



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-2000

Robert A. Fenech
Vice President, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

May 27, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket No. 50-327

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNIT 1 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 -
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.7.12 SPECIAL REPORT 93-05

The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire barrier being nonfunctional for a period greater than the TS allowable timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS 3.7.12 Action Statement (a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Robert A. Fenech

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 93-05

Description of Event

On April 26, 1993, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 5, the fire barrier for the mechanical sleeve between 480-volt Shutdown Board Rooms 1B1 and 1B2 was breached. Temporary power cables were routed through the sleeve for emergency power to the polar crane during the core barrel lift. This was strictly a contingency action to provide an alternate power source for the polar crane during a critical lift in the unlikelyhood of an interruption of primary power.

Cause of Condition

The core barrel lift was performed, the temporary cables were removed, and an attempt was made to reestablish the fire barrier. However, the fire retardant sealant used in the mechanical sleeve to establish a fire barrier was not available. The barrier could not be returned to its normal condition within the technical specification (TS) allowable timeframe.

Corrective Action

In accordance with Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors inside the shutdown board rooms were verified operable; a roving fire watch was established and will be maintained until the fire barrier is reestablished as required by TSs.