

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/93014(DRSS); 50-457/93014(DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-456; 50-457

Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Braidwood Station

Type of Inspection: Announced, Routine Physical Security Inspection

Inspection Dates: May 17-21, 1993

Inspector:

J. L. Belanger
J. L. Belanger

Senior Physical Security Inspector

6/7/93
Date

Approved By:

James R. Creed
James R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

6/8/93
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 17-21, 1993 (Reports No. 50-456/93014(DRSS); 50-457/93014(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced physical security inspection involving Management Support, Security Program Plans and Audits; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; and Alarm Stations and Communications.

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined except for one violation in the area of access control of vehicles:

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CONCLUSION

Certain vehicles were assigned to designated vehicle status, yet they routinely were assigned outside the protected area which is contrary to the definition of a designated vehicle. A lack of management oversight and inadequate procedural guidance characterized the licensee's designated vehicle program.

The licensee's newly upgraded security communications system was identified as a program strength. A weakness in the CCTV assessment of one alarm zone because of low lighting was identified.

Four observations were noted.

- Recent security force personnel layoffs have had a negative effect on morale.
- The quality of the x-ray machines barely met test standards and should be closely monitored by management.
- The recently assigned onsite Quality Verification auditor responsible for conducting field monitoring observations does not possess security experience; consequently, this may affect his ability to identify problem areas in the security program.
- The offsite Quality Verification audit program improved because of the comprehensive pre-audit checklist developed during the preparation phase and the security experience of the auditor assigned.

Protected and vital area physical barriers and their associated detection systems were maintained in an excellent condition. The quality of the CCTV assessment system continued to improve through an ongoing program to replace tube cameras with solid state cameras. Alarm station operations were excellent because of the knowledge and professionalism of the station operators, the quality of station equipment, and the maintenance of that equipment.