance being developed to increase uniformity in treatment of site risks across hazard mechanisms and facility types
- ANS 2.8 being refocused from "Probable Maximum" emphasis to provide requirements for performing PFHA Evaluation
  - Provides high level criteria/process expectations for preparing external flood hazard curve
  - Requirements are not hazard specific
  - · Allows flexibility in defining methodology to be used
  - Focus on data collection and use, methodology selection, hazard uncertainty and justification of extrapolations to low frequencies

3

- Co-existent hazards not prescriptive
- Peer review requirements
- ANS 2.8 being revised to respond to stakeholder comments
- Expectation to issue Final in 2017

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#### Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3

## Evolution of Treatment of Flood Hazard Frequency in ASME/ANS PRA Standard

#### Known Challenges

- To date, few external flood PRAs have been performed
- Diverse nature of flood hazards, measures of severity and associated plant responses
- Proposed guidelines written with cognizance of challenges
  - Requirements ensure that analysts appropriately consider known characteristics, challenges and issues
  - Requirements have been written to afford significant flexibility in how there topics are addressed
- Standard establishes requirements for performing high confidence "mechanismspecific" hazard frequencies and characterizing the challenges posed by that hazard in a manner consistent with the estimation of plant risk.
- From a hazard perspective, primary focus was to develop external flood hazard scenarios suitable for PRA applications, addressing risks of lower frequency flood hazard but recognizing the potential impacts of more frequent flood events
- Standard Part to be incorporated in 2017 Edition of Revised Standard

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# ANS/ASME PRA Standard: Specific Hazard Frequency PRA Element Upgrades

> Includes Requirements for hazard mechanism screening

- > Requirement for developing (or using existing) PHFA curves
  - · Intent to be consistent with ANS 2.8 development
    - Reconciliation not yet performed
  - Data Collection
  - Model/method Selection
  - Treatment of uncertainties
  - Mechanism specific considerations identified but no detailed hazard specific supporting requirements
  - Address challenges:
    - o Coexistent hazards
    - Multiple measures of flood severity

Included Requirement for Peer Review

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
### Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3

# External Flood Hazard Frequency: Standard Considerations for Workshop

5

- Activity in Standards development is indicative of the importance of understanding the flood hazard for Nuclear Plant sites
- > Primary focus of Standards is not a single prescriptive methodology
  - Standard allows for advances in methodologies with emphasis on characterizing uncertainties and use of a systematic process
  - However, for the Standards to be effective a full spectrum of methods for credible flood mechanisms need to be available
- Practical example applications for PFHF for flood mechanisms at typical sites are important to make meeting the standard easier
- Increased guidance for providing practical means for identifying and characterizing uncertainties
- Guidance on treatment and role of correlated and co-existent hazards
- Standard requires independent peer review to increase confidence in predictions

★) Westinghouse



2.3.1.4.2 Questions and Answers

# Question:

How big of a watershed or subwatershed can be modeled successfully using the stochastic event-based rainfall runoff model?

# Response:

As the watershed increases in size, it becomes more complex because it includes both moving and nonstationary fronts. The only point of reference that I have is that EPRI performed some work primarily considering stationary storms for a power plant in an 8,000-square-mile watershed. That work considered all the different initiating precipitation/snow melt processes but only stationary storms. With only that single example, it is possible that any larger area would be difficult to model in that way.

## Question:


What are the most difficult problems with developing the American Nuclear Society flooding standard?


## Response:


The biggest problem at present is ensuring consistency among the various sections of the standard. The models and processes that we considered work and the technology that exists is acceptable, so the issue is being consistent through the standard as it is such a wide change.

**2.3.1.5** NRC Flooding Research Program Overview, Joseph Kanney\*, Ph.D., Meredith Carr, Ph.D., P.E., Thomas Aird, Elena Yegorova , Ph.D., and Mark Fuhrmann, Ph.D., Fire and External Hazards Analysis Branch, Division of Risk Analysis; and Jacob Philip, P.E., Division of Engineering, Structural, Geotechnical and Seismic Engineering Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. NRC (Session 1A-5; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C500</u>)

2.3.1.5.1 Presentation







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# **Implementation**

# External Collaboration

Domestic

- Federal Working Groups
  - ACWI/SOH, NSTC/CENRS/SDR
  - USGCRP (in process)
- EPRI (MOU in place)
- International
  - OECD/NEA/CSNI/WGEV
  - IRSN (MOU in process)

# Communication

- Periodic internal briefings, seminars
- Annual PFHA Research Workshops
- NUREG Reports
- NRC Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
- Professional meetings & conferences

8



# **Current Projects**

# Leverage Available Flooding Information


- Development of Flood Hazard Information Digests for Operating NPP Sites
  - Contractor: Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
  - NRC PM: Joseph Kanney
- Guidance on Application of State-of-Practice
   Flood Frequency Analysis Methods and Tools
  - Contractor: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
  - NRC PM: Meredith Carr


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# 2.3.1.5.2 Questions and Answers

## Comment:

This area is very important with regard to waste management and decommissioning. Would it be possible to work cooperatively with the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) by adding NMSS to the review of the documentation?


## Response:

We would certainly like to work with you on this issue.

**2.3.1.6 EPRI Flooding Research Program Overview**, John Weglian, EPRI (Session 1A-6; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C501</u>)

2.3.1.6.1 Presentation





- Research in 2017
- Guidance on conducting PRA external flooding walkdowns
  - Research in 2017 or 2018
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# **EPRI's NMAC Flood Protection Research**

Flood Protection

- 3002005423 Flood Protection Systems Guide
- Follow-on work to identify and communicate good practices in maintaining an external flooding design and licensing basis




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# **EPRI Technology Innovation Research**

- Technology Innovation (TI) Projects at EPRI are long-term, high-risk, high-payoff research investigations
- EPRI has a TI project looking at smooth particle hydrodynamics (SPH) for flooding simulations
  - Initial project is focused on an internal flooding scenario
  - Results will be compared to existing flooding assessments
- Goal of the project is to determine if any new risk insights are obtained with this approach
- SPH may be useful for simulating external flooding scenarios
  - Note: Idaho National Labs is investigating the use of SPH for use in dynamic PRA models

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# 2.3.2 Day 1: Session 1B - Storm Surge Research

This session covered the development of guidance for the application of improved mechanistic and probabilistic modeling techniques for key flood-generating processes and flooding scenarios.


**2.3.2.1** *Quantification of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Storm Surge Models*, Norberto C. Nadal-Caraballo\*, Ph.D., Victor Gonzalez, P.E., and Jeffrey A. Melby, Ph.D., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory (Session 1B-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C502</u>)

# 2.3.2.1.1 Abstract

Quantification of the storm surge hazard is an integral part of the PFHA of structures and facilities located in coastal zones. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research and Development Center's Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory is performing a comprehensive assessment of uncertainties in probabilistic storm surge models in support of the NRC's efforts to develop a framework for probabilistic storm surge hazard assessment (PSSHA) for nuclear power plants (NPPs). Modern stochastic assessment of coastal storm hazards in hurricane-prone coastal regions of the United States requires the development of a joint probability analysis model of tropical cyclone forcing parameters. The joint probability method (JPM) with optimal sampling (JPM-OS) has become the standard probabilistic model used to assess coastal storm hazard in these areas, having been adopted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USACE in most post-Katrina coastal hazard studies. Different JPM-OS approaches have been developed, but they typically follow a common general methodology. Nevertheless, the details in the application of these approaches can vary significantly by study, depending on the adopted solution strategies. Variations between studies, for example, can be found in the computation of storm recurrence rate (SRR), definition of univariate distributions and joint probability of storm parameters, and development of the synthetic storm suite (e.g., different optimization methods). The treatment of uncertainties in the JPM -OS methodology also varies by study and is typically limited to the quantification and inclusion of uncertainty as an error term in the JPM integral.


An alternative for the treatment and quantification of uncertainty is derived from probabilistic seismic hazard assessment guidance, where the epistemic uncertainty arises from the application of different, technically defensible data, methods, and models relevant to hazard assessment and proposed by the larger technical community. This allows for the computation of a family of hazard curves, with associated weights, that represents each of the alternate modeling approaches. The present study has the objective of assessing the technically defensible data, models, and methods that have been applied to individual components of the JPM-OS methodology, along with the characterization of their respective uncertainties. The quantification of uncertainty associated with the SRR, for example, focused on the characterization of the SRR variability due to the selection of computational approach, optimal kernel size, tropical cyclone intensity, period of record, observational data, and data resampling. The development of univariate probability distributions of storm parameters was evaluated by fitting multiple distributions to each relevant tropical cyclone parameter, focusing on three different datasets, including observational data from the National Hurricane Center and synthetic data from a global climate model (GCM). The uncertainty related to optimal sampling techniques was examined by constructing a reference storm set using a Gaussian process metamodel that was trained with data from the North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study recently performed by USACE. Numerical experiments were also designed for the assessment of methods typically used for the discretization of and incorporation of uncertainty.

### 2.3.2.1.2 Presentation





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
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



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Mod			Data	SRR	Marginal/Conditional	Integration
JPN	JPM-Refer	rence	Observed (HURDAT) Reanalysis	Models (GKF, UKF, EKF) Screening	Parameterization Dependencies	Distribution erro JPM integral (standard discretization,
	" (RS, BQ, H JPM-ST		Synthetic (GCM, STM)	(period of record, intensity)	Statistical approach (parametric vs. non- parametric)	random sampling Gaussian redistribution)
	Task 4		All	Task 2	Task 3	Task 5
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
















































# Task 5: Data, Models, and Methods for Generating Synthetic Storm Simulation Sets Results – Integration of Uncertainty


JPM-OS Uncertainty (Gaussian)	Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP)						
	10 <sup>-2</sup>	10 <sup>-3</sup>	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10 <sup>-5</sup>	10 <sup>-6</sup>		
Discrete (444 values)	3.0	4.7	6.2	6.9	7.5		
Discrete (30 values)	3.0	4.7	6.2	7.0	NaN		
Discrete (3,000 values)	3.0	4.7	6.2	6.9	7.4		
Random (444 values)	3.1	4.8	6.3	7.1	7.7		
Random (30 values)	2.9	4.7	6.1	7.5	NaN		
Random (3000 values)	3.0	4.7	6.1	6.9	7.4		
SurgeStat "Redistribution" (FEMA)	3.0	4.7	6.2	6.9	7.5		
					COASTA		

Task 5: Data, Models, and Methods for Generating Synthetic Storm Simulation Sets

## Results – Integration of Uncertainty

Percentage Difference in Storm Surge at The Battery, NY

JPM-OS Uncertainty (Gaussian)	Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP)						
	10 <sup>-2</sup>	10 <sup>-3</sup>	10 <sup>-4</sup>	10'5	10-6		
Discrete (444 values)	-	-	-	-	-		
Discrete (30 values)	0	0	0	1	NaN		
Discrete (3,000 values)	0	0	0	0	-1		
Random (444 values)	2	2	1	2	2		
Random (30 values)	-3	0	-1	8	NaN		
Random (3000 values)	-1	-1	0	-1	-1		
SurgeStat "Redistribution" (FEMA)	0	0	0	0	-1		
					COASTAL HYDRAULIC LABORATOR		
ARMY BUILDING STRONG		44			LADONATON		



#### 2.3.2.1.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

When you performed GCM downscaling, what grid resolution did you consider?

#### Response:

The set of results that we were given did not directly characterize the extratropical transition storms. The results were from a hurricane model that focused exclusively on tropical cyclones.

#### Follow-up Question:

Without the proper grid resolution, such storms would not be captured. The presentation mentioned 1,470 storms; from how many GCM projections did this result?

#### Response:

The researchers simulated 15,000 years and produced 5,000 storms. The reference for this joint study is as follows:

 Lin, Ning, K. Emanuel, M. Oppenhemier, and E. Vanmarcke. 2012. Physically Based Assessment of Hurricane Surge Threat under Climate Change. *Nature Climate Change* 2 (6): 462–467.

#### Follow-up Question:

There are about 70 GCM projections and if you use each with 100 years, the results would cover about 7,000 years. You had looked at these Monte Carlo simulations and reconciled them with the downscaled data; how do you reconcile them with climate change?

#### Response:

This study did not specifically consider climate change.

#### Response from NRC Project Manager:

The focus of this project is not specifically to look at climate change or to look at the change in recurrence rate or change in landfall<sup>1</sup>.

#### Response:

With regard to downscaling, this is a very valid method. This method can be used with JPM-OS to assess tropical cycles, assuming that some issues can be fixed.

#### Question:

Your presentation alluded to transitioning from a tropical cyclone to an extratropical cyclone and how you condition your model based on the source, for example considering whether it is in the Gulf of Mexico, the South Atlantic, mid-Atlantic, or the North Atlantic and the complications that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> NRC Program Manager indicated that he would get back to the questioner with a more complete response.

arise as you go further north with regard to the synoptic weather. It seems likely that issues would arise with the model as a storm moved from the Gulf to the north, especially over the Atlantic.

#### Response:

The set of models used for this approach (i.e., the meteorological model and the hydrodynamic model, the Advanced CIRCulation model (ADCIRC) in this case) only see tropical cyclones. Therefore, we need to characterize the extratropical transition by reflecting that in our synthetic storm surge. For example, when we move to the north and storms go through the extratropical transition, they tend to increase in their translational speed and size, so we need to make sure that the synthetic storms that we are generating are also comparable with those changes. If we develop a set for the Gulf of Mexico versus for the North Atlantic, the parameters will reflect those differences. The historical occurrences in those individual seasons inform the individual characteristics that we have those storms carry.

**2.3.2.2** Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment—Storm Surge, John Weglian, EPRI (Session 1B-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C503</u>)

#### 2.3.2.2.1 Abstract

It is important to evaluate risks to NPPs and other vital structures from external hazards that could simultaneously impact multiple, diverse equipment relied upon for accident mitigation. External flooding hazards can lead to floodwaters, which overwhelm a site's response, especially when the flood levels exceed the plant's design basis. A PFHA provides a mechanism to determine the risk to a site from an external flooding hazard, including from extremely rare, beyond-design-basis events. One of the external flooding hazards that can impact a site is a storm surge—the elevation in water level at the shore due to the atmospheric effects of a large storm.


Many storm surge methods and analyses are focused on assessing the flooding impacts from a tropical storm making landfall; however, other types of storms can also cause storm surges, and these events can occur on large lakes as well as oceans. EPRI has published a technical report, on the subject, "Probabilistic Flooding Hazard Assessment for Storm Surge with an Example Based on Historical Water Levels," EPRI ID 3002008111, dated August 31, 2016 (http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000003002008111). The report describes multiple methods for performing a PSSHA ; however, the detailed example is based on the assessment of a storm surge at an inland lake site based on historical water levels and wave heights.


The process of performing a PSSHA begins with identification that a site is potentially subject to a storm surge. The PSSHA then utilizes a qualitative or quantitative screening approach to determine if the hazard can be screened out form further consideration. If the hazard cannot be screened, a probabilistic approach is used to determine the frequency of the storm surge flooding parameters (e.g., water level). At each step in the process, the uncertainty in the analysis is considered and characterized. The PSSHA process includes the use of a peer review to provide an independent assessment of the process and decisions made in the analysis.


The report includes an example that uses historical information to assess the probability that a storm surge on one of the Great Lakes could impact a particular site. The historical data were used to determine the lake level, surge level, and wave heights. Additional evidence from paleo


data was used to extend the historical record for lake level. This information was used to determine probabilistic distribution functions (PDFs) for the parameters of interest. These PDFs were used in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the storm surge-frequency hazard curve for the site. This hazard curve provides the likelihood that a particular flood level at the site would be exceeded by a storm surge per year. This information can then be used to develop a PRA model to determine the core damage frequency, large early release frequency, or other metrics.


#### 2.3.2.2.2 Presentation






















2.3.2.2.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

How did you use the paleoflood data to extrapolate for 4,000 years? The timeframe for glaciation is much longer, and the performance period for waste management ranges from 10,000 to 20,000 years. Would you be able to extrapolate further given the large amount of data?

#### Response:

The paleo data available did go back beyond 4,000 years; however, the data before 4,000 years was judged not to be applicable to the current time. The lake levels were significantly different than those currently observed. Therefore, the researchers limited the analysis to 4,000 years.

#### Question:

The paleoflood data were used only for the lake level. There is an assumption that, given the paleo elevation 4,000 years ago, this would still be a potential initiating level for the lake for the next 60 years of operation.

#### Response:

The lake level is different from paleoflood because it considered the average lake level during that timeframe rather than surge levels. Two different reports cover that topic in different ways. The assumption is that weather patterns can add more or less water to the lakes. It is possible that a storm event in the last 4,000 years added significantly more water to the lakes than what we have seen in our historical measurement, which would be reflected in the higher lake level. This is an attempt to capture that portion of the uncertainty based on the starting point for the storm surge itself.

#### Follow-up Question:

When testing the resulting lake level statistically, was the level 10 or 20 or 30 feet higher? Was it in a reasonable range that you could expect?

#### Response:

Although paleo data were available beyond 4,000 years, the researchers did not deem them to be applicable for the current effort.

#### Question:

What input did the peer reviewers provide?

#### Response:

I was not involved in that activity and do not know the answer.

#### 2.3.3 Day 2: Session 2A - Climate and Precipitation

This session continued to consider the development of guidance for the application of improved mechanistic and probabilistic modeling techniques for key flood-generating processes and flooding scenarios.

It also included an assessment of the potential impacts of dynamic and nonstationary processes on flood hazard assessments and flood protection at nuclear facilities.


#### **2.3.3.1 Regional Climate Change Projections: Potential Impacts to Nuclear Facilities**, L. Ruby Leung^, Ph.D., Rajiv Prasad\*, Ph.D., and Lance Vail, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Session 2A-1; ADAMS Accession No. ML17054C504)

#### 2.3.3.1.1 Abstract


This research project is part of the NRC's PFHA research plan in support of developing a risk-informed licensing framework for flood hazards and design standards at proposed new facilities and significance determination tools for evaluating potential deficiencies related to flood protection at operating facilities. The PFHA plan aims to build upon recent advances in deterministic, probabilistic, and statistical modeling of extreme precipitation events to develop regulatory tools and guidance for NRC staff with regard to PFHA for nuclear facilities. An improved understanding of large-scale climate pattern changes such as changes in the occurrence of extreme precipitation, flood/drought, storm surge, and severe weather events can help inform the probabilistic characterization of extreme events for the NRC's safety reviews. This project provides a literature review, focusing on recent studies that improve understanding of the mechanisms of how the climate parameters relevant to the NRC may change in a warmer climate, including discussions of the robust and uncertain aspects of the changes and future directions for reducing uncertainty in projecting those changes. The current focus is on the southeast region, consisting of 11 southeastern States in the conterminous United States. Except for Kentucky, all these States have currently operating NPPs. New nuclear power reactor permit and license


applications submitted to the NRC in the recent past were for sites located in several of the southeastern States (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida).


The literature review includes an overview of the climate of the southeastern United States, focusing on temperature and precipitation extremes, floods and droughts, strong winds (hurricanes and tornadoes), sea level rise, and storm surge. The southeast region occasionally experiences extreme heat during summer and extreme cold during winter. Floods can be produced by several mechanisms, including locally heavy precipitation, slow-moving extratropical cyclones during the cool season, tropical cyclones during summer and fall, late spring rainfall on snowpack, storm surge near coastal areas from hurricanes, and occasional large releases from upstream dams. Hurricanes cause major economic loss but also contribute significantly to the region's rainfall. Combined with sea level rise, hurricanes pose significant threats from storm surge and inland inundation. The overview is followed by discussions of projected changes in the aforementioned climatic aspects. For example, depending on the future emission scenarios, seasonal precipitation shows moderate increases to significant decreases in magnitude. Very heavy precipitation events are projected to increase in frequency, while annual maximum precipitation is expected to increase in magnitude. Although precipitation intensity generally scales with the Clausius-Clapevron rate of 7 percent per degree of warming, precipitation intensity decreases at higher temperatures because of the transition to a moisture-limited environment. Besides climate change, urbanization and changing land use may result in changes in runoff and flooding. However, both short-term and longer-term droughts are expected to intensify in the Southeast. Streamflow is expected to decline as evapotranspiration generally increases with warmer temperatures. Urbanization and population growth may increase stress on water supplies. As sea surface temperatures increase in the future, hurricanes are projected to intensify as the thermodynamic environments for major hurricanes become more favorable. With sea level projected to rise and hurricanes to become more intense, there is increased probability for storm surge along the southeastern Coastline. Lastly, the researchers made a current assessment of climate modeling and Federal agency activities related to climate change.




#### 2.3.3.1.2 Presentation












# Extreme precipitation projected to increase in the future


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








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#### 2.3.3.1.3 Questions and Answers

#### Comment:

Fort Calhoun and St. Lucie experienced profound effects from flood, but neither were extreme events. It's important to emphasize that in addition to considering extreme events, those with 50–100-year return periods also need to be taken into account.

#### Comment:

Be cautious as the term "extreme event" has a different meaning for hydrologists than for climatologists.

**2.3.3.2** Numerical Modeling of Local Intense Precipitation Processes, M. Lev Kavvas\*, Ph.D., Kei Ishida\*, Ph.D., and Mathieu Mure-Ravaud\*, Hydrologic Research Laboratory, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Davis (Session 2A-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C505</u>)

#### 2.3.3.2.1 Abstract

As population and infrastructure continue to increase, our society has become more vulnerable to extreme events. A flood is an example of a hydrometeorological disaster that has a strong societal impact. Tropical cyclones and mesoscale convective systems are recognized for their ability to generate intense precipitation that may in turn create disastrous floods. Tropical cyclones are intense atmospheric vortices that form over the warm tropical oceans, while mesoscale convective systems are organized collections of several cumulonimbus clouds that interact at the mesoscale (regional scale) to form an extensive and nearly contiguous region of precipitation.


This study assessed the suitability of a regional numerical weather model to simulate local intense precipitation processes within intense tropical cyclones and mesoscale convective systems. More specifically, the study used the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model at 5-kilometer

resolution in order to reconstruct the intense precipitation fields associated with several historical tropical cyclones and mesoscale convective systems that affected the United States. The WRF model was run in the simulation mode, which means that it was only subject to the influence of its initial and boundary conditions, and no observation was used to improve the simulations through nudging or other data assimilation techniques.

Numerous studies have shown that regional numerical weather models perform relatively well in reconstructing such storms in the forecasting mode where such techniques are used to improve the model's performances. However, in the context of climate change where one may be interested in simulating the storms of the future, it is important to evaluate the performances of regional numerical weather models in the simulation mode, since no observation is available for the future that would allow using nudging or data assimilation. The storm systems that were simulated were selected within the time period from 2002 to present, based on the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Stage IV precipitation dataset, which is a mosaic of regional multisensor analysis generated by National Weather Service (NWS) River Forecast Centers since 2002. These storms correspond to the most severe storms, in terms of the generation of an intense precipitation field containing pockets of extreme rainfall.

The initial and boundary conditions for the simulations were obtained from the Climate Forecast System Reanalysis (CFSR) dataset, which is provided by NCEP at 0.5 x 0.5 degree spatial resolution and 6-hour temporal resolution. For the simulations of the mesoscale convective systems, the model's simulation nested domains were set up over a region in the Midwest so that the innermost domain covered the severe precipitation areas caused by these storm systems. However, several sets of simulation nested domains were prepared for the simulations of the tropical cyclones because of the diversity in the paths of these systems. More precisely, while the outer domain was the same for all cases and was chosen so as to cover the paths of all the identified severe tropical cyclones, different inner domains were set up so as to include the severe precipitation areas caused by each individual tropical cyclone. With these sets of simulation nested domains, the WRF model was configured to obtain the best results for the simulation of each of the selected severe mesoscale convective system and tropical cyclone storm events with respect to the simulated and observed precipitation fields.

The study compared the simulation results with observations from the Stage IV precipitation dataset. More precisely, on the one hand, the simulation results were evaluated by means of several goodness-of-fit statistics: the relative error for the simulation inner-domain total precipitation, and the percentage of overlapping between the simulated and observed fields for several precipitation thresholds. On the other hand, the simulated and observed precipitation fields were plotted so as to visually appreciate the similarities and differences in the fields' texture and structure. The study showed that under an appropriate choice of the model's options and boundary conditions, the WRF model provided satisfactory results in reproducing the location, intensity, and texture of the intense precipitation fields in the historical tropical cyclones and mesoscale convective systems. The model's options that were investigated include the parameterization schemes such as microphysics, cumulus parameterization, planetary boundary layer physics, and long-wave and short-wave radiation physics; the vertical resolution (number of layers); the initial date for the simulation; the time step; and other options related to the physics and dynamics. Although certain combinations of the parameterization schemes provided in each case realistic results in terms of the precipitation fields' textures and structures, placing these fields in the correct spatial locations required additional efforts, so that the best set of the model's options varies from one storm system to the other.



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# Objective of the project that is the subject of this presentation:

To assess the suitability of a regional numerical weather model to simulate local intense precipitation processes (such as Mesoscale Convective Systems).

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## Plan

#### 1. Literature Review

- > Classifications of extreme precipitation events
- Numerical weather models used to simulate such storm events
- 2. Configuration of the numerical atmospheric model WRF by means of the numerical simulations of two historical severe storm events (for this purpose the August 2007 MCS and Hurricane Frances were chosen)
  - Initial and boundary conditions
  - > Observation data for model validation
  - Choosing candidates
  - > Choosing the nested-domains

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### **Classifications of extreme precipitation events in USA**

• Various classifications of extreme precipitation events in the literature

• In general, a distinction between tropical and non-tropical origin

• Classification proposed by Schumacher and Johnson (2005) and Stevenson and Schumacher (2014):

✓ Mesoscale Convective Systems: convective systems with areal extents greater than 100 km and with durations between 3 and 24 h

 Synoptic Systems: events characterized by the strong large-scale ascent commonly associated with synoptic-scale features (i.e., extratropical cyclones) and/or lasting longer than 24 h


Tropical Systems (hurricanes)


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
Evaluation of Model Performance with respect to placing the intense precipitation field in the correct location


 In order to assess the ability of the model to place the intense part of the precipitation field we used the percentage of overlapping, i.e. the number of grid points where both the observation and the simulation are above the threshold, divided by the number of points where the observation is above the threshold. For example, 25% overlapping means that the intense part of the simulated field overlaps with the intense part of the observed field at 25%.


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












## Work Plan

- 1. Determine the intense MCSs and TCs in the Stage-IV dataset (2002-present) that realized within the simulation inner-domains;
- 2. Validate the model for each of these storms; then for each of these storms construct the underlying wind and moisture fields;
- 3. Perform a transposition exercise for one historical MCS and for one historical Hurricane using 2 target areas;
- 4. Determine the most intense future storm event for each of the two modeling inner domains (one for MCS and one for TC) by dynamically downscaling the Community Climate System Model version 4 (CCSM4) climate projection by WRF model over the two domains.

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• We determined and simulated the intense Tropical Cyclones that affected the Eastern US from 2002 to present. Tropical Cyclones are intense atmospheric vortices that form over the warm tropical oceans.

• We determined and simulated the intense Mesoscale Convective Systems that affected the Midwestern US from 2002 to present. Mesoscale Convective Systems are organized collections of several cumulonimbus clouds which interact at regional scale to form an extensive and nearly contiguous region of precipitation.

• Both storm systems are recognized for their ability to generate intense precipitation that may in turn create disastrous floods.

• Storms were selected from the NCEP Stage-IV precipitation analyses, a mosaic of regional multi-sensor analysis generated by National Weather Service River Forecast Centers (RFCs). They combine rain gauge data and radar-estimated rainfall. They are provided at 4 km resolution and three time resolutions: 1-h, 6-h, and 24-h time intervals.

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• We used the website <u>http://schumacher.atmos.colostate.edu/precip monitor/</u> from the Precipitation Systems Research Group in Colorado State University in order to identify intense precipitation events.

• This website lists every event for which a given threshold (e.g. 100 year, 24 hour) was exceeded at at least one grid cell in Stage IV observation data.

• We analyzed all events and we selected 11 Tropical Cyclones (TCs), and 7 Mesoscale Convective Systems (MCSs) which generated intense precipitation fields.

• We used the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) model at 5-km resolution in order to reconstruct their intense precipitation fields.

• Climate Forecast System Reanalysis (CFSR) was used for initial and boundary conditions. The provided spatial and temporal resolutions of CFSR are  $0.5 \times 0.5$  degree and 6-hourly.

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• The WRF model was run in the simulation mode: it was only subject to the influence of its initial and boundary conditions, and no observation was used to improve the simulations through nudging or other data assimilation techniques.


• In the context of climate change where one may be interested in simulating the storms of the future, it is important to evaluate the performances of regional numerical weather models in the simulation mode, since no observation is available for the future which would allow using nudging or data assimilation.


• The WRF model was configured to obtain the best results for the simulation of each of the selected severe MCS and TC storm events with respect to precipitation fields by trying many sets of the model's options:


 parameterization schemes such as microphysics, cumulus parameterization, planetary boundary layer physics, long wave and short wave radiation physics, etc.


- vertical resolution (number of layers)
- initial date for the simulation
- time step
- other options related to the physics and dynamics.

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












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

























































































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2.3.3.2.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

The models seem to reproduce the storms well. When the storm is moved to a different location, what assumptions do you make in order to conclude that the initial and boundary conditions that occurred in the Midwest could happen in the Southeast? How do we know when we have transposed a storm to a region that is not realistic, that we have done something that is not meteorologically possible? Are there limits on where we can transpose storms and in what situations?

#### Response:

The modeling is not creating new artificial initial or boundary conditions. We performed a similar exercise for atmospheric rivers, in California and in the West. This modeling involved a shift in the boundary conditions in the zonal direction, with respect to the meridional direction, or with respect to the latitudinal direction, and as such there must be realism. However, in this case, we are using historically observed conditions and shifting them either in the south-north direction or in the east-west direction. These storms are historical cases that have set initial and boundary conditions in the CFSR reanalysis data.

#### Follow-up Question:

Could those initial and boundary conditions occur in a different location?

#### Response:

Yes; before starting a transposition exercise, analysts need to justify how much shifting is realistic. The new work is investigating synoptic conditions and will help analysts decide what level of shifting is realistic. In this case, we are simply shifting historically observed boundary conditions and not creating any. The storms' initial conditions are just moved.

#### Question:

Have you considered the Goddard database on intense storms?

#### Response:

No, we did not.

#### Comment:

The Goddard database provides satellite data with a much lower resolution of storms as Stage IV reanalysis data.

#### Response:

The reanalysis data set is good for assessing the performance of these models.


**2.3.3.3** *Extreme Precipitation Frequency Estimates for Orographic Regions*, Andrew Verdin\*, Kathleen Holman, and David Keeney, Flood Hydrology and Meteorology Group, Technical Services Center, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Session 2A-3; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C506</u>)

#### 2.3.3.3.1 Abstract

This presentation gave an update to the research project "Phase II: Research to Develop Guidance on Extreme Precipitation Frequency Estimates for the Tennessee Valley." The focus of this presentation was the use of sophisticated statistical techniques for identifying homogeneous regions within greater orographic domains and the subsequent fitting of extreme value distributions for point-scale return-level estimates of precipitation within each homogeneous region. Identification of homogeneous regions is essential for regional frequency analysis. Regional analyses are based on the assumption that data from stations within each homogeneous region come from the same theoretical distribution, which is a common method of extending environmental datasets. Parameter estimation is sensitive to a number of influential factors, the period of record being one of the most important. It is essential, then, to strengthen the parameter estimates by substituting "space for time." The presentation discussed the Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) algorithm, a widely used method of identifying homogeneous regions, and the application of the SOM algorithm to the Tennessee River Valley. Results from the SOM algorithm are consistent with subjective methods of regionalization. For each homogeneous region, the study applied two distinct methods of regional frequency analysis for estimating the extreme value distribution parameters of the regional growth curve: L-moments and Bayesian . The regional growth curve for each homogeneous region is produced using scaled annual maximum precipitation data. Subsequently, a point-scale return level is estimated by scaling the

regional growth curve by the at-site mean of the location of interest. However, it may be of interest to estimate precipitation magnitudes at locations where no historical observations exist. To this end, gridded reanalysis may be used as input to regional frequency analysis. Specifically, the Newman et al. (2015)<sup>2</sup> dataset offers an ensemble of gridded daily precipitation for 33 years. The ensemble contains 100 members, each of which is an equally plausible precipitation total for the grid cell of interest. Similar to the identification of homogeneous regions, the study assumed that all ensemble members come from the same theoretical distribution, which extends the period of record by two orders of magnitude. The ensemble members may be collapsed into a single dataset, and the extreme value distribution parameters are estimated independently at each grid cell. The presentation discussed differences in the inherent assumptions and resulting differences in the two methods. The presentation ended with an illustration of the two methods' abilities in quantifying small exceedance probability precipitation events with associated uncertainty.

#### 2.3.3.3.2 Presentation



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Newman, A. J., Clark, M. P., Craig, J., Nijssen, B., Wood, A., Gutmann, E., Mizukami, N., Brekke, L. & Arnold, J. R. (2015). Gridded ensemble precipitation and temperature estimates for the contiguous United States. Journal of Hydrometeorology, 16(6), 2481-2500.

# NRC Research Overview

Previous Research (Phase 1):

Research to Develop Guidance on Probable Maximum Precipitation Estimates for the Eastern United States

## Current Research (Phase 2):


Research to Develop Guidance on Extreme Precipitation Frequency Estimates for the Tennessee River Valley


Slide 2


# Outline

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Precipitation-Frequency
- 3. Regional P-F analysis
- 4. Case study in Tennessee River Valley
  - A. L-moments
  - B. Bayesian
- 5. Summary

## **Motivation** Risk is determined by three components: Magnitude of hazard 1. 2. Probability of occurrence 3. Consequences Deterministic approach (e.g., PMP) provides single maximum magnitude via physical and theoretical arguments and computations (e.g., transposition) Probabilistic approach (e.g., P-F) provides full range of magnitudes for annual exceedance probabilities using observed data Slide 4 **Precipitation-Frequency** 1. Define relevant precipitation duration 1-hr, 6-hr, 12-hr, 1-day, 2-day, etc. ٠ 2. Extract annual/seasonal maxima from time series Meteorological analysis, scheduled construction, etc. 3. OC annual/seasonal maxima for false maxima Missing data treated as 0... 4. Fit extreme value distribution to maxima Estimate $\theta = (\mu, \sigma, \xi)$ 5. Calculate quantiles of distribution Precipitation magnitudes for variety of annual exceedance probabilities (AEP)








# **L-Moments**


Slide 12


# **L-Moments**


1. Identify weather stations (sites) within HR


- Screened, quality-controlled maxima
- 2. Compute L-statistics for each site
  - L-mean, L-scale, L-skewness, L-kurtosis
- 3. Test for heterogeneity
  - Discordancy measures (e.g.,  $D_i \leq 3$ )
- 4. Calculate regional L-statistics (weighted by POR)
- 5. Identify a suitable distribution
  - GEV, GPD, GNO, GLO, PE3, Wakeby
- 6. Calculate regional growth curve
  - Scale growth curve (point, basin, region)




















## Summary

Regional P-F analysis is a useful framework for quantifying risk of extreme precipitation on local scale

Self-Organizing Maps algorithm addresses orographic effects, defines HRs

Regional growth curve describes maxima at any point within HR

Bayesian addresses parametric uncertainty, computationally expensive

L-Moments is an efficient method for frequency analysis; robust regional estimates of extreme value distribution parameters

Gridded products useful for P-F estimates at unmonitored locations

Many sources of gridded products (e.g., radar, satellite, numerical models) Slide 32

# Questions?

NRC contactJoseph Kanney:joseph.kanney@nrc.gov+1.301.415.1920	<u>Reclamation contacts</u> Andrew Verdin: Kathleen Holman: David Keeney:	<u>averdin@usbr.gov</u> <u>kholman@usbr.gov</u> <u>dpkeeney@usbr.gov</u>	+1.303.445.3647 +1.303.445.2571 +1.303.445.2533
		joseph.kanney@nrc.gov	+1.301.415.1920

#### 2.3.3.3.3 Questions and Answers

#### Comment:

The methods that were used in National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Atlas, "Precipitation-Frequency Atlas of the United States," Volume 2, issued 2004 and revised 2006, were changed, in large part because of regionalization. Regionalization is an approach that combines a lot of stations together in a way that is actually very subjective, and the results vary significantly depending on how many clusters are chosen and the parameters chosen for the kinds of clusters. In addition, when defining clusters that have many stations, the data end up being smoothed because you are averaging too much, especially when the method is combined with the L-moments approach. The resulting estimates hardly represent the local estimates that are needed in engineering design, which is the primary purpose for producing precipitation frequency estimates. Because of this, NOAA has changed these results and will also change the first volumes of the series if funds are available. It is surprising that the L-moments ended up being higher than in the Bayesian approach, because they tend to be very low for extreme frequencies. This is why NOAA is moving away from their use and toward a maximum likelihood approach. A climate change analysis that is based on annual maxima series cannot take into account changes in frequencies of extreme events. For this reason, we should not do further analysis on the annual maximum series, methods used in the first few volumes of NOAA Atlas 14 and proposed to use here but that were developed in the 1990s. Instead, we need to move toward a more advanced methodology. To best apply NOAA Atlas 14, use the methodology in more recent volumes.

**2.3.3.4** Local Intense Precipitation Frequency Studies, John Weglian, EPRI (Session 2A-4; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C507</u>)

#### 2.3.3.4.1 Abstract

To ensure that NPPs are adequately protected against extreme rainfall, plant design has traditionally relied on deterministic requirements to define the extent of flooding that might need to be accommodated. For purposes of PRA, a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the frequency and amount of extreme rainfall is necessary. Such an understanding is also needed to provide further perspective on the challenges posed by precipitation corresponding to the deterministic criteria.


To explore the state of the technology and data available to support a more comprehensive probabilistic evaluation, EPRI undertook an evaluation of the precipitation-frequency relationship for two sites in the United States, one an inland site and the other an Atlantic Ocean coastal site. The study was primarily based on regional precipitation-frequency relationships that embody NWS data from a large number of precipitation measurement stations in the vicinity of the plant sites. The study was published as "Local Precipitation -Frequency Studies: Development of 1-Hour/1-Square Mile Precipitation—Frequency Relationships for Two Example Nuclear Power Plant Sites," EPRI ID 3002004400, dated October 2, 2014 (http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000003002004400).


Plants in the United States are designed to be protected against flooding that could result from local intense precipitation. For design purposes, local intense precipitation is defined based on precipitation associated with a 1-hour/1-square-mile probable maximum precipitation (PMP)


event. The method described in this report was applied to calculate the probability of the PMP occurring for the two example sites as well.


The approach employed in this report successfully demonstrated the feasibility of a probabilistic technique for establishing precipitation-frequency relationships for local precipitation events. The regional analyses also found that an event corresponding to the 1-hour/1-square-mile PMP would result in an extremely large amount of precipitation and would be extremely rare.


2.3.3.4.2 Presentation





















- Uncertainty was modeled considering the regional probability distribution to be a 3-parameter distribution represented by a form of the 4-parameter Kappa distribution with a fixed value of the 2<sup>nd</sup> shape parameter (h)
- In the uncertainty analysis, the parameter h was allowed to vary around the regional h value
- This method preserves the correlation between L-kurtosis and L-skewness and provides for variability in the shape parameter, h
- Latin-hypercube sampling used to select 1000 sample sets

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16



## **Local Precipitation Summary Statistics**

Description	Inland Site	Coastal Site
PMP for the Site	17.9 "	18.4"
World Meteorological Organization Record Short Duration (1-Hour or Less) Rainfalls	12.0" – 15.8"	
Study Area 1-Hour Maximum Rainfall	3.5"	4.0"
Study Area 2-Hour Maximum Rainfall	5.5"	6.5"
PMP AEP Estimated by Extending Mean Precipitation-Frequency Relationship	<10 <sup>-9</sup>	<10 <sup>-9</sup>
10 <sup>-6</sup> AEP Precipitation Using Mean Precipitation-Frequency Relationship	8.9"	8.5"
	AEP	Annual Exceedance Prob
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20

#### 2.3.3.4.3 Questions and Answers

#### Comment:

Because of the dependence in the data, when nearby stations are used, you are basically creating a sample from the same store. As a result, when using the regional approach, the actual record is much shorter than perceived. It is not the sum of the station years from all the stations in the region. That sometimes leads to overconfidence when estimating precipitation frequency at extreme frequencies. This was a mistake; the first few volumes of NOAA Atlas 14 did not account for the spatial correlation and independence of observations at nearby stations, and therefore the confidence intervals in those volumes were very narrow. This approach gives the appearance of high levels of confidence in our estimates even for a return period of 1,000 years. One slide of the presentation showed a 1,000- or 2,000-vear rare event, not even an extreme. I may be one of a few people who feels that we should not extrapolate to those return periods. One slide in a presentation for tomorrow will address this issue. There is lots of disagreement over this issue and feel that some type of approach must be taken, as some designs need those numbers. Although we are assuming a distribution, such as generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. in many cases there are many other distributions that pass the statistical test. We use L-moments to calculate distribution parameters but there are other ways to fit distribution parameters. Because of this, when all these uncertainties are put together at the 1,000- and 2,000-year return periods, the range of estimates is so wide, practically between zero and infinity. We should be very careful when selecting those numbers and using them, especially in a deterministic mode as it is currently done in engineering design.

#### Response:

I agree that it is extremely dangerous to extrapolate to very long levels. For example, from my aerospace background, in the failure of the space shuttle Columbia, when analysts saw on the camera that foam had hit the leading edge of a wing on takeoff, they took the existing foam data and extrapolated three orders of magnitude to conclude that it was not an issue. That extrapolation was inaccurate and in fact there was a very serious issue. It is extremely difficult to rely on extrapolation to those extreme levels. Because of this, our industry relies both on deterministic, with a PMP approach, and risk-based approaches to help inform decisions. A PRA practitioner who wishes to assess vulnerabilities at a site to a level commensurate with other hazards faced there needs to have an estimate that can be used down to low frequencies (e.g., 10<sup>-6</sup>), but also needs to keep in mind at the same time the wide range of uncertainty associated with such an estimate. The PRA can be used to show vulnerabilities to try to make the plant safer, but it cannot indicate that a plant is safe to a certain level and nothing can go wrong.

#### Comment:

The assignment of frequencies to deterministic stylized events is of concern (e.g., the frequency of exceedance of the PMP for a stylized 1-hour event), even understanding the deterministic concept and the assignment of assumptions. Ponding elevation on the ground is an important example. The value for this can come from a 1-hour event, 6-hour events, or any other durations, as well as different temporal distributions and other characteristics. As a result, we report this one number on this stylized event, and we underestimate the frequency of, for example, experiencing inconsequential flooding. There is not a one-to-one mapping between the concepts. Analysts should be cautious when using a frequency of one duration of precipitation from one type of event when the relevant consideration is the frequency of exceeding ponding elevations on the ground as a result from many different types of events.

#### Response:

This is a good point. The PRAs in other areas show something similar. For example, the risk of core damage from a large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is extremely small because the probability of a large-break LOCA is extremely small. The probability of a small-break LOCA leading to core damage is usually significantly higher just because the event happens more often. Similarly, a lesser but longer duration flood may result in more water intrusion into a plant. Even if the flood does not result in a higher water level in the plant, it may still have some impact because it occurs more often and thus may challenge the plant enough to be more risk significant than the isolated worst-case scenario.

#### 2.3.4 Day 2: Session 2B - Leveraging Available Flood Information I

This session covered research to develop the means by which the staff can leverage available frequency information on flooding hazards.

#### 2.3.4.1 Development of Flood Hazard Information Digest for Operating NPP Sites,

Curtis Smith\*, Ph.D. and Kellie Kvarfordt, Idaho National Laboratory (Session 2B-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C508</u>)

#### 2.3.4.1.1 Abstract

The objective of this project is for Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and demonstrate a database architecture for a flood hazard information digest to facilitate gathering, organizing, and presenting a variety of flood hazard data sources. Additionally, INL is assisting in the population of the digest.

The goal of the project is to provide information and tools to support external flooding-related activities, particularly the risk-informed aspects of the Significance Determination Process (SDP). Under the SDP, the use of probabilistic flood hazard information and insights is an important input in the determination for follow-up inspection actions and resource allocation, and for risk-informing licensing actions. However, the NRC staff has had to improvise and only use probabilistic flooding hazard estimates on an ad hoc basis, in a limited manner, with acknowledged limitations with respect to the technical defensibility of the resulting estimates.

A particular challenge in developing probabilistic flooding hazard estimates within the SDP is that the required flood hazard information is not readily accessible. It is challenging for the NRC staff to assemble and analyze the information within the time available for the SDP. Thus, there is a need to better organize flooding information at operating reactor sites and improve its accessibility for the NRC staff performing SDP analyses. The Flood Hazard Information Digest application has been developed to address these needs.

The following major data sources have been identified and targeted for inclusion in the Flood Hazard Information Digest:


- flood hazard information, including flood protection and mitigation strategies, available from sources that include NUREGs, final safety analysis reports, individual plant examination for external events submittals, and SDP analyses
- recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (ML111861807)

- o Recommendation 2.1: Flood hazard reevaluation submittals
- Recommendation 2.3: Walkdown submittals
- available precipitation frequency information from the NOAA Atlas 14 database
- available flood frequency information from U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) databases
- available information for hurricane landfall and intensity along U.S. coastal areas


In addition to providing access to these and other data sources, the flood digest must provide, where needed, guidance for using the available information.


The Flood Hazard Information Digest has been implemented as a cloud-based Web application. The digest utilizes INL's Safety Portal, a system that helps integrate and manage a comprehensive collection of many different kinds of content, including Web pages, Web applications, models, and documents, where users may store, use, share, modify, or otherwise contribute to projects. The emphasis of the Safety Portal is to serve as a resource to promote collaboration between producers and users of information. The flood digest shares available services such as user account management, file sharing, and a publications/permissions/ subscriptions model.


The Flood Hazard Information Digest application is available to eligible users at https://safety.inl.gov/flooddigest. New users will be prompted to register for access. Sample data for selected plants are currently available, and data population efforts for remaining operating NPP sites are underway. The bulk of data population is targeted for completion by end of this fiscal year. The flood digest application has been implemented in such a way as to facilitate the inclusion of additional external event hazards if needed.




#### 2.3.4.1.2 Presentation









## Contacts

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2.3.4.2 At-Streamgage Flood Frequency Analyses for Very Low Annual Exceedance Probabilities from a Perspective of Multiple Distributions and Parameter Estimation Methods, William H. Asquith^, Ph.D., P.G., U.S. Geological Survey, Lubbock, TX; and Julie Kiang, Ph.D., U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, VA (Session 2B-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C509</u>)

## 2.3.4.2.1 Abstract

USGS, in cooperation with the NRC, is investigating statistical methods for flood hazard analyses. One task is to provide guidance on very low annual exceedance probability (AEP) estimation and the quantification of corresponding uncertainties using streamgage-specific data. The term "very low AEP" implies exceptionally rare events, defined as those having AEPs less than about 0.001 (or 10<sup>-3</sup> in scientific notation). Such low AEPs are of great interest for flood frequency analyses for critical infrastructure such as NPPs. Flood frequency analyses at streamgages are most commonly based on annual instantaneous peak streamflow data and a probability distribution fit to these data. The fitted distribution provides a means to extrapolate to small AEPs. Within the United States, the Pearson type III probability distribution, when fit to the base-10 logarithms of streamflow, is widely used, but other distribution choices exist. The USGS -PeakFQ software implementing well-known guidelines of USGSError! Bookmark not defined., Bulletin 17B "Guidelines for Determining Flood Flow Frequency," issued 1982 (method of moments), and pending updates (Bulletin 17C, the expected moments algorithm using the Pearson type III) was specially adapted for an "Extended Output" user option to provide estimates at selected AEPs from 10<sup>-3</sup> to 10<sup>-6</sup>. Parameter estimation methods, in addition to the product moments and expected moments algorithm, include L-moments, maximum likelihood, and maximum product of spacings (maximum spacing estimation). This project comprehensively studies multiple distributions and parameter estimation methods for two USGS streamgages (01400500 Raritan River at Manville, NJ, and 01638500 Potomac River at Point of Rocks, MD). This task involved the four techniques of parameter estimation and up to nine probability distributions, including the generalized extreme value, generalized log-normal, generalized Pareto, and Weibull. Uncertainties in streamflow estimates related to AEP are depicted and quantified as two primary forms: quantile (aleatoric (random sampling) uncertainty )and distribution-choice (epistemic (model) uncertainty). Sampling uncertainties of a given distribution are relatively straightforward to compute from analytical or Monte Carlo-based approaches. Distribution-choice uncertainty stems from choices of potentially applicable probability distributions for which divergence among the choices increases as AEP decreases. Conventional goodnessof-fit statistics, such as Cramér-von Mises, and L-moment ratio diagrams are demonstrated to hone distribution choice. The results in a generalized sense show that distribution choice uncertainty is larger than sampling uncertainty for very low AEP values. Future work includes consideration of nonstandard flood data at streamgage locations, regional information, and nonstationarity in flood frequency analyses.



# At-Streamgage Flood Frequency Analyses for Very Low Annual Exceedance Probabilities from a Perspective of Multiple Distributions and Parameter Estimation Methods


William H. Asquith<sup>1</sup> and Julie E. Kiang<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> USGS, Lubbock, Texas (wasquith@usgs.gov) <sup>2</sup> USGS, Reston, Virginia (jkiang@usgs.gov)


> U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2nd Annual Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Workshop, NRC Headquarters, Rockville, MD, January 23–25, 2017


# **Very Low AEP Estimation:**


- Some Facts:
  - The longest streamflow records are on the order of 120 years but often just a few decades of data are available.
  - Conventional flood frequency requires estimates for return periods of about 10–500 years. Common guidance in the U.S. is generally accepted as adequate (log-Pearson type III distribution; method of moments; Bulletins 17B/C).
- Flood frequency for VL-AEPs (very low annual exceedance probabilities) *requires different approaches and considerations* than used conventionally.
  - This work stresses the *communication of uncertainty* in VL-AEPs.
  - This study shows that choices of probability models and fitting methods can produce enormous ranges in estimates that are associated with large uncertainty.



2-186







# Task 1 Details — Distributions

- Logarithmic transformation of annual peaks used, and the adjective "log-" (e.g. log-Pearson type III) implied in talk.
- Nine probability distributions:
  - Generalized Extreme Value (GEV, three parameter)
  - Generalized Logistic (GLO, three parameter)
  - Generalized ("skew") Normal (GNO, three parameter; log-Normal3)
  - Generalized Pareto (GPA, three parameter)
  - Pearson type III (PE3, three parameter; a standard choice in U.S.)
  - Weibull (WEI, three parameter; reversed GEV)
  - Kappa (KAP, four parameters; common in regional L-moments)
  - Asymmetric Exponential Power (AEP4, four parameters)
  - Wakeby (five parameters)

slide 11

# Task 1 Details — Parameter Estimation



• <u>Expected Moments Algorithm</u> (EMA, product moments) though restricted to PE3 (Pearson type III). "Bulletin 17C" publication pending from USGS.


 $M_r = \mathrm{E}[(X-\mu)^r] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (x-\mu)^r f(x) \,\mathrm{d}x$ 


• L-moments (LMR): linear combinations of the quantile function


$$\lambda_r = \frac{1}{r} \sum_{k=0}^{r-1} (-1)^k \binom{r-1}{k} \frac{n!}{(j-1)!(n-j)!} \int_0^1 x(F) \times F^{j-1} \times (1-F)^{n-j} \, \mathrm{d}F,$$


- <u>Maximum Likelihood (MLE)</u>: maximization of sum of logarithmic densities via probability density function  $\log(L_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n \log(f(x_i; \theta)),$
- <u>Maximum Product of Spacings (MPS)</u>: maximization of sum of U-statistic increments of the *cumulative distribution function*


$$M_n(\theta) = \sum_{i=1}^{n+1} \log \left[ U_i(\theta) - U_{i-1}(\theta) \right] \text{ for } U_i(\theta) = F(x_{i:n}; \theta)$$











# Future Tasks (2 – 4)

- 2. Nonstandard flood information (regional + paleo + climate + historical sources) use in PE3-EMA (expected moments algorithm).
- **3.** Non-stationarity (land use, regulation, climate change)
- 4. Training seminar led by USGS at NRC HQ in late summer 2017 to review Tasks 1, 2, and 3.

slide 23

# **Future Research Directions for VL-AEP**

## Regional skew update for Nation:

- Substantial non-USGS sponsorship needed.
- PE3-EMA + vastly improved "low-outlier detection" + more data since late 1970s (Bulletin 17B).
- Improved error estimates for weighted skew computations — critically important for short-record streamgages.
- Include L-skew + L-kurtosis Value added component to assess regional distribution forms and (or) strength of the Pearson type III for VL-AEP.

Distribution shape parameters (skewness and kurtosis) control distal tail estimates for very low AEPs (VL-AEPs).

# **Future Research Directions for VL-AEP**

- EMA extension to other three-parameter dists.
  - Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) and thus Weibull
  - Generalized "Skew" Normal and thus log-Normal3
- Unification of theory for historical data (censoring) for Lmoments. (We barely explore L-moment left-censoring by indicator variable within this USGS/NRC project.)
- Method of MPS<sup>1</sup> needs further review.
- Further look into four-parameter distributions
  - Kappa + Asymmetric Exponential Power distributions as a "joint family" canvasing the L-skew / L-kurtosis domain.

<sup>1</sup> Maximum product of spacings or "maximum spacing estimation."

slide 25

# **Contact Information:**

#### PRESENTER:

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## 2.3.4.2.3 Questions and Answers

## Question:

Have you considered other examples in the United States besides the Northeast, such as the Pecos River?

## Response:

This study is limited to the Potomac and Raritan Rivers. For this project, the criteria required a very long record period and a fair amount of skew in the data, free from regulation; therefore, it was limited to this area. The continuing work in this project will review data from a host of additional gauges across the United States, from west to east.

## Comment:

One of the future tasks in the project appears to be to consider nonstationarity by urban effects or climate change. The experience with NOAA Atlas 14 leads to some suggestions. First, when discussing nonstationarity, you should distinguish between a change in frequency or in magnitude, or whether there is a change in both of them. If there is a change in magnitude only, approaches based on annual maxima series could be applicable. However, if there is a change in the frequency of extreme events, either streamflow or precipitation, you should change the series used in the analysis. That is, you should go from annual maxima series to partial duration or peaks over threshold, because extremes are more common in recent periods than they were before. Applying this suggestion does pose some issues. Methods currently being used for streamflow and precipitation, in USGS Bulletin 17B and NOAA Atlas 14, are based either on conventional moments or L-moments and cannot be adjusted easily to include nonstationarity. However, the maximum likelihood approach can be adjusted. L-moments were suggested for frequency in 1990s when sample sizes were relatively small, and relations showed that they were more reliable than maximum likelihood. However, with 20 more years of data available for the analysis of extreme events, there may no longer be a reason to use L-moments. Recent studies show that we should abandon L-moments in the analysis of extreme events and instead move to maximum likelihood. There are a number of other conflicts like this. For example, Federal agencies have agreed to use the term "AEP." If we change from annual maximum series (AMS) to partial duration series (PDS), we will need to go back to using the terms "return period" or "recurrence interval," because AEP does not go with the partial duration series. In general, care must be taken with terminology because we use different terms to define the same thing. For example, the term "extreme event" means different things to different professions and different people. An event for some is something that has a beginning and an end. We perform frequency analysis, which is very important for precipitation. We are not analyzing events, but rather the amounts per duration, which can be from a single event or multiple events. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the two [events and partial duration series], because there are a lot of differences in methodologies that are used to analyze these two different things.


## Response from NRC Project Manager:


Another example of the difference is considering the frequency of a particular volume for a dam on a reservoir. The number of events contributing to that volume is not important, but rather the frequency of getting a particular volume. **2.3.4.3 Extending Frequency Analysis beyond Current Consensus Limits**, Keil Neff, Ph.D., P.E., and Joseph Wright, P.E., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation ,Technical Service Center, Flood Hydrology and Mete orology (Session 2B-3; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C510</u>)


## 2.3.4.3.1 Abstract

Traditionally, deterministic methods have been used to determine inflow design floods based on a particular loading event to meet regulatory criteria. For infrastructure with high hazard potential, including nuclear facilities and many large dams, the probable maximum flood (PMF) has often been used as the inflow design flood. Risk-informed decision-making is currently used by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), USACE, and other agencies to assess the safety of dams, recommend safety improvements, and prioritize expenditures. This involves developing estimates of hydrologic hazards to perform PRAs. Hydrologic hazard curves provide magnitudes and probabilities for the entire ranges of peak flow, flood volume, and water surface elevations. There are multiple methods available to estimate magnitudes and probabilities of extreme flood events; these methods can be generally classified as streamflow-based statistical analyses or rainfall-based with statistical analyses of the modeled runoff. Method selection is based on the level of detail necessary and site-specific consideration, including data availability, hydrologic complexity, and required level of confidence. This presentation focused on describing recommended methods and approaches for extending frequency analysis methods beyond current consensus limits (AEPs greater than 1:10<sup>5</sup>) for both rainfall and riverine flooding applications.

## 2.3.4.3.2 Presentation







# Some Key Hydrologic Hazard Analysis (HHA) Concepts

Hierarchy and Risk Process – Agency Specific
Probability Estimates and Full Distributions needed, with Uncertainty
PMF and Single (Point) Deterministic Flood Estimate No Longer Adequate – more information required
Hydrologic Hazard Curves are the Load Input to Risk Peak Flow and Volume Frequency Curves 1/1,000 AEP to 1/10,000 AEP (typical for failure probability) less than 1/10,000 AEP extrapolation!
Hydrographs; Maximum Reservoir Levels
HHA Methods vary; depend on study level
Multiple HHA Methods Used and Combined

# Hydrologic Hazard Curve Principles

Data - focus on past (paleoflood) and present (recent) data Flood Hazards Estimated using Interdisciplinary Teams Flood Models, Relationships and Tools developed inhouse by Reclamation and collaborators

Uncertainty of Estimates is Quantified

Fundamental challenge - We have short records of past floods but we want to characterize future floods with long return periods

Because estimation of Hydrologic Hazard Curves involves substantial extrapolations, use of multiple methods and independent data sets provides more reliable results

# Credible Extrapolation

Typical Range	Range (Best)
<b>1 in 1</b> 00	1 in 200
1 in 500	1 in 1,000
1 in 4,000	1 in 10,000
1 in 2,000	1 in 10,000
1 in 15,000	1 in 40,000
1 in 40,000	1 in 100,000
	1 in 100 1 in 500 1 in 4,000 1 in 2,000 1 in 15,000

USBR - USU (1999), Swain et al. (2006)

# Hydrologic Hazard Curves: Extreme Flood Probability Estimation Methods

Principles for improving estimation with annual exceedance probabilities on the order of 10<sup>-3</sup> or smaller

Substitution of space for time (e.g. regional precip frequency) Introduction of more 'structure' into models (e.g. antecedent soil moisture seasonal dependence)

Focus of extremes or 'tails' as opposed to or even to the exclusion of central characteristics (e.g. topfitting flood distributions)

NRC (1988) Estimating Probabilities of Extreme Floods

# Hydrologic Hazard Methods

#### Method

#### **Data Inputs**

Graphical Flood Frequency EMA FLDFRQ3

Hydrograph Scaling

GRADEX

Australian Rainfall-Runoff

NWS SAC-SMA

SEFM

Distributed R-R Model

peak flow, reconnaissance paleofloods, PMF hydrograph

peak flow, detailed paleofloods peak flow, detailed paleofloods

hydrographs and volumes

rainfall gages/regional statistics; streamflow volumes

PMP design storm; rainfall frequency; watershed parameters

Precipitation frequency, 6-hr P,T, soil parameters, snow parameters, hourly and 6-hr streamflow (calibration) rainfall gages/detailed regional rainfall

frequency, watershed parameters, snowpack, reservoir data regional extreme storm DAD data, watershed parameters, snowpack

#### Assumptions

logNormal flood frequency; PMF hydrograph represents volume

LP3 flood frequency distribution with moments

various flood frequency distributions with likelihood

hydrographs represent extreme flood response; requires FFA for scaling

flood frequency same shape as rainfall frequency with exponential tail; saturated basin


Exceedance Probability of PMP; average watershed parameter values; runoff frequency same as rainfall frequency


existing RFC calibration acceptable; runoff frequency approximated by rainfall frequency; calibrated parameters apply to extremes


main inputs defined by distributions; unit hydrograph; rainfall frequency using GEV/Imoments


diffusive wave runoff; stochastic storm transposition rainfall frequency

# Statistical Approach Black River at Kingstree (SC)









# Rainfall-Runoff Modeling

- USBR uses multiple methods. Typically a combination of a physical based model with a statistical component that analyzes historic (and prehistoric) streamflow
- USBR often considers a rainfall-runoff model to represent the extreme flood potential in a watershed that is typically controlled by snowmelt flooding

# Rainfall-Runoff Models

Lumped (1-Dimensional) HEC-HMS (HEC-1) SAC-SMA SWMM Quasi-Distributed Hydrologic Runoff Unit (HRU) Approach Distributed (2D) Variable Infiltration Capacity (gridded) WRF-Hydro TREX

# Precipitation Frequency Regionalized precipitation (L-moments) Australian RainfallRunoff NOAA Atlas 14 Temporal Derived from observed data Design templates (SCS Type II, USBR 2/3, etc.)

## Spatial

Modeled (WRF)

Derived from observed data (at-site, transposition) Design templates (HMRs)

# Australian Rainfall-Runoff Method


Use ARR rainfall/PMP probability concepts


- Customize ARR concepts on spatial/temporal patterns, runoff models, loss rates and sensitivity by Reclamation
- Estimate rainfall distribution to 1/100 (NOAA 2) or 1/1000 (NOAA 14, state studies)
- Assume rainfall distribution from this AEP to PMP using ARR shape factors.


Assign AEP to point PMP from drainage area

Develop rainfall point to area relationship, temporal pattern, and spatial pattern

Use runoff model (e.g. unit hydrograph) with AEP neutral parameters for losses, lag time, antecedent floods, initial reservoir level







g4-13

# NRC Research

## Current Research

This project will develop a technical basis document to provide guidance for extending frequency analysis methods beyond current consensus limits for both rainfall and riverine flooding applications.

The focus will be on describing alternative methods and approaches for integration of the characterizations from multiple approaches to estimate rainfall and floods with AEPs 1X10<sup>-5</sup> to 1X10<sup>-6</sup>.

Uncertainty characterization and quantification will also be a focus of this project.

## U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Technical Service Center Flood Hydrology & Meteorology

Joseph M Wright, P.E. Group Manager 303-445-2463 imwright@usbr.gov

Keil J. Neff, P.E., Ph.D. Hydrologic Engineer 303-445-2541 kneff@usbr.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Joseph Kanney, Ph.D. Hydrologist 301-415-1920 joseph.kanney@nrc.gov

## 2.3.4.3.3 Questions and Answers

## Question:

Are any other similar projects underway, and what did you learn from their application?

## Response:

Another current project uses a SEFM [Stochastic Event Flood Model] to estimate frequencies, which gives a much better understanding of the process that is involved, both for infrequent events and more frequent events.

## Question:

The presentation mentioned that a team of hydrologists came to a consensus decision. Do you have any more details about that?

## Response:

USBR has an internal review process and works in a team approach for more complicated studies.

## 2.3.5 Day 2: Session 2C - Leveraging Available Flood Information II

This session presented research to develop the means by which the staff can leverage available frequency information on flooding hazards.

**2.3.5.1 Collection of Paleoflood Evidence**, John Weglian, EPRI (Session 2C-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C511</u>)

## 2.3.5.1.1 Abstract

In a PRA, it is important to estimate the frequency of initiating events (events that can cause or demand an immediate trip of the reactor). The estimation of this frequency is challenging for rare events and particularly so for external hazards like external flooding, for which the historical record is limited to about 100 to 200 years. An external flooding PRA would use a flood hazard frequency curve that plots at much rarer return periods.

Various techniques are available to extend the data at a particular site, including the use of storm transposition and numerical generation of synthetic storms, but these are still based on data collected in the recent past. The investigation of paleoflood evidence (evidence of flooding that occurred outside of the observed record) has the ability to inform the record of actual past flooding events in the region of interest.


In major flooding events, debris and sediment can be suspended and transported long distances in the fast-moving water. When the water enters a low-flow region, some of the suspended material will sink and become deposits on the surrounding floor. If these deposits are preserved in the environment, they can be used to estimate the time of the event and the flood discharge.


Paleoflood evidence can be found in terrace or overbank deposits when the water exceeds the riverbank and leaves the deposits on the surrounding land. These deposits may be good for estimating the frequency of flooding events that exceed that particular height, but they may not be good at estimating the flood stage for any particular event. Paleoflood evidence may also be deposited in caves or canyon walls, which could provide a good estimate for the flood stage, but the topography may be more prone to have one flooding event wash away the evidence of previous flooding events.


Paleoflood evidence has been used in arid climates with great success, but it was not clear if the same evidence would be preserved in humid climates. Initial research indicates that paleoflood evidence is preserved in humid environments but extracting the data may be more challenging than in arid environments.




### 2.3.5.1.2 Presentation











 Caves may provide better estimate of flood stage than terrace deposits

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#### 2.3.5.1.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

The presentation stated that partial information is better than looking for perfect information and as a result having no information. How do you understand the environmental setting at the time of the flood and whether there is collaborating evidence? That is, how can you tell if the information available is reliable and how should it be used in a flood assessment? This is particularly important with regard to frequency and the development of hazard curves.

#### Response:

The answer is very site specific. If a site appeared to be a meandering river that has changed flow paths you would consider results differently than at a site that is a canyon that has remained stable for 10,000 years. Therefore, the analyst has to consider the site environment and river basin and how they many have changed over time. Sensitivity studies provide on was to deal with this. For example, if you want to study how a river would change in depth or base height, you could consider depositional effects that lift up the riverbed and scouring effects that wear it down. However, if you are looking at paleoflood evidence, the river may have moved up or down a little bit but may have roughly maintained the same width... It takes a significant amount of water to make a difference in height at high elevations. However, in a sensitivity analysis, one can consider an area that is 10 feet deeper and determine whether that change has an impact on the results.

One concern is that though flooding may have occurred at some point in history, evidence of it cannot be found and so it would be missing from the data. However, this concern can be minimized by gathering information from multiple different locations. For example, data from the different universities that are working in different, yet nearby, locations could be combined. If there is evidence of floods around Knoxville, TN, that do not have corresponding evidence [from the sites studied by researchers working in the same area, but from] Alabama, that could indicate a problem and the need to gather data from many more places to have a good estimate of the flood history...

#### Question:

How is carbon dating applied to flooding studies for NPPs?

#### Response:

Radiocarbon dating can be used only over a certain period back in time and requires something in the flood deposit that has enough carbon to analyze. For example, a flood deposit may contain a twig, but to use radiocarbon dating the analyst would have to know whether that twig would have the same date as that flood, or whether that twig had been present for long time before the flood occurred and picked it up and carried it away. Another sampling technique called optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) looks at the effect of exposure to the sunlight of particular crystals. A sample that has been buried in the dark for a number of years, then collected and kept in the dark before analysis, would generate an output that can be correlated to much longer timeframes than radiocarbon samples. Other techniques may be able to date samples that are much older, but paleoflood evidence from a million years ago would not be applicable because a sample from that time would have been under the ocean. Paleoflood evidence is applicable for flooding events with AEPs of about 10<sup>-2</sup> to 10<sup>-4</sup> but becomes less credible beyond that.

#### Question:

The presence of freshwater clam shells and other evidence of reptiles and amphibians in these flood deposits can also provide some insight.

#### Response:

Depending on the finding, the finding could have been affected by humans because humans have been present during that time period. For example, some dirt next to a canyon wall was sunken. The geologists thought that it could have been the result of rainfall washing soil away. The archaeologist pointed out that looters digging for artifacts were a more likely cause. It takes a range of expertise to fully understand what the field evidence shows. You have to look in multiple places and see what all the evidence tells you to form a complete picture.

#### Question:

A researcher may find evidence in a particular location, but the site with the relevant frequency analysis is 10 miles downstream. What method would be used to try to bring that information together? Locations may have radically different responses in terms of the water surface elevation.

#### Response:


EPRI has partnered with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which has two different models. One includes all of the existing dams, but the other is a naturals model that assumes that none of the dams have been built. The naturals model can be run with a water level at a particular site, downstream or upstream, to determine water level at another site. The model has been calibrated with water flows. Models probably already exist for large rivers, but a hydraulic /hydrologic model could be built for the watershed of interest to determine the water height at the site of interest based on the water height at another location along the river. If the difference between the sites is significant, then the analysis would need to consider where the water came from in the first place. For example, if the cause was some kind of precipitation event that added water to the watershed, the water could have fallen in one part of the watershed and not the other. As these rivers filter into each other and combine, a flooding event may affect one part of the watershed and not another.


2.3.5.2 Paleofloods on the Tennessee River—Assessing the Feasibility of Employing Geologic Records of Past Floods for Improved Flood Frequency Analysis, or "Eastern US Riverine Flood Geomorphology Feasibility Study – Are Paleoflood Studies Possible in the midst of the tress and ticks? Tessa Harden\*, Ph.D., USGS, Oregon Water Science Center; and Jim O'Connor\*, Ph.D., USGS, Geology, Minerals, Energy, and Geophysics Science Center, Portland, OR (Session 2C-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C513</u>)

#### 2.3.5.2.1 Abstract


A 2015 field survey and stratigraphic analysis, coupled with geochronologic techniques, indicate that a rich history of large Tennessee River floods is preserved in the Tennessee River Gorge area. Deposits of flood sediment from the 1867 peak discharge of record (460,000 cubic feet per second at Chattanooga, TN) appear to be preserved at many locations throughout the study area. Small exposures at two boulder overhangs reveal evidence of three to four earlier floods similar in size to or larger than the 1867 flood in the last 3,000 years, one possibly more than 50 percent larger. Flood deposits are also preserved in stratigraphic sections at the mouth of the gorge at Williams Island and near Eaves Ferry about 70 miles upstream from the gorge. These stratigraphic records may extend as far back as about 9,000 years, preserving a long history of Tennessee River floods. Although more evidence is needed to confirm these findings, it is clear that a more in-depth, comprehensive paleoflood study is feasible for the Tennessee River. This study also lends confidence to the feasibility of successful comprehensive paleoflood studies in other basins in the eastern United States.

#### 2.3.5.2.2 Presentation








#### 2-225











# Screening results:

•Several southeastern US sites are potentially suitable, including several rivers with multiple sites.


These include Susquehanna River, Pennsylvania; Tennessee River, Tennessee; and Catawba River, South Carolina.

O'Connor, J.E., Atwater, B.F., Cohn, T.A., Cronin, T.M., Keith, M.K., Smith, C.G., and Mason, R.R., 2014, Assessing inundation hazards to nuclear powerplant sites using geologically extended histories of riverine floods, tsunamis, and storm surges: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2014–5207, 66 p., *http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/sir20145207*.

## **≊USGS**

slide 14

## Off to Chattanooga, March 20-26, 2016



# **Objective (simple version):**

Is a paleoflood study feasible in the eastern United States?

## Approach:


- Reconnaissance to identify potential sites
- Excavate and assess stratigraphy at a few key sites
- OSL and radiocarbon sample collection and analysis

**≊USGS** 

slide 16





Fieldwork, March 20-26, 2016:











2-237

# Tennessee River has all the ingredients:

- Sites
- Sediment
- Stratigraphy
- Potential for Chronology
- Bonus: Historical Information





slide 28

# Tasks for a Comprehensive Study (to begin in 2017)

- 1: Arrange for site access and permits
- 2: Thorough reconnaissance of potential sites (February, 2017)
- 3: Excavate and analyze the stratigraphy and chronology of the most promising sites
- 4: Determine likely flood magnitudes
- 5: Flood frequency analysis
- 6: Provide a USGS peer-reviewed report

## **≊USGS**

slide 29

# Funding and contact information:

- National Screening, and the Tennessee River scoping (2016) and implementation (planned for 2017-2018) funded by Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
- USGS Personnel: Tessa Harden <u>tharden@usgs.gov</u>); Jim O'Connor (<u>oconnor@usgs.gov</u>); and Harry Jenter (<u>hjenter@usgs.gov</u>)
- NRC Personnel: Mark Fuhrmann (<u>mark.fuhrmann@nrc.gov</u>); Meredith Carr (<u>Meredith.Carr@nrc.gov</u>); and Joseph Kanney (<u>Joseph.Kanney@nrc.gov</u>)

**≥USGS** 

slide 30

# **References:**

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- O'Connor, J.E., Atwater, B.F., Cohn, T.A., Cronin, T.M., Keith, M.K., Smith, C.G., and Mason, R.R., 2014, Assessing inundation hazards to nuclear powerplant sites using geologically extended histories of riverine floods, tsunamis, and storm surges: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2014–5207, 66 p. <u>http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/sir20145207</u>.



slide 31

#### 2.3.5.2.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

Among other things, the project looked at mica grains to help understand the energy of the flood and its deposit. Could you describe the energy regime and how you try to understand how big the flood is based upon the evidence of these so-called marker layers, as well as the scenario of the flood that might have deposited them? For example, could there have been ice jams or some earthquake that caused debris to create a dam that then caused the water levels to rise? What kinds of analysis have you done to think about the nature of the flood itself?

#### Response:

The first question relates to the method of extrapolation or taking the information of the deposit to determine how big the flood was. The approach is actually simple. The flood had to have a stage that was at least as high as a deposit. However, that is all that is known. For big floods or thick deposits, attempts are made to trace deposits up as high as possible in the existing records, but it is still not possible to know how much bigger the flood was above the deposit. One positive aspect of these new approaches is that they can accommodate that type of data (i.e., data that quantify the presence of a certain number of floods above a certain level in a given time period, but that do not indicate how much more above that level the floods were). However, that type of data is efficiently incorporated using these maximum likelihood techniques and the estimator approaches into the flood frequency analyses.

The second question relates to context issues. Historic information is valuable, in that if you find a deposit at the level of a known flood, it is certainly plausible that the found deposit was from an event similar to the known flood. However, if you find a deposit that is significantly higher or coarser, then you would need to consider what other types of mechanisms could generate higher stages. This is another advantage of these field studies in that they reveal considerations that are outside of those you were visualizing as the potential range of hazards affecting a site. For example, there could have been some sort of landslide in the Tennessee River Gorge that blocked the valley. Although that changes your flood frequency analysis, it is important to know for the plants upstream or downstream. As a result, these kinds of geological approaches are doubly valuable because they can tell you something about the problem of interest, but they might also tell you about problems that you should be interested in but did not know about.

#### Question:

Has Bulletin 17C been published yet?

#### Response:

Bulletin 17C is out for peer review, with plans to publish it by summer 2017<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Bulletin 17C was published March 29, 2018 as England, J.F., Jr., Cohn, T.A., Faber, B.A., Stedinger, J.R., Thomas, W.O., Jr., Veilleux, A.G., Kiang, J.E., and Mason, R.R., Jr., 2018, Guidelines for determining flood flow frequency— Bulletin 17C: U.S. Geological Survey Techniques and Methods, book 4, chap. B5, 148 p., <u>https://pubs.usgs.gov/tm/04/b05/tm4b5.pdf</u>

#### Question:

Have you used heavy mineral analysis? This could be an indicator for the movement based on the gravitational forces and the flood forces. It could also help in considering the particulate size distribution and determining how particles are distributed in the floods in different periods of time. Such information may indicate the dynamics for the flood forces taking place. The particulate size and shape of the particulate could be useful in determining the erosional forces that took place and thus the size of the flood. It may also be useful to conduct a heavy metal analysis for all of the sediments. It could be useful to separate the heavy minerals in the sediments of different layers and try to analyze them, including how they are distributed among the layers.

#### Response:

This study's stratigraphic approach is very simple, but there are many more complicated approaches that could be taken involving the techniques mentioned that would likely require expensive equipment. USBR does use the particle size, although it is not quantified in a rigorous way. Rather, it is used in a qualitative way in that, if one deposit is coarser or thicker than the other, it would hint that it was from a bigger flood. Although such an observation does not indicate flood size for certain, it inspires us to look higher. The minerology is also considered informally, mainly to be secure about the source of the sediment. For example, in the Tennessee River sites, one question is whether those deposits could have resulted from water coming down the hillslopes and somehow reaching underneath and into those caves. In that example, we know that could not have been the case because there is no source of mica in the rocks on the hill slopes. By contrast, the Tennessee River sediment is full of mica, which is easy to recognize in the sediments. Therefore, if mica is present, it indicates that this is Tennessee River sediment. This approach is simple, straightforward stratigraphy, although there are certainly ways to make it much more complicated and spend a lot more money doing it.

#### Question:

Did you observe any terrace deposits either in the Gorge or upstream that you could use to bracket the flood stages?

#### Response:

The Gorge itself does not contain much in the way of terrace deposits or alluvial deposits. At the upstream entrance to the Gorge, Williams Island has about a 10,000-year record of stratigraphy. We did study that; however, because that island was inundated by the 1867 flood and other historic floods, it does not reveal much about the full size of the floods. The stratigraphic record of thick and thin deposits could be correlated with the better record of high floods along the canyon margins. Further work at Williams Island will be done to determine whether that floodplain stratigraphy can be linked with what is seen up higher. The floodplain stratigraphy upstream could also be considered in terms of trying to evaluate flood history. In addition, although the valley was quite wide upstream, in some places the river banks up against bedrock, and that bedrock itself also contained higher flood deposits that could be evaluated. In addition to the Tennessee Gorge, other places on that river corridor are also worth investigating.

#### Question:

When the 1-in-500-year flood essentially turns out to be in the 60-year systematic data range, and research for the history of the flood reveals other floods, how can you be confident that you have

not missed information in between the big floods, or on a lot of other smaller floods (but that are bigger than the regular-sized flood), affecting the statistical tails because you do not have the precisions that are available from observing floods (i.e., those 60 years of systematic data)?

#### Response:

One way to address this issue is by conducting a sensitivity test. For example, if the data are missing three floods in a particular timeframe between given sizes, how big a difference does it make to the results? It turns out that if the biggest flood in the last certain number of years can be determined, the other ones do not matter as much. This results in an interpretative conclusion, such as "We know that we have had at least one flood of 50,000 cubic feet per second in the last 1,000 years." To help constrain the statistical tail, you would need to draw a conclusion about what has not happened. For example, if you can say that, because of the stratigraphy here, there was no flood this high in the last 10,000 years that helps constrain the flood frequency distribution. This type of information is also now much more efficiently employed in these newer flood frequency estimation techniques. In the end, you do need to have some confidence in some aspect of the record. This is one reason why both these studies are being done in parallel, to identify what happens when two different groups are doing the same work on the same river. Do the interpretive aspects work out to the same results in the end?

#### Comment:

In licensing, the approach is to base everything on procedures. The standard is presented, and peer reviews are conducted to determine whether the standard is met. The goal is to remove judgment from the process. In this discussion, there is concern with the extent that extrapolation can be done. These studies involve the professional judgment of expert geologists, statisticians, and others and provide good information to help improve decision-making. How does the NRC anticipate applying the information from these studies and this discussion into the nuclear power plant licensing process?

#### Response: NRC Hydrologist

The NRC will need to use multiple lines of evidence, multiple methods to increase our confidence in decision-making. This information is very good input to the risk-informed decision-making process, even though the answers may not be as crisp as we are used to obtaining in deterministic analysis.

#### 2.3.6 Day 2: Session 2D - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response I

This session considered the development of guidance for assessing the reliability of flood protection and plant response to flooding events.

**2.3.6.1 EPRI Flood Protection Project Status**, David Ziebell and John Weglian\*, EPRI (Session 2D-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C515</u>)

#### 2.3.6.1.1 Abstract

EPRI is actively helping nuclear electric generating companies manage the risk of external flooding by providing good technical practices where needed. The Flood Protection Systems Guide was published in November 2015 (EPRI ID 3002005423, available at cost to non-members) and describes flood-protection components at NPPs and the design, testing, inspection, and maintenance of these components. This presentation highlighted some of the information provided in that EPRI guide and describes a follow-on research and development effort to identify and communicate good practices in maintaining an external flooding design/ licensing basis. These guides are based on information collected from a consensus of industry peers. EPRI's members have asked for information to assist in the development and management of their flood-protection basis requirements in regard to external flooding-related events.


The published guideline gives specific attention to flood barrier penetration seals because of the relative complexity, varying designs, and lack of existing codes and standards for these components. Although the focus of the guide is on external flooding-related events, this guide provides descriptions of components, design considerations, maintenance activities, and other topics that can apply to both external and internal flood-protection requirements. Additional sections within the guide address recent industry events and major considerations for establishing and managing flood-basis requirements at the site level.

The design/licensing basis guide being developed is based on a detailed survey of design and management practices regarding maintaining adequate basis for operability of external flood -protection components at NPPs. This presentation described the survey approach and summarized the current status of the results being analyzed. In addition, this presentation described the planned report outline, which constitutes current views as to the kinds of management elements needed for an NPP owner to effectively manage the risk of external flooding.

Examples of key elements to be described in the guide include the following:

- design
- qualification
- maintenance
- design change process
- inspection
- periodic surveillance of flood protection features
- mitigating strategies for off-normal conditions
- training
- reevaluations of the adequacy of management methods
- integrated assessment
- documentation and reporting






### Flood Protection Systems Guide – Available to Members



- 12 Utilities Involved in TAG
- Good Initial Industry Feedback
- Significant Product Downloads Since Publication 11/24/15



Flood Protection Systems Guide – 2015 Technical Report

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
 Immediate response to assist members by providing flood protection feature guidance.





 Focused on feature descriptions, design criteria, inspections, and available testing methods.

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
### **Flood Protection Systems Guide Overview**

#### Section 3: Current Testing Methods and Acceptance Criteria

- Summary of Historic Penetration Seal Testing Methods
- Primer for follow-on work related to test criteria development

Design Consideration:

**Barrier Type and Thickness** 



guard against catastrophic tailure or the PPS during postulated moding events. For vertically ionited FBPSs, material arcep should be considered to ensure isoli leakage paths do not develop over time. Locations susceptible to leakage due to material oreep include the interface between the top of the opening and FBPS materials, as well as, the interface between the underside of any rigid penetrating items and the adjacent FBPS materials.

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
#### Flood Protection Systems Guide Overview Section 5: In-service Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Recommendations Table 5-2 Indications of Material Aging of FBPSs Material Indications of Material Aging Boot seals · Boot fabric may become less pliable/flexible. Boot fabric may crack, rip or tear when moved. Boot fabric may exhibit signs of chafing. Fiberglass reinforcing may become exposed. Bands/clamps at pipe and sleeve interfaces may become loose and require re-tightening. · Caulking at boot seam or at pipe/sleeve interfaces may separate. Grout seals Grout material may exhibit cracking or shrinkage Separation may be noticeable at penetrating items or opening edge Silicone Foam · Foam material may shrink. Visible signs of shrinkage include edge curl, concaved surfaces, and seal separation at penetrating items or opening substrate · Foam may become less pliable/flexible. Foam may exhibit cracking, tearing or splitting at penetrating item interfaces. · Foam material may harden, crack, tear or darken in color near penetrating items with elevated operating temperatures -© 2017 Electric Power Resea **Flood Protection Systems Guide Overview** Root Cause Summary for Recent Operating Experience loss of design and/or configuration recognition inspections equipment simulation or verification of contro contro testing, or repair procedures Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 7

#### Section 7: Establishing and Managing a Flood Bases

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
- Best practices from within TAG outlined
- Primer for Design Basis Best Practices Guideline focused more on "programmatic" aspects

10



	<ul> <li>Section Outlines</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Design (Method)</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Identification of features</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Acceptable methods</li> </ul>	
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<ul> <li>Work Management Procedures</li> </ul>	sporation
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<ul> <li>Maintenance Rule</li> </ul>	
– PMs	
<ul> <li>Installation and Testing</li> </ul>	
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	EPRI External Flood Protection Design / Licensing Basis Survey	
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	Thank you for your participation in this survey, which is intended to determine how plants best manage and maintain plant barriers, barrier components and other features used to protect against and mitigate the effects o <u>external flooding</u> .	of
	Click here to <u>download a Word version of this survey</u> . Please click the link(s) in the table below to start a survey. From this webpage, you may continue or update your responses for a site - answers are saved as you progress through the survey.	
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# **EPRI Point of Contact**

Project Manager: David Ziebell (<u>dziebell@epri.com</u>) – 404-316-9823

Supporting / Prior EPRI Participants: Jeff Greene, Senior Technical Leader Sam Harvey, Principal Technical Leader



# **Together...Shaping the Future of Electricity**

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Presenter: John E. Weglian Senior Technical Leader jweglian@epri.com 704-595-2763

22

Technical Lead: David Ziebell Senior Technical Leader dziebell@epri.com 404-316-9823

# 2.3.6.1.3 Questions and Answers

# Question:

You mention triggers and the advanced warning aspect of this effort. Because a warning affects the time available to potentially perform some actions, how was this aspect considered?

# Response:

I will note that I do not have personal insight into this project and am just presenting it. External flooding is the only hazard that we consider that might provide time for a warning. The approach of a forest fire may also permit such a warning. Other hazards do not give that flexibility. Certain flooding events may allow between hours and days of forewarning that the event is coming, and temporary barriers such as sandbags could be included. Considerations would include how long it takes to put up those barriers, the training requirements, and best practices, both in actions and the triggers to use. Guidance provided should be clear-cut and unambiguous so that users will not get it wrong. Timing and training should be addressed to make sure that users implement those actions correctly.

# Follow-up Question:

Many of these cases happened very recently because of the reassessment and the walkdowns. To what extent does this survey map or provide an image of a situation that is in flux? How much variability was evident between people who did have a well-established external flood program and those that did not, and between people who had well-established triggers and those that did not.

# Response:

The goal is to find and report on the best practices of each particular aspect that are identified by industry respondents. The report will not consider the variability in the answers but provide the best practices and not the worst.

# Comment:

With regard to external hazards, certain high-wind scenarios would also come with some sort of a warning time. In some cases, that will actually be correlated to the warning time for flooding. For example, in a hurricane, wind and storm surge are predicted. To a lesser extent, the convective environment that would be prone to hazards such as tornadic outbreaks might be known.

# Response:

Utilities have high-wind procedures and actions that they would implement knowing that such a hazard was coming. This may include a tornado warning and additional steps, such as not sending people outside anymore.

# Comment:

With regard to trigger points, some organizations have strived to identify actions that are easy to reverse and not too expensive and that can be based on the forecast. Actions that are hard to reverse and very big decisions should be based on rain on the ground. Quantitative precipitation

forecasts (QPFs) can predict a large amount of rainfall but only a small amount falls, and organizations do not want to recommend difficult actions and be seen to "cry wolf."

# Response:

Weather forecasters probably do not forecast the absolute extreme. For a rain forecast of 4 to 6 inches, the 90-percent probability may be 12 inches, but they are not forecasting 12 inches. They likely have particular wording to use when the model actually shows that 12 inches will fall. The approach also probably differs between an NWS forecast and one from the local news station.

# Question:

Given that one of the future elements of the flood protection status will be the periodic surveillance of flood protection features, will flood risk significance be a criterion as to what, when, and how to inspect that flood protection feature? For example, because a plant may have 1,000 seals, external flooding would be a hazard. Would you consider all 1,000 of the seals or can only those seals that may lead to the greatest flood possibility be the focus, to best use limited resources? How will this periodic surveillance be accomplished?


# Response:

This activity will not incorporate risk-based methodologies to try to consider that aspect. Instead, it covers more of a deterministic side of the equation that looks for best practices in the industry and actions people take. If a reasonable approach to prioritization is made available, that would be communicated.

**2.3.6.2** Performance of Flood-Rated Penetration Seals, William (Mark) Cummings\*, P.E., Fire Risk Management, Inc. (Session 2D-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C516</u>)


# 2.3.6.2.1 Abstract

Overall risk analyses of NPPs include the need for protection against potential flooding events, both internal and external events. Typically, a primary method used to mitigate the effects of a flooding event is the implementation of flood-rated barriers that isolate areas of the plant from the intrusion or spread of flood waters. Any penetrations through flood-rated barriers to facilitate piping, cabling, or other components must be properly protected to maintain the flood resistance of the barrier. Numerous types and configurations of seal assemblies and materials are being used at NPPs to protect penetrations in flood-rated barriers. However, no standardized methods or testing protocols exist to evaluate, verify, or quantify the performance of these, or any newly installed, flood seal assemblies. The NRC has implemented a research program to develop a set of standard testing procedures that will be used to evaluate and quantify the performance of any penetration seal assembly that is, or will be, installed in flood-rated barriers. This presentation provided a status of that research project and outlined plans to perform flood testing on candidate seal assemblies. This testing will evaluate the ability of the procedures to adequately address and record the various performance parameters of individual seal assemblies/materials. The results of this research program may be used in the evaluation of a seal assembly/material and whether it is acceptable for protecting penetrations in flood-rated barriers.





# **Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation**



- Research primarily restricted to publically-available information on NRC web site
   ADAMS database
  - NPP responses to NRC 50.54 Letter (54)
  - NRC Audit Reports
  - LERs, NUREGs, INs. IRs (relevant info noted in 28/-/15/13)
- Only four (4) of the NPP responses provided useable data/info
  - Resulted in database of 1880 individual FPSs
- Wide variety of seal assemblies and materials noted
  - Concrete, Mortar, Grout
  - Mechanical seals (such as boot or link)
  - Silicone foams (high & low densities)
  - Epoxies & Elastomers
  - Urethane
  - Caulking
- Combination of "fill" materials with exterior "damming" materials applied (waterproofing)

# **Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation**

## TASK 1.1 OVERVIEW (Cont'd)

- Wide range of penetration configurations and types of penetrants
  - Rectangular & Circular
  - Sleeved and Core Bore
  - Single & Multiple Penetrants and "Blanks"
  - · Pipes, Cables, Conduit, etc.
  - Varying sizes / diameters
- Both interior and exterior applications
- FPS Assessments
  - "Formed in place" seals (foams, elastomers) appear to exhibit greatest variability in performance
  - Materials / Products (formulations) vary between Manufacturers
- Lessons-learned from Fire Testing of penetration seals
  - Standardized testing methods (repeatability & reproducibility)
  - Defined performance metrics
  - Multi-functional testing not performed (such as combining fire & seismic performance)
- Summary Report Developed: "Flood Penetration Seal Assemblies at Existing Nuclear Power Plants"



# **Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation**

## TASK 1.2 OVERVIEW

- Review of NUVIA Flood Test Apparatus & Procedures
  - NUVIA is only entity currently testing FPSs; using standard procedures/protocols
- Review of UL 1479 Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Firestops
  - Section 6A Water Leakage Test (W rating)
  - · UL has yet to qualify any penetration seal for water-resistance; no test apparatus constructed
- Review of FM Approval Standard for Flood Abatement Equipment
  - · Does not address "penetrations" in flood barriers; primarily the barriers themselves, including dikes
  - · Does provide some input regarding "impact" resistance
- Review of ASTM E814 Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Penetration Firestop Systems
  - Used as a primary "template" for formatting Flood Test Procedure
  - Industry familiarity with formatting



# Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation

# TASK 1.2 OVERVIEW (Cont'd)

- Draft Procedure developed & delivered to NRC for review / comment
  - Includes "sample" test apparatus design (primarily for use with Task 2)
  - Procedure provides test "guidance" and standardized methodology
  - Minimal "hard" metrics for acceptance / failure
  - Minimum test pressures and/or duration may need specification



# **Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation**

# TASK 2 OVERVIEW

#### Development of Test Plan

- Selection of candidate FPSs; types and numbers to be tested
- Final design for Test Apparatus
- Location for testing

#### Test Objective(s)

- Exercise & evaluate Flood Test Procedure ("test the test")
- Research/Evaluation of specific FPS assemblies/materials noted as installed at NPPs

#### Test Matrix

- Include all types of seal assemblies & materials
- Greater emphasis on "formed in place" seals
- Some evaluation of existing (non-standard) seal configurations noted during Task 1 document research
- Scheduled Test Results/Report due mid-2018



# Flood Penetration Seal Performance Evaluation


# TASK 3 OVERVIEW

- Development of Final Technical Report
  - Summation of Task 1 & 2 results
  - Suitable for NUREG
- Scheduled Project Completion; 3<sup>rd</sup> Qtr 2018

## **GOING FORWARD**

#### NUREG

- Provide guidance to Industry for standardized process for evaluating/quantifying FPS performance
- Support NRC oversight requirements
- FPS pass/fail criteria will be function of Flood PRA requirements; NPP-specific
- Possible future development of commercial (industry) Test Standard



2.3.6.2.3 Questions and Answers

# Question:

Companies such as Nuvia may test seals for NPPs, maybe in France or other parts of Europe. Have you considered whether there are protocols outside of the United States that can inform this work?

# Response:

We are unaware of any other company in the world besides NUVIA that is making or testing actual flood seals. To consider seals associated with maritime uses, we looked at the standards available through Lloyds, the American Bureau of Shipping, and the military, well as non-U.S. entities, in terms of the authorities with jurisdiction. However, none of those organizations appear to be doing this work using a standard format.

# Question:

This research appears to focus on new, manufactured seals produced by different manufacturers and testing them in a defined facility. How will this research translate to the plants? Will they have portable options to test seals? Will those be recommended in the study? How are you considering installed seals?

# Response:

Ideally, many of the plants are using defined configurations, especially for the mechanical seals. Using the data provided by the plants on the exact nature of the seals, specific assemblies can be replicated in a test. The assembly may not be one that is currently marketed as a flood penetration or flood-rated seal assembly. This type of testing is planned for the second part of the study...

# Follow-up Question:

The task will then be to provide recommendations on how to test the seals in place, and the pass criteria will be no more than a certain number of cubic centimeters of leakage.

# Response:

The determination of the metrics is the question. The easiest approach, used in NUVIA's testing, is to state that the passing criterion is zero leakage. It will be more challenging to develop metrics that are performance based or risk informed (i.e., a little leakage may not lead to fail, if other mechanisms are in place to ensure that this leakage will not impact plant safety). For example, leakage of 0.6 liters per hour for one particular seal under 40 feet of head pressure may not pose a risk for plant A, but may for Plant B. Or 15 such seals replicated in a wall may pose a risk collectively. Therefore, we are trying to develop a protocol that gives a standardized way of looking at seals, testing those seals, and capturing whether there is leakage and if so what that leakage rate is. This information would return to the manufacturer to adjust designs for new seals. Existing plants would use the results as a basis to determine whether or not to replace a particular seal.

# Question:

A previous presentation discussed the failure of some seals at the Blayais site in France. Did Électricité de France perform any failure mode analyses that could be taken into account in this study and the resulting recommendations? For example, you have spoken about hydraulic tests. What about thermal, chemical, biological, and longevity effects on the seals, or does that add too much complexity? Is the study only considering whether the seal will hold water regardless of the environment it will be put in?

# Response:

The development and use of seals does need to take many other variables into account, such as chemical (i.e., material interactions). Many considerations are important to the adherence of a material, such as whether a penetration is sleeved or just core drilled. Manufacturers need to indicate what their material can or cannot do and then put restrictions on the use of the seals, such as that the penetration has to be sleeved or it has to be core drilled to get the proper adhesion properties to allow the seal to work.

A fire penetration seal for an application where seismic factors are a consideration, such as for a seismic rated wall or barrier, would have to be designed so that the penetrant is braced and moves as the wall moves. A significant amount of flex would not be expected in the penetration itself. The significance of such properties would need to be considered. The potential for an external seal to be exposed to impact damage during a flood would need to be considered. However, such analyses involving different variables can become very complicated, and the limits of the proposed protocol need to be established. From a thermal perspective, materials will experience some expansion, but a fire test would not consider this. For the study of seals and

flooding, some questions will require interaction with manufacturers about the limitations of a given material. For example, can it support expansion and contraction? Does the material shrink? Are small gaps a problem? Over time, minor leakage around the seal may begin to occur—is this a separation of the material from the wall, whether it is a sleeve and concrete, or is it separation from the penetrant? Although such questions rely on the manufacturer as the one with knowledge of its chemical formulas, many of these data are proprietary and will not be available to researchers. Manufacturers should ideally perform the testing or installing, where appropriate, so that they cannot blame performance issues on incorrect testing or installation. A risk-informed approach needs to take such factors into consideration, as well as plant-specific sensitivity analysis (i.e., what makes a big difference for a particular plant?).

# Question:

When modeling the degradation processes, is it possible to speed up the degradation? Is it possible to have a seal in the test apparatus that performs more like what is actually out there now, which could be very old?

# Response:

This is less of a problem for mechanical seals, but boot seals can crack. In the field, a visual inspection would reveal a condition such as rust on a mechanical seal that would indicate that it would not perform as well. Other materials might show surface cracking. There are ways of age-accelerating such conditions, but these may or may not be appropriate or representative. For example, exposing a seal to higher heat or higher levels of ultraviolet light for short periods of time may make it age faster. The level of accuracy of these methods is not known in terms of replicating how a seal would perform after 20 years.

# Follow-up Question:

Errors of installation, such as a failure to comply with the development length given in the manufacturer's specifications, could occur. Do you plan to look at seals that are outside of the specifications for installation to determine how that does or does not affect their performance?

# Response:

The human element is certainly a consideration. If the manufacturer's specifications are not followed, a seal may not adhere or will pop out with a higher pressure. However, the assumption is that when an installation of a seal is signed off, that means that the seal was installed in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements and the manufacturer or certified representative is liable for that assertion. If the seal fails, then an investigation would consider the reason for failure and whether it was a materials or an installation issue. In-service and other nondestructive testing cannot always tell whether installation was performed properly. Destructive testing is performed in some plants for some applications. If any were not installed properly, further investigation would be needed on others.

# Comment:

Questions have arisen on aging and the fact that the performance or future performance of both new material/seals and existing seals needs to be considered, in both new and existing plants. In addition, once there is an accepted testing protocol, plants that are decommissioning will provide an opportunity to harvest and then test various types of seals that have been in service for various periods of time. This could provide an opportunity to apply the protocol and gather a lot of very significant data that could be put to use in plant PRAs.

# Response:

The engineering of the seals is a factor. Evaluations are trying to extrapolate some of the test data to existing scenarios. For example, some seals use low-density forms. Testing has shown that in some cases, putting pressure around a low-density foam will cause it to shrink and can allow a greater flow of water around the seal. Evidence of that kind of performance may force the industry to investigate further and make some more broad-based decisions on the types of seals that may not be appropriate for use in a flood-rated barrier (as opposed to a fire-rated barrier).

It is a great suggestion to take advantage of opportunities to extract some seal materials from existing plants, because in some real-world applications, such as in a cable spreading room, accessing the penetrations is difficult, even for visual inspection.

# Question:

Will the product provide guidance on selecting bounding tests for other seal assemblies that might have varying geometric properties (e.g., annular spaces, penetrant size/number)?

# Response:

Such tests would need to be done on many different configurations to bound those materials and how they perform. For example, a 24-inch-diameter penetration has a 2-inch conduit running through it, which means that there is a lot of free surface area available to pressure. Such a configuration may react significantly differently when 10 conduits are running through that same penetration, with less free area to be subject to pressure. However, this configuration has more surface area, depending on the adhesive property of the materials, for the seal to adhere to that will keep the water from pushing through. Ultimately, this requires considering the types of materials that are used as the seal material and their individual properties to guide some of those bounding evaluations. If a material is tested with a fairly broad disparity between the configurations, it may be possible to extrapolate to determine how configurations in the middle of tested extremes will work as well. However, this will likely require a material assembly-type specific evaluation each time.

# Question:

Are the tests under discussion laboratory testing or is situ testing or both?

# Response:

At present, tests require an appropriate test apparatus, seals are not tested on a wall where they have been installed. This would not be feasible as a plant will not permit flooding of a compartment to test the seals there. Testing requires having a laboratory with the appropriate apparatus that can appropriately run the test using a standard methodology. The testing can involve changes to the protocol and a sensitivity analysis. For example, should the seal be hit immediately with a full range of pressure or should that pressure build up? There is a wide range of variables to address, depending on the flooding scenario.

# Question:

There is a distinction between qualification and acceptance testing versus in-service testing. Inservice testing may not be feasible for items such as flood seals. Are there examples of in-service testing for fire seals?

# Response:

A fire seal would be examined visually using that manufacturer's recommendation for what it should look like when new. If some cracking is observed, look to the manufacturer's specifications. However, the only way to verify that a seal is still good is to perform destructive testing. To do this, a certain percentage of the seals would be removed and examined to determine whether the seal was still good. If those seals pass, there is a higher level of confidence in the installation of other seals with the same type of installation and installed during roughly the same time period.

# Question:

Could an acoustic technique be used, either in the laboratory or in situ, in order to measure performance? Acoustic techniques are very effective in doing that. Long-term performance of the material and any kind of structural deformation could be examined. Even if it is not clear whether the material is degraded, you could see a lot about how the structure changes on an atomic scale.

## Response:

This is outside my area of expertise. Acoustic testing may not be able to measure minor shrinkage that is not even visible to the naked eye. However, such testing may be able to provide information on some properties, such as the density and whether the material has any open areas or pores. Whether such testing is appropriate would likely depend on the specific material to be tested.

## Question:

Some dams are solid concrete and might have 30 or 40 feet or more of head. Are you are assuming that the walls themselves are leak free?

## Response:

This protocol is not meant to assess the actual wall leakage.

## Follow-up Question:

If a plant has a concrete wall 2-feet thick, what would have more leakage, the wall or some kind of penetration?

## Response:

Are you considering whether the concrete is water resistant or cracks over time? If there is a crack through all 2 feet of a wall, there are likely other issues from a structural standpoint.

# Follow-up Question:

We have a seminar in about 2 weeks on the alkali-silica reaction. That may be a case that results in a lot of leakage through the concrete.

# Response:

As part of their installation for a core drill, some manufacturers specify that a sealant needs to be applied to the concrete because there was some reaction between the material and the concrete that would not allow it to adhere properly.

# 2.3.7 Day 2: Daily Wrap-Up Question and Answer Period

# Question:

Speakers were talking earlier about using fitting or uncertainty in frequency analysis and the apparently wide uncertainties in the AEP curve, especially for the very rare event. Is it necessary to examine so many different probability distributions that do not appear to vary among themselves within the uncertainty limits?

## Response: Joseph Kanney, Hydrologist, NRC

This behavior is only evident once the analysis has been done and the different distributions evaluated. The point is to characterize and quantify the uncertainties. One way to do this is to run through the different factors that are contributing to the epistemic uncertainties. In the case of the flood frequency or precipitation frequency analysis, the different distributions are a key contributor to the uncertainties. It may turn out that, for some of the examples, the analysis shows that that there was not a lot of difference between certain distributions. The problem is that this is not known until the analysis is done.

# 2.3.8 Day 3: Session 3A - Reliability of Flood Protection and Plant Response II

This session considered the development of guidance for assessing the reliability of flood protection and plant response to flooding events.

**2.3.8.1 Effects of Environmental Factors on Manual Actions for Flood Protection and** *Mitigation at Nuclear Power Plants*, Rajiv Prasad\*, Ph.D., Garill Coles^, and Angela Dalton^, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; Kristi Branch and Alvah Bittner, Ph.D., CPE, Bittner and Associates; and Scott Taylor, Ph.D., Battelle Columbus (Session 3A-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C517</u>)

# 2.3.8.1.1 Abstract

Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, the NRC identified the need to ensure the manual actions for flood protection and mitigation(FPM) at NPPs are both feasible and reliable. Environmental factors and conditions associated with floods that trigger manual actions for FPM can adversely affect the operators' ability to perform these actions. In 1994, a study (NUREG/CR-5680, "The Impacts of Environmental Conditions on Human Performance," issued September 1994) reviewed available research on the impacts of environmental conditions (ECs) on human performance. The current research is part of the NRC's PFHA research plan in support of developing a risk-informed licensing framework. It aims to apply the lessons learned from NUREG/CR-5680 and more recent research on how ECs affect human performance for actions similar to NPP FPM manual actions. The first year of the project focused on characterizing manual actions from available NPP FPMs, developing a conceptual framework for assessment of impacts of ECs on human performance, characterizing ECs that are expected to be associated with floods that may trigger NPP FPM procedures, and reviewing the research literature related to effects of ECs on human performance. The second year of the current research has continued to refine the conceptual framework, complete the review of more recently available literature, and propose a proof-of-concept method for application of the available information within the conceptual framework.


The conceptual framework represents an FPM procedure as a set of manual actions, tasks and subtasks, generic actions (Gas), and performance demands (PDs). A manual action is a distinct group of interrelated tasks that are performed outside the main control room to achieve an operational goal. A task is one step of a manual action that has a distinct outcome or predetermined objective contributing to accomplishment of the manual action. A task generally requires both motor and cognitive abilities. Several subtasks may comprise a task. A GA is an individual component of a task or subtask that is sufficiently simple to evaluate the impact of ECs on human performance. Successful completion of a GA may require several PDs, which are human abilities including cognitive, motor, and communication. The PDs were developed from three sources: (1) NUREG/CR-5680 performance abilities, (2) O'Brien et al. (1992)<sup>4</sup> task taxonomy, and (3) cognitive functions from NUREG-2114, "Cognitive Basis for Human Reliability Analysis," issued January 2016. The proposed PDs include (1) detection and noticing, (2) understanding, (3) decision-making, (4) action, and (5) teamwork. The PD "action" is further subdivided into fine motor and coarse motor skills, and the PD "teamwork" is further subdivided into (1) reading and writing, (2) oral communication, and (3) crew interaction.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> O'Brien, L.H., Simon, R., and H. Swaminathan, "Development of the Personnel-Based System Evaluation Aid (PER-SEVAL) Performance Shaping Functions," United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1992.


The literature review was structured to integrate the most recent research information with that assembled in NUREG/CR-5680, address ECs that had not been covered in that review and present the findings in a format that is most useful for those reviewing and assessing performance impacts from the range and combinations of tasks, Gas, and PDs pertinent to outdoor work in varying weather conditions. Because the literature reviewed represented a wide range of methods, objectives, variables, and rigor, the presentation also provided an overview of the state of the literature on performance effects on a range of ECs that include those associated with extreme weather conditions.


The presentation used an example to describe a proof-of-concept method to demonstrate how impacts can be assessed on a task that is part of an FPM procedure taken from a real NPP. Research on ECs' impacts is available in four categories: (1) quantitative information that is directly applicable, (2) quantitative information that is less directly applicable, (3) qualitative information that may be used to inform expert judgments or sensitivity analyses, and (4) no information (i.e., a research gap). The proof-of-concept method as illustrated by the example has limitations that need to be addressed. Finally, potential future research topics were presented that will further improve upon the conceptual framework and facilitate application of the framework to evaluation of FPM manual actions at operating NPPs.

# 2.3.8.1.2 Presentation









# **Environmental Conditions (ECs)**

Flood-Causing Mechanisms	Environmental Factors that Could Co-Occur with Floods of Interest	Environmental Conditions that Could Affect Manual Actions		
Local Intense Precipitation Streams and Rivers Dam or water-storage structure failure Storm surges and seiches Tsunamis Ice dams or jams Channel diversion or migration	Cold Heat Humidity Precipitation (rain, sleet, hail, snow) Wind Thunder Lightning	Primary Environmental Conditions <u>Cold</u> <u>Heat</u> Relative Humidity Precipitation Type and Intensity Wind Velocity <u>Noise Level</u> Water Depth		
Conditions Contributing to Combinations of Flooding Mechanisms Concurrent wind-induced wave activity Antecedent or subsequent precipitation Snowpack Dam failure concurrent with riverine flood Earthquakes Concurrent high tides	Standing water Moving water Waves Outdoor light level Ice Snow	Water Velocity <u>Vibration Frequency and Intensity</u> <u>Lighting Level</u> / Low Visibility Presence of Ice Snow Depth Presence of Lightning <u>Secondary Environmental Conditions</u> Slippery/muddy surfaces Condensation Windborne debris Waterborne debris		

# **Technical Literature Review on ECs**


- A key component of the project is the development of a comprehensive technical literature review on ECs pertinent to flood protection and mitigation.
- The literature review updated the information on ECs included in NUREG/CR-5680 and included additional ECs:
  - 1. Vibration
  - 2. Noise
  - 3. Heat
  - 4. Cold
  - 5. Lighting
  - 6. Humidity
  - 7. Wind
  - 8. Precipitation
  - 9. Standing and moving water

10.Ice

- 11.Snowpack
- 12.Lightning



# Literature Review Approach: Example of Standing and Moving Water



# **Example of EC Literature Review Summary** Table – Standing and Moving Water

 For each EC, the available literature was summarized by performance demands and coded based on the 4 levels of information.

Performance Requirements for Standing/Moving Water	Level of Informatio n Related to Impacts	Assumptions and Limitations on Applicability
Detection and Noticing		
Attention, memory, vigilance, switching, acuity, perception and threshold perception	3	(b)
Sensation and visual recognition	3	(b)
Understanding		
Pattern recognition, discrimination, understanding, evaluating, hypothesizing, diagnosing, and integrating	3	(b)
Decision Making	A	
Reasoning, computation, interpreting, classifying, goal setting, planning, adapting, and evaluating and selecting options	3	(b)
Action	C	
Fine motor skills - discrete and motor continuous, and manual dexterity	3	(b)
Gross motor skills - heavy and light	1	(a)
Other neurophysiological functions	3	(b)
Teamwork		
Reading and writing	3	(b)
Oral face-to-face and electronic communication	3	(b)
Cooperation, crew interaction, and command and control	3	(b)

Information levels were not cleanly cut and expert judgment was used to make coding decisions.


1 = Quantitative information that is directly applicable to determining the quantitative impact of an EC on a performance demand and can be directly used to support the proof-ofconcept approach.


3 = Qualitative information




fitness, loose or form fitting clothing, shoe gripping abilities, etc. It can be assumed that once an individual topples in moving water, none of the other manual or cognitive tasks will be possible

# Example of Level 1 EC Information in Literature – Standing and Moving Water





# 2-275



# A Proof-of-Concept Method for Impact Assessment: Single Prevailing EC

The impact of an EC  $E_j$  on the GA  $G_k$ , as measured by time, is the difference between affected time  $(TG_k^*)$  and baseline time  $(TG_k)$ .

$$TG_k = \sum_{i=1}^9 T_{i,k}$$

the affected time for  $G_k$ , given only one prevailing EC  $E_i$ , is:

$$TG_k^* = \sum_{i=1}^9 T_{i,k}^* = \sum_{i=1}^9 (1 + \Delta_{i,j,k}) T_{i,k}$$

Where

19

 $G_k$  = a GA, where  $k = 1, 2, 3, ..., n_G$ i = a performance demand required by  $G_k$ , where , ranges from 1 to 9

 $w_i$  = weight for performance demand<sub>i</sub>, where  $w_i \in [0,1]$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^9 w_i = 1$ 

 $E_i$  = an EC, where  $j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n_E$ 

 $I_{i,i,k}$  = impact factor for performance demand, from prevailing  $E_i$  within  $G_k$ 

 $TG_k$  = baseline time for performing  $G_k$ 

 $T_{i,k}$  = baseline time associated with performance demand , within  $G_k$  (which is  $w_i T G_k$ )  $\Delta_{i,j,k}$  = time adjustment for performance demand i from prevailing  $E_i$  within  $G_k$  ( $\Delta_{i,j,k}$  =  $I_{i,i,k} - 1$ 

 $TG_k^*$  = affected time for performing  $G_k$ 


 $_{18} T_{i,k}^*$  = affected time associated with performance demand <sub>i</sub> within  $G_k$  Pacific Northwest

# A Proof-of-Concept Method for Impact Assessment: Multiple Prevailing ECs

To account for the impact of multiple ECs, the impact factor I<sub>i,j,k</sub> could be combined (three examples):  $I_{i,k} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_E} I_{i,j,k}$ 

a) Simple additive combination, where  $n_E$  is the number of prevailing ECs while performing  $G_k$ 


b) Multiplicative combination, where  $n_E$  is the number of prevailing ECs while performing  $G_k$ 



c) Power function combination, where  $\alpha_i$ ,  $j_{-1,2,3,...n_E}$  are the different exponents for prevailing ECs' impacts while performing  $G_k$ 

Thus, the affected time for  $G_k$ , given multiple prevailing ECs, is expressed below, where  $I_k^*$  is the impact factor for the kth GA, appropriately weighted by performance demand weights.

$$TG_{k}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{9} T_{i,k}^{*} = \sum_{i=1}^{9} (1 + \Delta_{i,k}) T_{i,k} = \sum_{i=1}^{9} I_{i,k} w_{i} TG_{k} = I_{k}^{*} TG_{k}$$
Pacific Northwest
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# Method Application: an example (cont'd)

S <sub>5</sub> : Task 5. Fasten 4 Barriers		Performance Demand Weights (w)								
05. 103K V. 1 03161 4 Dalliels		W1 1. Detection and Noticing	W2 2. Understanding	W3 3. Decision	4. Action			5. Teamwork		
Subtask	GAs		Making	W4 4.1Fine Motor	W5 4.2 Gross Motor	W <sub>6</sub> 4.3 Other	W <sub>7</sub> 5.1 Reading' /writing	Wg 5.2 Oral Comm.	W9 5.3 Crew Interaction	
B1: 5.1 Position forklift	G1: 5.1.a. walking	0.25	0	0	0	0.75	0	0	0	0
	G <sub>2</sub> : 5.1.b. getting in forklift	0.25	0.25	0	0	0.5	0	0	0	0
	G <sub>3</sub> : 5.1.c. driving	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
B <sub>2</sub> : 5.2 Load plates onto forklift	G <sub>1</sub> : 5.2.a loading plates	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
$B_3$ : 5.3 Position plates against structure wall with forklift	G <sub>1</sub> : 5.3.a. Position plates/driving	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
	G <sub>2</sub> : 5.3.b. communicating the position	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.5
	G <sub>3</sub> : 5.3.c. pinning with forklift	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.5	0	0	0	0	0
	G4: 5.3.d. manual adjustment	0.33	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0	0
B4: 5.4 Drill holes and	G1: 5.4.a drilling (hand tool)	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0
secure with fasteners	G2: 5.4.b. bolting (hand tool)	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0

# Performance Demands Associated with Each GA under Task 5





22

# Method Application: an example (cont'd)

# GA Baseline Times, Impact Factors, and Affected Times

Task 5. Fas	ten 4 Barriers	L	1	Constant An	
Sub-Tasks	GAs	Baseline Time TG <sub>k</sub> (min)	Nominal GA Impact Factor I <sub>k</sub> (Primary EC only)	Affected Time TG <sub>k</sub> (Primary EC Only)	
1. C. I. L	5.1.a. walking	5	1.15	5.75	
5.1 Position forklift	5.1.b. getting in forklift	1	1.15	1.15	
	5.1.c. driving	9	1.23	11.10	
5.2 Load plates onto forklift	5.2.a loading plates	15	1.23	18.50	
	5.3.a. Position plates/driving	10	1.23	12.33	
5.3 Position plates against structure wall with forklift	5.3.b. communicating the position	10	1.25	12.50	
structure wall with forklift	5.3.c. pinning with forklift	20	1.23	24.67	
	5.3.d. manual adjustment	20	1.23	24.67	
5.4 Drill holes and secure with	5.4.a drilling (hand tool)	15	1.23	18.50	
fasteners	5.4.b. bolting (hand tool)	15	1.23	18.50	
Total Time		120		147.67	







2.3.8.1.3 Questions and Answers

# Question:

IMPRINT is not available to the public. The framework seems to lead to a deterministic "yes/no" answer rather than trying to establish the probability that an action is successful. However, the probabilistic information is important, and "definitive" answers on the time required are not needed on a generic basis because of the site-specific nature of actions. We developed a simple model and structure that cover some of these.

# Response:

IMPRINT, which is a stochastic tool, provides statistics, and the Monte Carlo simulation can give probability information. The result is site specific and condition specific depending on the site (access road, obstacle, etc.). Lead time is important.

# Question:

It would be a valuable tool. How would it handle the intersection between an emergency condition (or isolated condition) and a sunny-day version (nonemergency condition)? It seems that key assumptions for emergency conditions are more or less vulnerable.

# Response:

We did not look at emergency conditions in the current scope of work (e.g., stress or perception of fear); we focused on what is in the literature and conceptual framework; those issues would be part of the next steps. We needed the simple example to show things could be done.

# Question:

How do emergency conditions effect the "key assumptions?"

## Response:

Those are some things that need to be worked through [in another scope] (e.g., when crew members are not available to go out and perform tasks). This might actually be best to look at from a design point of view and assess feasibility to make procedures work.

## Comment:

If the control room personnel believe the water is dangerous, they will not send people out (or vice versa). Perception may be more important than actual conditions.

Also, there is a hierarchy, in that the "top three" adverse conditions might be the most controlling, so all factors do not need to be considered.

## Question:

Secondary effects are also important. For example, even a small elevation of water (from a local intense precipitation event) in a switch gear room with energized equipment would be an issue. Although there are not a lot of "forces" from the water, the energized equipment poses a larger risk. How can this be translated into probabilities of basic events?

## Response:

Many of the "secondary effects" are very site specific, along with the "perception of fear." This framework can allow analysts to "plug in" to a human reliability analysis or PRA framework that allows for the determination of when actions are not feasible, and mitigation is required.


**2.3.8.2** *Modeling Total Plant Response to Flooding Events*, Zhegang Ma\*, Ph.D., P.E., Curtis L. Smith, Ph.D. and Steven R. Prescott, Idaho National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Management Services; and Ramprasad Sampath, Centroid PIC, Research and Development (Session 3-A2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C518</u>)

# 2.3.8.2.1 Abstract


All NPPs must consider external flooding risks, such as local intense precipitation (LIP), riverine flooding, flooding due to upstream dam failure, and coastal flooding due to storm surge or tsunami. These events have the potential to challenge offsite power, threaten plant systems and components, challenge the integrity of plant structures, and limit plant access. Detailed risk assessments of external flood hazard are often needed to provide significant insights to risk-informed decisionmakers. Many unique challenges exist in modeling the complete plant response to the flooding event. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs); flood protection features; and flood mitigation measures to external flood may be highly spatial and time dependent and subject to the hydrometeorological, hydrological, and hydraulic characteristics of the flood event (antecedent soil moisture, precipitation duration and rate, infiltration rate, surface water flow velocities, inundation levels and duration, hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces, debris impact forces, etc.). Simulation-based methods and dynamic analysis approaches are believed to be a great tool to model the performance of SSCs and operator actions during an external flooding event. In support of the NRC PFHA research plan, INL was tasked to develop such new approaches and demonstrate a proof of concept for the advanced representation of external flooding analysis. This project developed a work plan and framework to perform a simulationbased dynamic flooding analysis. This framework was applied to a LIP event as a case study. A three-dimensional (3D) plant model for a typical pressurized-water reactor and 3D flood simulation models for the LIP event were developed. A state-based PRA modeling tool, Event Model Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD), was used to incorporate time-related interactions from both 3D time-dependent physical simulations and stochastic failures into traditional PRA logic models. An example state-based PRA model was developed to represent two accident sequences in a simplified traditional general transient event tree, along with incorporating 3D simulation elements into the logic so that the PRA model could communicate with the 3D simulation models. This integrated EMRALD model was run with 34 3D dynamic simulations and millions of Monte Carlo simulations. The EMRALD model results were compared with the corresponding traditional PRA model results. Insights and lessons learned from the project are documented for future research and applications.

The project shows that dynamic approaches could be used as an important tool to investigate total plant response to external flooding events with their appealing features. They can provide visual demonstration of component or system behavior during a highly spatial- and time-dependent flood event. They could provide additional important insights to risk-informed decisionmakers. The dynamic approaches could also play a supplemental role by supporting the development or enhancement of a static PRA with the insights from the dynamic analysis or by performing a standalone analysis that focuses on specific issues with limited sequences and components (e.g., FLEX).


# 2.3.8.2.2 Presentation











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





























III. Case Study (Cont.)					
<ul> <li>Compare EMRALD results with SAPHIRE results</li> <li>Grouping EMRALD results by the flow rate and failure components -&gt; 6 scenarios</li> <li>Quantify SAPHIRE model with proper change sets for the 6 scenarios</li> <li>EMRALD results seem to be consistent to those of SAPHIRE</li> </ul>	Scenario	Component Failure	Seq.	SAPHIRE	EMF
	1	None	Seq. 18	2.3E-07	2.0
			Seq.3	5.0E-10	0.0
	2	HPI-B pump failed	Seq. 18	2.7E-07	4.5
			Seq.3	7.7E-10	0.0
	3	HPI-B, and CSR-B pumps failed	Seq. 18	2.7E-07	3.8
			Seq.3	7.7E-10	0.0
	4	LPI-B, HPI-B, and CSR-B pumps failed	Seq. 18	2.7E-07	4.0
			Seq.3	1.9E-09	0.0
	5	All LPI and CSR pumps and HPI-B pump failed	Seq. 18	2.7E-07	3.8
			Seq.3	1.3E-07	2.0
	6	All LPI, HPI, CSR pumps failed	Seq. 18	8.6E-06	1.3
			Seq.3	3.2E-06	3.8
			J Idaho No	ational Labora	
IV. Summary			D		
The objective of this project is to inverse.			D		
The objective of this project is to inverse model total plant response to floodin	g eve	ents	D		
The objective of this project is to inverse.	g eve as a eling	ents n important tool i tool, could be a	roach n inte	nes to	
<ul> <li>The objective of this project is to inverse model total plant response to floodin</li> <li>Dynamic approaches could be used</li> <li>EMRALD, the state based PRA model</li> </ul>	g eve as a leling and o	ents n important tool tool, could be a other hazard ana	roach n inte	nes to	
<ul> <li>The objective of this project is to inverse model total plant response to floodin</li> <li>Dynamic approaches could be used</li> <li>EMRALD, the state based PRA mod dynamic PRA tool for external flood in</li> </ul>	g eve as a leling and o xplor	ents n important tool tool, could be a other hazard ana atory research	roach n inte alysis	nes to	







2.3.8.2.3 Questions and Answers

# Question:

Can the 3D modeling approach be applicable to seismic?

#### Response:

This is not part of the scope of this project, but there are some examples. It was done in a U.S. Department of Defense project, looking at a detailed piping network and internal flooding from an earthquake. It can also be applied to a high-wind case and atmospheric modeling, particle tracking, and other situations.

#### 2.3.9 Day 3: Session 3B - Frameworks I

This session considered the development and demonstration of a PFHA framework for flood hazard curve estimation.

**2.3.9.1** Technical Basis for Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment, Rajiv Prasad\*, Ph.D., and Philip Meyer, Ph.D., Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Session 3B-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C482</u>)

#### 2.3.9.1.1 Abstract

The purpose of this project was to develop technical bases for incorporating probabilistic assessment of riverine flood hazards into NRC guidance related to permitting, licensing, and oversight activities. Characterization and estimation of floods with return periods significantly greater than those for which statistical approaches are currently established are needed for the NRC's purposes.


PFHA is defined as a site-specific, systematic evaluation of the probabilities and frequencies of exceedance of hazards generated by applicable flood mechanisms to which SSCs could be exposed during specified exposure times at an NPP site. Flood mechanisms are those hydrometeorological, geoseismic, or structural failure phenomena that may produce a flood at or near an NPP site. Flood flows are characterized by several parameters, such as flood discharge, flood velocity, flood water-surface elevation, flood depth, flood duration, and hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. Flood hazards are those flood parameters that directly or indirectly affect the safety of NPP SSCs. All flood hazards may vary spatially and temporally during a flood event. To adequately estimate the potential for failure of and access to the SSCs during a flood, both the spatial and temporal variation in flood hazards should be estimated.

Traditionally, probabilistic flood analysis has focused on estimation of the return period (the inverse of the AEP of the annual maximum discharge using observations). These analyses are also called flood-frequency analyses. A nonmechanistic model, typically a parametric probability distribution, is used to represent the frequency of occurrence of observed peak flows. To estimate the complete flood hydrograph and other hydrodynamic flood parameters, a more mechanistic approach is required. A simulation-based framework using precipitation-runoff and hydraulic models with appropriate hydrometeorologic, topographic, bathymetric, and geomorphologic data can be used to provide a more comprehensive estimate of flood hazards. In addition, a simulation-based approach allows for the explicit representation of nonstationary behavior in riverine floods, such as changes in the river basin (e.g., localized changes, including installation or removal of a dam; or distributed changes, including gradual clearing of forests) and climate change effects (e.g., changes in magnitude and frequency of extreme events).

The project proposes a PFHA framework that is simulation based and includes a comprehensive evaluation of uncertainties. The framework uses three components: (1) a meteorological component that provides hydrometeorologic input data, (2) a hydrologic component that estimates runoff discharges from precipitation events given hydrometeorologic input data, watershed initial conditions, and physical watershed data, and (3) a hydraulic component that estimates hydraulic flood parameters, including floodwater-surface elevations and flood velocities given runoff discharges and physical river network properties. In addition, there may be another component to transform the watershed model outputs into the required flood parameters for which hazard curves are required. Aleatory uncertainties are associated with the hydrometeorologic inputs and with the watershed initial and boundary conditions. These quantities describe the primary

irreducible uncertainties affecting the occurrence of future flooding at a site: the depth and intensity of rainfall events in the future, and the watershed conditions at the time of those events. Epistemic uncertainties are associated with the parameters of the watershed model and describe the lack of knowledge in modeling the precipitation-runoff processes, in characterizing the watershed, and in determining appropriate parameter values for the models. These are the primary uncertainties that could be reduced by collecting additional data. By incorporating available data, a Bayesian approach is used to reduce the epistemic uncertainties. Watershed model outputs either directly represent the flood hazards of interest or may be transformed to them (e.g., hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads, scour potential). The aleatory uncertainties result in a distribution of each flood hazard, which constitutes a hazard curve. Epistemic uncertainties contribute to the uncertainty in the quantiles of the distribution representing the hazard curve (e.g., the uncertainty in the exceedance probability of a given flood hazard value). The team expects to address issues related to implementing the proposed framework in the near future.

# 2.3.9.1.2 Presentation



# **PFHA Definition**


PFHA is defined as a site-specific, systematic evaluation of the probabilities and frequencies of exceedance of hazards generated by applicable flood mechanisms to which SSCs could be exposed during specified exposure times at an NPP site


- PFHA is site-specific from meteorologic conditions to watershed and riverine characteristics to site layout
- Systematic covers the full range of exceedance probabilities
- Flood mechanisms phenomena producing a flood
  - Addressing precipitation-generated flooding here
- A flood can result in multiple hazards (e.g., hydrodynamic load, accumulation of water in structures)
  - Flood hazards are functions of the characteristics of the flow field (flood parameters)
- Multiple SSCs may be affected
  - At the site scale, flow field is significantly affected by buildings and obstructions





# **Flood Hazards**


Flood Hazard	Flood Parameters	Potential Effects on SSCs	Relevant Scale	
Hydrostatic load	Water-surface elevation	Loss of functionality from exceeding the design basis	Site scale	
Hydrodynamic Ioad	Water-surface elevation, flow velocity, flow density	Loss of functionality from exceeding the design basis	Site scale	
Inundation area	Water-surface elevation	Loss in accessibility leading to loss of functionality	Site scale	
Accumulation volume of water in SSCs	Water-surface elevation, time of inundation of openings	Loss of functionality	Site scale	
Erosion	Flow velocity, discharge, turbulence, and duration	Loss of functionality	Site scale	
Deposition	Flow velocity, discharge, turbulence, and duration	Loss in accessibility leading to loss of functionality	Site scale	
Debris impact Ioad	Water-surface elevation, flow velocity, duration	Loss of functionality from exceeding the design basis	Site scale	
Warning and lead times	Discharge hydrograph	Loss in accessibility leading to loss of functionality	Drainage area to site scale	
Inundation duration	Discharge hydrograph, water- surface elevation	Loss in accessibility leading to loss of functionality, loss of functionality from exceeding the design basis	Drainage area to site scale	


























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#### 2.3.9.1.3 Questions and Answers

# Comment:

TVA recently finished a framework very similar to that described here. With regard to uncertainty, we recently decided that we are really mostly interested in the extremely rare end of the spectrum. At that end of the spectrum, for a 15-inch rainfall, a watershed model will probably give a result of 12 inches plus-or-minus a half an inch or similar. On the more frequent side of that band, 4 inches of rainfall might give a half an inch of runoff, or it might give 3.8 inches of runoff. The way we run our reservoirs on a given day (the normal operating day), we could make almost any decision on the river, so the uncertainty is huge. However, at the really rare end of the spectrum, we would spill 100 percent. The structure of your uncertainty very much changes depending on what part of the probability spectrum you are looking at. We felt confident with that approach: looking primarily at the uncertainty in the rainfall and, at least for now, glossing over some of the rainfall runoff model uncertainty and routing uncertainty, because at the extreme end they are comparatively small, while the rainfall uncertainty is extremely large at the rare end.

# Response:

Those traits argue the site-specific nature of this analysis with regard to developing generalizations. Some of those concepts you expressed may or may not be generalized for the kind of reservoir TVA has. The type of evaluation you performed is what I meant when I talked earlier about applying expert judgment to simplify the problem and trying to establish generalizations.

#### Question:

This is a very impressive watershed modeling, including uncertainty analysis. How do you specify the initial and boundary conditions of the watershed?

# Response:

In determining the initial and boundary conditions, we considered what data might be available and, because that may be model specific, what model will be used and what output is desired. In general, watershed modeling involves conditions such as soil moisture, initial streamflow, and baseflow; the conditions in a winter or springtime situation; and the amount of the snow on the ground. Datasets are available for different places in the country that could supply that information to the model, taking uncertainties into account. For example, these data might be measured infrequently or only available in certain locations and require you to extrapolate. This returns to the same issue of what data you have and how much characterization do they afford you in terms of that particular model. This project used spatially distributed datasets that have been maintained and that could be used at least initially to look at those conditions.

# Question:

Listening to the descriptions of all these studies, it is clear that inferences are being made. Do today's statistical methods have credibility for statistical inference? This whole process of very challenging inferences really needs to have statistical validation because it involves many assumptions concerning many different aspects of the uncertainty analysis, not only in the models, but also in the way in that uncertainty is defined. How are those models and uncertainties validated? Many different models are available. My own experience with many years of modeling

is that you can fit just about anything to anything. You do not need to have very detailed models. You can take any polynomial with enough degrees of freedom and you can get a perfect fit. The issue really is how can you actually validate, with completely independent data, the particular model that you are using or the particular structure you are assuming for quantifying your uncertainties?

# Response

Uncertainty is a big issue for us. We acknowledge that there are two parts to it. One could come from variabilities: things could be measured with certain degrees of uncertainty. The second relates to these model structures. We treat the model structures as the epistemic part of the analysis, which leads to model validation and to how much weight should be given to a model or to a parameter structure that leads to a different conceptual model that is faithful to what you have observed. It goes back to the quality of your conditioning based on observed data, which is all we have. Based on the observed data, how can you condition the model parameter set as well as these models? We are trying to put this whole framework into a Bayesian model, where the parameter estimation is constrained by all the observations that we can find for that particular analysis. That would allow us to build a posterior distribution that can have not only model parameters but also weighting for different model structures. As more and more data become available, the Bayesian framework allows you to include that dataset and try to update the model structure. We do not yet know how much difference it would make. However, we need to do some computations with this framework to determine whether we can actually reach a practical solution where we can address some of these issues.

# Response

Validation is always a difficult topic. In any case, this issue will involve extrapolation because we are moving beyond the data to exceedance probabilities that are extreme. In terms of extrapolation, in order to validate your inferences, you are at the extreme end and you get data that are mostly less extreme. Therefore, you rely on expert knowledge and a physically based process that relies on the less extreme more than the more extreme parts of the process. You use what you have, and the more information, the better the approximation. We are relying on the knowledge of the process.

#### 2.3.10 Day 3: Session 3C - Frameworks II

This session considers the development and demonstration of a PFHA framework for flood hazard curve estimation.


**2.3.10.1** Evaluation of Deterministic Approaches to Characterizing Flood Hazards, John Weglian, EPRI (Session 3C-1; ADAMS Accession No. ML17054C483)


#### 2.3.10.1.1 Abstract


Following the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in 2011 and led to core damage at three units at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, the NPPs in the United States were required to reexamine their risk to flooding from external sources using the current regulatory guidance for new reactor sites. In many cases, these reexamined flood hazards exceeded the plant's original design basis. Many NPPs outside of the United States have also reevaluated their sites for external flooding hazards.


Deterministic, bounding analyses are used to ensure that NPPs are protected from what is expected to be the worst-case flooding events that could impact a site. Utilities will typically use the most conservative and bounding assumptions when initially assessing the flood hazard to a site. If the site is not able to withstand the flood using those bounding assumptions, the analysis is refined using more realistic, but still bounding, assumptions. This process is known as the hierarchical hazard assessment. EPRI published the technical report, "Evaluation of Deterministic Approaches to Characterizing Flood Hazards," EPRI ID 3002008113, dated November 29, 2016 (http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=00000003002008113).

The report examines the assumptions, inputs, and methods used for assessing the external flooding hazards for the following flooding mechanisms: local intense precipitation, flooding of streams and rivers, dam breaches and failures, storm surge, wind-generated wave and runup, and hydrodynamic and debris loads. For each of these flood mechanisms, the report provides several areas where the analysis can be improved to provide a more realistic characterization of the flood hazard. Some examples are provided to describe some of these improvement opportunities. Utilities can use the report to identify opportunities to improve their bounding flood hazard analyses for existing or new plants.












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



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


## **Dam Breaches and Failures**










## **Storm Surge**

### Principal Opportunities for Increasing Realism

- Improved techniques for characterization of the meteorological characteristics of the storms causing surges
  - Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH)
  - Probable Maximum Wind Storm (PMWS)
- Use of high resolution meteorological forcing and numerical hydrodynamic models to simulate wind effects, pressure effects and corresponding storm surge, respectively
- 3. Consider storm complexities (e.g., transitioning storms)

19

Storm Meteorological Parameters





Source: NASA Earth Observatory Image


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
## Wind-Generated Wave and Runup











#### 2.3.10.1.3 Questions and Answers

#### Question:

Is this approach really deterministic in the sense that many of the models that are deployed in this application setting are calibrated?

#### Response:

This is not a probabilistic approach, with the exception of storm surge, which most likely will have some probabilistic aspects. It would still be considered a deterministic analysis. In terms of the Manning roughness coefficient, it is not sufficient to look in a book and decide that while I am in this kind of area, this is what I am going to use. You have to look at the area upstream of your particular plant and identify the kinds of flow restrictions that are there. It is still a deterministic type of approach because you have to make sure that you are being bounding. Some of this could be accomplished with sensitivity studies. You would identify a site-specific refinement and run the model again with that piece a little higher or lower and see if it changes your results.

#### Question:

In terms of project scope, are you looking at some of these conservatisms and analyzing what value they add, because introducing more realism can also increase the extent of cost-benefit thinking on what to target. We acknowledge that every site is different, and hazards are different. Second question, the PRA models related to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," have brought debate on conservatisms. Sometimes a deterministic aspect being debated is what is ultimately influencing, or even distorting, the realism in the PRA. This work, even though you are calling it deterministic, could ultimately also translate into conservatism in a more risk-informed approach.

#### Response:

Some of these approaches could also be used to obtain the most realistic result possible for use in the PRA model. However, that was not the intent of this approach or this paper. The genesis of this effort is responding to 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters on the flooding hazards. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is having a workshop on the approach for addressing those in NEI-16-05, "External Flooding Assessment Guidelines," Revision 1, issued June 2016. This involves the option to revise your flood hazard as your starting point. Where do you start in your analysis to show whether you are protected? Do you need to rely on your mitigating strategy? EPRI did not begin with the assumption that everything that we might do will result in a reduction in the flood hazard. Some things in the approach can be considered conservative or nonconservative. Vehicle barriers are a great example. During a local intense precipitation event, the giant cement wall put in for security purposes may hold the water in and result in higher water levels that might have otherwise occurred. The project did not begin with that assumption that we are only reducing conservatism, but instead sought to say objectively what can we do to improve the realism but still maintain it as bounding? We received great feedback from the NRC, and I made some significant adjustment to some of the wording to account for some of the concerns that the agency had on the draft version. It should now be a much better product from both the NRC and industry standpoints.

**2.3.10.2** *Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Framework Development*, Brian Skahill\*, Ph.D.; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, Hydrologic Systems Branch, Watershed Systems Group (Session 3C-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C484</u>)

#### 2.3.10.2.1 Abstract

This research project is part of the NRC's PFHA research plan. Its objective is to develop and demonstrate a framework for PFHA for inland nuclear facility sites that will facilitate construction of site-specific flood hazard curves and support full characterization of uncertainties in site-specific storm flood hazard estimates for the full range of return periods of interest for NPPs. A PFHA must be able to incorporate probabilistic models for a variety of flood-related processes, allow for characterization and quantification of aleatory and epistemic sources of uncertainty, and facilitate not only propagation of uncertainties but also sensitivity analyses. The research project tasks are defined by focus areas, and in each case the objective is to develop and demonstrate a conceptual, mathematical, and logical framework for the probabilistic modeling of the given task specific flooding process. The focus areas include the following:

- literature review
- warm season rainfall and local intense precipitation
- cool season rainfall, snow, and snowpack
- site-scale flooding from local intense precipitation
- riverine flooding —rainfall or rainfall and snowmelt
- riverine flooding —hydrologic dam/levee failure
- knowledge transfer

This presentation summarized features of a current draft, proposed PFHA framework for warm season rainfall, which outlines the use of a spatiotemporal Bayesian Hierarchical Model (BHM) embedded within a multimodel averaging technique to leverage the capacities of Bayesian inference while generalizing the problem of extreme rainfall model selection. The Bayesian inference methodology was selected not only because it supports a probabilistic analysis of extreme rainfall, but also because it is a flexible means by which to combine all available and relevant complementary data. These characteristics of Bayesian inference are either required or highly desirable for extreme rainfall analysis, particularly given the application focus wherein quantile estimates are necessary for low exceedance probabilities. For example, additional data that could be combined with a given station's systematic record for a local or regional analysis of extreme rainfall are data from surrounding stations, information derived from expert elicitation, or included in a nonstationary climate index. An additional attractive feature of the Bayesian inference methodology is that it supports the capacity to compute the predictive posterior distribution for a future observation. Several demonstrations of the proposed PFHA framework for warm season rainfall not only reinforced various aspects of the key framework elements, but they also underscored the flexibility of the framework to accommodate different data scenarios. The first four demonstrations in aggregate emphasized the importance of data analysis, model selection, and inference methodology for the evaluation of extreme rainfall risk at a given location. The fifth demonstration emphasized the flexibility of the Bayesian inference methodology to accommodate treatment of nonstationarity in an analysis of extreme rainfall. The sixth demonstration profiled application of a BHM for the analysis of extreme daily rainfall using annual maxima data from 68 stations located within and surrounding the 11,478-square-mile Willamette River Basin in northwestern Oregon. The final demonstration briefly profiled two multimodel averaging techniques to generalize the problem of extreme rainfall model selection. The

presentation concluded with a brief summary of ongoing framework development for the probabilistic modeling of cool season rainfall processes.

2.3.10.2.2 Presentation





# Objective


The objective of this project is to develop and demonstrate an overall conceptual, mathematical and logical framework for probabilistic flood hazard assessment for inland and riverine sites (e.g. non-coastal sites). The framework will facilitate construction of site-specific flood hazard curves, and support full characterization of uncertainties in site-specific storm flood hazard estimates for the full range of return periods of interest for critical infrastructure facilities such as nuclear power plants. The focus areas will include:


- · Literature review
- Warm Season Rainfall and Local Intense Precipitation
- · Cool Season Rainfall, Snow and Snowpack
- Site-scale Flooding from Local Intense Precipitation
- · Riverine Flooding Rainfall or Rainfall and Snowmelt
- Riverine Flooding Hydrologic Dam/Levee Failure
- Knowledge transfer























homogeneous sub-regions, it includes the spatial components of the data, it is robust in the treatment of uncertainty, and it can be easily adapted to accommodate treatments of non-stationarity.

ty. LABORATORY


BUILDING STRONG<sub>®</sub>

# Regionalization

Let S denote the spatial region of interest and  $s \in S$  a specific site within S. Let  $y_{ts}$  denote the maximum annual rainfall of a given duration at location s for a year t. We assume the  $y_{ts}$  follow a GEV distribution with spatially dependent parameters; viz.,

$$y_{ts} \sim GEV(\mu_s, \sigma_s, \xi_s), \ \mu_s = \mathbf{x}_s^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}^{\mu} + \tau_s^{\mu}, \ \kappa_s = \mathbf{x}_s^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}^{\kappa} + \tau_s^{\kappa}, \ \xi_s = \mathbf{x}_s^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{\theta}^{\xi} + \tau_s^{\xi}$$

with  $\kappa_s = 1/\sigma_s$ , and  $x_s$ ,  $\theta^{\nu}$ ,  $\nu \in \{\mu, \kappa, \xi\}$ , and  $\tau_s^{\nu}$  denoting the covariates, the linear model parameters, and spatial random effects terms, respectively. Each GEV model parameter is defined by a linear model of the covariates plus a spatial random effects term that accounts for residual spatial association not captured by the covariates. One or more of the extremal model parameters may also be indexed in time to support the development of a spatio-temporal BHM (Economou et al. 2014). The spatial random effects term is assumed to be a zero-centered Gaussian spatial process.  $d_{s_ts_r}$  is the Euclidean distance between locations  $s_t$  and  $s_r$ 



BUILDING STRONG Available tools: R packages spatial.gev.bma, SpatialExtremes


## Regionalization

The likelihood is given by

 $p(\mathbf{y}|\{\mu_s, \kappa_s, \xi_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}) = \prod_{s \in \mathcal{S}_o} \prod_{t=1}^{T_s} p(y_{ts}|\mu_s, \kappa_s, \xi_s)$ , where  $\mathbf{y}$  and  $\mathcal{S}_o \subset \mathcal{S}$  denote the entire set of block maxima observations and the set of observation locations, respectively. The likelihood definition does imply that  $y_{ts}$  and  $y_{ts}$  are conditionally independent for any  $s \neq s$  where  $s, s \in \mathcal{S}$ . Model inference is performed using MCMC.

Prediction at locations  $q \in S \setminus S_o$  using the post burn-in MCMC draws requires specification of the spatial random effects terms. If  $\tau_s^{\nu} \sim GP(\alpha^{\nu}, \lambda^{\nu})$ ,

then  $\tau_q^{\nu} | \{\tau_s^{\nu}\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}_o} \sim N(\hat{\tau}_q^{\nu}, \hat{\kappa}_q^{\nu})$ 



COASTAL

HYDRAULICS


COASTAL &


HYDRAULICS


The Pacific Northwest region experiences warm, dry summers due to intensification of the Pacific subtropical high, and cool, wet winters as the polar jet stream dips southward bringing storms from the Gulf of Alaska. Winter storms that occur between

October and March typically make up to 75-80% of the region's annual precipitation

BUILDING STRONG Available tools: R packages spatial.gev.bma, SpatialExtremes








# **Generalization of Model Selection**

The existence of multiple models for extreme rainfall analysis is a source of epistemic uncertainty. Model averaging is a straightforward, systematic, reproducible, and revisable means by which to account for the variability expressed across competing models selected for the analysis of extreme rainfall.

Return period of 410.4 mm	Equal Weights		BIC	$\beta_{k} = \frac{\exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}I_{k}\right)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K}\exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}I_{k}\right)}$
4,438	0.25	0.137	0.075	
18,374,910	0.25	0.167	0.227	$I_k$ is a function of
35,482	0.25	0.391	0.530	data fit and model
1,567,614	0.25	0.305	0.168	complexity.
	4,995,611	3,564,577	4,445,779	COASTAL & HYDRAULICS LABORATORY
	period of 410.4 mm 4,438 18,374,910 35,482	period of 410.4 mm         Equal Weights           4,438         0.25           18,374,910         0.25           35,482         0.25           1,567,614         0.25	period of 410.4 mm         Equal Weights         AIC           4,438         0.25         0.137           18,374,910         0.25         0.167           35,482         0.25         0.391           1,567,614         0.25         0.305	period of 410.4 mm         Equal Weights         AIC         BIC           4,438         0.25         0.137         0.075           18,374,910         0.25         0.167         0.227           35,482         0.25         0.391         0.530           1,567,614         0.25         0.305         0.168

BUILDING STRONG Available tools: R packages MSClaio2008, SpatialExtremes





2.3.10.2.3 Questions and Answers

Questions were postponed until the end of the day.

**2.3.10.3** Riverine Flooding and Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding (SHAC-F), Rajiv Prasad\*, Ph.D., and Robert Bryce, Ph.D., Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; Kevin Coppersmith\*, Ph.D., Coppersmith Consulting (Session 3C-3; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C487</u>)

#### 2.3.10.3.1 Abstract

This research project is part of the NRC's PFHA research plan in support of development of a risk-informed analytical approach for flood hazards. The approach is expected to support estimation of flood hazards at new and existing facilities and enhance the NRC's capacity to support reviews of license applications, license amendment requests, and reactor oversight activities. Flood hazards at NPPs result from various flooding mechanisms, including local intense precipitation (LIP), precipitation and snowmelt in a river basin, dam failures, and storm surges and tsunamis. These flood events have the potential to challenge offsite power, threaten many onsite NPP SSCs, challenge the integrity of plant structures, and limit plant access. However, there is no widely accepted framework for performing a PFHA, and there are large uncertainties involved with estimating floods of magnitudes and frequencies of occurrence of interest for safety evaluations at NPPs. In 2013 and 2014, NRC-sponsored workshops discussed the available methods for conducting PFHAs and the development of a structured hazard assessment committee process


for flooding (SHAC-F). The need to develop implementation details of SHAC-F methodology was also recognized.


The objective of this project is to develop and apply the SHAC-F process to provide confidence that all data sets, models, and interpretations proposed by the larger technical community have been given appropriate consideration and that the inputs to the PFHA reflect the center, body, and range of technically defensible interpretations. The research team started with the overarching guidance from the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) process (NUREG/CR-6372, "Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts," issued April 1997; and NUREG-2117, "Practical Implementation Guidelines for SSHAC Level 3 and 4 Hazard Studies, Revision 1, issued April 2012) used in probabilistic seismic hazard assessments and adapting them to the needs of flood hazard assessments for purposes of risk analyses. For SHAC-F, the project adapted four levels, similar to SSHAC Levels 1–4. The virtual studies in the current project are carried out to simulate the full scope and activities that would accompany a full SHAC-F Level 3 PFHA. The project is investigating these aspects using virtual studies for LIP floods and riverine floods, excluding dam failures.


The research team will conduct the riverine PFHA SHAC-F virtual study using the same virtual site as for the LIP PFHA SHAC-F virtual study. It anticipates that several of the issues identified and solutions proposed during the LIP PFHA SHAC-F virtual study will inform the riverine PFHA SHAC-F virtual study. These issues include precise definition of data and models, compilation of data related to riverine flood characterization, compilation of previous hydrologic and hydraulic models applied to the river basin, and previous characterization of uncertainties in the river basin. For the riverine flood PFHA, the team initially expected to perform two separate Level 3 PFHA virtual studies: (1) riverine flood from precipitation in the river basin and (2) riverine flood from precipitation and snowmelt in the river basin. Because the only difference between the two is the snowmelt component and the expected seasonality, the team decided to combine the two virtual studies. The riverine Level 3 PFHA virtual study will have three technical integration teams: (1) the meteorological model characterization team, (2) the hydrologic model characterization team, and (3) the hydraulic model characterization team. For a riverine flood, hydrologic and hydraulic modeling are best handled by separate teams because of the spatially and temporally varied nature of runoff generation and flood routing in streams and rivers. A site visit may not be critical for a riverine SHAC-F study, but the technical integration teams should be familiar with the specific hydrologic and hydraulic characteristics of the river basin. This objective can be accomplished by selecting the members of the technical integration team who have extensive experience conducting flood studies in the river basin and by encouraging others familiar with technical and policy matters for the river basin to join the study on the Participatory Peer Review Panel.


Compared to the LIP PFHA SHAC-F virtual study, the team expects that a significantly larger amount of observed flood data will be available. At the same time, the team expects to face new issues related to characterizing the variability of inputs, parameters, and initial and boundary conditions over space, time, and seasons. One additional issue to be addressed is the need for characterizing flood hazards at the local NPP scale—riverine flood models typically use a lumped or semidistributed hydrologic model and a one-dimensional hydraulic stream reach model. A two-dimensional hydrodynamic model may be necessary to evaluate the effects of the riverine flood overtopping the banks and spreading on the NPP site. Characterization of flood hazards may be needed at a finer spatial scale sufficient to adequately resolve the locations of safety-related SSCs and doors.


#### 2.3.10.3.2 Presentation






































#### 2.3.10.3.3 Questions and Answers

#### Comment:

I have no issue with your analysis or the approach, but I have a fundamental issue with expending the amount of resources that are required to do a SHAC Level 3 type of study for a site-specific implementation. Would you actually obtain new risk insights by going to that level of detail? We have talked earlier about which distribution to use when you find out at the end that all of them were within the 5th and 95th percentiles. Something similar can happen here, where many experts are spending a lot of time performing this analysis. Because the SHAC process does not lend itself to being amended, what happens if in the future you perform a paleoflood study and one of those pieces does not fit what the new data indicate. The present SHAC process, at least for seismic, would require you to go through the whole process again with these new data, again expending potential millions of dollars to get to this point. My storm surge study included an approach that was similar to a SHAC process and used logic trees. I would make that akin to a SHAC Level 1, but in my opinion, in a case that is very site specific, utilities will find it untenable to perform an analysis at a SHAC Level 3.

#### Response: NRC Program Manager

We are not recommending a specific level of SHAC, but, for the purposes of working through the ideas, we felt that at a SHAC Level 3 we can gain the insights and downselect to identify what would be needed for a SHAC Level 2 or Level 1. If we had done this at a SHAC Level 2, we would not have gleaned any information about what a Level 3 might require. The purpose of this project was not to decide what level of SHAC is needed for any particular analysis, whether site specific or not. We chose SHAC Level 3 because we thought that was the right level to gain the desired insights.

#### Response: Rajiv Prasad:

With regard to the new data, that is one of the reasons we want to use a Bayesian framework, under which you do not need to perform the whole study again. You can basically say that I already have my prior historical inferencing and I need to update that. The updating could be done at a lower level than the SHAC Level 3.

#### Question:

Does a SHAC Level 3 for flood really need to mirror the same level of effort and time required for a SHAC Level 3 for seismic? Looking at the big picture and fully recognizing the project's purpose of adding structure, how does this apply in the sense that hydrology and meteorology are imbedded as part of the analysis? A seismic analysis is easier in that you can do a SHAC at one site and that will require considering the full gamut of issues, including the hydrologic response, versus asking whether we perform a SHAC at the level of a localized area? Do we develop a hazard aspect only on precipitation or a very specific subset of that?

#### Response:

In a seismic analysis, you have the advantage that you have a source and it could include an entire region. Flooding is rather site specific. Even in a large watershed, you have to make sure that watershed analysis is appropriate for each particular site of interest, which makes it more complicated. Your point is well taken in asking whether we need to follow all of those steps that

the seismic community does. Apart from the issue of data versus model, one challenge is whether the hydrologists understand what they need to do. The nuclear community has performed such analyses for a while, but the hydrologists do not quite know what we mean, for example, for local intense precipitation, in some cases. We also note the lack of a framework. On the seismic side, over the years, experts have come to an agreement on what the framework looks like for performing the probabilistic seismic hazard assessments. We do not have such an agreed-upon framework for flooding, and that needs to be worked through with all of the experts to give the context for the analysis. In addition, such a framework needs to represent the community, not the personal bias of a particular hydrologist. In SHAC, we want to represent the full body and range of the technically informed community. We might come to the conclusion that we will have to tailor SHAC even more for flooding than we already have. The project document will include some of the lessons learned, and this will be an ongoing process. When we perform a SHAC in a real situation, we will work through the practical nature of the computations. These include how many models and how many people should be involved, what resources should be devoted? Is SHAC Level 1 sufficient, or is Level 2 needed? Do we need to go to SHAC Level 3? What is the risk significance in the first place? All of these need to be worked through as we continue the project, develop these terminologies and this whole approach, and try to apply it.

#### Question:

My question relates to the variation in the data and how they fit, as well as the data quality objectives. As presented, the SHAC process lacks explicit actual review of the data quality objectives and whether the data fit. You mentioned that if the data do not fit the model, the data could be rejected. However, this means that you are relying on data and that you try to strive to obtain more data to compare to the model rather than relying on the specific analysis. Ultimately, you need to consider the data quality and the data quality objectives and how everything fits your objectives for the analysis. I agree that you are looking for a risk, but now you are dealing with hazard, which is different from risk. The risk includes different types of uncertainties and impacts, and this could be specific to the actual conditions that you are addressing. I also suggest that you include the data quality objectives process in order to accept or reject the data. It is possible that you may reject data that are very important and significant, and you may call certain data outliers that are actually important.


#### Response:


Quality assurance, which relates not only to data, takes place throughout the process. We will apply the process from the seismic side to the flood side. Sometimes we obtain Federal agency data from the agency's Web site, and the agency indicates that it has already applied a data quality control process and only publishes processed data. We sometimes rely on such assurances, but, in addition, whenever there is a project activity that transforms the data and tries to use them in the analysis, we will subject the data to quality control. With regard to your statement that we are only dealing with that hazard and not the risk, I completely agree that this is a hazard analysis. We are trying to determine a probabilistic description of the hazard. The framework that I presented this morning tries to do this and we are trying to use the best information and tools available to try to build a sound foundational basis in probability and statistics. We will then go from there to say that we have come up with uncertainties that in the SHAC process allow you to say that you have considered all sources of uncertainties that can arise, not only from variabilities, but also from people's personal opinions and the way they do modeling. The question still remains on how to take these hazard assessments and then interface with the risk community. What products do we need to give you to be able to use them in a human reliability analysis or PRA, and where are those interfaces? We need to have further conversation between the risk community and the hazard community.


#### 2.3.11 Day 3: Session 3D - Panel Discussion


This session included panel presentations and discussion on Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Activities in Partner Agencies, chaired by Joseph Kanney of the NRC.

2.3.11.1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/National Weather Service (NOAA/NWS), Sanja Perica, Ph.D. (Session 3D-1-A; ADAMS Accession No. ML17054C488)











### 2.3.11.2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Christopher Dunn, P.E., D.WRE.,


Norberto Nadal-Caraballo, Ph.D., John England, Ph.D., P.E., P.H., D.WRE. (Session 3D-1-B; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C489</u>)









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






**2.3.11.3 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)**, Curt Jawdy, P.E. (Session 3D-1-C; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C490</u>)
























## Operations



TVA created a rules-based RiverWare model to represent operations spanning our highlyintegrated system


Model was run for the 68-yr continuous record and rules were adjusted based on operator feedback





000 150000 2000 Maximum Outflow

Unprecedented storms were also run and rules were adjusted based on operator feedback

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







## **Calculating Runoff**

Execute the hydrology model using the selecter starting soil moistures and generated rainfall.







## Summarizing

Calculate summary stats like peak headwater & flow etc. for each run


 Create headwater frequency curve from sampled rainfalls using total probability theorem


Describe sources of uncertainty (only rainfall presently)








# Example Hazard Curve















**2.3.11.4 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)**, Curtis Smith, Ph.D., Idaho National Laboratory (Session 3D-1-D; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C491</u>)















**2.3.11.5** Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (France's Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN)), Vincent Rebour\*, Claire-Marie Duluc (Session 3D-1-E; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C492</u>)









# 2.3.11.6 Discussion

# Question:

The USBR report on hydrologic hazard estimation discussed the Logan Workshop 1999 effort that led to that table that gives the limits of credible extrapolation with outside data, regional data, paleoflood data, and others. Where are we today within that scope? That report talks about Bayesian and other methods that have been presented in the last few days. Are we trying to establish better understanding of the credibility of these more rare or extreme events—are we trying to narrow down better on those limits?

# Curt Jawdy, TVA

From TVA's perspective as a dam safety owner, TVA has a portfolio of 49 dams to keep as safe as possible. As a result, we have to prioritize our portfolio of projects in the best way. Therefore, we want to obtain the absolute value of the flood loading that is as accurate as we possibly can. For this reason, we put all this work into storm typing and understanding our uncertainties and breaking the system down as finely as possible. Ultimately, we have a decision to make, whether we have great data or not. For us, it is more about the relative value of dam A investment or dam B investment or dam C investment. While the absolute value is important, from a portfolio perspective, it is just as important to compare them to help make decisions.

# John England, USACE:

Data on Australian rainfall and runoff are available on the Web, including a new 2016 version that has the same table I have worked on over the years with [Rory] Nathan [University of Melbourne] and David Bowles [Utah State University], who were both at the 2013 NRC PFHA workshop. We are working on implementing tools to make those probabilities as credible as possible with full uncertainty and then propagate that to decisions. The first step is to achieve credible estimates and quantify that uncertainty, which is large, and then second to roll it into a decision framework that USACE and USBR are managing. The framework is an f-n chart [estimated life loss vs. annualized failure probability plot]. As a result, in a dam safety construct decision framework, given some fixed set of consequences, you can state that the consequence estimate is 1 and you use lives lost as the surrogate for consequences. You do not need to go to 10<sup>-5</sup> to 10<sup>-6</sup> to use the process to focus on other locations in your inventory of dams. The key is combining information to obtain the best estimate you can with the information you have to help make a decision for the portfolio across an inventory. When considering specific dams or levees in USACE, you need to take a harder look, and sometimes you just have to make a call to do what is best for the decision of that organization. This may include collecting additional paleoflood information or performing additional rainfall studies such as storm typing, or you can decide that, given other factors, we can assess them in almost a deterministic standard, such as the probable maximum flood(PMF) for overtopping in the case of a dam, and take some sort of action based on that. In my opinion, we have not really made very particular progress on the tables, which have been criticized a lot over the years. We have not made much particular progress in refining those numbers. Instead, we have focused on the tools and data that go into making those numbers and quantifying that uncertainty. As Brian Skahill (USACE) mentioned earlier on combining disparate data types. The hydraulic hazard community is trying to grow PFHA skills. USBR has focused on trying to include site data with regional information, expand the information in space and time, and bring in causative mechanisms. This is within a Bayesian framework in the research area that is used within USACE. But holistically, those are the pieces of information the community is still grappling

with how to apply practically. In the meantime, we are making decisions with the best information we have at the time.

# Brian Skahill, USACE:

The spatial statistics of extremes is an active area research. Some papers in the past 5 years are pivotal for how we will look at the statistics of hydrometeorological extremes. Academia and government agencies are involved in active research to advance tool development and increase capacity to use those tools. The capability to combine all that information is being worked on within the PFHA framework development activity for the NRC.

# Question:

The last two presentations tried to address the actual risk impacts to NPPs, which is of primary importance. My question is related to the integration of uncertainties from the hazard event. The hazard relates to analysis of the flood event itself, including when and how it will take place. Unfortunately, we do not have the qualifications to do that, so how do we determine the kind of consequences? The consequences of the hazard are really the risk. When we talk about risk at the NRC, we know about the risk triplet: the hazard itself, the probability of the hazard, and the consequences. Consequence is not dealt with much. This can be called "the scenario" or "the impact scenario." Could you elaborate on the consequence analysis and how the uncertainties from the event itself (flood, in this case) and those of the consequence (scenario uncertainty) can be integrated together in order to achieve the results of the risk analysis we are trying to achieve? Second, how will we deal with the data? Although we did not talk much about the independence of the data, our colleague from IRSN did address the independence of the parameters in the uncertainty analysis. Our discussion of risk also did not give much consideration to data independence. These are important factors in a risk analysis that pertains to flood events.

# Curtis Smith, INL for DOE

Once we get to the risk analysis part, it will be building on accepted practices, including industry and NRC PRA models. Some of the uncertainties for factors such as the hazard curves for a specific magnitude of floods are not really much different than some of the initiating events we already have in the models that we use for decisions every day. For example, the medium- and large-break LOCAs have frequencies down to 10<sup>-4</sup>, 10<sup>-5</sup>, and 10<sup>-6</sup>, with a fair amount of uncertainties. However, we do not really question that those came from work in the 1980s and 1990s, and we just continue to use them with those large uncertainties. This is a similar case, although a flood has some unique features in that it is the kind of a failure that might knock out many components that a LOCA may not. However, the models being produced, whether an event tree/fault tree or a more dynamic kind of a model, are equipped to handle the dependency specific to external hazards. That element sometimes is a challenge. This is just another tool in a scenario that is in a larger kind of model.

# Question:

Is MetVue publicly available?

# Christopher Dunn, USACE:

MetVue is not yet publicly available but will be in the future. The goal was to release it by the end of 2016, so that could take place sometime in 2017<sup>5</sup>.

# Follow-up Question:

You talked about transposing and moving storms in MetVue. Are there any adjustments made to the precipitation amount as that is done, such as to take into account storms passing over changes in elevation or orographics? Or is it just strictly moving that spatial pattern to a new spot?

#### Christopher Dunn, USACE:

Currently, MetVue does not do that. Users will have a lot of discretion in how to use it. You could potentially move a storm to another area where it does not make physical sense. Users will need to be careful when manipulating events, moving them around, and transposing them to ensure that they are doing something that is physically possible.

#### Question:

When will USACE release Hydrologic Modeling System (HMS) 4.3, including the Markov chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) capability?

# Christopher Dunn, USACE:

This is planned for September 2017<sup>6</sup>.

# Christopher Dunn, USACE:

The NRC's research themes have focused in part on epistemic uncertainties and understanding them from a framework of different interpretations of data models and methods, which has not been a big focus in the flooding field. Will the work the NRC is funding improve the state of practice with respect to the treatment of epistemic uncertainties? How that will help in applications that are not related to NPPs?

# Curtis Smith, INL for DOE:

People appear to be agreeing on the different kinds and drivers of uncertainty, and the community of practice is moving forward. I would encourage it to keep moving forward and also consider what the NRC does for the other hazards. For example, we have a Bayesian distribution for the frequency of a large-break LOCA as an initiating event. If we want to use something like flooding hazards as an initiating event or a probabilistic PRA-type of initiating event, we would want to have an apples to apples kind of model. This appears to be an issue of concern among participants. We have that issue with a loss of offsite power, in terms of how far back in history we should consider, given that the practices of the grid have changed over last 20 to 30 years. This is the challenging question, as we are discussing climate and floods from 500 years ago, so going far back in history may be necessary. But the idea of having Bayesian distribution and Bayesian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> HEC MetVue was released publicly in summer 2019 and can be accessed at <u>https://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-metvue/</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> HEC-HMS 4.3 was released in September 2018 and includes the Monte Carlo Uncertainty tool <u>https://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-hms/documentation.aspx</u>

models and classifying uncertainty (aleatory, epistemic) very much fits into the NRC way of thinking. This is the case for many synergies with other activities in risk assessment.

# Norberto Nadal-Caraballo, USACE:

The collaboration with the NRC has given us the chance to evaluate many methods and models that we had not even considered in the past, and we are applying a lot of the lessons learned. We are still learning a lot doing this study, and we are in the process of applying some of those lessons learned to USACE products. For example, before this study, we did not even contemplate considering some of the epistemic uncertainties whose importance we are now realizing. In previous studies by FEMA and USACE, we just computed, for example, the modeling errors. We compared high-water marks with the results from ADCIRC, and, although we incorporated those uncertainties in the hazard curve, we basically ignored everything else. We have seen that the uncertainty in the SRR models is significant and can impact the final hazard curve. This has been a very good opportunity for us to see that and to give us the chance to improve our products moving forward.

# Question:

In terms of both the statistical analysis and the uncertainty in the riverine modeling, are you considering multiple models, multiple distributions in the statistical part of it or different physical mechanisms or models that contain different physical mechanisms in modeling uncertainty portions?

# Vincent Rebour , IRSN:

Our first objective is to identify the set of tools. The second step will be testing different methods of modeling.

# Question:

What resolution are the researchers at the University of Illinois using in those climate models to make climate projections? Until you reach a very fine resolution, essentially going to a convection permitting climate model, there will be certain precipitation events that just cannot be modeled, for example.

# Sanja Perica, NOAA/NWS: Response unclear and not recorded.

# Brian Skahill, USACE:

Based on the ongoing work on **Error! Bookmark not defined.**development for the NRC and then the related work with HMS at the Hydrologic Engineering Center, I proposed to the HMS team and the supervisory chain at the Hydrologic Engineering Center that as we now have that capability encased in HMS, and given that the HMS tool has a lot of flexibility and an adaptable, user-friendly interface, it would not be too difficult to transition to looking at different loss mechanisms for basin modeling and different transformation methods. We could definitely leverage the sampler and MCMC sampler we now have in HMS to support treatment of the model generalization problem that was brought up in the last two questions.

# Question:

What are the limitations of using maximum likelihood estimation for probabilities of less than 10<sup>-4</sup> for a dam safety application?

# Sanja Perica, NOAA/NWS:

Although I do not know the answer, under the maximum likelihood approach, L-moments approach, or whichever approach you choose, once you are at frequencies of 10<sup>-4</sup>, there are of course many uncertainties. It is difficult to identify which approach will result in smaller uncertainties.

#### Follow-up Question:

Can others address the question in terms of dam safety assessment?

#### Curt Jawdy, TVA:

We are just starting to look into the uncertainties outside of rainfall, but we are seeing that most TVA dams are fairly well in control out to the 10,000-year event. When you are looking at a time out that far, the soil is full of moisture and it is all going to runoff no matter what model you use. The rainfall uncertainty is so high, the further out you go. Much of the operational uncertainty in the reservoir system and the runoff uncertainty in the hydrological model will likely be swamped by the rainfall uncertainty. As a result, we are taking the approach of tackling the uncertainties that seem to be the biggest first and working down.

# John England, USACE:

USBR did this in practice in about 2002 when we were working with FloodFreq3. The code is available, and Brian Skahill's research now is moving in a more modern framework with R (a statistical package). We looked at model uncertainty. Some of the issues that William Asquith touched on (see Section 3.4.2) in a likelihood framework you could do a little more conveniently to exploit LP-III versus GEV in terms of the peak flow frequency. As a result, you can directly account for which models fit well and then include those and weight them to inflate the uncertainty to include some model uncertainty. A couple of journal articles were published on that, and USBR published a report for Folsom Dam in 2002. This gives a place for likelihood and makes it a little more convenient to include covariates. However, it is challenging for practitioners to understand, and so we are still trying to include long data sets, as well as the biggest rainfalls and the biggest floods in the analysis. That is really the first order problem on the data side, rather than arguing between L-moments and likelihood. It is important to include the really big events and know the physics you are trying to mimic with the statistical models.

# Question:

Has the work on automated storm typing been published?

# Curt Jawdy , TVA:

It has not been published in a journal yet. We are reviewing our entire framework in April and need to determine what is proprietary and what can be published.

# Question:

Could you provide more detail on how you are tackling the debris loading and gate failure scenarios for the Willamette River Project?

# John England, USACE:


With regard to the previous question, there is extensive information in the academic literature, namely hydrology system science, on patterning and typing in climate. From a research perspective, MGS Engineering Consultants work for TVA in terms of patterning and using typing to do storms is not unique but well founded in other academic literature, including SOMs. It is actually in the roots of NOAA/NWS Hydrometeorological Report No. 55a, "Probable Maximum **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Estimates—United States Between the Continental Divide and the 103rd Meridian," issued June 1988, with the storm classification system in its PMP .


With regard to the question in the probabilistic world about the debris and gates on the Willamette River, this is a new part of project, so we do not yet have clear documentation. We are essentially adopting a gate scenario, based on the fault tree work that was shared through USACE and **Error! Bookmark not defined.**'s Best Practices in Dam Safety Risk Analysis. That training course on mechanical reliability, offered for the past 5 or 6 years, contains a whole gate module, and we are now trying to take the step of moving those pieces into the hydrologic hazard analysis. We have not yet come to consensus on how to do it. We know gate reliability and debris are huge issues, and therefore we are sort performing the scenario analysis and looking at initiation nodes in an event tree.


# 2.3.12 Day 3: Session 3E - Future Work in PFHA

2.3.12.1 Future Work in PFHA at EPRI, John Weglian\*, EPRI(Session 3E-1; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C493</u>)

# 2.3.12.1.1 Presentation







# **Dam Failure**

- Difficulty exists in getting data from dam regulators for risk assessment
- Best approach seems to be working through the NRC to get needed data
- This approach has generally produced more of a deterministic result and not a flood hazard frequency curve
- Best research approach may be to work with a dam regulator to come up with a methodology they can use to produce the hazard frequency curve the utilities need






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# **Correlated Hazards**

- External flooding may often be correlated with high winds
- A complete analysis of the hazard of the event will require consideration of both flooding and wind effects
- Further research is required to assess the best way to integrate separate PRA models correctly when the hazards are correlated







# 2.3.12.1.2 Questions and Answers

# Question:

How are you planning to model the storm surges for the Monte Carlo simulations?

# Response:

We will use probability density functions for the storm surge parameters that will be used. The actual hydrologic model (developed by the contractor) has not been chosen yet.

# Question:

What EPRI exists for NPP sites located on the Great Lakes?


# Response:


If the meteorological parameters can be successfully estimated, then this modeling may be applicable to both coastal and Great Lakes sites.


**2.3.12.2** *Future Work in PFHA at NRC*, Joseph Kanney, Ph.D., Meredith Carr\*, Ph.D., P.E., Thomas Aird, Elena Yegorova, Ph.D., and Mark Fuhrmann, Ph.D., Fire and External Hazards Analysis Branch, Division of Risk Analysis; and Jacob Philip, P.E., Division of Engineering, Structural, Geotechnical and Seismic Engineering Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. NRC (Session 3E-2; ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C494</u>)


2.3.12.2.1 Presentation























# 2.3.12.2.2 Questions and Answers

# Question:

You alluded to combining different flood mechanisms in a single hazard curve. I would think of treating them differently in building the PRA and considering the importance of other factors besides the water level. Note that the hazard curve may be discontinuous (including step changes).

# Response:

Realistically, different portions of the hazard curves will come from different places. Contributions to the total hazard may come from different processes.

# Question:

What is the peer review process for your model and its application/performance demands?

#### Response:

The model will be reviewed internally at the NRC. This report can be shared with other Federal agencies as well.

#### Comment:

Validation should reflect the predictive power of the model.

# Question:

With respect to the utility of the models, how would you use surrogate models?

#### Response:

With local intense precipitation, for example, we will use anecdotal data to deal with the limited data case. These data can be used to constrain the model in certain situations. Other situations include ungauged catchment areas.

# 2.4 Summary

This report documents the 2nd Annual NRC Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Workshop held at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, on January 23–25, 2017. These proceedings included the following:

- Section 3.2: Workshop Agenda (in the program (ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C495</u>)
- Section 3.3: Proceedings (abstracts in the program at ADAMS Accession No. <u>ML17054C495</u> and complete workshop presentation package including slides and guestions and answers at ADAMS Accession No. ML17040A626)
- Section 3.4: Summary
- Section 3.5 Workshop Participants

# 2.5 Participants

\* indicates speaker, ^ indicates remote participant

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# 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

# 5.1 Summary

This report has presented agendas, presentations and discussion summaries for the first four NRC Annual PFHA Research Workshops (2015-2019). These proceedings include presentation abstracts and slides and a summary of the question and answer sessions. The first workshop was limited to NRC technical staff and management, NRC contractors, and staff from other Federal agencies. The three workshops that followed were meetings attended by members of the public; NRC technical staff, management, and contractors; and staff from other Federal agencies. Public attendees over the course of the workshops included industry groups, industry members, consultants, independent laboratories, academic institutions, and the press. Members of the public were invited to speak at the workshops. The fourth workshop included more invited speakers from the public than from the NRC and the NRC's contractors.

The proceedings for the second through fourth workshops include all presentation abstracts and slides and submitted posters and panelists' slides. Workshop organizers took notes and audio recorded the question and answer sessions following each talk, during group panels, and during end of day question and answer session. Responses are not reproduced here verbatim and were generally from the presenter or co authors. Descriptions of the panel discussions identify the speaker when possible. Questions were taken orally from attendees, on question cards, and over the telephone.

# 5.2 Conclusions

As reflected in these proceedings PFHA is a very active area of research at NRC and its international counterparts, as well as other Federal agencies, industry and academia. Readers of this report will have been exposed to current technical issues, research efforts, and accomplishments in this area within the NRC and the wider research community.

The NRC projects discussed in these proceedings represent the main efforts in the first phase (technical-basis phase) of NRC's PFHA Research Program. This technical-basis phase is nearly complete, and the NRC has initiated a second phase (pilot project phase) that is a syntheses of various technical basis results and lessons learned to demonstrate development of realistic flood hazard curves for several key flooding phenomena scenarios (site-scale, riverine and coastal flooding). The third phase (development of selected guidance documents) is an area of active discussion between RES and NRC User Offices. NRC staff looks forward to further public engagement regarding the second and third phases of the PFHA research program in future PFHA Research Workshops.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

These workshops were planned and executed by an organizing committee in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), Division of Risk Analysis, Fire and External Hazards Analysis Branch, and with the assistance of many NRC staff.

#### Organizing Committees

1st Workshop, October 14-15, 2015: Joseph Kanney and William Ott.

<u>2nd Workshop, January 23–25, 2017</u>: Co-Chairs: Meredith Carr, Joseph Kanney; *Members:* Thomas Aird, Thomas Nicholson, MarkHenry Salley; *Workshop Facilitator:* Kenneth Hamburger

<u>3rd Workshop, December 4–5, 2017</u>: Chair: Joseph Kanney, Members: Thomas Aird, Meredith Carr, Thomas Nicholson, MarkHenry Salley; Workshop Facilitator: Kenneth Hamburger

<u>4th Workshop, April 30–May 2, 2019</u>: Co-Chairs: Meredith Carr, Elena Yegorova; Members: Joseph Kanney, Thomas Aird, Mark Fuhrmann, MarkHenry Salley; Workshop Facilitator: Kenneth Hamburger

Many NRC support offices contributed to all of the workshops and these proceedings. The organizing committee would like to highlight the efforts of the RES administrative staff; the RES Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Branch; and the audiovisual, security, print shop, and editorial staff. The organizers appreciated office and division direction and support from Jennene Littlejohn, William Ott, MarkHenry Salley, Mark Thaggard, Michael Cheok, Richard Correia, Mike Weber, and Ray Furstenau. Michelle Bensi, Mehdi Reisi-Fard, Christopher Cook, and Andrew Campbell provided guidance and support from the NRC Office of New Reactors and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The organizers thank the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for assisting with planning, contributions, and organizing several speakers. EPRI personnel who participated in the organization of the workshops include John Weglian, Hasan Charkas, and Marko Randelovic.

During the workshops, Tammie Rivera assisted with planning and organized the registration area during the conference. David Stroup and Don Algama assisted with room organization. Notes were studiously scribed by Mark Fuhrmann, David Stroup, Nebiyu Tiruneh, Michelle Bensi, Hosung Ahn, Gabriel Taylor, Brad Harvey, Kevin Quinlan, Steve Breithaupt, Mike Lee, Jeff Wood, and organizing committee members. The organizers appreciate the assistance during the conference of audiovisual, security, and other support staff. The organizers thank the panelists, the technical presenters, and poster presenters for their contributions; Thomas Aird and Mark Fuhrmann for performing a colleague review of this document; and the Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Group for transcript reviews.

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# APPENDIX A: SUBJECT INDEX

17B, Bulletin, 1-48, 1-178, 1-189, 2-36, 2-187, 2-200, 4-215, 4-262, 4-265 17C, Bulletin, 2-36, 2-187, 2-194, 2-244, 3-121, 3-332, 4-163, 4-208, 4-214, 4-220, 4-230, 4-232, 4-236, 4-252, 4-257, 4-261, 4-265, 4-289 2D, 1-34, 3-385, 4-314 model, 1-183, 1-186, 2-52, 2-211, 2-362, 2-367, 2-377, 3-367, 4-202, 4-313, 4-326 CASC2D, 1-151 HEC-RAS. See HEC-RAS TELEMAC, 4-203, 4-206, 4-328 3D, 4-314 coastal, 4-123 model, 1-252, 1-261, 2-288, 2-295, 2-302, 2-306, 2-393, 3-22, 3-25, 3-199, 3-378, 4-24, 4-126, 4-291 terrain mapping, 1-252 accumulated cyclone energy, ACE, 4-372 ADCIRC, 1-196, 2-78, 2-334, 2-379, 2-403, 4-57, 4-94 AEP, xxxvii, 1-12, 1-17, 1-36, 1-50, 1-54, 1-69, 1-149, 1-166, 1-191, 1-198, 2-22, 2-43, 2-54, 2-154, 2-187, 2-201, 2-204, 2-219, 2-225, 2-270, 2-307, 2-340, 3-15, 3-21, 3-74, 3-97, 3-116, 3-117, 3-132, 3-135, 3-138, 3-337, 3-355, 4-15, 4-60, 4-74, 4-94, 4-120, 4-127, 4-132, 4-194, 4-209, 4-214, 4-253, 4-286, 4-381 drainage area based estimate, 1-69 low AEP, 2-187, 3-117, 3-135 neutral, 1-185 return periods, 1-51 very low AEP, 1-166, 2-187, 3-117, 4-158 AEP4. See distribution: Asymmetric Exponential Power aleatory uncertainty. See uncertainty, aleatory American Nuclear Society. See ANS AMM. See Multi-decadal:Atlantic Meridional Mode AMO. See Multi-decadal: Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation AMS. See annual maximum series ANalysis Of VAriance, ANOVA, 4-201 annual exceedance probability. See AEP

annual maximum series, 1-72, 1-165, 2-155, 2-201, 2-373, 3-75 searching, 4-149 ANS, 3-377, 4-442, 4-452, 4-461, 4-471 areal reduction factor. See ARF ARF, 1-84, 2-374, 2-383, 2-417, 3-224, 3-401, 4-18, 4-120, 4-133, 4-142, 4-144, 4-149, 4-152, 4-162 averaging, temporal and spatial, 4-148 dynamic scaling model, 4-151 methods, 4-147 empirical, 4-151 test cases, 4-147 arid, 1-61, 2-217, 2-223, 3-163, 3-200, 4-132 semi-, 4-131 ARR. See rainfall-runoff: model: Austrailian Rainfall and Runoff Model ASME, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 4-442 associated effects, 1-12, 1-31, 1-34, 2-43, 3-15, 4-15, 4-31 atmospheric conditions. 1-90 dispersion, 2-16 environment, 2-71 instability, 4-377 interactions, 4-98 moisture, 3-28, 4-125, 4-346, 4-353 parameters, 2-81, 3-111 patterns, 2-85 processes, 3-310 rivers, 1-56, 1-59, 1-162 stability, 4-163 variables, 4-122 at-site, 1-84, 1-180, 2-31, 2-152, 2-155, 2-160, 2-163, 2-188, 2-206, 2-209, 3-70, 3-75, 3-79, 3-84, 3-132, 3-139, 3-310, 3-315, 4-125, 4-137, 4-208, 4-214, 4-264 Austrailian Rainfall and Runoff Model. See rainfall-runoff: model: Austrailian Rainfall and Runoff Model autocorrelation, 3-126 BATEA. See error: Bayesian Total Error Analysis Rayesian, 2-151, 2-162, 2-165, 2-313, 2-400, 2-402, 3-70, 3-88, 3-93, 3-140, 3-304, 4-163, 4-220, 4-223, 4-229, 4-257, 4-294

analysis, 1-171, 4-308 approach, 1-167, 2-168, 2-308, 4-257, 4-366 BHM, 1-86, 1-175, 2-338, 2-345, 3-304 estimation, 1-156 framework, 1-161, 1-163, 2-321, 2-369, 2-400, 4-257 gridded, 3-90 hazard curve combination, 4-220 inference, 2-338, 2-342, 2-347, 3-70, 3-78, 3-93, 3-304, 3-313, 3-387, 4-223 maximum likelihood, 1-186 model, 2-321, 2-345, 2-353, 2-402, 3-307, 3-326 posterior distribution, 1-161, 1-163, 1-171, 2-163, 2-321, 2-338, 2-342, 3-78, 3-79, 3-88, 3-93, 4-223 prior distribution, 1-161, 1-171, 2-163, 3-78 Quadrature, 1-196, 2-68, 4-69 regional, 2-163, 3-79 Bayesian Hierarchical Model. See Bayesian:BHM best practice, 1-15, 1-151, 2-34, 2-45, 2-248, 2-259, 2-405, 3-17, 3-22, 3-25, 3-242, 3-246, 3-301, 3-361, 4-18, 4-24, 4-254, 4-318 Blayais, 2-9, 2-266, 3-27, 3-240, 4-390, 4-472 bootstrap 1000 year simulation, 3-359 resampling, 4-64 boundary condition, 1-90, 1-95, 1-196, 2-102, 2-113, 2-150, 2-312, 2-320, 2-326, 2-354, 2-366, 2-413, 3-43, 3-47, 3-68, 4-30, 4-39, 4-203, 4-266, 4-271, 4-298 bounding, 2-323, 2-337, 3-28, 4-457, 4-470, 4-478 analyses, 2-268, 2-322, 3-28, 4-470 assessments, 3-370 assumptions, 2-322 estimates, 2-37 tests, 2-268 BQ. See Bayesian: Quadrature breach, dam/levee, 1-21, 1-148, 1-209, 1-214, 1-220, 2-34, 2-322, 2-325, 2-329, 3-267, 3-268, 3-314, 4-198, 4-204, 4-262, 4-312, 4-404, 4-405, 4-425 computational model, 4-415, 4-417 development, 3-267 initiation, 3-198 location, 4-262, 4-313

mass wasting, 4-419 models, 3-301, 4-425 tests, 3-269, 4-406 Bulletin 17B. See 17B, Bulletin Bulletin 17C. See 17C, Bulletin calibration, 1-89, 1-90, 1-101, 1-123, 1-158, 1-161, 1-177, 2-207, 2-312, 2-317, 3-67, 3-70, 3-144, 3-146, 3-202, 4-25, 4-75, 4-105, 4-217, 4-227, 4-313, 4-332, 4-369 CAPE, 1-60, 1-139, 2-96, 2-381, 4-136, 4-144, 4-161, 4-218 CASC2D. See 2D:model CASC2D CDB. See current design basis: CDF, 1-152, 1-164, 4-66 center, body, and range, 1-136, 1-207, 2-354, 2-359, 3-94, 3-314, 3-320, 4-266, 4-313 CFHA. See flood hazard:flood hazard assessment:comprehensive CFHA. See coastal flood hazard assessment CFSR. See reanalysis:Climate Forecast System Reanalysis CHS. See Coastal Hazard System Clausius-Clapeyron, 1-58, 2-89, 4-353, 4-384 cliff-edge effects, 1-12, 1-31, 2-43, 3-15, 3-373, 3-382, 4-15, 4-474 climate, 1-51, 1-54, 1-98, 1-151, 1-196, 1-209, 1-267, 2-16, 2-77, 2-88, 2-223, 2-372, 2-402, 3-29, 3-81, 3-120, 3-133, 3-136, 3-179, 3-189, 3-208, 4-11, 4-105, 4-113, 4-119, 4-125, 4-132, 4-137, 4-335, 4-354, 4-369, 4-379, 4-380, 4-383 anomalies, 1-61, 3-196 hydroclimatic extremes, 4-335 index, 2-338, 2-345, 3-304, 3-310, 3-313 mean precipitation projections, 4-341 mean precipitation trends, 4-339 models, 1-58, 1-63, 1-95, 2-97, 2-100, 2-112 downscaling, 4-341 patterns, 1-56, 2-88, 3-29, 3-192 predictions, 1-96 projections, 1-22, 1-51, 1-55, 1-96, 2-48, 2-89, 2-112, 2-373, 3-19, 3-30, 3-47, 3-67, 3-162, 4-335, 4-356, 4-369 precipitation, 4-344 regional, 1-74, 1-123 scenarios, 4-341 science, 1-22, 1-52, 2-90, 2-405, 3-193, 4-

381

temperature changes, 3-32 trends, 4-335 variability, 2-100, 4-137, 4-225, 4-371, 4-377 climate change, 1-22, 1-51, 1-63, 1-95, 1-162, 1-188, 2-48, 2-77, 2-88, 2-98, 2-102, 2-114, 2-168, 2-199, 2-307, 2-366, 3-19, 3-29, 3-35, 3-38, 3-115, 3-195, 3-398, 4-20, 4-30, 4-33, 4-98, 4-260, 4-355, 4-364, 4-370, 4-378, 4-380, 4-383, 4-454 high temperature event frequency increase, 2-94 hydrologic implacts, 2-99 mean changes, 2-99 precipitation changes, 2-91 scenarios, 2-93 streamflow change, 2-98 coastal, 1-148, 1-267, 4-34, 4-93, 4-317 CSTORM, 2-379 StormSim. 2-379 coastal flood hazard assessment, 1-194 Coastal Hazard System, 2-379, 3-328 coincident and correlated flooding, 2-40, 3-10, 3-15, 3-395, 3-403, 4-15, 4-19, 4-318, 4-448 coincident events, 1-12, 2-43, 2-332, 3-15, 4-15. 4-86 combined effects, 1-12, 1-30, 2-43, 4-432, 4-440 combined events, 1-25, 1-31, 1-37, 1-133, 2-89, 2-356, 2-419, 3-318, 3-380, 3-386, 4-95, 4-440, 4-451, 4-454, 4-456, 4-477 combined processes, 1-25 compound event framework, 4-320 concurrent hazards, 1-228, 2-276, 3-374, 3-377 correlated hazards, 2-52, 2-410, 3-26 confidence interval, 1-72, 1-157, 3-15, 3-139, 4-14, 4-199, 4-214 confidence limits, 1-178, 1-194, 1-199, 2-36, 2-196, 3-94, 3-108, 4-57, 4-69, 4-232, 4-253 NOAA Atlas 14, 2-373 convective potential energy. See CAPE correlation spatial and temporal, 2-340, 3-307 cumulative distribution function. See CDF current design basis, 1-10, 1-23, 1-247, 2-21, 2-42, 2-202, 2-255, 3-12, 3-154, 4-381, 4-480

design basis flood, 4-454 event, 3-245 return period, 3-352 flood walkdown, 2-254 dam, 1-210, 2-201, 2-244, 2-307, 2-329, 2-338, 2-400, 3-15, 3-136, 3-149, 3-194, 3-197, 3-267, 3-314, 3-338, 3-405, 4-14, 4-130, 4-208, 4-224, 4-228, 4-253, 4-257, 4-278, 4-281, 4-312, 4-404, 4-425, 4-451, 4-476 assessments, 4-196 breach. See breach, dam/levee case study, 1-65, 1-74, 2-348, 2-378, 3-143, 3-333, 3-336, 3-355, 3-358, 4-125, 4-213, 4-218, 4-238, 4-298, 4-329 computational model, 4-405 embankment. See embankment dam erosion. See erosion: dam failure, 1-6, 1-11, 1-37, 1-172, 1-227, 2-12, 2-34, 2-52, 2-276, 2-288, 2-322, 2-325, 2-329, 2-340, 2-353, 2-409, 3-22, 3-26, 3-136, 3-197, 3-217, 3-266, 3-353, 3-371, 3-374, 3-378, 3-388, 3-395, 4-14, 4-228, 4-295, 4-318, 4-322, 4-455, 4-476 failure analysis, 4-324 models, 1-159, 3-191 operations, 2-384 Oroville, 3-339, 3-361, 3-389, 4-258 overtopping, 3-277, 3-303, 3-367, 4-330, 4-333, 4-407 physical model, 1-209, 1-216, 3-268, 4-405 potential failure modes, 2-340 regulation, 1-155, 1-188, 4-289 releases, 2-97, 3-37, 4-287, 4-318, 4-363 risk, 1-24, 2-378, 2-416, 3-138, 3-197, 3-369, 3-400, 4-20, 4-287, 4-320, 4-334 risk assessment, 4-321 safety, 1-151, 1-211, 2-203, 2-400, 2-404, 3-135, 3-202, 3-331, 3-353, 4-114, 4-124, 4-130, 4-158, 4-161, 4-163, 4-209, 4-217, 4-224, 4-227, 4-229, 4-231, 4-279, 4-323, 4-369 system of reservoirs, 3-334 system response, 3-354 data collection, 4-458 regional information, 1-154 transposition, 4-123

data, models and methods, 1-136, 1-197, 1-207, 2-53, 2-57, 2-62, 3-94, 3-96, 3-99, 3-104, 3-320, 4-57, 4-59, 4-268 model choice, 3-312 model selection, 3-312 DDF. See depth-duration-frequency decision-making, 1-23, 1-32, 1-36, 2-30, 2-246, 2-271, 2-395, 3-136, 3-248, 3-337, 3-400, 4-31, 4-34, 4-117, 4-129, 4-243, 4-276, 4-465, 4-476 dendrochronology, 2-220, 2-222, 3-124, 3-190, 4-229 botanical information, 4-216 tree ring estimate, 3-123 tree rings, 3-124, 3-183 deposits, 2-216, 2-244, 3-116, 3-182, 3-188, 3-190, 3-212, 3-234, 4-241, 4-243, 4-259 alluvial, 2-245 bluff, 3-187 boulder-sheltered, 2-239, 3-188, 4-250 cave, 2-220, 2-222, 2-240, 3-187, 4-229 flood, 2-223, 2-225, 2-227, 2-241, 2-242, 2-245, 3-163, 3-171, 3-173, 3-185, 3-190, 3-196, 3-200, 3-213, 4-238, 4-243 paleoflood characterization, 4-239 slackwater, 2-220, 3-124, 3-186, 3-362, 4-229, 4-230 surge, 4-259 terrace, 2-220, 2-245, 3-124, 3-183, 3-184 depth-duration-frequency, 2-372, 4-330 deterministic, 1-30, 1-35, 1-149, 1-151, 1-257, 2-8, 2-38, 2-71, 2-83, 2-179, 2-205, 2-260, 2-286, 2-323, 2-337, 2-408, 2-410, 3-10, 3-22, 3-28, 3-103, 3-140, 3-246, 3-259, 3-262, 3-374, 3-391, 3-393, 3-395, 4-13, 4-27, 4-31, 4-56, 4-122, 4-126, 4-130, 4-158, 4-175, 4-293, 4-383, 4-386, 4-454, 4-475, 4-477, 4-481 analysis, 2-179, 2-246, 2-322, 2-337, 3-390, 4-85, 4-382 approaches, 1-6, 1-28, 1-73, 2-26, 2-50, 2-154, 2-322, 2-337, 2-409, 3-24, 4-24, 4-199, 4-470 criteria, 2-168, 2-400 focused evaluations, 2-21 Hydrometerological Reports, HMR, 1-185 increasing realism, 2-332 methods, xxxviii, 1-29, 2-25, 2-202, 4-472 model, 1-151, 1-243, 2-88, 3-29, 3-304, 4-330, 4-355, 4-382

distribution, 1-71, 1-153, 2-151, 2-179, 2-187, 2-245, 2-270, 2-307, 2-369, 3-70, 3-96, 3-143, 3-315, 4-81, 4-125, 4-159, 4-163, 4-256, 4-260, 4-275, 4-315 Asymmetric Exponential Power (AEP4), 2-193, 2-197, 2-200 empirical, 4-64 exponential, 1-165, 1-208, 2-63, 2-207 extreme value, 2-151, 2-155, 3-70, 3-74 flood frequency, 2-207, 2-246, 3-117, 3-126, 4-208 full, 2-205 Gamma, 2-63, 2-347 generalized 'skew' normal (GNO), 1-80, 1-83, 2-159, 2-187, 2-193, 2-200, 2-373, 3-77 generalized extreme value (GEV), 1-80, 1-83, 1-175, 1-207, 1-258, 2-63, 2-159, 2-163, 2-174, 2-179, 2-187, 2-193, 2-197, 2-200, 2-207, 2-318, 2-346, 2-373, 3-70, 3-77, 4-111, 4-119, 4-149, 4-157, 4-224, 4-261, 4-343, 4-360 generalized logistic (GLO), 1-83, 1-84, 2-159, 2-193, 2-197, 2-373, 3-77 generalized Pareto (GPA or GPD), 1-83, 1-155, 1-196, 1-207, 2-63, 2-159, 2-187, 2-193, 2-197, 3-77, 4-224 GNO (generalized 'skew' normal), 2-197 Gumbel, 1-155, 1-196, 1-207, 2-63, 2-346, 4-205, 4-328 Kappa (KAP), 2-174, 2-177, 2-193, 2-200, 2-373, 3-358, 4-218, 4-307, 4-332 log Pearson Type III (LP-III), 1-155, 1-178, 2-36, 2-187, 2-194, 2-199, 4-208, 4-214, 4-257, 4-261 lognormal, 1-155, 1-207, 2-63, 2-66, 2-207, 3-100, 4-229 lognormal 3, 2-200 low frequency tails, 2-65 marginal, 4-60, 4-70 multiple, 2-53, 2-187, 2-403, 3-117, 4-257 mutltivariate Gaussian, 3-102 normal, 1-207, 2-63, 2-171, 4-49, 4-52, 4-69, 4-205, 4-229 parameters, 2-179, 2-188 Pearson Type III (PE3), 1-83, 2-159, 2-193, 2-197, 2-373, 3-77, 4-224 Poisson, 1-165, 1-198 posterior. See Bayesian: posterior distribution precipitation. See precipitation: distribution

prior. See Bayesian: prior distribution probability, 3-99, 4-89 quantiles, 2-155 tails, 2-207 temporal, 1-160, 2-179, 4-121, 4-290 triangle, 4-205, 4-208, 4-229, 4-328 type, 3-101 uniform, 4-205, 4-208, 4-257, 4-328 Wakeby (WAK), 1-83, 2-159, 2-193, 2-197, 2-373, 3-77 Weibull (WEI), 1-155, 1-196, 1-207, 2-63, 2-69, 2-187, 2-193, 2-197, 2-200, 3-100, 3-103, 4-328 Weibull plotting position, 4-64 Weibull type, 4-68 EC. See Environmental Conditions EHCOE. See External Hazard Center of Expertise EHID. See Hazard Information Digest EMA. See expected moments algorithm embankment dam, 1-21, 1-148, 1-209, 2-47, 3-19, 3-267, 3-269, 3-272, 3-276, 3-336, 4-19, 4-424 erosion. See erosion: embankment rockfill, 1-216, 3-273, 4-330, 4-404 zoned rockfill, 3-274 ensemble, 1-85, 1-124, 1-144, 2-100, 2-152, 2-161, 3-81, 3-86, 4-41, 4-52, 4-56, 4-97, 4-114, 4-117, 4-123, 4-381 approaches, 4-123 Global Ensemble Forecasting System, GEFS, 4-35, 4-56 gridded precipitation, 2-152, 2-160, 3-71, 3-81, 3-86, 3-89 models, 4-55, 4-56 real-time, 4-49 storm surge, 4-34, 4-35, 4-36 ENSO. See Multi-decadal: El Niño-Southern Oscillation Environmental Conditions, 1-21, 1-224, 2-271, 3-248 impact quantification, 3-257 impacts on performance, 2-280 insights, 3-256 literature, 2-278, 3-252, 3-257 method limitations, 2-284 multiple, simultaneously occuring, 3-257 performance demands, 2-275, 3-251 proof-of-concept, 2-273, 2-281, 3-251 standing and moving water, 2-279

Environmental Factors, 1-19, 1-21, 1-223, 1-238, 2-31, 2-47, 2-271, 2-276, 2-415, 3-19, 3-250, 3-398, 4-20, 4-441 epistemic uncertainty. See uncertainty, epistemic erosion, 1-11, 1-153, 1-222, 2-245, 3-15, 3-261, 4-14, 4-81, 4-96, 4-230, 4-330, 4-334, 4-404, 4-417 dam, 3-271, 3-284, 3-292, 3-302, 3-303, 4-407, 4-414, 4-424 embankment, 1-19, 1-21, 2-47, 3-19, 3-277, 3-292, 3-301, 4-19, 4-407 rockfill, 1-209, 4-404, 4-424 zoned, 3-267, 4-422, 4-424 zoned rockfill, 3-267, 4-404 equations, 4-420 erodibility parameters, 3-273, 3-303, 4-404, 4-415, 4-422 headcut, 3-267, 4-414, 4-416, 4-418 internal, 1-213, 3-136, 3-267, 3-272, 3-290, 3-292, 3-300, 3-302, 3-303, 4-416 parameters, 1-221, 3-285 processes, 1-21, 1-148, 1-221, 3-270, 4-407, 4-425 rates, 1-221, 3-267, 3-285, 4-404, 4-415 resistance, 3-267, 3-270, 4-407, 4-417 spillway, 3-136, 3-343, 4-211 surface, 2-330, 3-267, 3-284, 4-414, 4-416, 4-418, 4-422, 4-424 tests, 1-209, 1-215, 1-217, 3-267, 3-286, 4-404, 4-405 error, 1-35, 1-125, 1-166, 1-195, 2-56, 2-200, 2-317, 3-67, 3-105, 4-34, 4-41, 4-57, 4-76, 4-87, 4-90, 4-95, 4-102, 4-228, 4-262, 4-468 Bayesian Total Error Analysis, BATEA, 1-161 bounds, 3-116, 3-117 defined space, 4-35 distribution, 2-56, 4-49 epistemic uncertainty, 3-94 estimation, 4-108 forecasting, 4-35 instrument characteristic, 4-102 mean absolute, 4-62 mean square, 3-130 measurement, 1-161, 1-164, 4-262 model, 1-162, 2-193, 2-403, 4-57, 4-69, 4-79 operator, 2-284, 3-247, 3-257 quantification, 2-189, 4-59

random, 4-105, 4-107 relative, 3-48 root mean square, RMSE, 4-151, 4-306 sampling, 1-71, 2-192, 3-332, 4-79 seal installation, 2-267 simulation, 1-197, 2-57, 2-102, 3-42, 3-67, 3-97, 3-105 space, 4-35, 4-52 term, 2-53, 2-57, 2-73, 3-94, 3-96, 4-57, 4-60, 4-228 unbiased, 3-97, 4-60 undefined space, 4-35 EVA. See extreme value analysis evapotranspiration, 3-40 event tree, 1-22, 1-46, 1-260, 2-28, 2-288, 2-297, 2-300, 2-401, 2-405, 2-417, 3-301, 3-303, 3-389, 4-324, 4-440 analysis, 4-313, 4-477 EVT. See extreme value theory ex-control room actions, 4-474, 4-475 expected moments algorithm, 1-156, 1-186, 1-188, 2-187, 2-194, 2-199, 2-207, 2-212, 2-214, 3-117, 3-122, 3-139, 3-141, 3-149, 4-208, 4-214, 4-252, 4-257 expert elicitation, 1-135, 2-338, 2-343, 2-347, 3-326, 4-220, 4-226, 4-229, 4-313 external flood, 2-247, 2-259, 2-288, 3-22, 3-198, 4-385, 4-429 equipment list, 3-262, 3-264, 4-435 operator actions list, 3-262, 3-264 human action feasibility, 3-264 warning time, 3-264 risks, 3-260 scenarios, 3-132, 3-261 external flood hazard, 2-290, 4-455 frequency, 2-79 model validation, 2-394 external flooding PRA. See XFPRA External Hazard Center of Expertise, 2-15 extratropical cyclone, 1-11, 1-17, 1-18, 1-58, 1-91, 1-196, 2-77, 2-89, 2-97, 4-55, 4-98, 4-346, 4-355 reduced winter frequency, 4-362 extreme event, 4-290 extreme events, xxxvii, 1-56, 2-30, 2-88, 2-101, 2-168, 2-201, 2-307, 2-400, 3-29, 3-42, 3-140, 3-181, 3-193, 3-304, 3-313, 3-371, 4-281, 4-315, 4-349, 4-381, 4-475 external events, 4-29 meteorology, 4-352

extreme precipitation, 1-58, 1-90, 1-100, 2-88, 2-89, 2-104, 2-105, 2-153, 2-167, 3-33, 3-35, 3-40, 3-45, 3-70, 3-398, 4-101, 4-110, 4-347, 4-354 change, 2-91 classification, 1-92, 2-105, 3-44 climate projections, 4-342 climate trends, 4-339 Colorado/New Mexico study, 4-144, 4-159, 4-383 event, 1-91 increases, 2-94 spatial coherence, 4-337 temporal coherence, 4-337 variability, 4-337 extreme storm data, 3-334 extreme storm database, 2-377 increase, 4-359 frequency, 4-364 intensity, 4-364 model, 1-65, 2-153, 3-72 advances, 2-341 risk, 4-337 extreme value analysis, 1-194, 3-328 extreme value theory, 3-304, 3-313, 4-114, 4-151 fault tree, 1-46, 1-260, 4-324 FHRR. See Near Term Task Force: Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluations FLEX, 2-24, 2-288, 2-304, 3-199, 3-248, 3-258, 3-263, 4-314, 4-381, 4-440 flood, 2-415, 3-31 causing mechanisms, 4-318 complex event, 4-449 depths, 1-34 design criteria, 3-352 duration, 1-31, 1-34, 1-255, 2-30, 2-291 dynamic modeling, 1-255, 2-291, 2-304 elevations, 1-51 event, 1-253, 2-289 extreme events, 1-172, 2-207, 4-466 gates, 4-473 hazard, 1-12, 1-153, 2-44, 3-16, 4-15 diverse, 4-447 increase, 4-364 mechanisms, 1-31, 1-132, 2-309, 2-325, 2-356, 4-432 mitigation, 2-30 operating experience, 4-11 organizational procedure, 3-245 response, 3-245

risk, 1-177 riverine, 1-6, 1-16, 1-133, 1-148, 1-150, 1-168, 1-175, 1-267, 2-46, 2-202, 2-227, 2-288, 2-338, 2-353, 2-355, 3-15, 3-18, 3-22, 3-27, 3-115, 3-198, 3-246, 3-314, 4-11, 4-14, 4-24, 4-31, 4-164, 4-197, 4-228, 4-255, 4-265, 4-295, 4-311, 4-455 routing, 1-11 runoff-induced riverine, 4-318 SDP example, 1-43 simulation, 2-52 situation, 4-202 sources, 4-456 sparse data, 4-30 stage, 4-480 warning time, 1-34, 2-30 flood events Blayais, 4-465 Cruas, 4-466 Dresden, 4-466 Hinkley Point, 4-466 St. Lucie, 4-466 flood frequency, 2-30, 3-118, 3-398, 4-252, 4-330, 4-473 analysis, 1-13, 1-148, 1-150, 1-153, 1-172, 1-176, 1-180, 2-45, 2-81, 2-187, 2-190, 2-202, 2-227, 2-244, 3-17, 3-116, 3-119, 3-126, 3-129, 3-135, 3-137, 3-142, 3-163, 3-199, 3-234, 3-325, 4-18, 4-246, 4-265, 4-474 gridded, 3-92 methods, 1-13, 2-45, 3-17 benchmark, 4-33 curve, 3-112, 3-355, 4-176, 4-253 extrapolation, 2-218 extrapolation, 3-139 limits, 2-170 methods, 1-191 flood hazard, 1-10, 1-27, 1-30, 2-16, 2-42, 2-43, 2-182, 2-309, 3-12, 3-151, 3-371, 4-14, 4-327, 4-473 curves, 4-266 combining, 4-219 family of, 2-54, 3-108, 3-380, 4-71, 4-267, 4-475 dynamics, 3-385 flood hazard analysis, 3-354 case study, 4-191 riverine pilot, 2-50 flood hazard assessment, 1-29, 3-328, 3-336, 4-318

comprehensive, CFHA, 1-152 influencing parameters, 4-202 probabilistic analysis, 1-30 re-evaluated, 1-248 riverine, 2-307 scenarios, 4-458 static vs. dynamic, 3-368 Flood Hazard Re-Evaluations. See Near Term Task Force: Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluations flood mitigation, 4-20, 4-472 actions, 3-379 approaches, 4-449 fragility, 3-381 proceduralized response, 3-245 procedures, 4-473, 4-475 strategies, 2-254 flood protection, 1-255, 2-51, 2-248, 2-250, 2-291, 3-22, 3-25, 3-242, 4-21, 4-24, 4-33, 4-472 barrier fragility, 2-52, 2-410, 3-26, 3-395 criteria, 2-250 failure modes, 3-374 features, 2-250, 3-245, 3-262, 3-265, 4-27, 4-435 fragility, 3-377, 3-379 inspection, 2-250 maintenance, 2-254 oversight, 3-246 reliability, 1-37 survey, 2-257 testing methods, 2-250 training, 2-254 work control, 3-245 flood protection and mitigation, 1-11, 1-21, 2-21, 2-43, 2-180, 2-271, 2-415, 3-13, 3-16, 3-150, 3-250, 4-11, 4-14 training, 3-245 flood seals, 1-19, 1-44, 1-223, 1-265, 2-19, 2-47, 2-247, 2-251, 2-260, 2-265, 3-19, 3-235, 3-240, 4-20, 4-384, 4-392, 4-393, 4-402, 4-403, 4-426, 4-473 characeristic types and uses, 1-266, 2-262, 3-237, 4-386, 4-394, 4-397 condition, 4-387, 4-435 critical height, 4-435 failure mode, 4-387 fragility, 3-381 historic testing, 2-251 impact assessment, 4-387

performance, 1-19, 2-47, 2-261, 3-19, 3-235, 4-393 ranking process, 4-388 risk significance, 4-386 tests, 1-20, 1-265, 2-262, 3-236, 4-394 criteria development, 2-251 plan, 2-264, 3-238, 4-395 procedure, 1-265, 3-239, 4-396 results, 4-400, 4-401 series, 4-397 Focused Evaluations. See Fukushima Near Term Task Force: Focused Evaluations FPM. See flood protection and mitigation fragility, 1-11, 3-13, 4-14 analysis, 1-259 curve, 4-324 flood barrier. See flood protection: barrier fragility framework NARSIS, 4-327 simulation based dynamic flood anlaysis (SBDFA), 1-253, 1-256, 2-292 **TVA Probabilistic Flood Hazard** Assessment, 2-320, 2-404, 4-277 scenarios, 4-282 Fukushima Near Term Task Force, 1-9, 1-23, 1-27, 1-32, 2-17, 2-20, 3-263, 4-11, 4-386 Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluations, 1-23, 4-440, 4-471, 4-480 Fukushima Flooding Reports, 4-471 re-evaluated flooding hazard, 4-480 Focused Evaluations, 3-263, 4-471 Integrated Assessment, 2-21, 3-263, 4-386 Mitigating Strategies Assessments, 3-263, 4-440, 4-475 post Fukushima process, 4-472 Recommendation 2.1, 4-480 Recommendation 2.3, 4-435, 4-479 Gaussian, 2-67 Gaussian process metamodeling, 3-102, 4-59.4-61 local correction, 4-61 uncertainty, 4-61 GCM. See Global Climate Model, See Global Climate Model GEFS. See ensemble: Global Ensemble Forecasting System GEV. See distribution:generalized extreme value

GLO. See distribution:generalized logistic Global Climate Model, 1-128, 1-162, 2-53, 2-55, 2-63, 2-67, 2-71, 2-77, 2-96, 2-99, 2-403, 3-41, 3-47, 3-94, 3-100, 3-103, 4-99, 4-114, 4-163, 4-260, 4-360 downscaling, 2-55, 3-102 model forcing, 2-71 Global Precipitation Measurement, GPM, 4-100, 4-117 global regression model, 4-61 global sensitivity analysis, 4-198, 4-327 case studies, 4-202 simple case, 4-205 GNO. See distribution:generalized 'skew' normal goodness-of-fit, 2-102, 2-187, 2-194 tests, 1-71 GPA. See distribution: generalized Pareto GPD. See distribution:generalized Pareto GPM. See Gaussian process metamodeling Great Lakes, 3-31 water levels, 4-366 decreases, 4-368 lowered, 3-40 GSA. See global sensitivity analysis hazard analysis, 3-349, 4-450 assessment, 3-22 hydrologic, 3-136, 3-195, 4-115 identification, 2-82 probabilistic approach, 4-471 quantification, 2-315 hazard curves, 1-11, 1-51, 1-164, 2-43, 2-68, 2-84, 2-218, 3-13, 3-100, 3-104, 3-332, 4-14, 4-90, 4-474, 4-477 comparison, 4-281 full, 1-12, 2-43, 3-15, 4-15 full range, 2-30 integration, 4-60, 4-70 MCI, 2-70 MCLC, 2-69 weight and combine methods, 4-210 Hazard Information Digest External, 3-149, 3-399 Flood, 1-13, 1-223, 1-241, 2-45, 2-180, 2-181, 2-186, 2-413, 3-17, 3-149, 3-161, 4-18 flood beta, 2-183, 3-152 flood workshop, 1-252, 2-183, 3-152 Natural, 3-151 population, 2-183, 3-152

hazardous convective weather, 1-57, 1-60, 3-31, 3-36, 3-40, 4-368 NDSEV, 3-35 NDSEV increase, 4-361 severe weather, 4-30 monitoring, 3-245 HCW. See hazardous convective weather headcut. See erosion: headcut HEC, 3-195, 3-201 -FIA, 4-261 -HMS, 2-376, 3-202, 4-166, 4-263 MCMC optimization, 2-376 -LifeSim, 4-261 -MetVue, 2-377 models, 4-312 -RAS, 4-166, 4-207, 4-230, 4-244 -RAS 2D hydraulics, 2-377 -ResSim, 4-166, 4-258 -SSP, 4-262 -SSP, flood frequency curves, 3-334 -WAT, 2-378, 4-161, 4-165, 4-166, 4-256, 4-261, 4-263, 4-313, 4-316 FRA, 4-196 hydrologic sampler, 4-191 MCRAM runs, 2-378 HEC-RAS, 4-191, 4-236 historical data, 1-96, 3-117, 3-120, 3-122, 3-131, 4-30, 4-215, 4-269 flood information, 1-154 floods, 1-187 intervals, 3-131 observations, 1-55, 3-80 peak, 1-155, 3-123 perception thresholds, 3-131 records, 2-62, 3-21, 3-183 records extrapolation, 2-80 spatial patterns, 4-141 streamflow, 1-183 water levels, 2-50, 3-24, 3-113 homogeneous region, HR, 1-71, 1-77, 2-151, 2-155, 2-159, 2-167, 3-70, 3-75, 3-83 human factors, 3-388, 4-471 HRA, 2-30, 4-475 HRA/HF, 1-24 human actions, 2-19, 3-385, 4-446, 4-473 Human Error Probabilities, 2-280 human errors, 2-293 human performance, 2-273, 3-251 human reliability, 4-474 operator actions, 4-474

organizational behavior, 3-379, 3-382, 3-385, 4-473 organizational response, 4-473, 4-479 humidity, 1-53, 4-358 HURDAT, 1-207 hurricane, 1-57, 1-95, 2-51, 2-53, 2-77, 2-81, 2-89, 2-105, 2-407, 3-26, 3-37, 3-43, 3-111, 3-247, 3-393, 4-25, 4-34, 4-35, 4-73, 4-98, 4-113, 4-259, 4-326, 4-370, 4-380, 4-480 2017 season, 4-371 Andrew, 4-474 Category, 4-41, 4-98 Florence, 4-481 Frances, 1-101 Harvey, 3-180, 3-329, 3-361, 3-367, 3-391, 4-95, 4-114, 4-124, 4-160, 4-259 Ike, 4-56 Isaac, 3-53, 3-69 Katrina, 1-194, 2-53, 4-263 Maria, 4-211 Sandy, 4-259 hydraulic, 2-226, 2-266, 2-288, 2-307, 2-354, 2-400, 3-198, 3-199, 3-234, 3-315, 4-144, 4-170, 4-230, 4-254, 4-257, 4-262, 4-326 detailed channel, 1-11 models, 1-133, 1-158, 1-186, 2-311, 2-420, 3-195, 4-60, 4-70, 4-198, 4-326 dependent inputs, 4-326 hydraulic hazard analysis, 2-324 hydrologic loading, 4-232 models, 1-63, 1-133, 1-158, 2-311, 2-376, 4-123, 4-282, 4-331, 4-381 risk, 1-15, 2-46, 3-18, 4-329 routing, 2-387 runoff units (HRU's), 3-143 simplified model, 3-337 simulation, 4-279 hydrologic hazard, 2-378, 3-331, 4-211 analysis, 3-334, 4-115 analysis, HHA, 1-85, 2-207, 3-136, 4-114, 4-125 curve, 1-15, 1-170, 2-45, 2-204, 2-340, 3-17, 4-130, 4-219, 4-329 stage frequency curve, 4-213 Hydrologic Unit Code, HUC, 4-149 watershed searching, 4-150 hydrology, 2-151, 2-202, 2-226, 2-307, 2-338, 2-354, 2-369, 2-400, 2-411, 3-70,

3-135, 3-195, 3-304, 3-315, 3-325, 3-366, 3-387, 4-114, 4-122, 4-127, 4-144, 4-161, 4-170, 4-211, 4-229, 4-244, 4-276, 4-313, 4-381 initial condition, 1-90, 1-95, 2-104, 3-44 Integrated Assessments. See Fukushima Near Term Task Force: Integrated Assessment internal flooding, 3-25, 4-386 scenarios, 3-25 inundation mapping, 3-367, 3-368 dyanamic, 3-368 modeling, 4-176 period of, 3-261 river flood anlysis, 4-327 JPM, joint probability method, 1-35, 1-195, 1-199, 1-209, 2-34, 2-53, 2-56, 2-74, 2-77, 3-94, 3-99, 3-112, 4-25, 4-57, 4-64, 4-73, 4-77, 4-88, 4-228, 4-318 integral, 1-199, 2-56, 3-97, 4-60 parameter choice, 2-62 storm parameters, 1-197, 1-207, 2-57, 3-97, 3-100, 4-68, 4-76 surge response function, 4-78 JPM-OS, joint probability method, with optimal sampling, 1-194, 1-196, 2-53, 2-55, 2-73, 2-77, 3-94, 3-102, 4-81 hybrid methodlogy, 2-68 KAP. See distribution:Kappa kernel function, 2-56, 3-99, 4-68 Epanechnikov, EKF, 2-58, 2-65, 3-98 Gaussian, GKF, 1-200, 1-202, 2-58, 2-60, 3-98, 4-99 normal, 2-65 triangular, 2-65 uniform, UKF, 2-60, 2-65, 3-98 land use, 1-24, 2-420 urbanization, 2-98 land-atmosphere interactions, 1-57 levee breach. See breach, dam/levee likelihood, 3-78 functions, 1-166 LIP. See local intense precipitation L-moment ratio, 2-194, 3-77 diagram, 2-174 local intense precipitation, 1-6, 1-17, 1-22, 1-34, 1-54, 1-64, 1-76, 1-88, 1-100, 1-130, 1-133, 1-144, 1-223, 1-255, 2-34, 2-47, 2-50, 2-97, 2-101, 2-103, 2-168, 2-175,

2-287, 2-291, 2-297, 2-322, 2-326, 2-337, 2-341, 2-353, 2-370, 2-421, 3-19, 3-22, 3-42, 3-47, 3-198, 3-246, 3-314, 3-315, 4-19, 4-24, 4-264, 4-295, 4-311, 4-455 analysis, 4-480 framework, 1-17, 2-46, 2-104, 3-18 screening, 3-369 severe storm, 1-90, 3-46, 4-361 numerical simulation, 1-90, 1-95 logic tree, 2-56, 2-63, 2-85, 2-369, 3-94, 3-97, 3-107, 3-114, 4-57, 4-81, 4-86, 4-93 branch weights, 4-91 LP-III. See distribution:log Pearson Type III manual actions, 1-21, 1-31, 2-272, 2-415, 3-245, 3-250, 3-398, 4-449, 4-473 decomposing, 2-275 modeling time, 3-257 reasonable simulation timeline, 3-246 timeline example, 3-256 maximum likelihood, 1-156 Bayesian, 1-186 estimation, 1-70, 2-404 MCMC. See Monte Carlo:Markov Chain MCS. See mesoscale convective system MEC. See mesoscale storm with embedded convection mesoscale convective system, 1-18, 1-57, 1-59, 1-64, 1-91, 1-97, 1-100, 1-111, 1-123, 2-101, 2-104, 2-112, 2-150, 3-29, 3-31, 3-33, 3-42, 3-47, 3-49, 3-52, 3-67, 4-133, 4-355 intense rainfall increase, 4-361 precipitation increase, 3-40, 4-368 rainfall, 4-360 reduced speed, 4-361 simulations, 2-144 mesoscale storm with embedded convection, 2-381, 3-357, 4-128, 4-135, 4-142, 4-159, 4-161, 4-218 Meta-models, 4-61, 4-206 Meta-Gaussian Distribution, 4-59, 4-64, 4-69 example, 4-67 meteorological inputs, 4-132 model, 1-133, 1-158, 2-311 MGD. See Meta-models:Meta-Gaussian Distribution mid-latitude cyclone, 2-382, 4-120, 4-128, 4-133

Midwest, 4-357, 4-368 floods, 4-363 intense snowpack, 4-363 Region, 3-31 MLC. See mid-latitude cyclone model, 1-90 alternative conceptual, 4-470 averaging, 2-352 dependence, 3-310 improved, 1-12, 2-44, 3-16, 4-15 nested domain, 3-53 nested grids, 4-55 numerical modeling, 1-97, 4-327 nested domain, 1-101 parameter estimation. 2-313 parameters, 4-176 selection, 2-346 warm-up, 2-385 moisture maximization, 3-45 saturation deficit. 1-61 saturation specific humiity profile, 1-58 sources, 1-76 water vapor, 1-61, 4-347 Monte Carlo, 1-163, 1-185, 2-77, 2-187, 2-286, 2-411, 3-23, 3-79, 3-93, 3-94, 3-199, 4-57, 4-162, 4-175, 4-257, 4-330 analysis, 3-21, 3-111 Integration, 2-70, 3-103 Life-Cycle Simulation, 2-69, 3-103, 4-64 Markov Chain, 1-161, 1-171, 2-402 sampling, 4-201 simulation, 2-55, 2-74, 2-81, 2-85, 3-102, 3-111, 3-113, 3-328, 4-59 MSA. See Fukushima Near Term Task Force: Mitigating Strategies Assessments Multi-decadal Atlantic Meridional Mode (AMM), 4-370, 4-373, 4-376, 4-379 Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation (AMO), 4-373 El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), 1-206, 4-370, 4-373, 4-376, 4-379 North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), 4-370, 4-374, 4-376, 4-379 Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), 4-354 persistence, 4-113, 4-354 multivariate Gaussian copula, 3-104, 4-59 MVGC. See multivariate Gaussian copula

NACCS. See North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study NAO. See Multi-decadal:North Atlantic Oscillation National Climate Assessment, 4th, 3-42, 4-335 NCA4. See National Climate Assessment, 4th NEB. See non-exceeedence bound NEUTRINO, 4-291, 4-297, 4-314, See also smoothed particle hydrodynamics, SPH NOAA Atlas 14, 1-72, 1-185, 2-158, 2-168, 2-171, 2-179, 2-181, 2-201, 3-87, 4-127, 4-144 future needs. 2-372 gridded, 1-73 tests, 2-373 non-exceedance bound, 4-229, 4-230, 4-236, 4-238 nonstatitionarity/nonstationary, 1-37, 1-155, 1-162, 1-177, 1-188, 1-191, 3-117, 3-133, 3-315, 4-264 change points, 3-125, 3-127 model, 2-373 processes, 1-12, 1-55, 2-44, 3-16, 4-15 trends, 3-125, 3-128 North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study, 1-196, 2-53, 3-102, 4-94, 4-99 numerical weather models, 1-18, 1-89, 1-95, 2-104, 3-44, 3-103, 4-55 regional, 2-104, 3-45 observations, 1-71 based, 3-81 data, 1-95 record, 3-121 satellite combination algorithms, 4-105, 4-108, 4-112 combinations, 4-104 mutli-satellite issues, 4-108 operating experience, 1-31, 4-447, 4-473 data sources, 4-465 operational event, 4-464 chronology review, 4-466 orographic precipitation. See precipitation, orographic paleoflood, 1-24, 1-154, 1-181, 2-87, 2-216, 2-217, 2-225, 2-369, 2-400, 2-407, 2-416, 3-21, 3-26, 3-116, 3-117, 3-136, 3-140, 3-163, 3-179, 3-181, 3-195, 3-207,

3-325, 3-393, 4-18, 4-208, 4-228, 4-244, 4-253, 4-259, 4-290 analytical framework, 4-233 analytical techniques, 4-242 benchmark, 4-252 case study, 4-234, 4-236 data, 1-181, 1-186, 2-51, 2-81, 2-206, 2-219, 3-113, 3-117, 3-120, 3-123, 3-141, 3-179, 3-333, 3-394, 4-30, 4-215, 4-221, 4-246, 4-269 database, 3-208, 3-213 deposits. See deposits event, 3-139 hydrology, 2-229, 3-164, 4-247 ice jams, 4-235 indicators, 3-181 interpretation, 3-394 reconnaissance, 2-235, 3-168, 4-233, 4-237 record length, 4-247 screening, 4-242 studies, 3-333 humid environment, 2-228, 3-163 suitability, 2-235, 3-167, 3-394 terrace, 4-236, 4-242 viability, 4-234 partial-duration series, 1-165, 2-201, 2-373 PCHA. See Probabilistic Coastal Hazard Assessment PDF. See probability density function PDO. See Multi-decadal:Pacific Decadal Oscillation PDS. See partial-duration series PFA. See precipitation frequency: analysis PFHA, 1-257, 2-79, 2-218, 3-307, 3-353, 4-10, 4-453, 4-477 case study, 2-380 combining hazards, 4-207 documentation, 4-460 framework, xxxviii, 1-12, 1-16, 1-148, 1-157, 1-163, 1-166, 1-175, 2-44, 2-46, 2-307, 2-311, 2-322, 2-338, 2-345, 2-353, 2-401, 3-16, 3-18, 3-304, 3-359, 3-398, 4-11, 4-15, 4-19, 4-455 aleatory, 1-163 peer review, 2-87 regional analysis, 2-342, 2-348 riverine, 1-16, 2-46, 2-308, 2-312, 2-413, 3-18 site-specific, 2-309 hierarchical approach, 4-458

high level requirements, 4-459 paleoflood based, 4-289 results, 4-459 river, 4-207 statistical model, 2-84 team, 4-458 PFSS historic water levels, 2-81, 3-111 pilot studies, 3-70, 3-386, 3-404, 4-11, 4-16, 4-22, 4-312, 4-440 pilot studies, 2-418 plant response, 1-255, 2-20, 2-289, 2-291, 3-261, 3-398, 4-20 model, 1-260, 3-377 proof of concept, 1-255 scenarios, 1-260 simulation, 1-22 state-based PRA, 1-260 total, 1-253, 2-304, 2-415 PMF, 1-150, 2-25, 2-80, 2-202, 2-205, 2-400, 3-21, 3-141, 3-149, 3-266, 3-355, 3-390, 4-230, 4-454, 4-474 PMP, 1-50, 1-56, 1-66, 1-69, 1-73, 2-25, 2-153, 2-168, 2-169, 2-179, 2-405, 3-69, 3-149, 3-391, 4-114, 4-117, 4-120, 4-158, 4-160, 4-383 State SSPMP Studies, 3-338 traditional manual approaches, 2-104 PRA, 1-11, 1-42, 1-256, 2-24, 2-28, 2-43, 2-79, 2-168, 2-179, 2-202, 2-216, 2-268, 2-287, 2-289, 2-337, 2-370, 2-401, 2-417, 2-421, 3-1, 3-13, 3-21, 3-25, 3-199, 3-259, 3-266, 3-315, 3-365, 3-368, 3-386, 3-390, 3-396, 3-405, 4-14, 4-264, 4-312, 4-323, 4-385, 4-391, 4-403, 4-429, 4-461, 4-462, 4-463, 4-469, 4-471, 4-474 bounding analysis, 4-468 dams, 1-24 dynamic, 1-22 external flood. See XFPRA initiating event frequency, 1-47, 2-79 inputs, 1-132 insights, 4-476 internal flooding, 3-262, 4-440 LOOP, 4-469, 4-474 peer review, 4-461 performance-based approach, 4-451 plant fragility curve, 4-476 quantitative insights, 4-464

recovery times, 4-469 risk information, 4-464 insights, 4-478 safety challenge indications, 4-465 Standard, 3-377 precipitation, 1-11, 1-53, 1-64, 1-160, 1-267, 2-88, 2-168, 2-179, 2-181, 2-201, 2-226, 2-260, 2-270, 2-288, 2-307, 2-353, 2-369, 2-381, 2-402, 3-15, 3-27, 3-31, 3-38, 3-40, 3-42, 3-52, 3-56, 3-67, 3-115, 3-134, 3-136, 3-150, 3-162, 3-198, 3-248, 4-11, 4-14, 4-56, 4-100, 4-113, 4-127, 4-144, 4-158, 4-210, 4-218, 4-228, 4-315, 4-326, 4-335, 4-353, 4-359, 4-380 classification, 2-105, 3-45 cool season, 3-307 distribution, 3-363, 4-114 duration, 2-155, 2-179, 3-74 field area ratio, 3-48 gridded, 2-161, 3-81 historical analysis, 1-19 increases, 3-40, 4-359, 4-364, 4-368 instrumentation, 4-102 modeling framework, 3-46 near-record spring, 3-37 numerical modeling, 1-17 patterns, 4-120, 4-140 point, 2-382, 2-417, 3-359, 4-18, 4-101, 4-146 processes, 1-90 quantile, 3-74 regional models, 4-117 seasonality, 1-72, 2-171, 2-382, 3-32 simulation, 1-89, 2-103, 3-48 warm season, 2-340, 3-33, 3-38 precipitation data, 3-156, 4-147 fields, 1-125 gage, 1-79, 2-156, 3-83, 4-117 geo0IR, 4-102 Liveneh, 3-308, 4-119, 4-143 microwave imagers, 4-102 observed, 1-96, 1-181, 2-154, 3-48, 3-140 regional, 1-181 satellite, 4-101, 4-104, 4-112 precipitation frequency, 1-19, 1-64, 1-185, 2-151, 2-154, 2-168, 2-181, 2-211, 2-270, 2-372, 3-70, 3-72, 3-81, 3-150, 3-198, 3-224, 4-119, 4-127, 4-132, 4-141, 4-144,

4-146, 4-158, 4-161, 4-218, 4-228, 4-282, 4-290, 4-312, 4-315 analysis, 1-66, 1-73, 1-175, 3-74, 4-128, 4-138 curve, 3-75 estimates, 4-144 exceedance, 2-95 large watershed, 3-359 regional analysis, 4-133 relationship, 1-67, 1-85, 1-87, 3-73, 4-129 precipitation, orographic linear model, 1-86 methodology, 1-66 regions, 1-17, 1-65, 2-153, 2-156, 2-167, 2-414, 3-72, 3-398, 4-18 pressure setup, 4-36, 4-37 Probabilistic Coastal Hazard Assessment, 3-328 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment. See PFHA Probabilistic Risk Assessment, See PRA probabilistic safety assessments, 4-472, 4-474 probabilistic seismic hazard assessment, 1-30, 2-58, 3-94, 4-57, 4-59, 4-477 probabilistic storm surge hazard assessment, 2-53, 2-78, 4-81 probability density function, 1-57, 1-133, 1-152, 1-163, 1-164, 1-201, 2-79, 2-85, 3-113, 4-205, 4-207, 4-316 probable maximum flood. See PMF probable maximum precipitationrecipitation. See PMP PSHA. See probabilistic seismic hazard assessment PSSHA. See probabilistic storm surge hazard assessment rainfall. See precipitation/rainfall rainfall-runoff, 4-210 methods, 1-15, 2-46, 3-18 model, 1-11, 1-152, 1-157, 1-183, 2-211, 2-384, 2-386, 2-398, 3-15, 3-143, 4-14, 4-134, 4-217 Austrailian Rainfall and Runoff Model, 1-70, 1-73, 1-150, 1-185, 2-212 SEFM, 1-151, 2-213, 2-216, 3-23, 3-28, 3-149, 4-276, 4-316, 4-329 stochastic, 1-151 stochastic, HEC-WAT, 3-334 VIC, 4-119, 4-369

reanalysis, 2-56, 2-151, 4-114, 4-122, 4-125, 4-143, 4-160, 4-269 Climate Forecast System Reanalysis (CFSR), 1-95, 2-102, 2-113, 2-150, 3-47, 4-118 PRISM, 4-117, 4-163, 4-370 Stage IV, 1-96, 1-100, 2-113 record length effective, 3-126 equivalent independent, ERIL, 2-175 equivalent, ERL, 4-159, 4-221, 4-230 historical, 2-66 period of record, 2-53, 2-151, 2-373, 3-70, 3-83, 3-136, 4-113 regional growth curve, RGC, 1-77, 1-80, 1-84, 2-151, 2-155, 2-166, 3-75, 3-85, 3-89, 3-91 uncertainty, 1-82 regional L-moments method, 1-71, 1-73, 1-87, 1-185, 2-151, 2-154, 2-159, 2-161, 2-165, 2-167, 2-174, 2-179, 2-187, 2-201, 2-404, 3-70, 3-72, 3-77, 3-85, 3-93, 3-143, 3-387, 4-127, 4-332 regional precipitation frequency analysis, 2-151, 2-154, 2-167, 3-70, 3-71, 3-72, 3-75, 3-93, 3-144, 3-334, 4-218 reservoir, 4-170 operational simulation, 4-279 rule-based model, 4-281 system, 4-287 RFA. See regional precipitation frequency analysis RIDM. See Risk-Informed Decision-Making risk, 1-39, 1-50, 2-20, 2-154, 2-340, 2-380, 3-21, 3-138, 4-166 analysis, 1-51, 1-177, 2-203, 2-205, 2-401, 3-136, 3-149, 3-197, 3-217, 3-361, 4-175, 4-462 assessment, 4-92, 4-196, 4-233, 4-473 computational analysis, 3-378 qualitative information, 3-385 risk informed, 1-6, 1-10, 1-29, 1-40, 1-149, 2-42, 2-182, 2-392, 3-12, 3-151, 3-202, 4-10, 4-14, 4-129, 4-322, 4-451 approaches, 2-26 oversight, 2-28 use of paleoflood data, 2-51 Risk-Informed Decision-Making, 1-151, 2-24, 2-246, 2-288, 3-135, 3-198, 3-332, 3-337, 4-127, 4-210, 4-229, 4-279, 4-323, 4-330

screening, 4-124, 4-233, 4-268, 4-471, 4-473, 4-477 external flood hazard, 4-31 Farmer, 1967, 4-477 flood, 4-456 hazard, 2-82 methods, 4-328 non-conservative, 4-477 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment, 3-369 SDP, 1-10, 1-41, 1-51, 1-248, 2-28, 2-42, 2-180, 3-12, 3-116, 3-149, 3-325 floods, 2-30 Seals, 1-44 sea level rise, 1-53, 2-89, 2-97, 4-86, 4-92, 4-355, 4-381 nuisance tidal floods, 2-93 projections, 2-100 SLR, 1-57 sea surface temperature, SST, 4-370, 4-373 anomalies, 4-374, 4-377, 4-378 SEFM. See rainfall-runoff:model:SEFM seiche, 1-6, 2-52, 2-409, 3-395, 4-318, 4-455 seismic, 1-6, 4-451 self-organizing maps, SOM, 1-77, 2-151, 2-157, 2-167, 3-70, 3-83, 3-93 Senior Seismic Hazard Assessment Committee. See SSHAC sensitivity, 4-76 analysis, 4-326 analysis ranking, 4-200 quantification, 4-476 to hazard, 4-476 SHAC-F, 1-16, 1-64, 1-130, 2-46, 2-353, 3-18, 3-314, 3-325, 3-388, 4-264, 4-290, 4-311 Alternative Models, 1-142, 4-266 coastal, 2-419, 3-403, 4-19 framework, 1-132, 1-133 highly site specific, 3-319 key roles, 2-360 Levels, 4-268, 4-269, 4-271 LIDAR data, 4-271 LIP, 1-138, 1-142, 4-19 LIP Project Structure Workflow, 3-318 participatory peer review, 4-266 project structure, 2-360 LIP, 2-363 riverine, 2-367, 3-323 redefined levels, 3-322, 3-324 riverine, 2-366, 4-19

site-specific, 3-324 Work Plan, 1-135 significance determination process. See SDP skew at-site, 4-214 regional, 4-214 SLOSH, Sea Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes, 4-38 smoothed particle hydrodynamics, SPH, 1-263, 3-25, 3-378, 4-291, 4-296, See also NEUTRINO validation, 4-306 snowmelt, 1-133, 2-340, 3-307, 4-217 energy balance, 2-376 extreme snowfall, 1-60 flood, 1-183 rain on snow, 2-97 site, 3-308 snow water equivalent, SWE, 3-306, 4-224, 4-332 snowpack increased, 3-37 VIC, snow algrorithm, 3-308 soil moisture, 3-40 reduction, 1-57 space for time, 1-77, 2-207 spillway. See erosion: spillway SRR, 1-196, 1-202, 2-57, 2-59, 3-96, 4-60, 4-70, 4-86 models, 2-58, 3-98, 3-99 rate models, 2-60 sensitivity, 4-88 variability, 2-59 SSCs, xxxviii, 1-152, 1-260, 1-265, 2-288, 2-307, 2-309, 2-353, 3-198, 3-262, 3-264, 4-264, 4-429, 4-435, 4-440, 4-445 flood significant components, FSC, 4-387 fragility, 3-371, 3-381, 4-32 safety, 4-472 SSHAC, 1-30, 1-64, 1-132, 2-85, 2-354, 3-317, 4-93, 4-229, 4-264, 4-274, 4-313 Project Workflow, 3-321 state-of-practice, 1-176, 4-61, 4-321, 4-444, 4-447 statistical approaches, 1-179, 4-320 copula-based methods, 4-320 extreme value analysis, 4-320 statistical models, 4-268, 4-269 streamflow based, 1-15, 2-46, 3-18 stochastic, 1-185, 1-257, 3-143 flood modeling, 4-129, 4-132 model, 3-100, 4-458

approach, 3-332 inputs, 4-119 storm parameters, 4-74 simulation, 3-103, 3-328, 4-279, 4-281, 4-320 storm generation, 4-140 storm template, 3-145 storm transposition, SST, 4-120 weather generation, 3-334 Stochastic Event-Based Rainfall-Runoff Model. See rainfall-runoff:model:SEFM storm local scale, 4-133 maximization, 4-120 parameters, 4-41 patterns, 3-144, 3-364, 4-120, 4-257, 4-276, 4-286, 4-332 precipitation templates, 2-383 seasonality, 4-134, 4-331 synoptic scale, 4-133 storm recurrence rate. See SRR storm surge, 1-6, 1-17, 1-35, 1-57, 1-192, 1-193, 2-34, 2-47, 2-53, 2-78, 2-87, 2-97, 2-259, 2-288, 2-322, 2-337, 2-369, 2-411, 3-19, 3-22, 3-24, 3-26, 3-29, 3-94, 3-109, 3-110, 3-112, 3-115, 3-198, 3-229, 3-328, 3-361, 3-364, 3-396, 4-25, 4-30, 4-34, 4-35, 4-57, 4-70, 4-73, 4-81, 4-93, 4-228, 4-259, 4-295, 4-311, 4-317, 4-355, 4-382, 4-451, 4-455 case study, 2-84 data partition, 4-70 deterministic, 2-331 wind-generated wave and runup, 2-333 hazard, 2-54, 2-55, 4-84 hurricane driven, 3-394 model, 1-194, 4-75 numerical surge simulation, 3-105 PCHA Studies, 2-379 probabilistic approaches, 2-50 Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment, 2-407, 3-393, 4-24 probabilistic model, 3-97, 4-60 P-Surge model, 4-53 tidal height, 3-111 total water level, 2-86 uncertainty, 3-398, 4-19 storm transposition, 2-81, 2-377, 3-21, 3-47, 3-54, 3-357, 4-133, 4-281 storm typing, 2-381, 3-334, 3-356, 4-119, 4-133, 4-138, 4-217, 4-282, 4-286

large winter frontal storms, MLC, 3-357 scaling and placement, 3-359 seperation, 3-359 summer thunderstorm complexes, MEC, 3-357 tropical storm remants TSR, 3-357, 4-134 stratified sampling, 4-282 stratiform leading, 1-93, 1-94 parallel, 1-93, 1-94 trailing, 1-93, 1-94 stratigraphy, 3-163, 3-183, 3-199, 3-200, 3-234, 4-18, 4-250 analysis. 2-227 record, 4-251 streamflow data, 3-157 gage regional data, 1-181 historical, 3-38 Structured Hazard Assessment Committee Process for Flooding. See SHAC-F structures, systems, and components. See SSCs synoptic storms, 1-91, 2-105, 3-45 synthetic datasets, 2-62, 4-269 storm, 2-67, 2-81, 2-386, 3-21, 3-96, 3-102, 4-60, 4-62, 4-70, 4-78, 4-279, 4-282 storm simulations sets, 2-73 storms, 2-57 systematic data gage record, 1-177, 2-206, 3-119, 3-123, 3-130, 3-183, 4-252 TC. See tropical cyclone TELEMAC. See 2D:model:TELEMAC temperature, 1-53 change, 2-91 high, 1-57 profiles, 4-122 trends, 4-357 **Tennessee River** Valley, 2-153, 2-156, 3-83, 3-182 Watershed, 4-246 TRMM, Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, 4-100, 4-111 tropical cyclone, 1-11, 1-17, 1-64, 1-67, 1-91, 1-100, 1-123, 1-194, 1-198, 1-204, 2-53, 2-55, 2-59, 2-71, 2-89, 2-95, 2-101, 2-105, 2-112, 3-15, 3-29, 3-42, 3-47, 3-53,

3-67, 3-99, 3-101, 3-193, 4-14, 4-35, 4-51, 4-57, 4-61, 4-68, 4-73, 4-98, 4-125, 4-138, 4-346, 4-355, 4-370, 4-380 parameters, 2-65 P-Surge, 4-49 variable cross track, 4-51 tropical storm remnant, 3-357 TSR, 2-382, 4-127 tsunami, 1-6, 2-52, 2-409, 2-420, 3-395, 4-318, 4-455 model, 1-25 uncertainty, 1-36, 1-72, 1-125, 1-148, 1-167, 1-178, 1-187, 1-197, 2-30, 2-53, 2-74, 2-78, 2-87, 2-152, 2-165, 2-177, 2-179, 2-187. 2-219. 2-270. 2-320. 2-338. 2-340. 2-377, 2-400, 2-403, 3-21, 3-29, 3-40, 3-67, 3-71, 3-90, 3-94, 3-105, 3-119, 3-126, 3-136, 3-138, 3-149, 3-163, 3-194, 3-202, 3-246, 3-304, 3-315, 3-326, 3-334, 3-389, 4-30, 4-34, 4-35, 4-57, 4-81, 4-88, 4-95, 4-114, 4-163, 4-196, 4-197, 4-207, 4-228, 4-244, 4-254, 4-256, 4-264, 4-275, 4-282, 4-291, 4-313, 4-355, 4-381, 4-426, 4-450, 4-462, 4-477 analytical, 4-242 Bayesian, 1-86 bounds, 1-89 discretized, 4-64 distribution choice, 2-187, 2-193, 2-197, 3-70 full, 1-15, 2-45, 3-17 hazard curve evaluation, 2-317 hydrologic, 2-99, 3-338, 4-233 integration results, 2-76 joint probability analysist, 2-47, 3-19 knowledge, 2-356, 3-317, 4-175, 4-233 PRA, 3-373 reduced, 2-219, 3-357 SLR projections, 2-100 sources, 1-42 SRR, 2-60 storm surge, 1-17, 1-193, 2-47, 2-54, 3-19, 3-95, 4-58 temporal, 1-257 tolerance, 4-215 uncertainty analysis, 2-87, 4-326, 4-476 UA, 4-198 uncertainty characterization, 1-15, 2-46, 2-74, 2-81, 2-341, 3-18, 3-105, 4-233

uncertainty propagation, 1-83, 1-87, 1-193, 2-54, 2-58, 2-73, 2-398, 3-15, 3-95, 3-102, 3-106, 4-14, 4-58, 4-60, 4-200 uncertainty quantification, 1-161, 1-193, 1-200, 2-54, 2-189, 2-206, 2-420, 3-95, 4-30, 4-58, 4-60, 4-71, 4-206, 4-215, 4-298 input parameter, 4-201 river flood models, 3-404 sources, 4-205, 4-327 uncertainty, aleatory, 1-12, 1-42, 2-43, 2-57, 2-192, 2-313, 3-15, 3-96, 3-106, 4-15, 4-60, 4-79, 4-267, 4-268, 4-269, 4-271 natural variability, 4-86, 4-175 variability, 1-194, 2-54, 4-458 uncertainty, epistemic, 1-12, 1-42, 1-163, 1-194, 1-197, 1-202, 2-43, 2-54, 2-57, 2-62, 2-193, 2-313, 3-15, 3-93, 3-96, 3-98, 3-106, 4-15, 4-57, 4-71, 4-79, 4-81, 4-86, 4-92, 4-267, 4-458, 4-475 knowledge, 4-86 SRR models, 4-68 validation, 1-90, 1-95, 1-125, 2-312, 3-48, 4-62, 4-76, 4-293, 4-298 warming, 1-60, 4-337, 4-368 increased rates, 4-357 increased saturation water vapor, 4-346 surface, 3-34 warning, 2-259, 3-362, 4-35, 4-314, 4-479 time, 1-34, 1-153, 3-261, 3-371, 4-450 triggers and cues, 3-382, 4-473, 4-479 watershed, 1-157, 3-56 model, 1-158 Watershed Level Risk Analysis, 4-166 wave, 4-295 impacts, 4-299 physical modeling, 4-300 setup, 4-36 wind, 1-53 setup, 4-36 stress formulation, 4-76 tornado frequency increasing, 2-92 locations, 2-92 warning, 2-259 waves, 1-11 WRF, Weather Research and Forecasting model, 1-18, 1-85, 1-90, 1-95, 1-97, 1-185, 2-102, 2-114, 3-28, 3-42, 3-47, 3-52, 3-69, 4-160 parameterization, 1-123, 2-114, 3-47

XFEL. See external flood equipment list XFOAL. See external flood operator actions list XFPRA, 3-259, 3-370, 3-372, 3-377, 3-379, 3-384, 3-402, 4-429, 4-441, 4-475, 4-479 capability categories, 4-443 documentation, 4-438 flood event oriented review, 4-467 flood progression, 4-433 fragility, 4-30, 4-444, 4-445 guidance development, 4-27 hazard analysis, 4-444, 4-445 HRA, 3-265, 3-374 initial plant state, 3-379, 3-382 initiating event, 4-446 key flood parameters, 4-433 multiple end states, 3-382 operating experience, 3-371 period of inundation, 4-433 period of recession, 4-433 physical margin assessment, 4-435 pilots, 3-371 plant response, 3-373, 4-444 preferred equipment position, 3-264 propagation pathways, 4-433 requirements, 4-443 scenarios, 3-265, 3-373, 3-385, 4-433, 4-446. 4-464 screening, 4-445 sources, 4-433 uncertainty, 3-385 vulnerabilities, 3-265, 4-473 walkdown, 2-51, 3-26, 3-260, 3-393, 3-395, 4-26, 4-437, 4-440, 4-445, 4-475 walkdown guidance, 2-408, 3-259, 4-440 warning time, 4-433

## APPENDIX B: INDEX OF CONTRIBUTORS

This index includes authors, co-authors, panelists, poster authors and self-identified participants from the audience who spoke in question and answer or panel discussions.

Adams, Lea, 4-162 Ahn, Hosung, 5-490 Aird, Thomas, 2-38, 2-407, 3-11, 3-195, 3-380, 4-12, 4-378, 4-419, 5-490 Al Kaibaf, Azin, 4-312 Allen, Blake, 4-323 Anderson, Victoria, 3-354, 3-370, 3-374 Andre, M.A., 4-287 Archfield, Stacey A., 4-206 Asquith, William, 2-184 Bacchi, Vito, 4-195, 4-320 Baecher, Gregory, 3-197, 3-213, 4-315 Bardet, Philippe M., 4-287, 4-306, 4-309 Barker, Bruce, 4-323 Bellini, Joe, 2-30 Bender, Chris, 4-91, 4-92, 4-94, 4-97 Bensi, Michelle, 1-24, 4-312, 4-435, 4-464, 4-465, 4-466, 4-469, 4-471, 4-473, 5-490 Bertrand, Nathalie, 4-195, 4-320 Bittner, Alvah, 1-220, 2-267, 3-240 Blackaby, Emily, 3-5, 3-195, 3-209 Bowles, David, 2-396, 3-40 Branch, Kristi, 1-220, 2-267, 3-240 Breithaupt, Steve, 3-346, 5-490 Bryce, Robert, 1-129, 2-349 Byrd, Aaron, 1-166 Caldwell, Jason, 4-112, 4-323 Campbell, Andrew, 2-12, 4-375, 4-422, 4-455, 4-470, 4-473, 5-490 Carney, Shaun, 3-346, 4-272, 4-306, 4-307, 4-308. 4-310 Carr, Meredith, 2-38, 2-407, 3-9, 3-11, 3-380, 4-9, 4-12, 4-162, 4-252, 4-311, 4-456, 4-472, 4-474, 5-490 Charkas, Hasan, 5-490 Cheok, Michael, 5-490 Cohn, Timothy, 1-174, 4-250 Coles, Garill, 1-220, 2-267, 3-240 Cook, Christopher, 1-24, 3-351, 3-374, 5-490 Coppersmith, Kevin, 1-129, 2-349, 3-304, 4-261 Correia, Richard, 1-5, 5-490

Craven, Owen, 3-5, 3-195, 3-209 Cummings, William (Mark), 2-256, 3-227, 4-386, 4-419, 4-420, 4-421, 4-422 Dalton, Angela, 1-220, 2-267, 3-240 Daoued, A. Ben, 4-315 Davis, Lisa, 3-5, 3-179, 3-195, 3-209 DeNeale, Scott, 3-197, 3-198, 3-213, 3-219, 4-111, 4-142, 4-312, 4-315, 4-320 Denis, Suzanne, 4-464, 4-467, 4-468, 4-469, 4-472, 4-473 Dib, Alain, 3-42 Dinh, N., 4-287 Dong, John, 4-323 DuLuc, Claire-Marie, 2-391, 4-195, 4-252, 4-253 Dunn, Christopher, 2-370, 2-398, 4-162 England, John, 2-370, 2-396, 2-400, 2-401, 3-68, 3-319, 3-347, 3-348, 3-349, 3-372, 3-373, 4-112, 4-156, 4-157, 4-159, 4-160, 4-161, 4-206, 4-252, 4-253, 4-254, 4-255, 4-256, 4-258, 4-259, 4-260, 4-307, 4-311, 4-363 Fearon, Kenneth, 3-322, 3-347, 3-372 Ferrante, Fernando, 3-315, 3-351, 3-370, 3-372 Fuhrmann, Mark, 2-38, 2-407, 3-11, 3-163, 3-375, 3-380, 4-12, 4-162, 4-252, 5-490 Furstenau, Raymond, 4-1, 4-9, 5-490 Gage, Matthew, 3-209 Gaudron, Jeremy, 4-464, 4-465, 4-467, 4-472 Gifford, Ian, 4-456, 4-464, 4-467 Godaire, Jeanne, 3-195, 3-205 Gonzalez, Victor M., 1-190, 2-50, 3-94, 3-198, 3-223, 3-316, 3-347, 3-348, 3-349, 3-350, 4-56, 4-91, 4-95, 4-97 Gupta, A., 4-287 Hall, Brian, 4-227 Hamburger, Kenneth, 5-490 Hamdi. Y, 4-315 Han, Kun-Yeun, 4-328

Harden, Tessa, 2-224, 3-163, 3-194, 3-199, 3-226, 4-242, 4-243, 4-252, 4-253, 4-255, 4-256, 4-258 Hartford, Des, 4-470 Hockaday, William, 3-5, 3-195, 3-209 Holman, Katie, 1-63, 2-148, 3-70 Huffman, George J., 4-98, 4-156, 4-158, 4-160. 4-161 Ishida, Kei, 1-86, 2-98 Jasim-Hanif, Sharon, 3-335, 3-348 Jawdy, Curt, 2-375, 2-396, 2-400, 4-272 Kanney, Joseph, 1-7, 2-38, 2-266, 2-367, 2-407, 3-11, 3-94, 3-193, 3-316, 3-348, 3-349. 3-369. 3-380. 4-12. 4-33. 4-91. 4-242, 4-256, 4-306, 4-307, 4-309, 4-310, 4-329, 4-363, 4-374, 4-421, 4-423, 4-455, 4-456, 4-464, 4-465, 4-473, 5-490 Kao, Shih-Chieh, 3-197, 3-198, 3-213, 3-219, 4-111, 4-142, 4-156, 4-157, 4-160, 4-312, 4-320 Kappel, Bill, 3-41, 3-69 Kavvas, M. Levent, 1-86, 2-98, 3-42, 3-69 Keeney, David, 1-63, 2-148, 3-70 Keith, Mackenzie, 3-163, 4-243 Kelson, Keith, 3-192, 4-208, 4-227, 4-252, 4-253, 4-255, 4-256, 4-257, 4-259 Kiang, Julie, 2-184, 3-116 Kim, Beomjin, 4-328 Kim, Minkyu, 4-328 Klinger, Ralph, 3-195, 3-205 Kohn, Nancy, 1-220 Kolars, Kelsey, 3-116 Kovach, Robin, 4-364 Kunkel, Kenneth, 4-329, 4-376, 4-378 Kvarfordt, Kellie, 1-238, 2-177, 3-149 Lehman, Will, 4-162, 4-252, 4-253, 4-254, 4-255, 4-257, 4-258, 4-260, 4-306, 4-307, 4-308, 4-309, 4-311 Leone, David, 4-80 Leung, Ruby, 1-50, 2-85, 3-29, 3-115, 4-349, 4-363, 4-374, 4-375 Lim, Young-Kwon, 4-364, 4-374 Lin, L., 4-287 Littlejohn, Jennene, 5-490 Lombardi, Rachel, 3-209 Ma, Zhegang, 1-250, 2-284, 3-199, 3-223, 3-360 Mahoney, Kelly, 3-68, 3-69 McCann, Marty, 3-40, 3-388 Melby, Jeffrey, 1-190, 2-50 Meyer, Philip, 1-129, 2-303, 4-261

Miller, Andrew, 4-423, 4-464, 4-467, 4-468, 4-469, 4-471, 4-472, 4-474 Miller, Gabriel, 3-339, 3-345, 3-346 Mitman, Jeffrey, 1-36 Mohammadi, Somaveh, 4-312 Molod, Andrea, 4-364 Montanari, N, 4-287 Mouhous-Voyneau, N., 4-315 Mure-Ravaud, Mathieu, 1-86, 2-98, 3-42 Muto, Matthew, 4-323 Nadal-Caraballo, Norberto, 1-190, 2-50, 2-370, 2-399, 3-94, 3-198, 3-223, 3-316, 4-56, 4-91, 4-94, 4-95, 4-96, 4-97 Nakoski, John, 4-1, 4-28 Neff. Keil. 2-199. 3-135 Nicholson, Thomas, 3-347, 3-349, 3-369, 4-261, 4-306, 5-490 Novembre, Nicole, 4-323 O'Connor, Jim, 2-224, 3-163, 4-242, 4-243 Ott, William, 1-5, 5-490 Pawson, Steven, 4-364 Pearce, Justin, 4-227 Perica, Sanja, 2-367, 2-399, 2-400 Pheulpin, Lucie, 4-195, 4-320 Philip, Jacob, 1-261, 2-38, 2-407, 3-11, 3-380, 4-12, 4-419, 4-421, 4-422, 5-490 Pimentel, Frances, 3-354 Prasad, Rajiv, 1-50, 1-129, 1-147, 1-220, 2-85, 2-303, 2-349, 2-365, 3-29, 3-192, 3-193, 3-240, 3-304, 3-315, 4-261, 4-306, 4-307, 4-349, 4-363 Prasad, Rajiv, 2-267 Prescott, Steven, 2-284, 3-194, 3-199, 3-223, 4-287 Quinlan, Kevin, 4-156, 4-162, 4-374, 4-377, 5-490 Ramos-Santiago, Efrain, 3-198, 3-223 Randelovic, Marko, 4-23, 4-72, 4-384, 4-386, 4-423, 5-490 Randelovic, Marko, 4-378 Rebour, Vincent, 2-391, 2-399, 4-195 Reisi-Fard, Mehdi, 2-22, 3-227, 5-490 Ryan. E., 4-287 Ryberg, Karen, 3-116, 3-192, 3-194 Salisbury, Michael, 4-72, 4-91, 4-96 Salley, MarkHenry, 5-490 Sampath, Ramprasad, 2-284, 3-199, 3-223, 4-287 Schaefer, Mel, 4-114, 4-117, 4-125, 4-156, 4-158, 4-159, 4-160, 4-161, 4-286

Schneider, Ray, 2-30, 3-350, 3-362, 3-371, 4-374, 4-375, 4-377, 4-378, 4-384, 4-385, 4-386, 4-419, 4-446, 4-464, 4-466, 4-469, 4-471, 4-472 Schubert, Sigfried, 4-364 Sergent, P., 4-315 Shaun Carney, 4-310 Siu, Nathan, 3-257, 3-367, 3-369, 3-370, 3-372, 4-456 Skahill, Brian, 1-166, 2-334, 2-396, 2-397, 2-399, 2-400, 3-195, 3-200, 3-295, 4-206 Smith, Brennan, 3-197, 3-213 Smith, Curtis, 1-238, 1-250, 2-177, 2-284, 2-387, 2-397, 2-398, 3-149, 3-199, 3-223 Stapleton, Daniel, 4-80 Stewart, Kevin, 4-315 Stewart, Lance, 3-5, 3-195, 3-209 Stinchcomb, Gary, 3-5, 3-179, 3-195, 3-209 Taflanidis, Alexandros, 4-56 Taylor, Arthur, 4-33, 4-91, 4-93, 4-95, 4-96, 4-97 Taylor, Scott, 2-267, 3-240 Thaggard, Mark, 5-490 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Therrell, Matthew, 3-209 Tiruneh, Nebiyu, 3-116, 5-490 Vail, Lance, 1-50, 1-129, 2-85 Verdin, Andrew, 2-148, 3-70 Vuyovich, Carrie, 3-295 Wahl, Tony, 1-206, 3-258, 4-398, 4-419 Wang, Bin, 4-80, 4-91, 4-94, 4-96, 4-97 Wang, Zeechung (Gary), 4-456 Ward, Katie, 4-323 Watson, David, 3-197, 3-213, 4-111, 4-320 Weber, Mike, 2-1, 2-7, 3-1, 3-9, 5-490 Weglian, John, 2-46, 2-75, 2-165, 2-213, 2-243, 2-318, 2-402, 3-20, 3-109, 3-191, 3-192, 3-193, 3-234, 3-250, 3-295, 3-357, 3-369, 3-370, 3-373, 3-374, 3-375, 5-490 Wille, Kurt, 3-195, 3-205 Wright, Joseph, 1-174, 2-199, 3-135, 3-345, 3-346, 3-347, 3-372, 3-373 Yegorova, Elena, 2-38, 2-407, 3-11, 3-29, 3-380, 4-12, 4-98, 4-156, 5-490 Ziebell, David, 2-243, 3-234

## APPENDIX C: INDEX OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

AECOM, 4-485, 4-486 Agricultural Research Service - USDA, xxxiv ARS, xxxi, xxxiv Alden Research Laboratory, 3-393, 4-480 Amec Foster Wheeler, 2-419, 3-392 American Polywater Corporation, 4-479, 4-484 Appendix R Solutions, Inc., 3-391 Applied Weather Associates, 3-41, 3-345, 3-394, 4-481, 4-482 Aterra Solutions, 2-3, 2-30, 2-419, 2-422, 3-391, 4-478, 4-483 Atkins, 2-420, 3-392, 4-2, 4-3, 4-72, 4-91, 4-479, 4-485 Battelle, Columbus, Ohio, 1-220, 2-5, 2-267, 3-6, 3-240, 3-395, 4-482 BCO, 1-4, 1-220 Baylor University, 3-5, 3-195, 3-209 BC Hydro, 4-481 Bechtel Corporation, 3-396, 3-397, 4-478, 4-482, 4-483, 4-485, 4-486 Bittner and Associates, 2-5, 2-267, 2-419, 3-6, 3-240 B&A, xii, 1-4, 1-220 Booz Allen Hamilton, 4-481 Brava Engineering, Inc., 4-6, 4-323 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, xiii, 3-394, 4-482 Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses SwRI. 3-392. 3-398 Centroid PIC, 2-5, 2-284, 3-5, 3-199, 3-223, 4-5, 4-287 Cerema, 4-6 Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory, xiii, 2-3, 2-6. 2-50. 2-334. 2-421. 2-423. 2-424. 3-4, 3-5, 3-94, 3-195, 3-198, 3-223, 3-393, 3-395, 3-397, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-56, 4-91, 4-206 Coppersmith Consulting, Inc, xii, 2-6, 2-349, 2-420, 3-6, 3-304, 3-392, 4-5, 4-261 CCI, xii, 1-3, 1-63, 1-129 Curtiss-Wright, 4-479 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 2-420 DNFSB. 4-485 **DEHC** Ingenieros Consultores, 4-483 Department of Defense, 2-302

Department of Energy, xv, 2-6, 2-387, 3-7, 3-335, 3-394, 3-395, 4-483 DOE, x, xv, xvii, xxii, xxvi, 2-397, 2-398, 3-348, 4-306, 4-309, 4-454, 4-481 Department of Health and Human Services, 3-392 Department of Homeland Security, 3-394, 3-396 Dewberry, 2-424, 3-397, 4-480, 4-485, 4-486 Dominion Energy, 4-486 Duke Energy, 2-422, 2-424, 3-395, 3-398, 4-487 Electric Power Research Institute, iii, xvi, 2-1, 2-425, 3-393, 4-1, 4-479 EPRI, iii, xvi, xxi, xxxii, xxxvii, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-37, 2-46, 2-75, 2-165, 2-213, 2-223, 2-243, 2-318, 2-333, 2-402, 2-407, 2-421, 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-20, 3-27, 3-28, 3-109, 3-115, 3-191, 3-193, 3-234, 3-238, 3-250, 3-257, 3-295, 3-315, 3-351, 3-357, 3-369, 3-370, 3-372, 3-374, 3-375, 3-392, 3-398, 4-2, 4-7, 4-8, 4-23, 4-72, 4-378, 4-379, 4-384, 4-423, 4-462, 4-484, 5-490 Électricité de France, xvi, xxxiii, 2-262, 3-232 EDF, xvi, 3-232, 3-233, 4-8, 4-226, 4-384, 4-385, 4-434, 4-464, 4-465, 4-477, 4-481 Enercon Services, Inc., 2-422, 4-480 Engineer Research and Development Center. xvi. 2-3. 2-6. 2-50. 2-334. 2-421. 2-423, 2-424, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-94, 3-195, 3-198, 3-200, 3-223, 3-295, 3-316, 3-393, 4-56 ERDC, xvi, 3-94, 4-56, 4-478, 4-480, 4-483. 4-484 Environment Canada and Climate Change, 4-483 Environmental Protection Agency, xvi, xxxii EPA, xvi, *4-260* Environmentalists Incorporated, 2-422, 2-424 Exelon, 4-477 Federal Emergency Management Agency, xvii. 2-50 FEMA, xvii, xxii, 2-50, 2-399, 3-349, 3-396, 4-91, 4-259, 4-260 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, xvii, 2-420, 2-421, 2-422, 3-7, 3-322, 3-393

FERC, xvii, 2-424, 3-347, 3-393, 3-395, 4-122, 4-480, 4-483 Finland Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, xxxii STUK, xxxii Fire Risk Management, xviii, 2-5, 2-256, 2-420, 3-6, 3-227, 3-392 FRM, xviii First Energy Solutions, 4-478 Fisher Engineering, Inc., 4-7, 4-386, 4-419, 4-477, 4-479 Framatome, Inc., 4-485 French Nuclear Safety Authority, xii, 4-482 George Mason University, 4-480 George Washington University, 4-5, 4-287, 4-306, 4-477 Global Modeling and Assimilation Office, xix, 4-7, 4-364, 4-482 Global Research for Safety, xix GRS, xix, 4-29, 4-486 Goddard Space Flight Center, xix, 4-7, 4-364, 4-481, 4-482 Earth Sciences Division, 4-7, 4-364 GSFC, xix, 4-3, 4-7, 4-98, 4-156, 4-374 GZA GeoEnvironmental Inc., xix, 2-422, 2-423, 2-424, 3-394, 3-395, 3-398, 4-3, 4-80, 4-91, 4-92, 4-482, 4-486 HDR, 3-393 Hydrologic Engineering Center, xv, xx, 2-399, 2-420, 3-5, 3-195, 3-200, 4-4, 4-252 HEC, xviii, xx, 4-4, 4-5, 4-162, 4-208, 4-306, 4-482 HydroMetriks, 3-393 I&C Engineering Associates, 4-477 Idaho National Laboratory, xxi, 1-220, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-177, 2-284, 2-387, 2-422, 2-424, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3-149, 3-199, 3-223, 3-360, 3-394, 3-395, 3-396, 3-397, 4-5, 4-287, 4-482, 4-484 INL, xxi, 1-4, 1-220, 1-238, 1-250, 2-177, 2-178, 2-284, 2-397, 2-398, 3-149, 3-150, 3-193, 3-198, 3-315, 4-384 Idaho State University, 4-5, 4-287 IIHR-Hydroscience & Engineering, 4-486 Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, xxii, 2-6, 2-391, 2-420, 4-6, 4-315, 4-320 IRSN, xxii, xxviii, 2-6, 2-391, 2-397, 2-399, 2-420, 2-423, 4-4, 4-195, 4-252, 4-479, 4-484

Institute for Water Resources - USACE, xx, xxii, 4-4, 4-162 IWR, xxii, 4-4, 4-5, 4-252, 4-306, 4-482 Instituto de Ingeniería, UNAM, 4-479, 4-482 INTERA Inc., 4-479, 4-481 International Atomic Energy Agency, xxi IAEA, xxi Jensen Hughes, 2-422, 3-395, 4-8, 4-423, 4-464, 4-483 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, xxii, 3-392, 3-394, 4-6, 4-328, 4-482 KAERI, xxii Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety, 4-481 Kyungpook National University, 4-6, 4-328, 4-481. 4-482 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 3-391 Lynker Technologies, 4-487 Meteorological Development Lab, xxiv, 4-33 MDL, xxiv, 4-33, 4-480, 4-486 MetStat, Inc., xxxi, 2-419, 2-421, 2-423, 3-391, 3-395, 3-396, 4-6, 4-323, 4-477, 4-484, 4-487 MGS Engineering Consultants, 2-401, 2-424, 4-3, 4-6, 4-125, 4-156, 4-323, 4-477, 4-485 Michael Baker International, 2-424, 4-486 Murray State University, 3-4, 3-5, 3-179, 3-195, 3-196, 3-209, 3-397 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, xxv NASA, xviii, xix, xxv, 4-3, 4-7, 4-98, 4-156, 4-374, 4-481, 4-482 National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service NESDIS, xxvi, 4-485 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 3-394, 3-396 NGA, 3-392, 3-396 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, xxvi, 2-6, 2-165, 2-367, 4-142 NOAA, xiv, xvi, xviii, xx, xxi, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxix, 2-165, 2-176, 2-178, 2-198, 2-399, 2-400, 2-401, 2-421, 2-423, 3-150, 3-348, 3-395, 3-396, 4-125, 4-142, 4-158, 4-311, 4-376, 4-480, 4-481, 4-483, 4-485, 4-486 National Weather Service, xiv, xv, xvii, xxvi, 2-6, 2-99, 2-367, 3-42, 3-239, 4-2, 4-3,

4-33, 4-91, 4-92, 4-472

NWS, xiii, xx, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxxi, 2-99, 2-165, 2-256, 2-399, 2-400, 2-421, 2-423, 3-396, 4-2, 4-33, 4-34, 4-480, 4-481, 4-486 Natural Resources Conservation Service NRCS, xxvi, xxviii, xxxv, 3-393, 3-394 Naval Postgraduate School, 4-480 NIST, 3-395 North Carolina State University, 4-5, 4-7, 4-287, 4-329, 4-482 Nuclear Energy Agency, xxv, 4-1, 4-2, 4-28 NEA, xxv Nuclear Energy Institute, xxvi, 3-7 NEI, xxvi, 2-333, 3-354, 3-369, 3-370, 3-374, 3-391, 3-396, 4-464, 4-473, 4-484 NuScale Power, 4-487 Nuvia USA, 3-391 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, xxvii, 2-424, 3-5, 3-198, 3-219, 3-392, 3-394, 3-397, 3-398, 4-6, 4-312, 4-315, 4-320, 4-479, 4-482 ORNL, xxvii, 3-5, 3-197, 3-213, 4-3, 4-111, 4-142, 4-156, 4-160 Oklo Inc., 4-484 Oregon Water Science Center - USGS, 2-224, 2-421, 3-5, 3-199, 3-226 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, xxviii, 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-85, 2-267, 2-303, 2-349, 2-419, 2-420, 2-422, 2-423, 3-3, 3-6, 3-29, 3-240, 3-304, 3-395, 3-396, 4-5, 4-7, 4-261, 4-306, 4-349, 4-374, 4-478, 4-482, 4-484 PNNL, xxviii, 1-3, 1-4, 1-50, 1-63, 1-129, 1-147, 1-220, 3-192, 3-193, 3-240, 4-307 Parsons, 4-480, 4-485 Penn State University, 4-483 PG&E, 4-484 PRISM Climate Group at Oregon State University, xxviii RAC Engineers and Economists, LLC, 3-391 **River Engineering & Urban Drainage** Research Centre, 4-482 RTI International, 3-346, 3-391, 3-392, 4-5, 4-272, 4-306, 4-478 Sargent & Lundy, 2-423, 4-485 Schnabel Engineering, 4-480 Science Systems and Applications, Inc., 4-7, 4-364 Secretariat of Nuclear Regulation Authority, 4-481

SEPI, Inc., 4-487

Sorbonne University—Université de

Technologie de Compiègne, 4-6, 4-315

Southern California Edison, 4-6, 4-323 Southern Nuclear, 3-397, 4-485

Southwest Research Institute, 2-420, 2-425,

3-398, 4-479

- Taylor Engineering, 2-419, 3-391, 4-3, *4-91*, 4-478
- Technical Services Center USBR, 2-4, 2-148, 2-199, 2-423, 2-424, 2-425, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-70, 3-135, 3-195, 3-395

Tennessee Valley Authority, xxxiii, 2-6, 2-375, 2-419, 2-421, 2-422, 3-339, 3-391, 3-395, 3-397, 4-5, *4*-272, 4-478

- TVA, xxxiii, 2-223, 2-316, 2-396, 2-400, 2-401, 3-191, 3-345, 3-346, 3-397, 4-5, 4-121, 4-125, 4-142, 4-156, 4-157, 4-159, 4-251, 4-252, 4-272, 4-286, 4-307, 4-308, 4-310
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, xiii, xvi, xxxiv, 1-147, 2-3, 2-6, 2-420, 2-421, 2-422, 2-423, 2-424, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-195, 3-198, 3-200, 3-223, 3-295, 3-316, 3-319, 3-393, 4-2, 4-56, 4-113, 4-307, 4-482, 4-483, 4-484
  - COE, xiii, xxxiv
  - Corps, xiii, xxxiv, 2-50, 2-334, 2-370, 3-347, 3-348, 3-349, 3-372, 3-373, 4-91, 4-156, 4-159, 4-160, 4-259, 4-260, 4-307, 4-309, 4-311, 4-470, 4-482, 4-483, 4-484
  - Dam Safety Production Center, 4-208
  - Galveston District, 4-3, 4-112, 4-478
  - RMC, Risk Management Center, xxx, 2-420, 3-7, 3-319, 3-347, 3-348, 3-349, 3-393, 4-3, 4-4, 4-112, 4-156, 4-206, 4-208, 4-227, 4-252, 4-308, 4-479
  - Sacramento Dam Safety Protection Center, xv, 3-394, 4-4, 4-227, 4-252
  - USACE, xiii, xvi, xvi, xx, xxii, xxv, xxx, xxxiii, xxxiv, 1-4, 1-147, 1-166, 1-190, 2-50, 2-199, 2-396, 2-397, 2-398, 2-399, 2-400, 2-401, 3-68, 3-347, 3-348, 3-349, 3-350, 3-372, 3-373, 3-397, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-91, 4-97, 4-112, 4-125, 4-156, 4-4, 4-5, 4-206, 4-208, 4-227, 4-228, 4-252, 4-306, 4-478, 4-479, 4-480, 4-482, 4-483, 4-484
- U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, xii, xvii, xxxii, xxxii, xxxiv, 1-3, 1-63, 2-4, 2-148, 2-199, 2-

421, 2-423, 2-424, 2-425, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-70, 3-135, 3-136, 3-149, 3-192, 3-195, 3-205, 3-258, 3-345, 3-346, 3-347, 3-348, 3-350, 3-372, 3-373, 3-393, 3-394, 3-395, 3-397, 3-398, 4-7, 4-114, 4-117, 4-242, 4-254, 4-259, 4-363, 4-398, 4-419, 4-470, 4-483, 4-486 USBR, xvii, xxv, xxxii, xxxiv, 1-3, 1-4, 1-63, 1-147, 1-174, 1-206, 2-213, 2-241, 2-396, 2-400, 3-192, 3-398, 4-125 U.S. Department of Agriculture, xxxiv USDA, xxxi, xxxiv, xxxv, 3-393 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, xxxiv USFWS. xxxiv U.S. Geological Survey, xxxiv, 2-4, 2-178, 2-184, 2-419, 2-421, 2-423, 3-4, 3-5, 3-116, 3-117, 3-163, 3-199, 3-226, 3-391, 3-393, 3-394, 3-395, 3-396, 4-4, 4-206, 4-243, 4-252, 4-259, 4-477, 4-481, 4-482, 4-483 USGS, xxi, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiv, xxxv, 1-4, 1-147, 1-174, 2-5, 2-178, 2-184, 2-198, 2-224, 3-150, 3-162, 3-192, 3-194, 3-196, 3-348, 3-394, 4-242, 4-256, 4-258, 4-259 UNC Chapel Hill, 4-477 University of Alabama, 3-4, 3-5, 3-179, 3-190, 3-195, 3-196, 3-209, 3-392, 3-395 University of California U.C. Davis, xxi, 1-3, 1-63, 1-86, 2-4, 2-98, 2-422, 2-423, 3-3, 3-42, 3-392, 3-395 University of Costa Rica, 4-483 University of Maryland, xxxiv, 3-5, 3-197, 3-226, 3-391, 4-6, 4-8, 4-312, 4-315, 4-435, 4-464, 4-477, 4-478, 4-483 US Global Change Research Program, 4-477 Utah State University, 2-396, 3-391 Virginia Tech, 2-422 Weather & Water, Inc., 4-6, 4-323 WEST Consultants, 4-479 Western Universiity, 4-486 Westinghouse, 2-3, 2-30, 2-424, 3-7, 3-350, 3-362, 3-371, 3-397, 4-7, 4-8, 4-378, 4-419, 4-446, 4-464, 4-485 Wood, 2-149, 3-391, 5-490 World Meteorological Organization WMO, xxxv, 4-376 Zachry Nuclear Engineering, 4-484