

8 Oceanwood Drive  
Duxbury, Ma. 02332  
June 15, 1993

Mr. James Taylor  
E.D.O.  
USNRC  
Washington D.C. 20555

Dear Jim,

Enclosed is a copy of the information I presented to the SALP Committee, June 10, 1993. Two points I would like to identify.

First, this is not Jane's opinion vs. The NRC's opinion. As you can see my documentation is of areas that have already been identified and developed by the NRC or identified by FEMA and concurred with by the NRC. The problem appears to be within the NRC process. Although all the problems had been identified by the NRC at different times it appears that no one collects all pertinent data related to one issue, analyses that data, and then properly assesses the effect it will have on planning.

The original problem with this issue seems to have been initiated by the NRC evaluators. Those onsite and in the EOF did not fully identify the myriad of problems that were presenting themselves. This seems to be either a lack of training in the evaluators background or a deliberate overlooking of flaws. I hope you ascertain what the problem is and fix it.

The second area not properly evaluated by the NRC was the EOC. This area is essential for the NRC to observe. This is where the Protective Action is determined and issued from. It is essential that the NRC be present in this location to ascertain; first, the information was properly and completely transmitted by the utility; and second; that the State properly received, analysed, and then developed the utility information into the correct protective action.

SECOND, The Chairman's office and the EDO's office has promised me that corrective actions will be taken if they are deemed necessary. I am confident that the information provided to the SALP Committee and now to you defines the weakness that have been overlooked, and determines that corrective actions are needed to assure Public Health and Safety. When the wrong Protective Action is developed and issued because the utility failed to develop a complete and timely PAR, the need for corrective action is strongly indicated.


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I appreciate the time you have given to this issue and look forward to hearing from you regarding the corrective actions planned for both the NRC evaluators as well as the Utility and other organizations that failed to properly perform their planning functions. I remind you that this is just one aspect of planning that has no substance behind the reams of paper Edison refers to as planning, the other areas off-site has even less substance. (If less than this is possible) Until the NRC does its job, identifying and properly assessing the problems in planning; We, the public do not and will not have planning.

Sincerely,

  
Jane A Fleming

8 Oceanwood Dr  
Duxbury, Ma. 02332  
June 10, 1993

RE. Pilgrim SALP 1993

I appreciate the opportunity to address the SALP board on these issues, but as you know I feel strongly that the Emergency Planning weaknesses we are about to discuss, should have been part of the NRC Initial SALP report. It is my hope that these issues, which have already identified and developed by the NRC, will now be properly assessed for the significant impact they have had on the lack of effectiveness of Emergency Preparedness. Further these issues once properly assessed for their significance should be identified in the Final SALP. Corrective Action should be initiated by the NRC and proper follow up to assure that the corrective actions have been addressed by the utility.

What weaknesses? Through a review of NRC documentation and FEMA evaluation, the areas of weakness that were identified and developed but their significance not properly assessed were:

1. The utility;
  - Issued incomplete and inaccurate notification forms,
  - Did not issue notification in a timely manner
  - Did not use the proper communication vehicles
  - Did not issue a PAR thru the proper planning channels.
2. The EOF aka Good Ol' Boys Club
  - Accepted hearsay rather than planning notification forms
  - Passed on hearsay to the EOC
  - Did not post information on status board
  - Knowingly accepted and passed on PAR information from unofficial channels.
3. The EOC
  - Accepted hearsay
  - Due to incomplete, inaccurate, and untimely information received developed and issued the  
WRONG PROTECTIVE ACTION

AND THE NRC FOUND THIS AREA AN EXERCISE STRENGTH

WHY

We will now address these issues and hopefully come to the conclusion that this area was indeed a myriad of weaknesses. The Final SALP hopefully will properly address these issue. The necessary corrective action will be taken and the SALP category will be changed to reflect the true characterization of Emergency Planning.

Jane A. Fleming

## Problems Areas.

### I. Notification

"Prompt notification of offsite authorities is intended to indicate within about 15 minutes for the unusual event class and sooner (consistent with the need for other emergency actions) for other classes. The time is measured from the time at which the operators recognize that events have occurred which make declaration of an emergency class appropriate."

(NUREG 0654 Appendix 1-3 BASIS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES)

#### 1. Timely notification of unusual event.

"The NOUE was received by Troop D at 0823. Following their procedures, the State EOC called Troop D at 0837, and verified that Troop D had completed all necessary notifications, including the notification of MDPH. However it was later determined that Troop D did not notify MDPH of the NOUE until 0856." (FEMA's Exercise Report page 12)

This is a 33 minute notification, 18 minutes beyond the required 15 minute notification time. MDPH is the...  
"Commonwealth officials (who) are to determine and implement appropriate Protective Actions." (FEMA Ex. Report pg. 10.)

Why did this initial delay occur? Why doesn't the Utility have direct communication with the ... "officials (who) are to determine and Implement the protective Action" Doesn't this indicate that Troop D's training did not identify the importance of MDPH role in planning. I would assume MDPH should be first notified or perhaps second only to MEMA. Is their no prioritizing in the notification? If not there should be.

Page 26. of the FEMA Ex. Report states: "No communication delays or problems were observed during the exercise."  
Interesting statement... would anyone care to explain it?

Where were the NRC evaluators to determine that the on-site information was properly and in a timely manner disseminated off-site?

#### 2. Timely Notification of General Emergency

According to the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM the event was upgraded to General Emergency at 13:27 notification was initiated at 13:40. 13 minutes

According to the FEMA Ex. Report. "The State EOF staff informed the State EOC of the GE ECL declaration at 13:28. However, the utility was somewhat slow in developing an off-site PAR at the GE ECL. As a result the MEMA/MDPH EOF staff formulated their own PAR and sent it to the State EOC and the AREA II EOC. However, the MEMA Director at the State EOC met with his key staff and decided to request that the State EOF staff obtain a utility PAR. Shortly thereafter, the State EOF reported that the utility had developed a PAR at 13:44."

The time discrepancies are fascinating here. As well as the fact this account is nowhere near the account Nancy Ridley reported to me. I request a clarification of the time discrepancies. Clarification of the delay in the notification of the State of the upgraded status. 13:27 to 13:44 is 17 minutes.

According to the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM notification of the upgraded to GE status was initiated at 13:40. How did the State EOF have this at 13:28? Shortly there after, the the State reported the the utility had developed a PAR at 13:44.

The term developed and notification do not connote the same meaning. Whether the utility developed the PAR or Notification of the PAR was received must be clarified.

The Utility supposedly developed the PAR between 13:27 and 13:40 when notification was initiated. The EOF stated the PAR was developed at 13:44. If so it was late. That should have been recorded by evaluators. Remember, above NUREG 0654 states that notification of levels above unusual Event should be sooner than 15 minutes, not 17 minutes. Later it will be developed that the EOF never received the PAR through proper communication channels. Never is certainly a violation of the 15 minute guide. NEVER is not SOMEWHAT LATE!

No matter what the time sequence was or what information was developed or not developed ; the Director of MEMA should not have to request the PAR from the Utility. This is an obvious failure on the part of the Utility. Again the NRC evaluators did not observe this. Why?

One rationale presented to me was, because, they did not have primary meteorological data, the utility was delayed in there development of a PAR. Again according to the PRIMARY NOTIFICATION FORM the lack of meteorological data was determined at 13:15. 18 minutes before they declared GE and 25 minutes before they initiated notification. Or, 29 minutes before FEMA's Ex. report states they developed a PAR. The initial notification form requests Meteorological Data, it does not indicate primary source or secondary source, it appears that within the 18 minutes, 25 minutes or 29 minutes the utility had sufficient time to obtain secondary meteorological data and include this data in the Initial Notification Form.

Why was it that the Director of MEMA had to request a PAR from the Utility? Why was it the meteorological Data was not completed on the form and why wasn't the PAR completed on page one of the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM?

This indicates not only a problem of timeliness for the Utility but procedural or training problems as well.

No matter which story of actual time sequence one believes the bottom line is the EOC Staff formed their own PAR and sent it to the EOF as well as AREA II EOF. That original PAR developed by the State was incorrect. The reason for the incorrect PAR was either the Utility was slow (17 minutes=a violation) or the Utility's Initial Notification Form sent to the States MEMA/FEMA EOC was incomplete. Nancy Ridley who developed the incorrect PAR only received the first page of the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM. That first page did not include Boston Edison's Protective Action Recommendation nor did it include the meteorological data. Without that information the State could not possibly determine and implement a proper Protective Action. Blaming the error on the "State Trainee" as the NRC is now attempting to characterize Nancy Ridley, does not hold up. Nancy couldn't develop the proper information she was not provided with the complete information by the utility. If Jerry Parker was the official actually in charge of the development of the Protective Action, As Bob Gregor of the EDO's office inferred, why didn't he step in and direct Nancy rather than the paid BECo exercise official. Parker has years of experience in this area.

The utility is at fault here either due to untimeliness or incomplete information. The action of the Director of MEMA requesting the PAR from the Utility supports the position that the root cause of the problem was the utility. The NRC observers or investigators did not seem to have observed these problems. Why??

The NRC finds no weakness. WHY?

#### EXERCISE WEAKNESSES

"An exercise weakness is a matter that could preclude, in an area observed, effective Emergency Plan implementation in an actual emergency. An exercise weakness is not, of itself, an overall response inadequacy, but does require correction under 10CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.5."

Explain why these events do not represent an exercise weakness? "Effective Emergency Plan implementation" The state developed the wrong Protective Action because the Utilities information was either untimely or incomplete. This in my mind precludes effective Emergency Plan implementation.

The NRC found this area an Exercise Strength. Why?

### What did the NRC observers find?

According to the the NRC's Emergency Preparedness Program and Exercise Inspection 50-293/91-28

"No violations or exercise weakness were identified."

#### "2.3 Activities Observed

During the exercise, NRC team members made observations of the notification and augmentation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

1. Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events;
2. Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
3. Notification of licensee personnel and offsite Agencies;
4. Communications, information flow, and record keeping;
5. Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose, consideration of protective actions, and recommendation of protective action to state officials;"

6-10 not pertinent at this time.

As a refresher, from the same NRC exercise report:

#### "3.0 Classification of Exercise Findings

##### Exercise Strengths

Exercise strengths provide strong positive indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.

##### Exercise Weaknesses

An exercise weakness is a matter that could preclude, in the area observed, effective Emergency Plan implementation in an actual emergency. An exercise weakness is not of itself, an overall response of inadequacy, but does require correction under 10CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV,F.5.

##### Areas for Improvement

An area for improvement is an area which did not have significant negative impact on exercise performance. However, it should be evaluated by the licensee to determine if corrective action could improve performance."

"4.0 Exercise Observations  
4.1 Control Room .....  
No exercise weakness identified"

BUT

"After the Unusual Event was declared and prior to activation of emergency response facilities, additional personnel were not immediately available to carry out in-plant assignments made by the Nuclear Operations Supervisor (NOS)"

Why not? According to NUREG 0654 Table B-1 Minimum Staffing for NRC Licensees for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies the vast majority of these positions are on shift personnel. Where were they?

Staging the control room portion of this in the NOS's office certainly was not realistic.

"4.4 Emergency Operations Facility....

The following areas were identified as exercise strengths:

Performance by key members of EOF support groups was very effective. This included response actions in engineering and technical assessment, radiation protection, dose assessment, and administration.

Review of expected protective Action Recommendations (PARS) and related information with the offsite impact was continuously discussed with the Massachusetts staff who were present in the EOF."

Unfortunately while the boys were chatting about what they were expecting (the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM) and passing on hearsay that there was a General Emergency to the States MEMA/MDPH EOC 17 minutes before the incomplete INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM was developed. This resulted in the MEMA/MDPH EOC issuing an inaccurate Protective Action.

It is nice that the offsite impact was "continuously discussed" in the EOF, it would have been far more effective if the personnel in the EOF and especially the personnel in the EOC, had had timely and complete information from the utility following the plan. It also would be far more effective if the EOF personnel, Bob Hallissey had the sense to convey the accurate weather information and the Utility PAR to the EOC. That is, after Director Rodham did finally request and receive this information, at 13:44 or later. Remember the FEMA Ex. Report states the EOF was aware the utility developed a PAR at 13:44 it did not state they received the official notification at that time. The MEMA/MDPH EOC is the official state organization that must determine and implement the Protective Action. Not the EOF. Planning should reflect that as a secondary verification the EOF should communication with the EOC and verify the

receiving of all official notification pertinent to the EOC determination and implementation of a Protective Action. This action should be a secondary verification, the utility should send official notification that is both timely and complete to the EOC (the commonwealth official (who) are to determine and implement a protective action.

The EOF sounds like another "Good old Boy Meeting" Everyone chatted about what they were expecting, but didn't receive thru proper communication channels. They all impressed one another and obviously the NRC inspectors with their glib knowledge of the situation. They passed on hearsay or verbal knowledge that a General Emergency had been called, seventeen minutes before the Utility developed a PAR. That hearsay resulted in the MEMA/MDPH EOC attempting to determine a Protective Action. The Protective Action the EOC did issue was inaccurate. The only one out of the group who seem to have any common sense was Dave Rodham Director of MEMA who finally, requested the Utility to develop a PAR. but, that was after an inaccurate Protective Action was issued by the MEMA/MDPH EOC.

AND THE NRC INSPECTORS FOUND THIS AREA AN EXERCISE STRENGTH

WHY? WHY? WHY?

If this is not an exercise weakness, "A matter that could preclude, in an area observed, effective emergency plan implementation in an actual emergency."

The wrong Protective Action was issued, if that was not "a matter that would preclude effective emergency plan implementation" I can't imagine many things that would preclude effective Emergency Plan implementation.

How and why did this happen? According to the "Official FEMA and NRC evaluations, Lack of timely development of the utilities PAR, incomplete information (no met data no PAR) on the Utilities Initial Notification Form and unofficial hearsay being passed from the EOF to the EOC. If the plans had been properly implemented and adhered to this would not have happened.

AND THE NRC INSPECTOR FOUND THIS AREA AN EXERCISE STRENGTH

WHY why WHY ???

And then what happened. Following the FEMA Pub Meeting I entered into discussion with Nancy Ridley The MEMA/MDPH EOC official in charge of determining and implementing a Protective Action. Nancy's version of events differ considerably from the FEMA or NRC reports. (See Apr.2,1993 Letter to David Williams pgs. 5-8 Attached)

As stated following my discussion with Nancy Ridley, I called Jim Taylor EDO. At Jim's request I explained my concerns to Ebe Mc Cabe. Ebe then researched this area and developed an extensive understanding of the problem that occurred in this area of the exercise.

Ebe and I stayed in close communication during this time and I was kept up to speed on the development of this issue. Tim Martin also, in the communication loop was helpful in adding additionally to my knowledge. It was Tim who sent along the Initial notification Form.

What was learned in this process:

1. The initial notification form of the upgrade to GE sent to the EOC did not include weather data nor a utility PAR.

Initial Notification Form

2. "It was indicated the the State (EOC) was provided scenario weather by an exercise controller..." As Nancy indicated.

NRC Inspection report No.50-293/92-04 pg9

3. "NRC follow-up found no specific transmission of scenario weather to the State. NRC INS REP pg 9

4. "The backup meteorological tower data (scenario wind speed and wind direction) were available in the EOF, but were not included on the notification form transmitted to the EOC."

NRC INSP REP pg 9

? If there was no specific transmission of scenario weather transmitted to the state, see 3, how did the EOF obtain the weather data? The good ol'boys club. Why didn't the utility follow planning procedures for proper notification?

5. "NRC discussion with the licensee emergency preparedness personnel confirmed the backup (scenario) weather information on data sheets for entry onto EOF status boards.

However, no record or specific recollection of posting of that information on the status boards or of communication of that information to the Commonwealth responders was provided."

NRC INSP REP pgs 9-10

Obviously, Planning procedures of proper notification by the utility nor the EOF were followed. The basic essence of planning ; the proper notification of State official of the Utilities PAR and supporting weather data, did not adhere to planning procedures nor did the utility comport with NUREG 0654 E. 1.,2.,3.,4.g.,1..

And THE NRC INSPECTOR FOUND THIS AREA AN EXERCISE STRENGTH

WHY, WHY WHY?

The information developed by Ebe McCabe portrayed in the NRC Insp Rep states further that:

"The licensee expressed the following intentions."

"..To include back up meteorological data on the notification forms when primary meteorological tower data is not available"

(What about including the PAR as well, see INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM)

"..To further discuss EOF information sources with the responders, and to provide a written description of those sources for the responders information folders."

This has to be a JOKE. Ebe clearly determined that the Utility did not follow planning procedures. The utility did not use the proper communication channel. The utility did not communicate the proper information on the proper notification forms. The Utility violated the above mentioned section of NUREG 0654. The EOF received information knowingly from incorrect sources and the NRC agrees they should PUT A WRITTEN REPORT IN THEIR FOLDERS.

tch,tch tch, obviously this is not the appropriate action. What is the appropriate action? Why didn't the NRC properly address this problem and demand corrective actions as well as retraining of both utility and state officials.

And the NRC INSPECTORS FOUND THIS AREA AN EXERCISE STRENGTH

WHY why why ?

Further information gained from Ebe McCabe's investigation into this area. In EBE's June 19, 1992 letter to me he states "also, the licensee had changed their notification form to better insure that such data would be provided even if the primary meteorological tower inputs were unavailable."

Great but what about inclusion of the PAR on the notification form, no mention of that.

The letter goes on to state: "...there is licensee, NRC, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts staff development and assessment of protective action recommendations."

Did this include training the utility to use the proper notification forms, and completely and accurately filling the forms out? Did it include training the utility to use the proper Plan designated means of communication? Did this train the state to accept information only from the proper plan designated form and communication. Did this train the

Utility and the State Official in the EOF to give up the Good Ol' Boy Method of communicating the most essential emergency planning information?

The letter goes on to state the NRC recognizes my concern about variability of coastal winds and the use of off-site (logon) data is less than accurate (totally not pertinent) but the utility will now assure us they will include on-site weather data in the future.

The letter goes on to say because the state finally produced the correct PAR there is no need for the NRC to initiate a separate review of off-site planning. The question is why hasn't the NRC initiate a thorough investigation into the on-site problems, as well as the NRC evaluators' assessment of this issue, reassess the information Ebe developed in his investigation of this area. Properly and clearly identify all problem areas and implement 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section IV.F.5, forcing the Utility to take proper corrective Actions.

Then the NRC can take the proper action against the Exercise Investigators, discipline, retrain or whatever the NRC does when they fail this miserably at their job. Next reassess the work Ebe did and determine the proper corrective action that should be taken there.

Then the NRC can investigate what went wrong off-site. BUT, get your focus correct the EOC did go to a back up weather source that would not be accurate, they did develop and issue an inaccurate Protective Action but the root cause of the EOC's problem was the Utilities' lack of complete and timely information. The NRC should direct its investigations to the EOF aka the GOOD OL' BOYS CLUB where everything was cosy and friendly and no planning procedures were followed.

But for right now the NRC can correct the FINAL SALP-- remove the misstatement-- no weaknesses were found. Insist the BECo take the proper corrective actions and then the NRC can put BECo's emergency planning into Category 3, where it belongs.